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A bstract

In contrast to the Greek concept of prophecy as a form of prediction, Romantic
prophecy rehabilitates a version of Hebrew prophecy that involves a more ambivalent
relationship to history and time. That is, while the rise of prophecy in Romanticism
might—like the rise of historiography more broadly—seem to organize and contain
political and epistemological revolution, closer examination reveals that, in fact, this very
attempt at hyper-organization becomes necessary only because of a deep and pervasive
sense of historical discontinuity. Hence, while prophecy might aim to ameliorate
disorder, in fact it draws attention to and exacerbates this same disorder. This uncertainty
stems from a new sense of time as a detotalizing and structurally ironic phenomenon.
Hence, chapter one looks at Immanuel Kant’s ironic, non-predictive form of prophecy—
what he calls the Sign of History—as an example of how prophecy becomes the infinite
absolute negativity of history or the counter-science that displaces natural history through
a history of nature. Chapter two considers William Wordsworth’s claims to special poetic
election and his attempt to absorb trauma into historical and subjective Bildung. It turns
out that while Wordsworth seems to invite what Georges Bataille calls a general
economy of expenditure, in fact he restricts this energy in an effort to profit from
prophecy. Chapter three looks at Percy Shelley’s play, Hellas, for how the synthesizing
figures of prophecy—metaphor, memory, and history itself—are inverted and displaced
by the Wandering Jew. Chapter four, on William Blake’s Milton, re-conceptualizes the
preface as a mode of ambivalent prophecy and reads Milton’s ostensibly totalizing form
in light of the absolute preface’s workelessness. Finally, chapter five uses Ernst Bloch’s
concept of exodus to organize readings of Caroline Lamb’s Glenarvon and Mary
Shelley’s Valperga and The Last Man in terms of how female prophecy, specifically,
displaces forms of history that remain disabling for marginalized subjects. These works
all do this through some version of double negation that inaugurates a negative dialectic,
negating the present in an effort to open the future to a new concept of the future.
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Daylight failed
Insensibly, and round us gently fell
Composing darkness, with a quiet load
Of full contentment, in a little shed
Disturbed, uneasy in itself as seemed,
And wondering at its new inhabitants.

—William Wordsworth, “Home at Grasmere”
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In t r o d u c t io n

In his short essay “Surrealism: The Last Snapshot of the European Intelligentsia,”
Walter Benjamin credits Andre Breton as “the first to perceive the revolutionary energies
that appear in the ‘outmoded’” {Reflections 181). In the list of examples of such uncanny
objects—“the first iron constructions, the first factory buildings, the earliest photos, the
objects that have begun to be extinct, grand pianos, the dresses of five years ago,
fashionable restaurants when the vogue has begun to ebb from them” (181)—one might
include Romantic prophecy. For upon the moment of its post-Enlightenment rebirth,
prophecy seems already ‘old’ or appears, despite its vogue, as already a discredited form
of knowledge. As such, this project is oriented less by an enquiry into the epistemological
validity of the occult than by questions about the meaning of this strange form of
(re)appearance. If it is increasingly clear that it cannot accurately predict future events,
what—one might ask—is the function of prophecy in the Romantic period? That is, what
need does the prophetic mode attempt to satisfy? What catalyzes the rise in prophetic
writing and posturing in this period? What cultural, philosophical, or political factors
make prophecy so attractive to thinkers and the general public in the late eighteenth and
early nineteenth centuries that James Franks can, in his 1795 Memoirs o f Pretended
Prophets, who have Appeared in Different Ages o f the World, and Especially in Modern
Times, refer to his historical moment as infected with “prophecy-mania” (iii)?
These questions frame prophecy as a response to something in the political
unconscious that is not, itself, immediately apparent but toward which prophecy,
symptomatically, gestures. Specifically, what literary and historical analysis suggests is
that the elusive and troubling element that catalyses Romantic prophecy consists of a new
and particularly disconcerting sense of temporality. As outlined in chapter one, several
cultural and political factors coalesce throughout the eighteenth century, crystallizing in
the 1790s, to create a newly intensified sense of temporal discontinuity that ends up
spurring the reactive emergence new modes of rationalizing historiography by figures
such as Montesquieu, Gibbon, Hume, Voltaire, Herder, and William Robertson,1 amongst

1 Robertson’s description o f his methodology in his Preface to The History o f the Reign o f Charles V neatly
captures the orientation o f universalizing historiography: “While his [i.e., Charles V ’s] numerous
Biographers describe his personal qualities and actions; while the historians o f different countries relate
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others. Prophecy is one aspect of this emerging science. That is, broad changes in classstructure, economic and social mobility, psychology, geological science, and—with the
French, Irish and Greek Revolutions—political formations and expectations tended to
undermine the prevailing, unconscious investment in Natural Law’s timeless truths. In
the midst of a sweeping return of the repressed—the return not only of socially
marginalized positions but also, epistemologically speaking, of the contingent and
irrational elements within thought—across a range of cultural institutions, the
Enlightenment’s linear, well-organized shape of consciousness is, at least in part,
deranged. Thus it seems that prophecy’s function is to attempt in some way to ameliorate
this growing sense of irrational temporality, to import regularity into an increasingly
chaotic world.
As noted, prophecy forms one strand within the rise of history as a science, that is,
of historiography. Historiography is prophecy’s more credible sibling, one who bears
similar traits but aspires to the status of science. Indeed, Karl Popper, in The Poverty o f
Historicism describes historicism as “an approach to the social sciences which assumes
that historical prediction is their primary aim, and which assumes that this aim is
attainable by discovering the ‘rhythms’ or the ‘patterns,’ the Taws’ or the ‘trends’ that
underlie the evolution of history” (3, Popper’s emphasis). Prophecy, in its positive or
predictive mode most commonly associated with the term, is made with the same genetic
material informing the growth of historical thinking in the eighteenth century and in
Romanticism specifically. Yet this would mean understanding history as in some sense,
in turn, prophetic—as always already contaminated by prophecy. That is, both discourses
would aim to recuperate a sense of rational order, to absorb and perhaps, at their most
sophisticated, to sublate irrationality by translating that negativity into a larger, organic
concept of subjective and historical Bildung. To put it into Georges Bataille’s terms,
discussed in more detail in chapter two, this kind of prophecy and history represents a
restricted economy of expenditure, one where negativity or discord is always converted
into the work of a larger, rational project. However, if the trickster Jacob is to his
traditional brother Esau what prophecy is to historiography, this blood affiliation also2
occurrences the consequences o f which were local or transient, it hath been my purpose to record only
those great transactions in his reign, the effects o f which were universal, or continue to be permanent” (vi).
2 See Hans Eichner, cited, below, in chapter one.
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complicates such attempts at narrative recuperation—for this affiliation is also a betrayal.
That is, Romantic prophecy, perhaps more dramatically and therefore more visibly than
historiography, draws attention to this attempted recuperation. In contrast to Medieval or
Classical forms of prophecy, where prophecy’s supplement to temporal determination
would in large measure complement the existing world-view—one premised on Divine
orders like Providence or the “beautiful order” of the kosmos—prophecy’s excessive
prodigality in the late eighteenth century begins to appear in all its desperateness. Such
desperation reveals all the more pointedly the general economy of expenditure—that is,
the temporalization of history that would open an unprecedented, unrestricted future—
predictive prophecy and historiography as a social science are attempting actively to
restrict. For the hyperbolic assertion of temporal continuity cannot help but figure—
amidst the contrasting social, political, and philosophical turmoil that coloured actual life
in the Revolutionary years—as a wish. Indeed, this double register is precisely the form
of Wordsworth’s claims to prophetic inspiration, as discussed in more detail below.
Romantic prophecy thus constantly makes a self-conflicting gesture that tends to invert
prophecy’s expected and conventional relationship to prediction: every affirmative
prediction (prophecy) becomes, at the same time, an implicit insinuation of temporal
^continuity; the same contingency which prophecy-as-prediction is invoked in order to
absorb seems, in other words, to persist and even to intensify through the very act of
absorption, staining the cover that would mask the inappropriate, the untimely.
Just as relentlessly reflexive contemplation in Romanticism carries consciousness
to the peaks of Absolute Knowledge only to open, at the apex of thought’s self-relation,
the abyss of the unconscious, so prophecy, deployed through the subtle density of
Romantic poetry and prose, reveals its downy underside, its counter-predictive and ironic
energy. Prophecy, in other words, takes flight, exposing history’s ordering exigency as in
part motivated by cultural and political demands to maintain the status quo; bom out of
the furor of the American and French Revolutions and periodically invigorated by
rebellions in Ireland and Greece, Romantic prophecy publicizes rational, progressive
history’s claims to authority as deeply counter-revolutionary—as a discourse that aims to3

3 This refers not only to Idealism’s attempt to think thought but also to the renewed interest in the self and
the genre o f autobiography.
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drain from the concept of “revolution” the newly acquired sense of “revolt.” Hence,
Romantic prophecy follows an ironic logic: its radical ambivalence allows it—especially
when deployed in the particular social and political circumstances considered in the
following chapters—to repudiate its identification with prediction, to suspend actuality in
favour of an immanent if opaque possibility. Romantic prophecy allows history to hover
in a kind of negative capability. In fact, prophecy’s impact on historical discourse proves
to be significant. For once the irrational is understood as part o/history rather than a
contingent privation of a general orderliness, fundamental narrativity, or metaphysics of
presence, it becomes increasingly clear that critical appeals to “get back to history” or to
“return to history” become enormously problematic. What, exactly, is being returned to?4
Such appeals rely on a particular concept of history’s stability generated through a
naive conflation of history with empirical materiality. Yet, this stability is always already
dissolving since narrative conservation acts only in response to psychological and
cultural disorientation. In fact, to take history as something like the legitimizing and
ultimate ground of all hermeneutic and aesthetic analysis relies on de-historicizing
history and converting it, ironically, into something transcendent—that is, into precisely
the kind of increasingly unconvincing form of order that catalyzed the rise of dialectical,
organic forms of history in the first place as more satisfying responses to the realities of
contingency, irrationality, and possibility. As the rise and development of reflexive forms
of history in thinkers like Goethe, Hegel, and Schelling suggests, history is not simply the
brute stuff of material existence labelled and displayed in a taxonomic profile but
precisely a form of aesthetics and desire; history does not spring fully formed from the
head of science but emerges amidst the nebulous forces of a specific social, political, and
aesthetic moment. Prophecy helps to reveal this—namely, that history is not a pre
conceptual object that remains at arm’s length from aesthetic productions. History in
Romanticism is, rather, nothing other than a name for the various narrative idioms that
emerge in an attempt not to repudiate irrationality but to formulate a dynamic, self
reflexive logic of development wherein negativity (to formulate discontinuity in
Hegelian, dialectical terms) takes on an active, productive role. Such history is

4 In particular, chapters one, three, and five consider the implications o f this problem in relationship to New
Historical methodologies.
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misrepresented if it is identified with transcendent verities, universal codes, or material
substances, not because Romantic history rejects the notion of some kind of order or even
totality but because it emerges precisely in the acknowledgement that a new concept o f
order is necessary in order to account for the growing sense of negativity’s immanence—
the sense of the discontinuous within the continuous, the unconscious within conscious,
the temporal within the historical, the Revolution (interruption) within revolution
(cyclical return).
Ultimately, prophecy’s meta-historical task is to remind Romantic history of its
relationship to critical negativity. Such history tends to forget its own originality and to
slip back into models of transcendent, static order. In other words, dialectical history in
Hegel seems divided against itself in a counter-dialectical way in the attempt, through its
perfection of determination in Absolute Knowledge, to eliminate its own discourse by
returning history to the atemporal and eternal; for even if Absolute Knowledge does not
mean the abrupt end of actual events or lives, Hegel’s claim to have established the
complete grammar of historical possibility effectively reduces time’s discontinuity to an
empty, homogenous, and basically spatial field. History becomes eminently reasonable
by being the very image of Reason. Hence, Romantic prophecy—-adapting the traditional
role of the prophet as the social conscience and revising the typical image of the prophet
as insane—calls such history back to its immanent discontinuity and madness, resisting
the disciplinary and restrictive mastery history, especially in its universalizing mode,
attempts to exercise. Prophecy protracts the vital, critical negativity—that is, the
possibility opened through time and the unconscious—that Romantic history initially
emerged in response to, but subsequently aimed to close over once again through its own
forms of epistemological management. In other words, prophecy indicates how the
history of history itself is not a history of progress per se, or that this sort of reflexivity
tends toward a kind of perfection that is in fact anathema to temporality. Hence,
contrastingly, and ironically, history is most historical—in the sense of temporalized—in
its inception, and only fades like Shelley’s coal into something resembling Natural Law
through subsequent ‘refinement.’ The chapters that follow attempt, in various ways, to
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reveal how Romantic prophecy, the Enlightenment’s nagging conscience, brushes
historiography against the grain.5
While the following pages do attend to specific historical and literary figures that
adopt a prophetic mode, the aim is, however, not to offer a taxonomy of prophets,
historical or fictional. Furthermore, the following investigations do not offer an
exhaustive catalogue of prophetic modes of rhetoric, although this matter does receive
treatment, particularly in linking Maurice Blanchof s sense of the radically fragmented
nature of the prophetic utterance, discussed in chapter one, to William Wordsworth’s call
to prophecy, addressed in chapter two. Rhetoric is also important for the analysis of
Shelley’s tropes in chapter three and Blake’s figures in chapter four. Yet, while it is
important to treat prophecy as a linguistic phenomenon—as something inseparable from
the fiats of announcing, pronouncing, renouncing, et cetera—it is essential also to
recover something of its ignored phenomenology and temporality. Ian Balfour’s seminal
study, for instance, will concentrate on the rhetoric of Romantic prophecy; and Paul de
Man, departing from his earlier phenomenological tendencies, will focus on the rhetoric
of temporality and of Romanticism more widely. Prophecy, however, has to do with how
time and history are formulated as phenomena, as experiences that shape and are in turn
shaped by consciousness and affect more broadly. As such, the following chapters also
explore prophecy in terms of moods like enthusiasm (chapter one) and anxiety (chapter
two). Moreover, prophecy seems to represent a specific form of what Soren Kierkegaard,
following Hegel, calls “infinite absolute negativity,” a mode of negation that—as
discussed in chapter one—links prophecy’s suspension of the actual, present, and familiar
world to irony, although this is irony understood not merely as a trope but as an
existential condition. This existential negativity, then, gestures toward prophecy’s
important relationship to the literary genre of the preface (analyzed in chapter four)—the
infinite, absolute negativity of the literary work. That is, the preface aims to anticipate
and organize the work to come, inaugurating the work after the fashion of a prophet.
However, just as the Romantic prophet reveals his ambivalent relationship to prediction,

5 “There is no document o f civilization which is not at the same time a document o f barbarism. And just as
such a document is not free o f barbarism, barbarism taints also the manner in which it was transmitted from
one owner to another. A historical materialist therefore dissociates himself from it as far as possible. He
regards it as his task to brush history against the grain” (Benjamin Illuminations 256-257).
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so Blake’s prefaces remain suspended between the projected work and a ceaseless act of
inauguration. This existential negativity also emerges through the treatment of memory.
That is, in its conventional understanding, prophecy is a kind of hyper-memory that
attempts to convert the future into something always already ‘past.’ Yet, a closer look at
memory in Wordsworth and Shelley, in particular, reveals that prophetic memory
functions, strangely, as the unstable privation of a more fundamental forgetting or
unconsciousness (this is discussed further in chapters two and three). It also suggests that
history itself as an organizing frame proves much more problematic than initially
expected—something evident not only in Kant’s discussion in The Conflict o f the
Faculties of the “Sign of History” (in chapter one) but also in Caroline Lamb and Mary
Shelley fragmented modes of historical fiction (considered in chapter five).
Chapter one, “Frühen Neuzeit: Prophetic Mediation and History’s (Dis)closure,”
begins by analyzing the fate of temporality after the Enlightenment and within in the
refinement of dialectical historiography in Romanticism. For in the very claim to
overcome static and objective thinking, it seems that the organic coherence sought by
thinkers like Herder, Goethe, and Hegel still marginalizes temporality, that this new and
dynamic ordering exigency remains at odds with the discontinuity of temporality itself,
such that the perfection of history as a social science would, curiously, mean the
elimination of time. This occasions a closer look at how a handful of thinkers—Reinhart
Koselleck, Jan Patocka, and Martin Heidegger, specifically—attempt to counteract this
tendency, to temporalize time and history in order to reformulate the possibilities of the
subject’s relationship to time, including the possibility that the subject’s most
fundamental horizon of being is temporality. Indeed, Heidegger, as the conceptual spur
for Koselleck and Patocka’s thought, is important for offering a strong critique of Hegel’s
basically spatial concept of time. Yet, it becomes impossible to follow Heidegger’s
thought uncritically to its conclusion in the reformulation of fundamental ontology, since
such reformulations aim, ultimately, to recuperate time’s negativity, to gather it together
or submit its expenditure to the restricted economy of “authenticity.” Heidegger’s notion
of being remains too close to onto-theological notions of transcendent presence to
understand adequately the radically detotalizing force of temporality. In an attempt to
consider more fully time’s strange and disconcerting negativity, the chapter therefore
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shifts to a consideration of time’s relationship to another kind of negativity, namely,
irony.
Focusing on the complex and existential formulation of irony in Kierkegaard’s
The Concept o f Irony and on the relationship of prophetic speech to presence and absence
in Maurice Blanchot’s The Book to Come, this portion of the chapter suggests that
prophecy is a form of irony, one that negates the present, the actual, and Heidegger’s
concept of the there of being (Da-sein) through its relentless insistence on the
discontinuity temporality introduces to any system. Clarifying the relationship between
prophetic ambivalence and time requires, thus, attention to the precise formulation of
ironic negativity in distinction from negativity in Hegelian dialectics. Once this negativity
is better understood, the chapter finally turns to the example of Kant, for whom
prophecy—formulated in The Conflict o f the Faculties as the Sign of History—is deeply
ironic. Kant’s ambivalence concerning the role of empirical evidence in determining
historical development offers a model for the ambivalence encountered in different terms
in the subsequent readings of prophecy in various literary works throughout the following
chapters.
Chapter two, “Wordsworth’s Gift of Prophecy,” considers how Wordsworth’s
poetic claims to prophetic insight cannot be separated from trauma. Especially in the
1805 Prelude, Wordsworth tends, in spite of his explicit project, to reverse the futural
orientation of prophecy and retreat into elusive psychological depths. This is because
Wordsworth cannot quite manage the generosity, the gift of prophecy. If Romantic
prophecy’s ironic content amounts to the removal of certainty and the present, if it gives
purely when it gives no-thing, then the attempt to appropriate this expenditure in the
name of subjective elevation proves to be counterproductive. For, ecstatic negativity
explodes the subject’s coherence: if, as Georges Bataille helps to explain, any subject or
selfhood remains beyond the ecstatic moment, this very subjectivity testifies to the
translation of the gift into mere property, testifies to the failure of pure expenditure.
Hence, in attempting to put ecstasy to work in the project of subjective Bildung,
Wordsworth invites a form of negativity that will always insist and persist throughout the
works it generates as a particularly deleterious force. Wordsworth’s spots of time
illustrate this point, as recollection’s recuperation of the past and ostensible stabilization
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of the subject cannot help but always also gesture to the traumatic violence that sustains
the very possibility of any deep impression. In fact, in a move that anticipates (though
implicitly fears) both Shelley and Blake’s poetic practices, Wordsworth seems repeatedly
and at different levels to invite irrationality, discontinuity, and negativity into his project
through the very mechanisms of ostensible development and organization. For instance,
beyond the spots of time, the chapter pursues Wordsworth’s self-conflicted and re
traumatizing itinerary through an analysis of the rhetorical complexities of his claim to
prophetic status and his accidental inversions of temporal predictability, where forward
tending moods like hope become, retroactively, indistinguishable from despair—where
the past and the future begin to overlap phenomenologically such that cultural and
subjective progression seems to become indistinguishable from regression.
Chapter three, “Dismembering History in Percy Shelley’s Hellas,” looks closely
at how Shelley treats prophecy as a figure in several of his works, including The
Wandering Jew, Prometheus Unbound, and The Triumph o f Life, but particularly in his
understudied play, Hellas. A closer reading of Shelley’s prophets suggests that they are
engaged in spectacles of radical dis-figuration and dis-memberment that deconstruct the
dialectical work of metaphor, memory, and history aiming ultimately to liberate life from
patterns of recurring violence through a new style of writing history. In fact, the recurring
figure of the Wandering Jew in Shelley’s oeuvre functions as an allegory for
autobiography’s defacement—an allegory in Walter Benjamin and Paul de Man’s sense,
as a form of expression that is always temporally self-distantiating. For the Wandering
Jew is a ‘figure’ for history and yet he is unable to relate his own history, is unable to
write autobiography in terms of a coherent narrative since such writing, if true to his
perpetual suffering, must be simultaneously the defacement of any progressive concept of
historical development. Hence, the difficulty with which Shelley’s prophet reflexively
figures himself in several of his texts offers a new and fruitfully problematic basis for
analysing de Man’s arguments about language and subjectivity. For if the Wandering Jew
is the perfect symbol for allegory—a figure o f disfiguration—he also loads with affective
and historical freight what for de Man is a basically mechanical, linguistic operation.
Yet, de Man’s reading of Shelley is still useful for thinking about how the attempt
at self-relation yields to the rhythm of defacement in the detotalization—or, what is the
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same, temporalization—of history. In fact, reading between Shelley’s Hellas and
Prometheus Unbound and his historical and literary models, Aeschylus’ The Persians and
Prometheus Bound, respectively, reveals not a smooth continuity between the Classical
and Romantic texts but rather a relation more like Blakean “redemption.” For just as
Blake’s Milton rewrites Paradise Lost as a psychodrama of redemption as inspiration,
where this inspiration is coincident with “Self Annihilation” (43.35) rather than perfect
re-collection or recuperation, so Shelley’s re-visions of Aeschylus does not aim to absorb
the Classical texts into a master narrative. Rather, the tangled lines of influence suggest
that Prometheus Unbound stands before Hellas as a kind of Aeschylean spectre, engaging
this group of texts in a confusing play of prefuguration and disfiguration, something that
will return in Blake’s treatment not only of John Milton but in his (dis)organization of the
prefatory relationships within and between texts in his Lambeth period. That is, Shelley’s
oeuvre seems to absorb the rhythms of The Triumph o f Life such that the Wandering
Jew’s counterhistory defaces Shelley’s corpus as a whole.
Like Mahmud in Hellas, Shelley often goes in search of an historical origin only
to find the “ever-shifting sand” of time (“Julian and Maddalo” 4). In an effort to clarify
that rhythm, chapter four, “‘And heard/ The poet mutter his prelusive songs’: Blake’s
Beginnings,” looks more closely at the logical and temporal paradoxes of inauguration,
the sense that prophecy’s claim to narrative coherence and organization relies on a radical
anteriority that proves, in fact, to be entirely unstable. As the etymology of the word
“inaugurate” (“To make auspicious or of good augury” [OED 3]) suggests, the very
concept of the prelude or preface offers another formulation of Romantic prophecy. For,
the preface precedes and shapes the book to come. Yet, this claim on the future must
contend with the preface’s own implicit regressiveness in seeking a place of absolute
anteriority. The preface is split between the act of positive inauguration and the
impossibility of sufficiently grounding itself—there seems, indeed, always to be the
possibility of a preface to the preface—paralleling prophecy’s internal contradiction as
both a form of continuity (prediction) and an agent of radical and insistent discontinuity
(for prediction supplements, and therefore implies, discontinuity). The chapter begins
with Blake’s Milton, which is typically understood as a totalizing vision both
conceptually and in terms of Blake’s oeuvre. A closer look, however, reveals that the
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very mechanisms of classifying and dividing that the text employs prove
counterproductive. This serves as an introduction to a broader discussion of the
paradoxical place of the preface as a prophetic, organizational apparatus in a range of
Blake’s texts, including The [First] Book ofUrizen, America, Europe, and others. It also
introduces and complicates time’s relationship to organization.
Hence, the later portion of the chapter turns specifically to Milton’s treatment of
the “minute particular” and the renovating “moment” in order to understand better how
these orienting or ostensibly synthesizing mechanisms remain fundamentally critical or
detotalizing. Through this reading, time in Blake seems to ‘expose’ history—to set
history outside of itself. Like Friedrich Schelling, with whom he is in this chapter
compared at some length, Blake displaces traditional metaphysical oppositions such as
appearance/essence and reconceives the relationship between time and eternity. That is,
Blake does not only reject a conventionally allegorical notion of history as the expression
of transcendent causes—something that echoes Percy Shelley’s translation of political
revolt into literary style in Hellas and anticipates both Caroline Lamb and Mary Shelley’s
treatment of history’s relationship to causation in chapter five. Rather, he also
understands the eternal in terms of a radical imaginative vitality, as the eternal ability or
capacity to ‘re-state,’ in every sense.
Blake’s form of prophecy inspires a practice of subjective, political, historical,
and literary ‘re-stating’ that stages the reading of three novels in chapter five: Caroline
Lamb’s Glenarvon and Mary Shelley’s Valperga and The Last Man. “‘The dark destiny
that involves us’: Caroline Lamb, Mary Shelley, and the Supplement of Prophecy” opens
with a discussion of Ernst Bloch’s concept of prophecy’s negativity as a catalyst for
concrete political action—a form of revolutionary activism latent in the Christian Bible.
This indeterminable, mobile, evasive prophetic element—variously described by Bloch
as the atheism in Christianity, the not-yet-conscious in history, and the principle of
hope—describes in political and historical terms how contingency and irrationality in
history, while in some sense unhistoricizable, remains at the heart of the very possibility
of history and of the state. In fact, beyond supplying a concept for how prophecy in the
novels discussed offers an exodus from a form of history that has reformulated predictive
prophecy as disabling inevitability, Bloch also distinguishes between Greek and Hebrew
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prophecy. This distinction is important for at least two reasons. First, it offers a way to
reframe the two sides of ambivalent, Romantic prophecy—predictive and disruptive—in
terms of two different shapes of prophetic consciousness, where the Hebrew mode works
corrosively, displacing the disabling Greek mode. Second, Bloch’s analysis of Greek
prophecy occasions a discussion of Cassandrian prophecy, introducing questions about
gender and prophecy. What, for instance, is the relationship between the sexual violence
at the heart of this myth and the gender relations in Glenarvon, Valperga, and The Last
Man? What, moreover, is the relationship between universal history as the formalization
of Cassandrian prophecy and the detotalizing impulse of female prophets in these
particular works?
In this context, Lamb’s Glenarvon writes ‘rational,’ total history as idolatry, for
such history is content to assume the position of a debased or failed image of what is in
fact an entirely fictional univocity. Against this ideology, however, Lamb does not pose a
compensatory historical iconography; rather, she displaces the very logic of expressive
causation, treating history itself as an idol, though no longer in the sense of a
misrepresentation but rather as pure simulation. That is, for Lamb history is enormously
overdetermined, in Louis Althusser’s sense. As such, Lamb’s text engages in a
complementary overdetermination of its own history. In so doing, Glenarvon turns, like
the prophetess Elinor St Clare, against historiography’s unifying, predictive tendency,
offering itself only as a Gothic reliquary of historical fragments. Shelley’s Valperga
likewise seems to turn against its own prophetic tendencies, as illustrated in the brutal
treatment of Beatrice, the prophetess of Ferreira. That is, while the text seems intent on
disciplining and discrediting prophets—not just Beatrice but also Bindo and
Mandragola—the excessive energy with which this is performed suggests a deeper
anxiety. Closer analysis reveals that the text is in fact situated at an historical moment
when prophecy is bom as symptom. The rise of the state on the model of the exceptional
subject induces an anxiety within the political order that raises questions about historical
progress. As such, the prophet is ‘bom’—in the sense that “Man,” for Foucault, is ‘bom’
within a particular epistemic framework—at the moment he or she becomes a supplement
to the political and the historical order. This supplement is dangerous since it exposes the
prevailing order’s relative weakness, offering a kind of Blochian exodus. As such, the
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treatment of prophets in Valperga is a desperate attempt to repress the symptom itself, to
obscure the supplement through a kind of systemic denegation: that is, a repudiation of
the negation that draws attention to this desperation.
Finally, The Last Man makes explicit what had remained implicit in Glenarvon
and Valperga: namely, that this symptom is frequently identified as female. Between the
treatment of Evadne within the narrative and the evocation of the Sybil of Cumae in the
text’s fictional frame, Shelley emphasizes how the kind of dialectical, progressive
historiography that emerges in the late eighteenth century relies on a foundational
repudiation of femininity—a radical sexual violence, in fact. Rather than oppose this
system of history with some kind of positively utopian scheme, Shelley, like Bloch,
emphasizes rather a certain kind of negativity as the path toward a completely new and
therefore necessarily unthought paradigm for thought—a shape of consciousness
evermore about to be, but not yet available. Thus, Shelley thinks rational history and the
‘state of reason’—-in every sense—to its apocalyptic end (as apex and conclusion) in an
effort not to eliminate possibility but rather to purge history, politics, consciousness, and
even desire of what remains a fundamentally disabling paradigm. Thanks to the gap
opened up between the narrative and its frame, Shelley is thus able to explode universal
history without forcing actual history to be identical to this purgation. For, if the narrative
of The Last Man seems depressing, the effect of the text changes radically from the
perspective of the fictional spelunkers of the Introduction and the actual reader, whether
in Shelley’s time or our own. That is, the text becomes a possible but not inevitable
future, one that, if frightening enough—if strong enough to ward off imagination’s
attempts at hermeneutic amelioration—might manage to undermine its own threat and
negate its own negation.
Taken as a cross-section of a wider phenomenon, these readings of prophecy in
Romanticism gesture toward a distinctly Romantic form of history, one that emphasizes
the irrational and irruptive forces in the subject such that history gains a rich texture and
murky depth. Prophecy, through the corrosive agency of temporality, unsettles
predictability through a critical and creative gesture ultimately enabling for marginalized
figures and for artistic, political, and utopian thought generally. Far from reaffirming the
political status quo, losing itself in subjective solipsism, or regressing to illusions of
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transcendent verities, Romantic prophecy reflects an active—if anxious—interest in
historical participation and affirms the concrete possibility of effective action through its
insistence that the prevailing social, political, psychological, and historical conditions
cannot eliminate the possibility of critical revision.
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C hapter O ne

Frühen Neuzeit: Prophetic Mediation and History’s (Dis)closure

Organically understood, the universe does not run predictably like a machine but, as with all living things,
grows and develops. Growth means irreversible change, and hence history does not unfold in accordance
with immutable laws but instead registers contingency. The romantics saw history as susceptible to rupture:
a new era might be unlike anything that had come before.
— Jennifer J. Baker, “Natural Science and Romanticisms”

I. Time’s Revolutions: Beyond the Discipline of History

In his recent book, Monstrous Society: Reciprocity, Discipline, and the Political
Uncanny, c. 1780-1848, David Codings describes a complex relationship between history
and determination, suggesting that the various forms of history that arise in late
eighteenth-century culture—models that aim to give a rational shape to the past and,
implicitly, the future as well—retain a kernel of restless negativity that displaces perfect
totalization:
There never has been an irreversible moment, a founding act that institutes
civilization or modernity, for any such moment can be inverted on a future
occasion. From this perspective we are not the product of an accumulated
history, a sequence of events that continuously narrows the opening to the
future, but inherit both a hoard of previous figural acts and an as yet
untested contrary hoard of figures of negation, repetition, radicalization, or
expansion. The past may be determining, but it is also determined, the
object of a continuous interpretive activity by which we refigure the
meaning of our historical position and the possibilities available to us. If
history is a narrative, it is also a counter-narrative of what is as yet
unrealized in the countless failed or suppressed projects of the past. (41)
This sense of an immanent counter-narrative—something that echoes Paul de Man’s idea
that in Wordsworth “the future is present in history only as the remembering of a failed
project that has become a menace” (Reading 59)—complicates the scene of history’s
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birth as science. For, as James Chandler notes “Romanticism” marks “the age of the spirit
of the age—that is, the period when the normative status of the period becomes a central
and self-conscious aspect of historical reflection” (78). Hence, if Romanticism sees the
emergence of history’s self-consciousness, it also witnesses—necessarily and
simultaneously—the birth of an historical unconscious, something that will perpetually
irritate the continuity and coherence of historical narrative. Prophecy is a strand of
historiography that exacerbates precisely this kind of irritation even as it seems to
promote narrative coherence. Before looking at prophecy, however, it is necessary briefly
to trace the shape of historiography across the eighteenth century to understand better
how prophecy complicates the scene. Indeed, the concept of history and the science of
historiography are particularly mobile in this period because they begin to break from the
Classical and Enlightenment sense that history follows a Natural Law where events
express unchanging forms or ideas. That is, the emergence of new, dialectical forms of
history—the result of a new awareness of history’s immanent counter-narrativity—means
that history expresses a desire for transcendental order only because confidence in the
existence of such order has been shaken. In effect, the idea of history itself descends into
change and development6; the notion of order itself becomes adaptable and needs to be
perpetually (re)organized. At this point, when ideas—including ideas of history—become
historical, it is possible, for the first time, to perform not only a history of ideas but also a
history of the idea of history.
As Hans Eichner notes, the Romantic formulation of historiography is part of a
larger shift in consciousness. This shift catalyses the modem divisions and methodologies
of the human and natural sciences. Specifically, Eichner suggests that one “immediate
consequence of the concept of an evolving universe was Romantic historicism” (16). For,
while “the eighteenth century had by no means lacked interest in history,” the kind of
history produced by writers like “Montesquieu, Gibbon, Hume, and Robertson”
nevertheless “remained fundamentally ahistorical” (Eichner 16). That is, Enlightenment

6 As Foucault says, “the historians o f the nineteenth century were to undertake the creation o f a history that
could at last be ‘true’— in other words, liberated from Classical rationality, from its ordering and theodicy:
a history restored to the irruptive violence o f time” (Order 132).
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history operated under the auspices of Natural Law, treating historical events and persons
as punctual manifestations of timeless, transcendent verities. The Romantics, in contrast,
[w]ho had done away with the notion of an unchanging universe, also
abandoned the concept of unchanging human nature. As they did so, not
only the preoccupation with but also the admiration for the timeless, the
universal, and the general made way for a decided preference for the
temporal, the local, and the individual; and the most obvious, indeed the
only, explanation for the temporal, local, and individual seemed to them
history. Here, Friedrich Schlegel was their most eloquent spokesman.
“The explanation of an organic product, of an organic being,” he declares,
“must be historical, not mechanical” (xvlli, 21, No. 36). “The world is not
a system, but a history” (XII, 418). “The best theory of art is its history”
(iv, 230). History is “the only science,” and hence “scientific physics . . .
must be natural history” (XII, 420). “All science is genetic,” and history is
therefore “the most universal, the most general, and the highest of all
sciences” (xi, xxiv, n. 1). The Romantic fascination with history led to
modem, historical philology, which replaced the quest for a universal
grammar; to a historical theory of genres, which replaced timeless laws of
poetry; and to a biology of evolution, which replaced one preoccupied
with classifying supposedly static, unchangeable species. Under its
influence, too, the quest for a timeless, universal “natural law” made room
for historicism in legal thought and, in the wake of Burke, provided
countless arguments against “man-made,” “artificial” constitutions such as
those of the United States and revolutionary France. (Eichner 16)7

7 “The new science that began with Copernicus and Galileo sought to explain the world rationally in terms
o f the laws o f nature, and these laws, like reason itself, were thought to hold uniformly at all times and
places. It seemed natural that human beings, the most rational o f creatures, should be equally timeless in
their essence. Thus even such an excellent historian as Voltaire conceived o f morality as being the same at
all times and places (‘la morale uniforme en tout temps, en tout lieu’), and he speaks o f a natural law that
must hold equally in Europe and Japan and that inspired Solon and Zoroaster as it inspires us (Lovejoy, p.
290). In fact, change seemed something almost unnatural. Some eighteenth-century philologists found it so
unreasonable to suppose that languages change that they denied, in the face o f all evidence, that the
Romance languages had developed from Latin (Foucault, pp. 89, 121).” (Eichner 16)
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If history becomes the discourse of Romanticism, this is thanks to a new experience of
discontinuity, irrationality, and individuality. Taken as essential aspects of reality rather
than privations or distortions of a fundamental coherence, these new forms of disruption
demand a suppler concept of order than that provided by Natural Law. Hence, history
begins to resist its characterization as a series of edifying vignettes by calling into
question the very validity of the values it ostensibly reinforces. Or, as Friedrich Meinecke
notes, the rise of Romantic historical consciousness insists on the “essential difference
between the idea of development in the historical sense, and the thought of perfection as
embodied in the outlook of the Enlightenment” (22).
In addressing the Enlightenment’s “fundamentally ahistorical” concepts of
history, the Romantics in fact critique a certain form of epistemology. For instance,
Edward Gibbon’s The History o f the Decline and Fall o f the Roman Empire—a text that
will be important to reconsider in chapter three, alongside Shelley’s Hellas—works in the
typically Enlightenment mode. Gibbon’s sense of history’s trajectory adopts a basically
Aristotelian concept of constitutional revolution. For Aristotle, revolution sees anarchy
turn into democracy, which is then replaced—through the “intemperance of demagogues”
(1240)—by monarchy, while monarchy is displaced by oligarchy. Oligarchy, however, is
not the end of politics, as it remains susceptible to popular revolt: “when great men who
are at least of equal merit are dishonored by those in higher office” (Aristotle 1244) the
population rises up and reverts to anarchy, beginning the cycle over. Ultimately, then,
Aristotle contains revolution in a closed circuit of constitutions: democracy is the initial
formulation of the state, reflecting the human drive to state formation for mutual support;
yet, increasing social stratification leads to decadence that is, in turn, corrected through
an anarchy that re-equalizes the system. In Reinhart Koselleck’s words, “[according to
ancient doctrine, there were only a limited number of constitutional forms, which
dissolved and replaced each other but could not naturally coincide. These are the
constitutional forms, together with their corruptions, still current today, succeeding each
other with a certain inevitability” (45). It seems that Gibbon operates on this model given
the markedly neutral, or at least casual, tone of his project. That is, Gibbon can relate
what seems to be an enormous catastrophe—the end of Western civilization—with
remarkable insouciance because he takes metaphysical comfort in this Classical notion
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that history’s changes are, at root, contained. Hence, the historian, in this model, is a
mere observer of inevitable processes; the historian’s ultimate goal is to stand at the
centre of history and render everything visible while, like Bentham’s guard, remaining
invisible.
Gibbon’s approach contrasts strikingly with both the creative role accorded to the
subject and to the elevated place of feeling in Romantic historiography. For instance,
Anthony Ashley Cooper’s notion of “enthusiasm” becomes a prerequisite for historical
analysis in Romanticism. “Enthusiasm [...] was, Shaftesbury’s works taught us, a motive
power for the observer, in addition to the aesthetic sense and metaphysical usage. The
author wrote in Moralists that all genuine love and admiration is enthusiastic, and so are
pure scholarship, the travels of explorers, gallantry, war and heroism” (Meinecke 12).
Indeed, echoing Foucault’s observation, noted above, that Romantic historicism’s
dialectical approach sought a history that could be true rather than merely accurate,
Friedrich Meinecke remarks that Shaftesbury’s “teaching that enthusiasm was the
necessary atmosphere for all higher mental and moral life threatened to shake the walls of
partition which prevented men from getting a glimpse of spiritual life and history as a
whole” (12). So, if Enlightenment history adopts a Classical stoicism, Shaftesbury in
contrast insists that the historian enter into the feelings of his subject. In Germany,
Johann Winckelmann takes a similar tack, reading the history of art—with its full range
of aesthetic effects—as the key to the history of politics: “Winckelmann’s new historical
sense was already in evidence in his discovery of a succession of styles in art, and the
connections between the life of art and the whole life of a nation, particularly with its
political destinies” (Mienecke 240). J.G. Herder, too, argues that historical analysis
requires a kind of Shelleyan sympathy: “in order to judge a nation, we must live in their
time, in their own country, must adopt their modes of thinking and feeling” (27-28).
With these sorts of modifications, history becomes modem because it begins to
understand its fundamentally relational, dialogic nature: the historian cannot be a neutral
or invisible observer since the concept of “neutral observation” is, especially after Kant,
epistemologically oxymoronic. If history insists on trying to be a purely objective
chronicle, it will mislead itself since its object is organized, and in that sense created, by
the historian to a greater degree than in other sciences. Hence, Romantic historicism
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embraces the problem of ‘subjectivity,’ in every sense. Resultantly, the concept of
historical order gains a mobility analogous to, because woven into, the mobility of the
subject. Indeed the subject, following Fichte, Hegel and other speculative thinkers, must
be understood as a demand or desire for identity—a kind of drive—rather than an
unchanging substance. Given its fundamental integration with subjectivity, historical
knowledge, then, becomes much denser than the Enlightenment could allow. To be an
historian is, in Romanticism, to be a philosopher and a psychoanalyst as well.
It is this difference that underlies Paul Veyne’s assertion that the Enlightenment
mode of history—something still popular in the social-scientific institutionalization of
history—“has made no progress since Herodotus or Thucydides, however surprising that
affirmation may seem” (106). History of this sort is what Foucault calls “natural history.”
This kind of knowledge treats the past as an archive of imitable examples. These
episodes, however, are able to retain explanatory or ethical power relevant to the present
and future of human experience only because the human is considered an unchanging
essence. As Peter Gay argues, the Enlightenment perpetuated the
idea of the historian as censor or builder of morale[, an idea that] was a
heritage from Classical antiquity; history had always been an adjunct to
ethics or politics, it had always been called upon to point a moral, enlist
loyalties, improve its readers. In the time of Voltaire and Gibbon this
notion was still very much alive. In 1763, James Boswell noted in his
journal, “I employed the day reading Hume’s History, which enlarged my
views, filled me with great ideas, and rendered me happy. It is surprising
how I have formerly neglected the study of history, which of all studies is
surely the most amusing and the most instructive.” This was the
philosophes’ view as well; as classicists, as radicals, and as men of their
time, they sought to amuse and instruct, like everyone else. (383)
Again, this ‘instruction’ is very problematic because it valorizes a particular kind of
subject—the subject of this education—as universal and timeless. It is additionally
problematic from a theoretical perspective: typically, history is less an accumulation of
exemplary events (i.e., the most banal habits of the everyday and therefore the most
representative of a particular moment) than a narrative tying together exceptional events.
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Indeed, this paradox emerges especially in dialectical and reflexive forms of Romantic
historiography where subjectivity’s central place tends to make history a fundamentally
exceptional kind of discourse. As Giorgio Agamben points out, the concept of the
“example” is problematically situated between the exemplary and the exceptional, in that
the moment something becomes an example it is singled out and, therefore, exceptional:
“The example [as representative of a set] is thus excluded from the normal case [within
the set] not because it does not belong but, on the contrary, because it exhibits its own
belonging to it. The example is truly a paradigm in the etymological sense: it is what is
‘shown beside,’ [from the Greek, para-deigma] and a class can contain everything except
its own paradigm” (22).
Hence, Romantic history, as much as earlier forms of history, seems to conflate
the distinction between an event as exception and the retroactively generated narrative of
examples, essentially confusing what might be consistent enough for general pedagogical
use (example) with what is in fact too complex and nebulous to serve as some kind of
universally communicable factum (exception). In Writing History, Veyne makes this
point quite forcefully, if in different terms. That is, if particular exceptional events in
history have a complex set of causes, this complexity ought not to be confused for some
kind of intelligence—even a self-modifying and responsive intelligence—behind or
below these events, rendering the events and their temporal succession the expression of
a universal mind or spirit. For to do this is to invent a replacement for Natural Law:
Since “superficial cause” does not mean a cause less effective than
another, it is not possible to discover main lines of evolution [in history],
any more than they could be found in a game of poker lasting for a
thousand years. [...]. When speaking of historical chance or any of its
synonyms [...], we must carefully distinguish a single event from history
taken as a whole. It is very true that certain events—the Revolution of
1789 and that of 1917—have deep-rooted causes; it is not true that history,
in the last resort, is exclusively guided by deep-rooted causes rising from
the middle class or the historic mission of the proletariat [as an Hegelian
Marxist might argue]—it would be too easy. Thus, understanding history
does not consist in being able to discern great underwater currents below
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the surface agitation; history has no depths. It is well known that its reality
is not rational, but it must be known that it is no longer reasonable; there
are no issues that are normal, giving history, at least from time to time, the
reassuring look of a well tied-up plot in which what ought to happen does
happen. (104)
Louis Althusser, in Reading Capital, anticipates this criticism. For Althusser, what Veyne
describes as the confusion between event and narrative in the self-mystified concept of
history can be formulated more specifically as a confusion of method for theory:
To put it crudely, history lives in the illusion that it can do without theory
in the strong sense, without a theory of its object and therefore without a
definition of its theoretical object. What acts as its theory is its
methodology, i.e., the rules that govern its effective practices, practices
centred around the scrutiny of documents and the establishment of facts.
What it sees as taking the place of its theoretical object is its ‘concrete’
object. History therefore takes its methodology for the theory it lacks, and
takes the ‘concrete’ of the concrete obviousness of ideological time for its
theoretical object. (109)
So, when Chandler, Foucault, and others refer to the birth of history in the late eighteenth
and early nineteenth centuries, this refers to a moment when history, attempting to
ameliorate this theoretical deficit, begins to look at itself as a science, or tries to conceive
of itself as a rational totality defined less by particular objects or instances than by a
coherent though dynamic process intimately connected to subjective consciousness. The
idea is that that process can be taken as rational and understandable, therein rendering
history Absolute (in the Hegelian sense) and therefore effectively finished since the
o

‘grammar’ of history is completed. So, ultimately, while this certainly marks an
improvement over Classical and Enlightenment histories predicated on Natural Law,
Romanticism’s dialectical totalization of history seems to diminish the complexity of
subjective temporality. Hence, prophecy emerges at this point as a symptom of Romantic
historiography’s failure perfectly to repress time.8
8 Later, in chapter five, I will look more closely at Althusser’s critique o f mechanical and expressive modes
o f historical causality in what amounts to a displacement o f the metaphysical logic o f
grammar/instantiation or language/speech in historical terms
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Romantic prophecy exposes the negativity introduced—if also partly
disavowed—by the new, complex place of the subject in dialectical historiography. In
Romanticism, the un-thought moves from a place on the periphery of thought’s
expanding empire in the Enlightenment into the very interstices of cognition: negativity
‘re-collects’ in the shape of an unconscious that is immanent and radically resistant to
thought rather than outside thought and imminently known. This casts a shadow over the
so-called birth of history. If knowledge is revolutionized through the birth of “Man,” a
“strange empirico-transcendental doublet” that emerges when the conditions of possible
knowledge enable a form of self-reflection that discloses “in him [...] what renders all
knowledge possible” (Order 318), this reflexivity does not lead to total clarity but rather
opens an abyss within knowledge as such. In The Order o f Things, Foucault illustrates
how several areas of the human sciences undergo fundamental epistemological
reorganization, resulting in a kind of metamorphosis of the limits of possible knowledge.
For instance, philology transforms into linguistics and physiology becomes biology; a
basically taxonomic form of ordering through comparison shifts to an ordering where
negativity works dialectically through a process of formation capable even of self
modification. Order becomes a principle, an exigency, following the ‘model’ of the
Romantic notion of the system as the demandfor systematicity rather than something
objectively and actually totalized. Yet, perhaps because history, as Althusser argues, has
no theory to begin with, the epistemic shift that results in history’s ‘birth’—the very idea,
for instance, that history has a ‘grammar’ that organizes its field—does not mean that
eighteenth-century history is really able to undergo the same kind of overhaul witnessed
in other sciences. For while it is true that history in Herder and Hegel, for instance,
becomes more self-reflexive—that it raises the question of history as an immanent idea
(Herder) or dialectical science (Hegel)—it nevertheless shrinks from the workless,
undialectical negativity of contingency and temporality, the symptomatic discontinuity of
the exceptions that form its very content.
William Godwin’s short essay “Of History and Romance” helps to illustrate this
tension where Romantic history becomes more self-aware and yet also conscious of its
methodological limitations—where it distances itself from the timeless truths
promulgated in Aristotelian Natural Law and the mere chronology of prehistorical
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thought even as it attempts to discipline irrationality in new, more complex ways. That is,
for Godwin, history retains something of its Classical moralizing and pedagogical
function but only insofar as it abdicates universality, in terms both of its object of
investigation and the applicability of its lessons. Godwin’s history continues to function
similarly to Enlightenment histories but only when it embraces its relationship with
fiction or romance. Godwin begins by dividing history “into two principle branches; the
study of mankind in a mass, of the progress, the fluctuations, the interests and the vices of
society; and the study of the individual” (453). Against the “dull repetition” of the first
branch, Godwin advocates inquiry into exceptional individuals, “illustrious men, such as
we find scattered through the long succession of ages” (456). For Godwin, in a rather
Shaftesburian way, only intimacy with “the development of great genius, or the
exhibition of bold and masculine virtues” can foster “an exchange of real sentiments” and
spur moral “improvement” (458). Indeed, since Godwin’s guiding questions for historical
analysis have less to do with factual accuracy and more to do with edification—he asks
first of historical narrative, “Can I derive instruction from it? Is it a genuine praxis upon
the nature of man? Is it pregnant with the most generous motives and fascinating
examples?” (461)—he will suggest that it is perfectly reasonable to supplement history
with fiction. In fact, he goes so far to suggest that history is a mode of fiction, namely
“fable” (461): a sentiment echoed by Veyne who asserts that “history has some likeness
to the novel (or lying history)” (55). However, if Veyne’s comments suggest that fiction
is deceptive while history is not, Godwin will actually invert this relationship. That is, not
only can romance furnish intimacy with edifying examples as well as (if not better than)
history proper but it also has the virtue of rejecting history’s illegitimate self
aggrandizement, its “graver name” (463). History, if done well, is romance.
Godwin, as if straddling the Enlightenment-Romantic divide, makes two
important gestures in his argument. First, he preserves the Classical and Enlightenment
sense of history as a pedagogical apparatus that operates in both moral and intellectual
spheres. But for Godwin, this edification is tied to a kind of micro-history of the
exceptional subject, one “not contented to observe such a man upon the public stage” but
keen rather to “follow him into his closet” (458). Second, Godwin argues that this kind of
edification can be accomplished fictionally and that, in fact, romance has the advantage
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of displaying the fictional quality that is, equally, active although repudiated in so-called
proper history. And yet, Godwin’s text seems suddenly to turn against itself. “True
history,” he writes, “consists in a delineation of consistent, human character, in a display
of the manner in which such a character acts under successive circumstances, in showing
how character increases and assimilates new substances to its own, and how it decays,
together with the catastrophe into which by its own gravity it naturally declines” (466).
Just as this passage itself seems naturally to ‘decline’—to begin with a sense of universal
human nature but end in decay and rupture—so it remains unclear if the personal history
Godwin privileges as the most edifying form of history is even possible. For in the final
paragraphs of his essay, Godwin asserts that while “the conjectures of the historian must
be built upon a knowledge of the character and his personages” it is, paradoxically, also
true that “we never know any man’s character”: “My most intimate and sagacious friend
continually misapprehends my motives” (466), Godwin laments, as if echoing his own
fictional character, St Leon, whose motives and historical adventures are, from the time
he acquires the Philosopher’s Stone, completely opaque to all but him alone. In a strange
reversal, the analysis of particularity—of exceptional, individual historical agents—that
was supposed to offer the deepest moral and therefore historical insight, turns out to be,
at the same time, radically resistant to enquiry. The same individuality that makes the
valorized historical figure exemplary turns out to bar the intellect’s access precisely
because that exemplarity is coincident with exceptionality.
In this Godwin sounds, perhaps unexpectedly, rather like Friedrich Schelling. For
in Ages o f the World [3] —discussed at greater length in chapter four—Schelling
comments, “certainly one who could write completely the history of their [s/'c] own life
would also have, in a small epitome, concurrently grasped the history of the cosmos” (3).
Yet, as Tilottama Raj an points out respecting this passage, this “is not to say that one can
write one’s history, which is itself enveloped in a prehistory that exceeds it, the prehistory
of life, of being” (“Psychoanalysis” §2). That is, if Schelling, like Godwin and other
Romantics, sees the individual as the key location for undertaking some kind of history,
he recognizes a similar paradox in that this same subject is always partly beyond the
province of the understanding. For Schelling this is because the emergence of the subject
in idealism as self-conscious, as a being that thinks its own capacity for thought, is

26

possible only through a complex action of repudiation or abjection: consciousness only
becomes self-consciousness in the modem sense against the backdrop of an unconscious
understood not as the privation of thought but rather something constitutively and
absolutely outside comprehension. Foucault, in fact, will describe this epistemological
conundrum as the very essence of modem ‘Man’ as “constituted at the beginning of the
nineteenth century” (330). That is, if Godwin would follow the subject into his closet,
Foucault and Schelling suggest that he might, like Caleb Williams, discover only a
deeper mystery. Indeed, “man appears,” Foucault writes, “in his ambiguous position as an
object of knowledge and as a subject that knows: enslaved sovereign, observed spectator,
he appears in the place belonging to the king, which was assigned to him in advance by
Las Meninas, but from which his real presence has for so long been excluded” (312).
Hence, any theory that aims to transcend a taxonomy of examples through an analysis of
history via an analysis of the subject will encounter not so much history’s original
essence as the very retreat o f the origin—the origin as nothing other than the rhythm of its
retreat and return, as the radical self-displacement or exceptionalism of the very subject
who, as sovereign, is able to decide on the state o f exception.
Hence, if thinkers like Schelling and Foucault practice a mode of historiography,
the emphasis in each case remains on immanent systemic catastrophe—the notion in
Schelling of possible regression or de-evolution and in Foucault of non-dialectical
epistemic breaks. The effect of this emphasis is to turn history into a critical system, a
form of order aware of its finitude as well as its limited epistemological and pedagogical
import. This brings us back to the place of prophecy. For, on the surface prophecy
attempts, like Classical and Enlightenment history, perfectly to organize and eliminate
contingency by implying a transcendent realm according to which history is always
already determined. At the same time, however, prophecy represents a “counter-science”
{Order 379) within Romantic historiography. Foucault uses this term to describe
positions in knowledge—knowledge as organized in the human sciences—-that express “a
perpetual principle of dissatisfaction, of calling into question, of criticism and
contestation of what may seem, in other respects, to be established” {Order 373). Rather
than definitively establishing facts through inquiry, a counter-science reveals the
irreducibly opaque conditions of the development of knowledge as a positivity. Hence
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counter-sciences are not “less ‘rational’ or ‘objective’” than positive sciences but rather
“flow in the opposite direction,” they “lead them back to their epistemological basis, and
[...] they ceaselessly ‘unmake’ that very man who is creating and re-creating his
positivity in the human sciences” (Order 379). Foucault’s treatment of the history of
nature (i.e., the notion that nature has a history) as a counter-science to natural history
thus gestures toward the deeply ambivalent attitude prophecy adopts toward historical
and subjective Bildung? For even if universal history marks an advance over the
Enlightenment concept of historiography—a kind of archive management or cultural
stewardship—there remains a totalizing exigency that tends to suppress temporality and
the new future time opens. It is, in fact, precisely this universal history that Heidegger
objects to in what he calls, as discussed below, historiography: a history that
detemporalizes and flattens out the historicity of human existence. By stressing the
finitude of being, Heidegger reminds historiography of the disruptive temporality of
human life, thus opening the discourse of history to a reading of prophecy as natural
history’s counter-science.

* * *

Romantic historical thought seems to surface as a rupture of Enlightenment
history. The Romantic shape of historical consciousness marks a “break in the Western
tradition of an incremental path to knowledge” (Tribe xiv), disclosing human existence as
resolutely historical while covering over, at the same instant, the epistemological claims9
9By “natural history” here 1 mean the conception o f history in general as something non-constructed or
simply given to the understanding. The term, however, inevitably overlaps with a particular kind o f history,
namely, one that focuses on tracing natural phenomena over time as, for instance, in evolutionary biology
or geology. While it is impossible to go into detail here, there is a parallel between how the term “natural
history” shifts from designating the general form o f history to naming a specific type o f history and the
way— discussed below— that “revolution” in the Aristotelian sense is contaminated and displaced by the
sense o f revolution as revolt or interruption. That is, when the division o f knowledge in the Enlightenment
and its reorganization in Romanticism re-phrases “natural history” as a particular way to study the natural
world, the term is re-situated between its older application, as a concept o f history in general, and a new
discourse, the history o f nature. In its ambivalent overdetermination, “natural history” seems divided not
simply between two historical moments but between to concepts o/history. Like a cross-section o f
sedimented earth, the concept o f “natural history” bears witness to an epistemic break between its semantic
layers.
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traditionally made in history’s name. Hence, history, as a narrative exigency or even
perhaps as a sense of determinations compacted over time, is predicated or founded on a
kind of ‘historical’ discontinuity, a break that cannot be narrated because it is what makes
the particular form of narration or hermeneutic phrasing possible in the first place. In
terms that will become important below, there is here a kind of historical parabasis, an
interruption in narrative (and historiography as narrative) that is, more precisely, the
interruption o f narrative and of history. When Chandler, then, seeks “to historicize the
question of historicism” (33) in the Romantic period, this must be understood as an
invitation to articulate a new concept of history, of time, and of the historical subject.
Indeed, Jan Patocka, in Heretical Essays in the Philosophy o f History, remarks that
“history is nothing other than the shaken certitude of pre-given meaning” (118). In other
words, history, as a mode of self-understanding, emerges when society’s sense of itself
becomes explicitly problematic: “thus in the historical epoch humankind does not avoid
what is problematic but,” in an almost masochistic turn, “actually invokes it, promising
itself from this an access to a more profound meaning than that which was proper to
prehistorical humanity” (Patocka 63). From this perspective, the accumulation of
historical facts is not, in itself, historical; rather, only when that data is narratively
schematized through attempts to explain cause and effect does it acquire properly
historical meaning. Again, the somewhat ironic condition for the emergence of history,
understood as investigating causes, is the loss of history as something self-evident,
commonsensical, or hermenutically neutral. In fact, the rupture of prehistory by history
‘proper’ corresponds to the existential condition of a “life unsheltered, a life of outreach
and initiative,” a way of being that “is differently, since it itself opens up the possibility
for which it reaches” (Patocka 39).
Patocka’s thinking about history rephrases Heidegger’s arguments concerning
both the origin of historicity in the structure of human existence and the strange way that
history discloses itself phenomenologically in what would seem to be the interruption o f
history. Toward the end of Being and Time, Heidegger challenges the claim of science—
specifically, the science of history, or historiography—to explain or ground itself
adequately. The inauthentic or vulgar thinking of history, a merely statistical-anecdotal
mode of recording events, tends to understand human existence as in time, thus posing
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for itself the problem of life’s continuity. From this everyday perspective, “Da-sein
traverses the time-span allotted to it between the two boundaries [i.e., birth and death] in
such a way that it is ‘real’ only in the now and hops, so to speak, through the succession
of nows of its ‘time’” (Heidegger 342). Such thinking implies that Dasein is “something
objectively present ‘in time’” (Heidegger 343). For Heidegger, however, such a
perspective not only fails to ask how it is possible for Dasein to be an object of history in
the first place, but it also mistakenly reduces human existence to the horizon of objective
presence. Heidegger suggests, rather, that humans are not so much in time as
fundamentally structured as temporal—that Dasein can become historical only because it
is already so, in its ontological structure. Hence, “Da-Sein does not first fill up an
objectively present path or stretch ‘of life’ through the phases of its momentary realities,
but stretches itself d\ong in such a way that its own being is constituted beforehand as this
stretching along. The ‘between’ of birth and death already lies in the being of Da-sein”
(Heidegger 343). It is, then, only on the basis of Dasein’s fundamental constitution that
anything like a science of history can be grounded. Ultimately, ontic historiography
cannot account for “the basic phenomenon of history, which is prior to the possibility of
making something thematic by historiography” (Heidegger 344).
Dasein and the useful things that make up its world can be objects of
historiography only on the basis of the “temporalizing of temporality” (Heidegger 349) or
fundamental historicity of Dasein, a condition that historiography as a science of
objectively present things cannot help to clarify, since Dasein and its world are never
completely available to objectification.10 This is because sciences, as sciences, have a

10 Heidegger’s importance at this stage o f the project centers on his critique o f the Hegelian concept o f time
as a mere variation o f space. To follow Heidegger’s exposition, “Hegel’s concept o f time presents the most
radical way in which the vulgar understanding o f time has been given form conceptually” (392). This is to
place Hegel in Aristotle’s company, since time, for both, is something objectively present. For Aristotle
time is what is counted or measured “in” time. And precisely what is counted are the “nows.” The nows, in
other words, are like objects within the very present that they, at the same time, constitute. Hence, the nows
“are ‘seen’ ontologically in the horizon o f the idea o f objective presence” (Heidegger 387). This means that
time is understood as an infinite series o f punctual nows, or as now-times, essentially confirming Plato’s
quip that time is the image o f eternity; “the now is now in every now, thus constantly the same, even if in
every now another may be disappearing as it arrives. Yet it does show at the same time the constant
presence o f itself as this changing thing” (Heidegger 387-388). This suspension o f the arrival and
disappearing o f the now in a present informs Hegel’s most concise definition o f time in the Logic: “as the
negative unity o f being-outside-itself, time is similarly something absolutely abstract and ideal. It is the
being that, in being, is not, and, in not being, is: it is intuited becoming. This means that the absolutely
momentary distinctions that directly supercede themselves are determined as external, but external to
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methodological limit, namely, thematization: science places objects on the horizon of
objective presence such that they are measurable, quantifiable data. This procedure does
not permit science to enquire into the very process whereby things become available to
thematization, that is, the process of being’s (dis)closure through particular, finite beings.
In contrast, phenomenology contends with this issue, as the process itself—appearance as
such—cannot be understood clearly in terms of merely manipulating or measuring
existent material. Heidegger phrases the paradox thus: “the idea of historiography as a
science implies that it has grasped the disclosure of historical beings as its own task.
Every science [however] is primarily constituted by thematization” (359). In a sense,
then, Hegelian or other dialectical forms of historiography—despite their admirable
reflexivity—cannot trace their own history, that is, the basis of their possibility as
sciences, since such reflexiveness imposes a barrier to, even as it promises, greater self
understanding. This is because the unity of ecstatic temporality in Dasein takes shape as a
process of understanding one’s existential structures rather than ontic states: Dasein’s
being-toward-its-death is what throws Dasein back onto itself, revealing its “factical
thrownness” which, consequently, “gives to the having-been its unique priority in what is
historical” (Heidegger 353). Indeed, the manner in which Dasein comes back to and
understands itself more clearly in its authentically historical being seems to run counter to
the everyday sense of history as ‘coming from the past,’ for it is Dasein’s futural
orientation that initiates the process: “authentic being-toward-death, that is, the fmitude
o f temporality, is the concealed ground o f the historicity o f Da-seirí’ (Heidegger 353).
Put differently, if history is to emerge as something more than what Nietzsche
would call “a disguised theology,” a self-interested and ultimately cynical attachment to
“all the scraps that fall from the bibliographical table,” it must appear, from the
perspective of this sickly “antiquarian,” as a rupture, disruption, even a destruction of
history (20, 49)—hence the valorization of what Nietzsche will call the “unhistorical”
power, or “forgetting,” as an antidote to “historical fever” (69, 4).11 That is, in a tricky

themselves” (§ 258). Hegel’s dialectical concept o f time thus sounds like the most refined version o f
Ecclesiastes’ assertion that “there is no new thing under the sun” (1:9). In his critique o f this sort o f atemporality, Heidegger thus gestures in the direction o f the kind o f prophetic temporality that will displace
fatality— even if it seems, at first, that prophecy is a synonym for inevitability.
11 “By the word ‘unhistorical’ I mean the power, the art, o f forgetting and drawing a limited horizon round
oneself. I call the power ‘super-historical’ which turns the eyes from the process o f becoming to that which
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phenomenological gesture, authentic history—what is, for Heidegger, Dasein’s self
understanding as thrown-projection toward its own-most possibility—can only appear,
can only disclose itself, ‘historically’ in terms of what seems to be unhistorical, or as
Nietzsche again says, “untimely,” since the being of Dasein can never be made
objectively present without conflating the ontological difference between beings and
being as such. Therefore, in Heidegger’s words, “lost in the making present of the today,
it [i.e., inauthentic historiography] understands the ‘past’ in terms of the ‘present.’ In
contrast, the temporality of authentic historicity, as the Moment that anticipates and
retrieves, undoes the making present of the today and the habituation to the
conventionalities of the they” (357-358, Heidegger’s emphasis). What this means, then, is
that any organized attempt to represent this rupture in fact only represses the emergence
of authentic historicity or restricts the general economy of temporal expenditure.
Somewhat ironically, vulgar historiography is, then, a symptom of the attempt to cover
over Dasein’s radical historicity.
Yet, such a gesture—in spite of itself—cannot help but call attention to precisely
what it seeks to repress. In a strangely protracted manner, ontic historiography does aid
historicity’s appearance, but only indirectly and against its own apparent efforts. That is,
the era of the rise of historicism is really the era of a crisis of historicity, the era where
historicity threatens to disclose itself and is, therefore, repressed all the more violently
through the very proliferation of historiographies. For, to make a Foucaultian point, better
than merely hiding something is pretending not to hide it: better than merely repressing
something is putting it to work. To put Heidegger’s discussion in more psychological and
social terms, society embraces historiography in order to sublimate the anxiety of
history’s temporalization and the sense of isolation and alienation modem time produces
by distancing subjects from comforting absolutes like “Human Nature,” “Progress,” or
even perhaps “God.” In a more Heideggerian idiom one could say that historicity is
covered over in its ostensible disclosure through historiography. Indeed, as Heidegger
gives existence an eternal and stable character— to art and religion. Science— for it is science that makes us
speak o f ‘poisons’— sees in these powers contrary powers; for it considers only that view o f things to be
true and right, and therefore scientific, which regards something as finished and historical, not as
continuing and eternal. Thus it lives in a deep antagonism toward the powers that make for eternity— art
and religion— for it hates the forgetfulness that is the death o f knowledge, and tries to remove all limitation
o f horizon and cast men into an infinite, boundless sea whose waves are bright with the clear knowledge
o f—becoming!” (Nietzsche 69-70)
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notes, “ultimately, the rise of the problem of ‘historicism’ is the clearest indication that
historiography strives to alienate Da-sein from its authentic historicity” (361). The
situation is, then, doubly ironic: if historiography is, unexpectedly, the covering over of
historicity, historicity nevertheless manages to ‘appear’ as this very covering over. Thus,
if historiography ultimately helps historicity to appear in its ontological structure, it does
so only symptomatically or according to a counterintuitive index that anticipates the
discussion, below, of Kant’s Sign of History.
Heidegger and Patocka’s idea that the ontological rootedness of history might be
disclosed through a rupture in the surface of history can, in one sense, be historicized. In
fact, this rupturing is the characteristic action of specifically Romantic prophecy. As
Koselleck suggests, a particularly acute awareness of, and ambivalence concerning,
history emerges alongside an understanding of historical time characteristic of the late
eighteenth century: “the decade from 1789 to 1799 was experienced by the participants as
the start of a future that had never yet existed” (56). For Koselleck, the French
Revolution introduces a change to the concept of revolution itself—marks a kind of
revolution of revolution. As noted above, the pre-Romantic sense of the term connotes an
Aristotelian “revolution of constitutions,” or a certain predictable pattern of historical
change that is, in essence, circular, working on the analogy of celestial revolution as a
rotation and a return (Koselleck 41).12 For, if Plato’s state was, in Aristotle’s view,
utopian for failing to acknowledge that states—like the human subjects on which, in
Plato, they are modeled—perish, Aristotle’s response nevertheless suspends Bildung
through a repetition that is essentially circular. As Alexander Kojeve notes, Aristotle
would assert that “there is no absolute political Knowledge relating to one of the possible
forms of State. But, happily, there is a closed cycle in the transformation of States, which
is eternally repeated. Therefore this cycle can be understood conceptually, and by
speaking of it, one can grasp the different States and Man himself through concepts”
(115-116). Yet, if this concept of “[hjistory has nothing to do with what is called
‘History’ today” (Kojeve 116), it is because modem history is a response to the
12 The De casibus tradition o f Medieval historiography, based on Boccaccio’s series o f biographical
sketches, De casibus virorum illustrium, is a specific example o f history’s reduction to a kind o f taxonomy
o f repeatable forms. As Larry Scanlon notes, readers often “see in its continual insistence on the instability
o f Fortune, and the nearly invariable downward trajectory o f each narrative it presents, nothing more than
Medieval didacticism o f the most static variety” (121).
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possibility of a development in the concept of change itself. With the French Revolution,
for instance, violent upheaval and civil war—traditionally conceived as either outside of
historical regularity (therefore insignificant contingencies) or completely absorbed by
predetermined narratives—seem to contaminate history, to gain traction as historically
significant events by appropriating and transforming the content of the Classical concept
of revolution.13 As Koselleck suggests, “revolution, initially a transhistorical expression
bound to natural factors, was consciously employed as a metaphor for long-term or
especially sudden political events, to ‘upheavals.’ To this extent it could contain elements
of civil war” (44). The contamination of the naturalistic basis of the word “revolution”—
something happening also in geology thanks to Georges Cuvier’s catastrophist theories of
global evolution—means also a breach in the limits of historical representation: that
which would either not have figured or would have threatened to disfigure historical
regularity itself is, in this reconfigured conceptual idiom, able to leave its mark on history
or to gain a certain historical legitimacy. History’s meta-psychology, as it were, takes on
Freudian dimensions: irrational and regressive events, rather than being understood as
exceptions to history and easily dismissed as chance errors, become ‘properly’ historical,
become part of the tissue of history, forcing the very concept of history and historical
change to reformulate itself. Thus, as Nikolas Kompridis suggests, “to say that an
openness to the novelty of the future, an openness to disruption, discontinuity, and
unforeseeable change, is what makes modernity historically distinctive as an epoch and
as a form of life is not to say quite enough” (40): the modem, Romantic subject is not
merely oriented toward the future but toward an altogether new concept o f the future.

13 The shift from an Aristotelian concept o f revolution to the notion o f revolution as the violent disruption
o f cyclical economy can be phrased, in Codings’ terms, as a shift from parodic, camivalesque forms o f
symbolic inversion characteristic o f early modem culture to the formulation o f such difference as the
inhuman, threatening Other o f culture. So, for instance, “by choosing to read the Revolution as disaster,
Burke constructs an instance o f the traumatic Real” (Monstrous 73). That is, as Codings argues,
Rabelaisian inversion mocks the system o f symbolic exchange but does so in an effort only to reorient the
relationships within that field. That is, it does not aim to eliminate symbolic exchange itself. In contrast,
disaster rewrites inversion as a kind o f total violence, one that displaces displacement just as romantic
revolution (rebellion) displaces revolution (repetition). That is, while symbolic exchange defers violence
precisely through exchange, disaster— like the gift— suspends that economy in the name o f a kind o f
jouissance or in the refusal to sublimate desire. “The shift from inversion to disaster is crucial in this
regard; by rewriting inversion, which mocks the entire field o f signification, as disaster, which destructively
disfigures that field, Burke creates a counter-poetics o f what Lacan would later cad the Real” (Codings
Monstrous 73).
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In a parallel context, Gerald M. MacLean, in Time’s Witness: Historical
Representation in English Poetry, 1603-1660, describes more precisely how the
revolution in the concept of revolution in historiographical consciousness must be linked
to the historical conditions of actual political revolution. From an implicitly Marxian
perspective, MacLean argues that history in seventeenth-century England involved “a
theory of representation based on metaphors of space and sight” (4) as a result of the
prevailing political model—namely, monarchy. Historiography adopts a view of the past
akin to the position—timeless, transcendent, ‘objective’—accorded to the sovereign,
effecting a “reduction of time to space” indicative of “the limits of the possible historical
consciousness of the time” (MacLean 5, 20). Social consciousness and aesthetic
productions are dialectically invested in the politics that shape daily life; cultural works
and forms of consciousness are not merely the effects of politics but also shape the
politics that will, reflexively, shape them. Therefore, radical changes in politics have
complex though corresponding effects on the organization of knowledge. In other words,
since the English and French revolutions both involved what Franco Moretti calls “the
deconsecration of sovereignty” (42), displacing monarchy through some form of popular
governance, historiography is altered in kind as the notion of a transcendent, totalized
vision of the past becomes fractured through this political upheaval into a more nebulous
field of perspectives—a perspectivism that Caroline Lamb, as discussed in chapter five,
takes full advantage of in an effort to displace prevailing forms of historical narrative.
Hence, where “the revolution in historiography of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth
centuries established history as a self-regulating discipline of knowledge whose terms
were increasingly subject to debate” (MacLean 17), this transition, it seems, echoes the
democratization that establishes government as a self-regulating discipline similarly
subject to debate. In other words, the revolution of the concept of revolution, the radical
revision of the sense of history that shifts emphasis from mere repetition to discontinuity,
is dialectically related to actual, political revolution.
For Koselleck, the revolution of revolution coincides with the “temporalization
[ Verzeitlichung] of history,” 14 or interrupts the iterative and therefore comparably
spatialized sense of time based on naturalistic revolution—what Mikhail Bakhtin calls
14 The phrase quite clearly echoes Heidegger’s “temporalizing o f temporality” (349) discussed above.
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“Folkloric time.” 15 Such temporalization is the ultimate consequence of “the peculiar
form of acceleration which characterizes modernity,” converting past futures—futures
that were in a basic sense predictable for being essentially continuous with their
present—into the opacity of modem futures, into the “frühen Neuzeit” of modernity
(Koselleck 5). That is, if Romanticism witnesses the rise of modem historiography-—of
different, relatively self-conscious ways of conceptualizing historical order in the wake of
Natural Law’s delegitimation—this historiography is itself produced as a reaction to
time’s loss of internal continuity, when past, present, and future no longer form a
predictable itinerary, therein soliciting compensatory organization. This discontinuity
marks—briefly, in a sudden flash that dies almost instantly—a certain openness to a
future that is literally unprecedented and, as such, completely new rather than recycled.
As Kompridis suggests, temporalization means that “our old way of thinking and acting
could not have prepared us in advance for the difference the new introduces. There are no
empirical or inferential relations that allow us to move from the old to the new without
expanding our empirical or logical space: the new introduces empirical and inferential
relations that were not already there” (33-34). That is, rather than simply paralysing the
subject, Romantic, temporalized historical existence introduces “the time of the new, the
time of new beginnings,” or an orientation “that is expectantly open to the novelty of the
future” even if this means that Romanticism cannot “bring its idea of itself to

15 In “Forms o f Time and o f the Chronotope in the Novel,” Bakhtin names the cyclical form o f time in
preindustrial culture— a “profoundly spatial and concrete” (208, Bakhtin’s emphasis) time based on
naturalistic repetition— “folkloric time.” In this chronotope,
human life and nature are perceived in the same categories. The seasons o f the year, ages, nights
and days (and their subcategories), copulation (marriage), pregnancy, ripening, old age and death:
all these categorical images serve equally well to plot the course o f individual life and the life o f
nature (in its agricultural aspect). All these images are profoundly chronotopic. Time here is sunk
deeply in the earth, implanted in it and ripening in it. Time in its course binds together the earth
and the labouring hand o f man; man creates this course, perceives it, smells it (the changing odors
o f growth and ripening), sees it. Such time is fleshed-out, irreversible (within the limits o f the
cyclical), realistic. (208)
Like other commentators discussed here, Bakhtin notices that this conception o f time undergoes a
fundamental reorganization in the eighteenth century: “[w]hen the immanent unity o f time disintegrated,
when individual life-sequences were separated out, lives in which the gross realities o f communal life had
become merely petty private matters; when collective labour and the struggle with nature had ceased to be
the only arena for man’s encounter with nature and the world— then nature itself ceased to be a living
participant in the events o f life” (217).
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completion” or that “it cannot ‘ground’ itself in its claims to autonomy so long as it is
open to the new, to unforeseeable new beginnings” (Kompridis 37).16
In other words, the concept of history in Romanticism begins to look prophetic in
precisely the terms of Soren Kierkegaard and Maurice Blanchot. For, as Koselleck
remarks, the revolution in the concept of revolution and the frühen Neuzeit of modernity
apparently “unchain a yeamed-for future while the nature of this future robs the present
of materiality and actuality” (18). Likewise, Kierkegaard suggests that “the prophetic
individual does not possess the future—he has only a presentiment of it. He cannot claim
it, but he is also lost to the actuality to which he belongs” {Irony 260). The Romantic
prophet represents precisely this modem, temporalized, historical subject. Paradoxically,

16 While the revolution o f revolution— the temporalization o f history— suspends the appeal to historical
precedence, this suspension is not itself, in a strange way, unprecedented. As MacLean’s study o f
historiography during the English civil war suggests, the seventeenth century offers a political precedent for
the suspension o f precedent. The notion that historical sensibilities might become increasingly dissatisfied
with the logic o f appealing to precedent as authority and its mystical structure dictating that “the older the
claim, the stronger the argument” (MacLean 18-19) is not, then, unique to Romanticism. And yet, it seems
odd to say that the suspension o f precedent as a meaningful way o f understanding one’s historical moment
is itself a precedent to which Romanticism might refer. For the form o f such a relation is precisely what the
content o f the revolutionary historical moments reveal to be impossible. This meta-historical ambivalence
toward precedents for the unprecedented is something several Romantic texts— discussed at greater length
in the chapters that follow— like Percy Shelley’s Hellas, Wordsworth’s Prelude, and Blake’s minor
Prophecies, seem especially sensitive to given their complex investment in scenes from the past even as
that past proves, hermeneutically, unstable or revisable. Indeed, the impossibility o f absolutely severing ties
with some mode o f continuity— for a history o f the suspension o f precedence constitutes the re-containment
o f time by space— seems to be the problem Romantic utopianism explicitly labours under. In fact,
Romanticism seems to act in response to its own ‘precedent’ in a way that would both build on and yet, in
doing so, deviate from Cromwell’s fate.
MacLean argues, for instance, that a deficit o f imagination was partly responsible for the success
o f the English monarchy’s restoration: “if opposition poets [i.e., anti-royalist poets] had done a better job o f
imagining unprecedented futures that did not require monarchy, then there would have been less need for
the Restoration” (9). While MacLean immediately backs away from this point— “yet to do so would surely
be to misconstrue the tasks and responsibilities o f the poets however directly engaged they might be in
changing the world” (9)— it seems, in fact, to find echoes in Romanticism, specifically in works like Percy
Shelley’s Defence. In other words, earlier instances o f time’s liberation from space— o f history’s
temporalization— suggest that a major difficulty for revolutions in or o f consciousness is the public’s
reluctance or inability to transcend the comfort afforded by some version o f precedent, a comfort that tends
to re-discipline temporality. For instance, in the case o f the English civil war, argues MacLean, “the new
age, however unprecedented it might have been, remained inescapably bound to traditional artistic habits o f
thought and representation, and to a past form o f government, one headed by a single, heroic leader” even
if that meant poets o f the Commonwealth would often “prefer republican Rome to monarchist England”
(233, 224). To avoid a similar fate, revolutionary Romantic poetry would thus have quite radically to revise
concepts like allusion— something Blake’s Milton, in its re-visioning exigency, illustrates. In an effort to
register temporal discontinuity and the kind o f future it opens, history in Romanticism would have to
remain suspicious even o f its comparison to other instances o f revolution, as such instances would tend to
replace imaginative production with a practice o f memorialization that would, again, diminish the future’s
prodigal opacity.
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history as a discipline—and as a form of disciplining time—appears, symptomatically,
when everyday, comfortable regularity fails to account for either world-historical events
or subjects’ subsequent existential distress. History seeks, artificially and quite ironically,
to preserve or to return to the continuity of prehistorical life, following a nostalgic
itinerary in seeking, in effect, to complete history in history’s complete annihilation, its
re-absorption into futures past.1718History—even in its partial liberation of individuality
from Platonic and Aristotelian schemes and from the Natural Law tradition—would
ultimately counteract the frightening, abyssal freedom of time itself, a freedom similar to
the purely negative (in the sense of workless) freedom of irony. And yet, what would it
mean to face this freedom? What would it mean to face history understood as the
defacement of social, political, cognitive, and sensible regularity, or as the removal of
certainty by pure possibility? As hinted above, such an historian might be thought of as
ironic in Kierkegaard’s sense. In fact, the Romantic prophet is indistinguishable from the
ironic figure of the historian—who is himself nothing other than the historical subject of
Romanticism. As an ironic historian—an historian who suspends or revokes historical
content in order to prepare for the new, unprecedented future—the Romantic prophet
figures, like Kierkegaard’s Socrates, as the midwife to history or as the preface to
historical actuality, a position that in itself, contrary to Hegel’s attempt “to reclaim a
positive content” {Irony 269) for Socrates, is only the condition of possibility for
positivity and as such, if thought in a rigorously dialectical manner, absolutely negative
and unactual.
Prophecy in the Romantic period cannot simply be identified with concepts like
anticipation or prediction, since these concepts aim in fact to discipline the much more
ambiguous and potentially disruptive effect of prophecy. If history emerges, as a reaction
to temporality, in and as a kind of hiatus in actuality, it is also trapped in this hiatus such
that it cannot impose its narrative with total success. For prophecy discloses, in spite of
its synthesizing and unifying vision of time, a perpetual preface in history that resists
instantiation and regularization, just as freedom in Kant would resist direct legislation.
17 That is, a return to a concept o f the future as something continuous with the past and present, a concept
o f the future characteristic o f Bakhtin’s folkloric time.
18 “Kierkegaard is, ironically, much more dialectical than Hegel on this point. For Kierkegaard, Socrates
was essentially ironic, essentially negative, and yet his standpoint o f negative freedom cleared the way for
positive freedom, and in this respect deserves a positive evaluation” (Hall 328).
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This is not to say—at the other extreme—that prophecy is always non-predictive: rather,
its relation to prediction is essentially ambivalent. Hence, prophecy’s effects, as a specific
kind of performance, cannot be reduced to its predictive efficacy. Indeed, like the concept
of revolution, prophecy in Romanticism is infected with its complete Other. “Claus
Westerman,” for instance, “has shown how the lament, the prayer, and the threat are as
characteristic of prophetic discourse as are the prediction and the oracle” (Balfour 5). As
Ian Balfour’s study illustrates, as far back as Herder and Eichhom in Germany and
Robert Lowth and Alexander Geddes in Britain, prophecy is recognized as a complex
form of linguistic performance, one that, specifically, complicates the notion of the
promise. In fact, the concept of prophecy is almost schizophrenic: just as historiography
tries to repress the same historicity and temporality it reveals, prophecy attempts to
repress—through its synonymization with prediction—the radically unprecedented future
time opens up. Prophecy, reduced to prediction, could be seen as a defensive attempt to
transform the most dangerously unpredictable element into a figure of prediction as such;
in fact, precisely this operation is discussed at greater length, and in the specific terms of
“denegation,” in chapter five in connection to Mary Shelley’s Valperga. Maurice
Blanchot, developing the insights of Andre Neher’s seminal L ’essence du prophétisme,
goes further along these lines, emphasizing the negativity of prophetic speech, how as a
linguistic performance prophecy remains intensely ambiguous: “to foresee and announce
some future event does not amount to much, if this future takes place in the ordinary
course of events and finds its expression in the regularity of language. But prophetic
speech announces an impossible future, or makes the future it announces, because it
announces it, something impossible, a future one would not know how to live and that
must upset all the sure givens of existence” {Book 79).19 Rather than providing

19 To look forward to chapter three, this helps to clarify why, in the case o f Percy Shelley’s play Hellas,
Ahasuerus the prophet diminishes the significance o f future knowledge, for it seems that there is nothing
interesting or unusual about simple prediction if what one predicts is that the repetition o f the same will
repeat again, or if prophecy does not claim to change the very nature o f the relationship to the future:
Would’st thou behold the future?— ask and have!
Knock and it shall be opened— look and, lo!
The coming age is shadowed on the past
As on a glass. (803-806)
As Mark Kipperman notes, ‘“ The coming age is shadowed on the past’ not because all time is the same
illusory moment but because the cycle o f revenge and retribution has produced a history empty o f progress,
a history about to end in 1821, a moment suddenly pivotal, not insignificant” (163).
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foreknowledge, Blanchot argues that “when speech becomes prophetic, it is not the future
that is given, it is the present that is taken away, and with it any possibility of a firm,
stable, lasting presence” (Book 79).
In his short essay, “On Prophetic Speech,” Blanchot hollows out the concept of
prophecy, placing emphasis on prophecy’s typically ignored or repressed disruptiveness.
For Blanchot prophecy is not a full speech, is not the mystical merger of signifier and
signified in a divine Logos. This is because, in the first instance, prophetic language
only repeats the speech confided to it, [and is] an affirmation in which by
a beginning word something that has actually already been said is
expressed. That is its originality. It [i.e., prophetic speech] is first, and yet
there is always before it already a speech to which it answers by repeating
it. As if all speech that begins began by answering, an answer in which is
heard, in order to be lead back to silence, the speech of the Outside that
does not cease: “my incessant Word,” says God. (Book 82-83)
The prophet’s ‘original’ utterance is always already displaced by the implicit interval or
difference occasioned by repetition. Hence, the prophetic utterance is hardly univocal but
rather aims to generate the impression of univocity in order to obscure or manage the
discord that solicited the prophet’s supplementation in the first place. “Prophetic speech
is originally dialogue” {Book 82), even if that dialogue amounts to a mere echo, given the
fundamental difference implicit in any mediation of the immediate. In fact, in a move that
recalls Kierkegaard’s tendency to treat rhetorical or grammatical phenomena in terms of
existential positions—for example, Socrates not only speaks ironically but is irony—
Blanchot describes the prophet himself as a kind of split-personality, as a subject who has
lost possession of himself in becoming possessed by the God:
Suddenly a man becomes other. Jeremiah, gentle and sensitive, must
become a pillar of fire, a rampart of bronze, for he will have to condemn
and destroy all that he loves. Isaiah, decent and respectable, must strip off
his clothes: for three years, he walks naked. Ezekiel, scrupulous priest who
was never lacking in purity, feeds himself on food cooked in excrement
and soils his body. To Hosea, the Eternal says, “Marry a woman of
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whoredom; let her give you a prostitute’s children, for the country is
prostituting itself,” and this is not an image. {Book 81-81)
Blanchot links this sense of psychological displacement—a kind of insanity or subjective
‘seizure’ in every sense of the word—back to the literally unsettled condition of the
Israelite’s priest class, as described in the Old Testament. That is, if “prophetic speech is
a wandering speech that returns to the original demand of movement by opposing all
stillness, all settling, any taking root that would be rest” (Blanchot 79), this means that
the language itself reflects the geographical condition of the Levites—the one tribe
denied a specific plot in the promised land: “but to the tribe of Levi he gave no
possession: because the Lord the God of Israel himself is their possession” (Joshua
13:33).20 Indeed, if Shelley’s Wandering Jew, discussed in chapter three, emerges from a
Medieval folkloric tradition, he also gestures toward this older record of an essentially
Hebraic placelessness.
For Blanchot, this description of the prophet serves, ultimately, as a description of
the poet’s essence as the ultimate mediator between the divine and the human, between
being and beings. In “The ‘Sacred’ Speech of Hölderlin,” the poet is described as
prophetic not because his or her speech is absolute but, on the contrary, because the poet
negotiates the relationship between existence and existents—a relationship that cannot be
actualized and therefore hovers in a strange, ontological anticipation that Blanchot will
call the “Sacred.” The Sacred, says Blanchot, following Heidegger, “is the immediate
[...], the immediate that is never communicated but is the principle of all possibility of
communicating” (“Sacred” 120) and thus must stand outside of and logically anterior to
mediation, or any play between phenomenal revelation and concealment. Hence, the poet
is mediation as such, is the navel or gathering point of the universe that assembles the
“AH”; “essentially, poetry relates to existence in its totality” such that “what poetry has
connection with, what, undoubtedly, allows it to be connection itself, is not nature (as
plant, people, or sky, or nature as ensemble of real things) but what Empedocles calls
boundless totality” (“Sacred” 115). The poet-prophet thus stands in a place prior to the
mediation he or she makes possible and is something like the immediacy of mediation.
Hence, when it comes to establishing continuity, the prophet is, existentially, as
20 The Bible offers an alternate reason for this exception in Genesis 49:5-7.
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ambivalent as he or she is rhetorically. The Sacred poet marshals the “shining power
whose outpouring is the law, principle of appearance of what appears, origin of all ability
to communicate” (“Sacred” 122). Or put differently, the prophet creates a radical opening
in the universe that allows phenomena to appear at all, making all subsequent oppositions
between discovering and covering-over—the whole play of cognitive and phenomenal
light and dark—possible: “the Sacred is the day: [but] not the day as it contrasts with the
night [...]. It is the day, but anterior to the day, and always anterior to itself; it is a before
day, a clarity before clarity” (“Sacred” 121).21
If the Sacred is the immediate that enables mediation, it is difficult to describe its
structure as anything but a kind of radical self-displacement—as a Derridian trace or a
Schellingian “intermediate concept,” something that “neither has being nor does not have
being” (Ages [3] 64, 39). Indeed, Blanchot adopts the rhetoric of prophecy to describe
this structure precisely because, for him, prophecy refers to the essential displacement or
evacuation of the mediator—that is, the displacement or evacuation of essence. Blanchot
articulates the problem of the immediate’s mediation through the delicate
phenomenology of temporality, where the poet can be thought of as existing in
anticipation of his or her own being. Hence, the poet, “existing as a ‘not yet,’ [...] has
grasped, foreseen the arrival of the Sacred, which is the principle of this very arrival
anterior to any ‘something is coming’ and by which ‘all’ comes, the All comes”
(“Sacred” 122). That is, the poet must “exist as a presentiment of himself, as the future of
his existence” just as the poem’s ‘presence’ is nothing but the anticipation—the ‘pre
sense’—of presence: “a poem is not without a date, but despite its date it is always yet to
come, it speaks in a ‘now’ that does not answer to historical indicators. It is presentiment,
and designates itself as that which does not yet exist, demanding the same presentiment
from the reader to make an existence for it, one that has not yet come into being”

21 Blanchot does not mean to suggest that without poets there would be no universe. Rather, the poet
represents something like a logical necessity for explaining how it is that the infinite and the finite have
come into contact. Hence, “the poem must exist” not because its absence would turn being into nothingness
but “because without it the day would be there but it would not light up; without it everything would
communicate, but this communication would also be at every moment the destruction o f everything, lost
into an always open infinity” (“Sacred” 125). Put differently, it is only through their relation that the
infinite and the finite gain contours: just as beings do not properly exists without being, it is also the case
that “the Immortals need mortals, need finiteness,” for “their light, too close to original unfurling, needs to
become thicker to light them up truly, to become clarity upon them” (“Sacred” 124).

42

(“Sacred” 117, 112). As a figure standing at the threshold of the world’s constitution, the
prophet is existentially ambivalent. That is, the prophet is located between mediation and
immediacy in an opposition that can coalesce into a dialectical drive but only by
abandoning its intermediate position and, with it, the prophet’s very Sacredness.
That is—as Kierkegaard would say of Socrates’ irony—the sacred (immediately
mediating) prophet never can come into being or actuality without abdicating his or her
place as the immediacy of mediation. And yet, it is the very insistence on expressing this
inexpressibility—through the silence of that impossible speech—that draws attention to
this impossibility. For, as Blanchot asks, in language that recalls William Blake’s [First]
Book ofUrizen, “how can the Sacred, which is ‘unexpressed,’ ‘unknown,’ which is what
opens provided only that it is not discovered, which reveals because unrevealed—how
can it fall into speech, let itself be alienated into becoming, itself pure interiority, the
exteriority of song? In truth, that cannot really be, that is the impossible” (“Sacred” 126).
However, as Blanchot’s fascination with Orpheus might suggest, the impossibility of
possessing the Sacred or rendering the Sacred objectively present—the impossibility of
reconciling the Sacred (immediacy) with speech (mediation and productive negation)—
does not mean that the poet abandons such a project: not only did the poet “never shy
away from this freedom of poetic existence that condemns him at once to the distress of
an existence purely to come and to the terrible trial of being the place of extreme
opposition, but he embodied it as no other did” (“Sacred” 130)—even if this meant
suffering certain disembodiment or literal dismemberment. That is, figuration’s
disfiguration, like the interruption on the surface of history that (dis)closes historicity, is
the operation through which the Sacred manages to be ‘expressed.’
After all, in another echo of Orpheus—but also, perhaps, recalling the tortured
Hebrew prophets or the suffering of Blake’s “Eternal Prophet” (Urizen 10:17), Los—
“whoever wants to be a mediator must first be tom apart. Whoever wants to take on the
ability to communicate must lose himself in what he transmits, yet feel himself
incommunicable” (“Sacred” 130). That is, the very impossibility of Sacred speech (hence2

22 Blanchot is engaged in the same kind o f problem that I will discuss in connection with Paul de Man, in
chapter three. De Man, however, will reduce the issue to a merely rhetorical play between trope and
performance— linguistic meaning and linguistic being— that casts language into an abyss o f perpetual
(dis)organization and (de)totalization.

43

Blanchot’s scare quotes around the word in his essay’s title) is what leads the finite back
to the infinite—as if the prophet’s word manifests itself only in silence, for “silence is the
only real communication, it is the authentic language” (“Sacred” 126). If time and
historicity both announce themselves in the interruption or persistent irritation of the
same history they make possible, then charting this irritation will consist of an analysis of
the silences—or in the phenomenological stuttering—that afflict Romanticism when
literature confronts the revolutionary concept of the future. Hence, chapter two
considerers the impalpable condition of impression disclosed in Wordsworth’s gibbetmast episode from The Preleude. Similarly, Ahasuerus’ narrative deficit, discussed in
chapter three, seems again to return inscription and marking to a kind of silence;
Ahasuerus is scarred by God’s mark and yet yields only a vacant, anti-predictive
prophecy. Indeed, something analogous occurs in the case of Blake, in chapter four, when
prophecy in Milton becomes a “blank in Nature” (Milton 8.21-22). This suspension of
determination through prophecy, finally, gestures toward the more violent repudiation of
female prophecy described in chapter five in the context of Caroline Lamb and Mary
Shelley—a case of prophecy disclosing temporality only through the ripples created by
the texts’ efforts to repudiate prophecy. All of these texts present prophecy as a tension
generated in the expression of an impossible expression, where this interruption emerges
only very subtly in phenomenological, linguistic, and formal terms.

II. Ironic Historiography and Prophetic History in Kant

There is a deep irony in moving from a concept of prophecy as clear, reliable
foresight to prophecy as radical silence, absence, and uncertainty—an irony that recalls
Kierkegaard’s description of irony as “infinite absolute negativity” (Irony 259). Romantic
prophecy, in fact, is not accidentally related to this kind of negativity but could be
defined as ironic historiography. Much depends upon a closer analysis of existential
irony, then, since it forms the ‘ground’ both for prophecy’s radical ambivalence and its
corrosive temporality, its resistance to the kind of narrative coherence that disciplines
time through an essentially spatial mapping.
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While The Concept o f Irony represents an extended elaboration on infinite
absolute negativity, the concept is in fact borrowed from Hegel’s description of Romantic
irony in the Aesthetics:
Solger was not content, like others, with superficial philosophical culture;
on the contrary[,] his genuinely speculative inmost need impelled him to
plumb the depths of the philosophical Idea. In this process he came to the
dialectical moment of the Idea, to the point which I call “infinite absolute
negativity,” to the activity of the Idea in so negating itself as infinite and
universal as to become finitude and particularity, and in nevertheless
canceling this negation in turn and so reestablishing the universal and
infinite in the finite and particular. To this negativity Solger firmly clung,
and of course it is one element in the speculative Idea, yet interpreted as
this purely dialectical unrest and dissolution of both infinite and finite,
only one element, and not, as Solger will have it, the whole Idea.
Unfortunately Solger’s life was broken off too soon for him to have been
able to reach the concrete development of the philosophical Idea. So he
got no further than this aspect of negativity which has an affinity with the
ironic dissolution of the determinate and the inherently substantial alike,
and in which he also saw the principle of artistic activity. (1.68-69)
It is useful here to emphasize that Hegel’s distaste for irony is not a result of irony’s
negativity or its suspension of the actual—for it is only through a thoroughgoing negation
that the universal and the particular achieve the productive synthesis Hegel, in the
Phenomenology, calls “individuality.” Rather, he is critical of stalling the dialectic in its
negative moment, of failing to negate the negation, thereby remaining in abstraction.
Later in the Aesthetics Hegel makes clear that the problem, then, is not irony’s negativity
but its inactivity, its refusal to put negation to work or to make negation effective in a
project that would involve concretization: a “purely universal consciousness” of the sort
indulged by irony, after all, “cannot attain to any specific action” (2.1209). The ironic
shape of consciousness “ends in mere heartfelt longing instead of acting and doing,”
suffers a kind of hypochondriac melancholy that “will not let itself go into actual action
and production, because it is frightened of being polluted by contact with finitude,

45

although at the same time it senses the deficiency of this abstraction” (1.159, 1.160).
Irony is thus too “one-sided” (1.160), anticipating Hegel’s criticism of Kant, since its
form of negation remains too purely ideal. Hence, Hegel’s real problem with irony has to
do with its lack of negativity or its non-dialectical attempt to take what is merely
subjective as the ground or foundation of philosophy: that is, irony begins to look like the
foundationalism expounded by intellectual intuition, if that concept is not properly
tempered by mediation.

For while intellectual intuition represents an advance over

Kant’s “optimistic form of skepticism” (Kojeve 109) insofar as it asserts a fundamental
continuity in knowledge—asserting that thought can know itself and its own conditions
of possibility, that thought can be Absolute in a way Kant’s paradigm necessarily
denied—Hegel is nevertheless wary of any intellectual intuition that would operate in a
purely positive mode or that would claim that actual knowledge of what actually exists is
available to consciousness immediately.
Kierkegaard, however, seems to find in irony’s hyper-negativity a more
ambivalent relationship to actuality, a relationship that is useful for describing prophecy
and, as discussed in connection with Ernst Bloch in chapter five, concrete utopia. That is,
ironic negativity seems, for Kierkegaard, to be meaningful and historically effective even
if its negativity is resolutely workless. For this is the key to how revolution can be
revolutionized: ironic negativity can suspend the drive to make all negativity productive
in the name of an overarching project, therein opening the possibility of a new project all
together, rather than committing subjectivity and history to an augmentation of the status
quo. Glossing Hegel, Kierkegaard remarks that “irony sensu eminentiori is directed not
against this or that particular existing entity but against the entire given actuality at a
certain time and under certain conditions” (Irony 254). Irony at this level is existential, a
way of being in the world—or of not being in the world—rather than something merely23
23 In fact, in the Philosophy o f Right, Hegel will define Romantic irony explicitly as a product o f Fichte’s
attempt to unify intuition and intellect in pure subjectivity:
Now this form o f subjectivism [i.e., Probabilistic] is irony, the consciousness that this principle o f
conviction is not worth much and that, lofty criterion though it be, it is only caprice that governs it.
This attitude is really a product o f Fichte’s philosophy, which proclaims that the Ego is absolute,
i.e. is absolute certainty, the “universal self-hood” which advances through a course o f further
development to objectivity. O f Fichte him self it cannot properly be said that he made subjective
caprice a guiding principle in ethics, but, later on, this principle o f the mere particular, in the sense
o f “a particular self-hood,” was deified by Friedrich von Schlegel with reference to the good and
the beautiful. (258)
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verbal or rhetorical. In words that anticipate Blanchot’s description of prophecy,
Kierkegaard continues that “the whole of existence [becomes] alien to the ironic subject
and the ironic subject in turn [becomes] alien to existence” {Irony 259). In fact, “actuality
has lost its validity for the ironic subject” such that “he himself has to a certain degree
become unactual” {Irony 259). Kierkegaard’s ironic subject is closest to Blanchot’s
prophet when Kierkegaard explicitly addresses the prophetic quality of this irony:
For the ironic subject, the given actuality has lost its validity entirely; it
has become for him an imperfect form that is a hindrance everywhere. But
on the other hand he does not possess the new. He knows only that the
present does not match the idea. He is the one who must pass judgment. In
one sense the ironist is certainly prophetic, because he is continually
pointing to something impending, but what it is he does not know. He is
prophetic, but his position and situation are the reverse of the prophet’s.
(261)
Blanchot’s reading would, then, reverse this reversal and read the prophet and the
prophetic mode as a kind of Kierkegaardian irony,24 opening a new way to think about
the performance of prophecy in Romanticism as a certain dis-actualization or a
detotalization in the hermeneutic relation to history as an object of figuration. After all, in
irony “the ironic figure of speech cancels itself [...] inasmuch as the one who is speaking
assumes that his hearers understand him, and thus, through a negation of the immediate
phenomenon, the essence becomes identical with the phenomenon” {Irony 248). That is,
Kierkegaard follows Hegel and yet deviates from his logic at a crucial moment: when the
ironist experiences a contradiction in the relationship between his actual and his ideal
conditions, this does not, as it would for Hegel, necessarily mean that the subject works
to reconcile this contradiction by refashioning the actual in an effort to actualize the ideal.
Rather, in a gesture recalling Schelling’s more recursive and tortured dialectic,
Kierkegaard imagines that this contradiction becomes actual as contradiction in a way
that threatens Hegel’s picture of history as the progressive, inevitable amelioration of
contradictions through work.
24 “Impossible, the reconciliation o f the Sacred with speech demanded that the poet’s existence come
nearest to non-existence. That is when, for one moment, it itself seemed possible, when, before foundering,
it agreed to assert itself in song” (“Sacred” 131).
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The Romantic prophet is an ironic historian; in spite of itself, historiography’s
aspiration to narrative coherence is precisely what historiography’s prophetic strain
suspends, just as irony, for Paul de Man, resides within but “is the undoing, the necessary
undoing, of any theory of narrative” {Aesthetic 179). Hence, the breach in history the
prophet makes, the subtraction of historical continuity and present actuality through his
or her supplementation of narrative, introduces désoeuvrement or Blanchot’s notion of
worklessness into the very historiography that would aim to turn all negation into
production. So, while “Socratic questioning is clearly, even though remotely, analogous
to the negative in Hegel” one key difference is that “the negative, according to Hegel, is a
necessary element in thought itself, is a determinant as intra [inwardly]” whereas with
Socrates “the negative is made graphic and placed outside the object in the inquiring
individual” {Irony 35). This sense of standing outside of a system aims to separate ironic
negation from dialectical negativity or determinate negation, in effect displacing the
immanent continuity attributed by Kierkegaard to the negative in Hegel’s paradigm:
For irony, everything becomes nothing, but nothing can be taken in
several ways. The speculative nothing is the vanishing at every moment
with regard to the concretion, since it is itself the craving of the concrete,
its nisus formativus [formative impulse]; the mystic nothing is a nothing
with regard to the representation, a nothing that nevertheless is just as full
of content as the silence of the night is full of sounds for someone who has
ears to hear [i.e. negative theology]. Finally, the ironic nothing is the dead
silence in which irony walks again and haunts (the latter word taken
altogether ambiguously). {Irony 258)
This ironic negativity, then, represents a certain kind of freedom from work and
teleology. Indeed Socrates, like the Romantic revolutionaries of the late eighteenth
century, seems concerned to shatter the determinism and fatality of the Greek kosmos and
to open the way to a concept of free action. And yet irony alone only offers what
Kierkegaard—echoing Hegel’s criticism—will call negative freedom, a product of
prophetic enthusiasm’s absorption in pure possibility:
In irony, the subject is negatively free, since the actuality that is supposed
to give the subject content is not there. He is free from the constraint in
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which the given actuality holds the subject, but he is negatively free and as
such suspended, because there is nothing that holds him. But this very
freedom, this suspension, gives the ironist a certain enthusiasm, because
he becomes intoxicated, so to speak, in the infinity of possibilities, and if
he needs any consolation for everything that is destroyed, he can have
recourse to the enormous reserve fund of possibility. {Irony 262)
For Kierkegaard, this negative freedom and ironic enthusiasm describes Romanticism as
a whole: “throughout this whole discussion I use the terms ‘irony’ and ‘ironist’; I could
just as well say ‘romanticism’ and ‘romanticist’” {Irony 275n). And while he will, like
Hegel, suggest that it betrays a failure in the dialectical method—an insistence on the
negative to the exclusion of the affirmative (although this ‘problem’ might be
reconsidered as a precursor to negative dialectics2526)—he also acknowledges that
Romantic irony is appropriate to its cultural situation, as a corrective to the empty
progressivism of science; in the context of Tieck’s irony, for instance, Kierkegaard
admits that “the world was in its dotage and had to be rejuvenated” and “in that respect,
romanticism was beneficial” {Irony 304).
However, if Kierkegaard will ultimately aim to curtail Romantic irony in a move
that parallels prophecy’s management of temporality through identification with
prediction, the pervasive irony of his own text tends to displace such containment.

25 “Negativity is part o f what Kierkegaard during the period o f writing Christian Discourses (1847) called
his ‘inverted dialectic’ (JP. 1:760)” (Burgess 159).
26 Niels Thulstrup in Kierkegaard’s Relation to Hegel raises a similar objection to the dialectically
recuperative readings o f Kierkegaard’s irony. Despite attaching his proper name to The Concept o f Irony,
Thulstrup argues that Kierkegaard produces, in fact, a kind o f pseudononomous text. Kierkegaard, says
Thulstrup, “as an experiment wished to try his hand at the role o f a Hegelian historian o f philosophy” (261)
even though he was in fact no Hegelian at all. As Thulstrup details with impressive historical precision,
Kierkegaard’s understanding o f Hegel, at the time o f his dissertation’s production, was spotty, largely
second-hand, and heavily mediated by Danish philosophers like J.L. Heiberg, Frederick Christian Sibbem,
Poul Martin Moller, H.L. Martenson, D.G. Monard, and Christian Molbech, and theologians like H.N.
Clausen. Hence, while “it is still possible that through secondary sources Kierkegaard had obtained a kind
o f understanding o f Hegel” (56), his contact with primary texts seemed to be, at least up to 1835, quite
limited. Hence, if Kierkegaard is in some respects experimenting or playing with the idea o f being an
Hegelian, Thulstrup sees an opening for a more ironic reading o f his treatment o f Hegel’s treatment o f
irony:
Kierkegaard, with such [existential as opposed to Hegelian] opinions, which [...] are only hinted
at in that work [i.e., The Concept o f Irony], was not a Hegelian, but one who as an experimenter
chose the indirect method, chose to appear as a w olf in sheep’s clothing, to play the role o f a
Hegelian historian o f philosophy. This looked so artless and harmless— and in the course o f time
some allowed themselves to be deceived by the costume, have in complete seriousness believed o f
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Indeed, Kant faces a very similar problem when he attempts to employ and yet curb
enthusiasm in an effort to prophesy the future in The Conflict o f the Faculties. For just as
Kierkegaard’s concept of irony introduces a potentially endless reflexivity into history, so
Kant’s reflexive, dualistic philosophy—a kind of structurally ironic philosophy—gestures
toward its own immanent irony in the very same moment as it claims to predict the
future. That is, within Kant’s work, there are significant hints that discontinuity or
fragmentation operates as the very form o f metaphysical ‘completeness,’ specifically in
his treatment of aesthetic judgment in the third Critique and the Sign of History in later
“historical political texts” including The Conflict, or what Jean-Francois Lyotard calls
Kant’s “fourth Critique’’'’ (Differend xiii).27 This reflects the ambivalence of prophetic
determination as an agent both of insistent regularization and a symptom of the crisis in
rational completion. For, Kant’s system will permit prediction only insofar as it also
makes concrete or empirically verifiable prediction impossible. Indeed, Kant draws
attention to the central place of irony in his metaphysics through rhetorical ironies. For
instance, “To Perpetual Peace” opens with a literally ironic prophecy of history—“a
certain Dutch shopkeeper’s sign, on which a graveyard is painted” (107) as a joke about
‘perpetual peace’—gesturing not only to that other, more complicated Sign in The
Conflict o f the Faculties, discussed below, but also hinting at the latter’s ironic
dimensions. In fact, just as biting sarcasm proliferates in the section concerning
philosophy’s relationship to theology, Kant’s discussion of history and prophecy in this
text is frequently incongruous and even comical. Specifically, the section called “An Old
Question Raised Again: Is the Human Race Constantly Progressing?” is book-ended with
ironic prophecies.

Kierkegaard, the master o f irony, that his outside, the academic dissertation On the Concept o f
Irony, full o f scholarship and perspicacity, was also his inside. That is a strange misunderstanding
o f a thinker who could not only write a book about irony but who could also use irony himself.
( 260)

27 Indeed it is Lyotard, in his essay “The Sign o f History” and throughout The Differend who draws
attention to the strange status o f the Sign o f History in Kant’s thought. For Kant himself, the issue figures
only briefly in The Conflict the context o f thinking about the relationship between the philosophy faculty
and the law faculty as a kind o f allegory, perhaps, for the problem (that is, the impossibility that is
nevertheless demanded by reason itself) o f legislating ideas. In fact, the connection to the French
Revolution as an example o f this difficult relation and its concomitant affects remains only implicit in Kant
while Lyotard brings it to the surface. In other words, the possibility o f reading The Conflict in terms o f a
theory o f history requires Lyotard’s mediation even as reading the Sign as a kind o f prophecy goes beyond
the terms o f Lyotard’s analysis.
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In the opening, for instance, Kant comments, “it was all very well for the Jewish
prophets to prophesy that sooner or later not simply decadence but complete dissolution
awaited their state, for they themselves were the authors of this fate” (Conflict 143). As
Peter Fenves elaborates, this kind of prophecy involves not vatic fullness but rather
forgetting; prophecy coincides with the prophet’s ignorance concerning his or her causal
role in what he or she ‘predicts’:
Such forgetfulness is the condition for the possibility of all previous
prophecy, not only in the various predictions of everyday life but even in
the divination that claims access to a divine ground. When recounted from
a position of utter awareness, the forgetfulness of prophets turns their very
announcement into jest, and so the account of successful prophecy always
appears as an ironic narrative of the impossibility of prophecy. {Fate 185)
The irony of the Hebrew prophets involves, then, an artificial discontinuity between
prediction and empirical actuality. Something slightly different, however, takes place in
the conclusion to Kant’s chapter with an irony based not on the secret determination of
actuality by the prophet, but on the total unreliability of empirical data as such:
A doctor who consoled his patients from one day to the next with hopes of
a speedy convalescence, pledging to one that his pulse beat better, to
another an improvement in his stool, to a third the same regarding his
perspiration, etc., received a visit from one of his friends. “How is your
illness, my friend,” was his first question. “How should it be? I’m dying of
improvement, pure and simple!” {Conflict 169)
Is this a metaphor for the historical hermeneutic Kant has just elaborated in terms of the
Sign of History? If so, does it undermine confidence in his assurance that history, despite
empirical evidence, is indeed progressing? Indeed, this prognosis seems to be perfectly at
odds with the symptoms, making the doctor’s claim seem ridiculous. Does this make
Kant’s historiographical prognosis of eventual improvement, with its perverse
relationship to empirical events, similarly ridiculous? For, Kant’s answer to the question
he poses—that, yes, humanity is progressing—seems to align itself with the irony of the
doctor’s counterintuitive prognosis since this improvement is expressed, strangely,
through empirical, regressive violence. Hence, it makes sense that, if in an earlier draft of
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the Conflict (the so-called “Krakauer Fragment”) Kant, as Fenves says, “appears in
precisely the position of—and with precisely the same function as—the Jewish prophets”
(Fate 186 n8), that he should here appear in the position of this strangely optimistic
doctor.28

* * *

Turning to the matter placed between these anecdotal brackets, it is important to
stress that the Sign of History is, itself, an ironic prophecy, a fragment in the ‘system’ of
history. It is ironic not for any failure to be promissory (indeed, upon closer analysis,
promises reveal themselves to be, in fact, the sort of fragmentary totality theorized in
Jena Romanticism). Rather, the Sign of History plays a role in the historical and political
context that is similar to the role of purposiveness in Kant’s third Critique. In other
words, it describes a complex mode of contact, claiming to link different domains—not
just the rational and the intuitive but the present and the future—only through a mode of
non-relation. This demands closer attention, as it helps to see how the Sign of History,
Kant’s explicit attempt to prophesy without foresight in precisely the mode of the
Romantic prophet sketched here, reflects the structural irony of the Kantian architectonic.
Irony is not simply a rhetorical mode that Kant might slip into or out of for stylistic effect
but rather describes the form of all attempts at systematic totalization made from within a
reflective idiom that must simultaneously forestall and fragment that same totalization.
In the third Critique, Kant identifies “purposiveness” as judgment’s autonomous
concept responsible for offering palpable confirmation of the realizablility of ideas—a
concept that grounds aesthetic judgments of taste as well as teleological concepts of
nature. Such a concept is necessary since the challenge facing Kant following the
Critique o f Pure Reason and the Critique o f Practical Reason remained how to connect
practical ideas to sensible intuition, a task apparently impossible and yet demanded by
reason itself. As Kant puts it, “the concept of nature [or the domain of the
28 Part o f the complication with interpreting Kant on this point is that he seems to demand the reader to
accept two antithetical positions. For, it is neither that empirical regression is merely apparent nor that
general progress is merely apparent. In truly antinomic form, these mutually exclusive itineraries do not
interfere with or relativize each other. Kant can say two different things at the same time— can, like the
Biblical prophets discussed further in chapters two and three, both threaten and comfort in one breath.
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understanding’s categories] does indeed allow us to present its objects in intuition, but as
mere appearances rather than as things in themselves, whereas the concept of freedom
does indeed allow us to present its object as a thing in itself, but not in intuition”
{Judgement 14). Reason must overcome this divide if ethics is to be considered more than
a mere pipedream. So, for Kant,
[e]ven though the moral law has its origin in our pure reason (rather than
in our experience of nature) and even thought the freedom of our will has
its place in the “supersensible” (or as [Kant] also calls it, the “noumenal”)
domain of things as they are in themselves rather than in the domain of
appearances, the “final end” or purpose that morality sets for us [...] must
nevertheless be realizable in nature and in accordance with its laws [that
is, the final end must be able to appear within the forms of space and time
and the categories of the understanding that make up the intuitable realm].
And this fact, [Kant] tells us, can be “cognized” or brought home to us by
the power of judgment, through its concept of purposiveness. (Guyer x)

90

Put differently, ideas need to be coordinated to phenomenal experience, at least in
principle, such that their imminent realization becomes palpable; however, the very
tangibility o f objects in intuition constitutes the insuperable barrier to things-inthemselves, precisely because the unconditional cannot be rendered conditionally or
understood in terms of the understanding’s a priori forms of knowledge without being
fundamentally distorted. But if the power of judgment—as the reflective judgment of the
third Critique, rather than the merely legislative, determinant judgment of the first
Critique— through its concept of purposiveness is supposed to span the gap here by
serving as the felt presentation of the possibility of the realizablity of ideas in nature, it
has to perform this function without in fact reducing the idea to an appearance. Indeed,
this is why prophecies are almost always presented in such cryptic terms.29

29 As Kant says toward the end o f the second introduction o f the third Critique, “the power o f judgment
[...] provides the mediating concept between the concepts o f nature and the concept o f freedom, which
makes possible the transition from the purely theoretical to the purely practical, from lawfulness in
accordance with the former to the final end in accordance with the latter, in the concept o f a purposiveness
o f nature; for thereby is the possibility o f the final end, which can become actual only in nature and in
accord with its laws, cognized” (81 -82).
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In Book Five of Wordsworth’s Prelude, for example, in what Michael Ragussis
calls “one of the most puzzling moments of all of Wordsworth’s poetry,” the speaker
relates a dream30—really, Descartes’ dream—of “strange freight” (5.84) designed “by its
very nature to elude our grasp” (148, 149). Rather than offer an interpretation of this
episode’s contents, it is useful at this point to consider—in a larger sense—the necessity
of its obscurity, that is, to read its obscurity itself as an expression of the essentially
Kantian injunction that ideas cannot be rendered directly intuitable. The obscurity in
prophetic episodes of this sort reflects Kant’s insistence on the negative presentation of
ideas or the fragmentary ‘unity’ of his system. Hence, in this episode, the stone
(geometry) and the shell (poetry), eternal forces that counterpoint the finitude of human
productions—“those palms atchieved [sic]/ Through length of time, by study and hard
thought” so frail that one “might almost ‘weep to have’ what he may lose” (5.5-7, 25)—
manage to sound “A loud prophetic blast of harmony” on the sensuous ear only in a
strangely “unknown tongue,” betraying at once its characterization as “articulate sounds”
(5.96, 94, 95). Likewise, in Kant we are supposed, strangely, to feel reason itself in a
deflected and indirect presentation of ideas—that is, in ideas’ ‘actual possible’
realization, where what is actual is the possibility o f realization and not realization itself.
Precisely this issue of intuiting without feeling—or feeling without feeling—reflects the
ironic economy in Kant’s system that, when highlighted, clarifies the relationship
between what Kant says in his Critical works and what he says in his later, prophetic
comments on history in The Conflict o f the Faculties.
The promissory quality of purposiveness’s mediation—that is, purposiveness as a
guarantee of an agreement between reason and appearances, where it is the guarantee and
not the actual agreement that is cognizable—is a perspective that stretches analogy (as in
Wordsworth’s dream where rocks and shells are massively overdetermined) to its limits.
The apparent contingency of aesthetic experience and nature itself is treated as i f it were
part of an organized whole. This whole is represented, analogically, as something akin to
but infinitely more powerful than human understanding. So, while purposiveness does
not claim to represent something in nature as such, it does offer the subject an orientation

30 In the 1850 version, the text shifts from the third to the first person such that the speaker shifts from the
auditor to the teller o f the tale.
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toward nature. With purposiveness, the demand of rational totality offers reflective
judgment a guide—an as if (contingency were rational) that judgment’s reflections can
follow in order to allow theoretical reason to coincide with practical reason or the higher
horizon of moral ideas. As Kant notes, “this transcendental concept of a purposiveness of
nature is neither a concept of nature nor a concept of freedom [...] but rather only
represents the unique way in which we must proceed in reflection on the objects of nature
with the aim of [facilitating] a thoroughly interconnected experience” {Judgement 71).
This is why aesthetics becomes part of the focus for the third Critique, for
“without being transformed into a moral experience, the aesthetic experience of beauty
nevertheless offers some palpable confirmation of our more abstract presupposition of the
conditions of the possibility of morality” (Guyer xvi). Beauty, as another kind of sign or
what Kant calls “hypotyposis,” thus confirms a universal purposiveness in this gesture
while-—since aesthetics does not impose determinate judgments and since beauty in
particular is a mode of judging without a concept—at the same time withholding a
determinate purpose. After all, beauty can claim subjective universality since it is based
not on an agreement concerning contingent data (i.e., whether subjects agree about the
relative beauty of an object) but on a universalizible cognitive process, expressing the a
priori harmony of the understanding’s categories with nature—a capacity or power
common to all subjects. The sublime, likewise, offers a sensible sign of universal
coherence, although this coherence comes about in a counterintuitive mode of
presentation by the imagination: “the experience of the sublime is the feeling (rather than
mere idea) of our own power of reason, which is precisely what makes it an aesthetic
experience, and palpable evidence for the existence of that faculty of mind that is
presupposed but not actually experienced in morality itself’ (Guyer xv). Hence, Kant
notes that “the beautiful seems to be taken as the presentation of an indeterminate concept
of the understanding, but the sublime as that of a similar concept of reason” (128), such
that each brings theoretical and practical ideas, through their respective faculties, into a
relationship with something intuitable, without determining or objectifying their
respective ideas.
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Put differently, aesthetic judgment aims to address the problem that Kantians have
often faced concerning the motivation guiding an ethical scheme as purely formal as the
categorical imperative. As Dale Snow notes,
[i]n order to be truly free, man’s essence must be outside all causal
connections and thus independent of time: nothing determines it but itself.
It is a classic conundrum of Kantian moral theory that the good will is
described as resisting all influence from inclinations, whether benign or
malign, and determining itself by means of the moral law alone. Students
of Kant have long been confessing themselves stymied by the notion of
determination to action by reason alone; in fact we may speculate that
enough of the original students of Kant found this a stumbling block that
Kant attempted to clarify his meaning by invoking the feeling of respect
for the moral law. This is not an inclination, Kant reminds us, but a pure
feeling. A pure feeling—this expression, verging as it does on the
oxymoronic, reflects Kant’s struggles to capture the sense of self which
we undeniably do have especially strongly at moments of moral choice.
(170)
The “pure feeling” of respect reflects the precarious if also crucial place of feeling as a
vanishing mediator of sorts between pure theoretical understanding and pure practical
reason, for it is just as important that that Law be felt (as opposed to thought) as that this
feeling gesture, sign-like, toward an ethical ideal that is always beyond all intuition or
feeling.
Kant’s concept of the historical Sign represents a prophecy of historical progress
that attempts to form a similar kind of bridge—so, an ambivalent, fragmentary, and
treacherous bridge—between ideas and appearances as that provided by purposiveness in
aesthetic judgment.

1 1

Hence, the understanding here confronts some of the same31

31 Kant’s Sign continues his complication o f semiotics begun in the third Critique, where he displaces the
intuitive content o f schematic hypotyposis with symbolic hypotyposis: a way o f expressing concepts not
through intuitions but through an analogy to intuitions. In other words, symbolic hypotyposis is not the
attempt to feel ideas; rather, it is the attempt to export the kinds o f laws or schemas that govern intuitive
data to a realm o f relations— relations between concepts— that exist outside intuitions. This would be
something like formal synesthesia: using the schema offered by, say, taste but in another sensory context,
like sound. This is rather different than saying Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony is savory in any literal way—
although it is clear how such analogies can become metaphors very easily. Instead it means to take the
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paradoxes as it did in the third Critique, in that this historical Sign claims to offer
palpable confirmation of the idea of progress without itself embodying actual progress.
The Begebenheit responds to the “desire” for “a fragment of human history and one,
indeed, that is drawn not from the past but future time” (Conflict 141) that would
guarantee history’s progress. In Kant’s words, this index of history “would have to be
considered not itself as the cause of history, but only as an intimation, a historical sign
(signum rememorativum, demonstrativum, prognostikon) demonstrating the tendency of
the human race viewed in its entirety, that is, seen not as [a sum of] individuals (for that
would yield an interminable enumeration and computation), but rather as divided into
nations and states (as it is encountered on earth)” (Conflict 151). So, for example, the
apparently regressive events of the French Revolution serve as a sign of progress not
because the actual Revolution marks an improvement in material life but because the
events disclose, simultaneously, a feeling and a will amongst observers that transcends
the determinate situation. This feeling may remain unconscious or “incognizant” (151)
but, nevertheless, it signifies the rational idea of sustained peace on earth. Hence,
‘reading’ history demands a special kind of exegete: what emerges here is a prophecy of
progress that is akin to purposiveness’ (implicit) prophecy in the third Critique to unite
theoretical and practical realms, the as if formula modeling the kind of totality reason can
seek only indirectly through contingent historical circumstances.
More specifically, the higher aims of the human race are, as noted, observable in
the experience of sympathy that an observer feels for one or another side in a conflict.
This is “a universal yet disinterested sympathy” (Conflict 153), says Kant, recalling32

‘rules’ o f taste (bitterness diminishes flavors, saltiness can intensify sweetness, etc) and apply these kinds
o f relations to another realm o f objects or another set o f data. In fact, this example is inadequate in that
Kant’s symbolic hypotyposis would go one step further: rather than applying the relationships in one sensefield to another, he would aim to use the relations within intuition as such as a model for a realm outside
intuition altogether. This brings us back to The Conflict in that the Sign o f History is similarly ambivalent
with respect to intuition. For, as noted, this Sign attempts to link intuitive, actual historical experience and
rational realms— the idea o f progress— via a very dislocated form o f analogy, that is, via an apophatic
mode o f affect that inspires a concept o f history’s progress but only insofar as, in the final analysis, it
repudiates its intuitive basis.
32 When Kant talks about the vejy existence o f the Sign as evidence o f progress— because it can emerge as
a sign only if progress has already been made— this is not to say that the Sign stops being a sign. It may
well be that that capacity for enthusiasm relies on a certain level o f moral development; but this
development is not to be understood as the end o f progress or the apex o f the realization o f ideas in nature.
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aesthetic judgment’s disinterestedness, since public expression of this sympathy could
prove extremely risky for the observer. As Gary Aylesworth explains,
[bjecause the public display of enthusiasm for the Revolution is contrary
1 -i

to the self-interest of the spectators [...] it is a sign of progress in the
development of the moral faculty [even though] as a motivating passion, it
is ethically condemned, since if it were to affect our disposition to act, our
will would not be purely motivated by law. Thus, for Kant, enthusiasm for
the French Revolution may be uplifting as a sign (Begebenheit) of human
progress (i.e., moral development), but is condemnable if it becomes a
motive for joining the revolutionaries. (92)
The same event can figure, to use Lyotard’s terms, in two different phrase regimes or in
two different registers simultaneously. In one, the Revolution is condemnable; in the
other, it generates a laudable sign, a hint that Reason and actual history must, at some
point, coincide. Hence, while the material, historical situation becomes a rather unreliable
horizon for answering the question, “is the human race progressing?”, there remains a
kind of feeling—bound up with but separable from historical events—that is responsible
for disclosing the possibility of the idea of progress. The Begebenheit, this feeling or
affect, then, is not itself the idea of progress rendered immediately palpable but, like
purposiveness, is a concept that aims to show history could realize this idea, or that
history is capable of progress... eventually.
The prophetic Sign of History has, in other words, an ironic, double voice as well
as a radically discontinuous temporality. Rather than synthesizing the contingent and the
rational, it suggests that contingency and rationality continue to phrase the ‘same’
historical events according to their own regimes despite the mutually exclusive
consequences, such that history can always appear to be “dying of improvement.” For
Lyotard, this is not so much a problem with the Kantian system as it is a resource—which
is to say that Kant’s permanent parabasis, the double-voiced quality of irony’s irony, is
for Lyotard an opportunity to theorize various discontinuities. As Georgess van den
Abbeele notes, “Lyotard is able to theorize dissonant forms of ethical and political
activism beyond the politics o f consensus and representation”—that is, beyond Hegelian
ideology that puts all negativity to work—thanks precisely to “the reputedly static
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antithetic and dialectic” of Kant’s system (xi, my emphasis). That is, the absolute
ambivalence the Sign of History represents, as both regressive and progressive, is exactly
the kind of tension that allows for “the theorization of nontraditional models of dissent
(or ‘dissensus,’ as Lyotard liked to say) and unpresentable cases of injustice (eventually,
his notion of the ‘differend’)” (van den Abbeele xii). Lyotard aims, in other words, not to
sublate Kant’s internal conflicts, but rather—in Lyotard’s metaphor—to navigate
between various islands in an “archipelago” of phrases “like an outfitter or an admiral
who launches expeditions” (Enthusiasm 12). In other words, contact between these selfcontained and perhaps conflicting realms does not mean smashing islands together by
some manipulation of geological tectonics—or philosophical architectonics—but accepts,
rather, a persistent heterogeneity.
In the case of the historical sign more precisely, the promise (of synthesis)
manifests itself as a peculiar feeling, a species of sympathy, analogous to the sublime:
namely, as enthusiasm—a pejorative term, routinely ascribed to prophetic revolutionaries
in the eighteenth century, suggesting a lack of mature thought.3334 Yet, as Kant notes, in
33 While Lyotard aims to maintain conceptual fidelity with Kant in a number o f ways, his emphasis on the
discontinuity in Kant’s system and the suspension o f Reason’s metanarrative takes Kantian thought in a
direction that Kant him self would be reluctant to accept. For Kant remains committed to the idea o f totality
that Lyotard suspends. And Kant would certainly reject the notion o f complete heterogeneity o f the
domains. After all, this disjunction only appears in Kant against his persistent efforts to unify (although in a
strangely oblique, disunited way) intuition and reason.
34 The distance between the Sign o f History as a kind o f reasonable enthusiasm and Schwärmerei
(fanaticism) is for Kant impossible to maintain, as the former seems actively to solicit the latter. This
corroborates Jon M ee’s description o f the socio-political dimensions o f the Romantic discourse
surrounding terms like “enthusiasm” and “fanaticism.” As Mee notes, “the context o f the 1790s” more
widely serves as “a crucial period in the development o f the idea that enlightenment transparence itself
might be a species o f enthusiasm” (18)—the notion that general education might promote counter-cultural
movements. Hence, Mee traces the dialectic between enthusiasm and its regulation through the eighteenth
century, charting its pejoration by political conservatives and subsequent (but very qualified) amelioration
in Romanticism. In political discourse, Mee argues, to label someone an “enthusiast” was to suggest that
his or her ecstasy threatened not only the state but also the notion o f subjectivity itself—threats that recall
the perceived danger o f Socrates’ irony and the “infinitely light playing” that “gives the arbitrary I ffeereign in ironic self-satisfaction” (Irony 270,296) in Schlegel. As Mee writes,
This influx o f divine power was also seen to involve a dangerous dissolution o f subjectivity in
which, as Nigel Smith puts it, “the distinction between individual utterance and Scriptural
authority dissolves.” Thus, paradoxically, the arrogance o f the enthusiast involved the destruction
o f his or her proper self. The apocalyptic ecstasies o f the prophet threatened the continuous self
identity that so much eighteenth-century writing sought to affirm. Enthusiasm threatened a stable
subjectivity as much as it did the stability o f the body politic. (28)
While this may indeed capture the general sense o f the time, M ee’s statement is somewhat misleading:
enthusiasm offers a mode o f subjectivity o f a different sort, one that from a Kantian perspective, as
discussed above, must look paradoxical and unstable but that aims, in fact, at something more sure— i.e.,
absolute— than Kant was able to offer. Yet this perceived instability promoted discipline in a variety o f

59

combination with a republican constitution, “the passionate participation in the good, i.e.,
enthusiasm, (although not to be wholly esteemed, since passion as such deserves
censure), provide[s] through this history the occasion for the following remark [...]:
genuine enthusiasm always moves only toward what is ideal and, indeed, to what is
purely moral, such as the concept of right, and it cannot be grafted onto self-interest”
(Conflict 155). In other words, enthusiasm is the prophetic feeling par excellence. Yet, it
has, like aesthetic feelings, to stop short of becoming an interested feeling, just as
purposiveness for Kant stops short of determining an actual purpose in aesthetic
judgment. Indeed, a closer look at the third Critique reveals how Kant’s attempt to
negotiate between sublime enthusiasm—something that echoes Shaftesbury’s concept of
enthusiasm as a prerequisite for thought—and a more dangerous Schwärmerei serves as
an attempt to regulate and discipline his own form of prophecy. As Kant says in Section
29 of the third Critique, enthusiasm is an “affect” rather than a “passion”: “[affects] are
related merely to feeling; [passions] belong to the faculty of desire [...]. [Affects] are
tumultuous and unpremeditated, [passions] sustained and considered” (Judgment 154).
Proper enthusiasm, while it seems to be excited at the prospect of ideas, lacks the hubris,
as it were, of a passion that would seek to determine the idea sensuously—and therein fall
victim to a transcendental illusion by ascribing thought’s categories to reality itself. Kant
suggests, then, that “enthusiasm is aesthetically sublime because it is a stretching of the
powers through ideas, which give the mind a momentum that acts far more powerfully
and persistently than the impetus given by sensory representations” (Judgment 154). In
other words, there is a reasonable amount of feeling—quantified as affect—that can

forms, including psychological diagnosis: “‘Distraction’ became a key word in describing its [i.e.,
enthusiasm’s] psychological effects. Oscillating between the gloominess o f the Puritan and the sensuality
o f the antinomian (often in the same person), it came to be regarded as a form o f madness” (29). This
madness speaks further to the medicalization o f the term: “By 1735 this threat [of religious zeal] did not
even need to be religious. Once the term was medicalized, it was free to be attached to any kind o f socially
disruptive mania” (Mee 31). Recalling the Sign o f History, enthusiasm also became associated with a
breech in empirical methodology: the subjective claim to transcendent insight is not subject to scientific
verification as it can not enter the public sphere. “‘Demonstration’ to others rather than personal
‘perswasion’ was crucial to Lockean psychology as the means o f proving the truth o f one’s sensations. The
idea o f enthusiasm as resistant to the kind o f public dialogue that demonstration entailed was a recurrent
theme o f eighteenth-century writing on the matter” (Mee 37). Such fears meant that “the possibility o f a
positive definition o f enthusiasm oriented towards the unworlding o f things-as-they-are remained available,
but always haunted by a fear that unworlding was at best unworldly and at worst subversive” (Mee 43)—
just as Kierkegaard’s “controlled irony” is haunted by the abyss o f irony or Kant’s “genuine enthusiasm”
by Schwärmerei.
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attend thought’s movement beyond the sensible, or that might spur the “the mind to soar
above certain obstacles by means of moral principles” (Judgment 154, Kant’s emphasis).
The presentation of this feeling guarantees human progress—the movement
toward perpetual peace, or “the combination of the greatest possible virtue with the
greatest possible happiness of all humanity” (Guyer x)—because it proves that humans
have the capacity for a peaceful society. This mere having-the-capacity-for, expressed in
the feeling of this ability or potential, is in other words the substance of the assurance;
for, as Lyotard describes Kant’s position, “if the history of humanity were but sound and
fury, it would have to be admitted that this same nature that placed the ‘seeds’ of reason
in man also prohibits man, through its own disorder, from developing the effects of those
seeds in reality. Which is [for Kant] contradictory” (Différend 163). As such, the
Begebenheit marks a confusing prophecy: immediate improvement cannot be expected to
manifest itself in empirical situations nor is it to be solicited through participation in
actual, violent revolution. So, if Kant asserts that history is indeed progressing, the
empirical realization of this progress remains frustratingly indeterminate with respect to
time.35 After all, for Kant “revolutionary politics is based on a transcendental illusion in
the political domain, confusing what can be presented as an object for a speculative
and/or ethical phrase—in other words it confuses schemata or examples with analoga.
The progress of a common being for the better is not to be judged on the basis of
empirical intuition, but on the basis of signs” (“Sign” 168). Hence, the time of the
progress to-come is never specified or determinable—it is always to-come. Or, as Kant
says, “so far as time is concerned, it can promise this [actual progress] only indefinitely
and as a contingent event” (Conflict 159). In other words, there is a sense that, just as the
strength of the promise is untouched by regressive, empirical violence it is, at the same
time, also perhaps perpetually suspended in its active promising. And yet, this does not
make the prophecy less ‘true’ or cancel the promise of eventual and perpetual peace, as
35 “N ow I claim to be able to predict to the human race— even without prophetic insight— according to the
aspects and omens o f our day, the attainment o f this goal [i.e., a republican constitution]. That is, I predict
its progress toward the better which, from now on, turns out to be no longer completely retrogressive. For
such a phenomenon in human history is not to be forgotten [Kant’s emphasis], because it has revealed a
tendency and a faculty in human nature for improvement such that no politician, affecting wisdom, might
have conjured out o f the course o f things hitherto existing, and one which nature and freedom alone, united
in the human race in conformity with inner principles o f right, could have promised. But so far as time is
concerned, it can promise this only indefinitely and as a contingent event [my emphasis]” ( Conflict 159).
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suspension in no way undermines the promise as such. As Kant notes, in terms that
strongly parallel the description of ironic, Romantic prophecy as the insistence of
discontinuity and the revocation of certainty, “philosophical prophecy still would lose
nothing of its force” (Conflict 159) even if what it promises cannot have its fulfillment
historically or temporally specified.
If enthusiasm describes the feeling of transcending feeling—something akin to the
oxymoronic “pure feeling” of respect for the moral law—the danger enthusiasm
generates lies in the possibility of feeling’s persistence into the supersensible.3637That is, if
enthusiasm “is a modality,” in fact, “an extreme form of the sublime feeling” (“Sign”
171, 172), its real virtue lies in its spectacular impotence. As Lyotard says of
enthusiasm—although it could be said of the sublime as well—“the attempt to provide a
presentation not only fails [...] but also, so to speak, is reversed or inverted so as to
provide a supremely paradoxical presentation, which Kant calls a ‘simply negative
presentation,’ and which he characterizes with some audacity as a ‘presentation of the
infinite’” (“Sign” 172). In the sublime the imagination’s failure to present ideas is itself
expressed as a painful pleasure, ‘pleasure’ in a non-sensuous and disinterested register
since this concerns the play between reason and understanding rather than anything in
sensible intuition. In Kant’s words from the third Critique, in the sublime “the
imagination, although it certainly finds nothing beyond the sensible to which it can attach
itself, nevertheless feels itself to be unbounded precisely because of this elimination of
the limits o f sensibility; and that separation is thus a presentation of the infinite, which for
that reason can never be anything other than a merely negative presentation, which
nevertheless expands the soul” (156, my emphasis). Similarly, enthusiasm is considered
“genuine” only if it collapses or curtails its attempt to realize ideas, only if it keeps its
distance from the unconditional. Enthusiasm, like aesthetic feeling more broadly, in its
attempt to offer palpable evidence of the realizibility of rational ideas, has to be
maintained, but equally disciplined or rigorously curbed.
361 consider this problem again in chapter two when time, in Wordsworth’s Prelude, ‘appears’ only as the
impalpable power or potentiality o f sensitivity, leaving the speaker with an impression without content or
an invisible mark intuitable only in or through its impalpability.
37 This conflicting relationship between feeling and numbness sets into play a psychological economy that
will be rewritten in Jacques Lacan’s formulation o f the superego as the agency that demands the subject
enjoy...but not too much.
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Behind enthusiasm’s ambivalent attitude toward ideals lies prophecy’s ambivalent
relationship to prediction. Just as prophecy’s narrative supplementation intensifies the
very temporal and historical discontinuity it is supposed to ameliorate, so is enthusiasm
divided between promising and yet empirically repudiating historical progress.
Prophecy’s schizophrenic structure is thus rewritten in Kant in terms of enthusiasm’s
barely restrained fanaticism, its oddly necessarily self-conflicting stance as a guarantee
that relies on the absence o f empirical evidence of the future it imagines in order to
sustain this guarantee. In Lyotard’s words, “Schwärmerei gives rise to an illusion, to
‘seeing something beyond all limits of sensibility,’ i.e., to thinking that there is a
presentation when there is not. It makes a non-critical transition which is comparable to
the transcendental illusion (the illusion of knowing something beyond all the limits of
knowledge). Enthusiasm, on the other hand, sees nothing, or rather sees the nothing and
refers it to the unrepresentable” (“Sign” 173). “Genuine enthusiasm,” then, as opposed to
the fanaticism of Schwärmerei, seems to intuit ideas but then, like Oedipus, to pluck out
its own eyes, to collapse under its own limitations like the sublimed imagination.

So

there are blind Greek prophets even in Kant. The Schwärmer, by contrast, enjoys his or
her obscenity, claims to feel ideas, or to be, in the case of history, engaged in making
progress actually happen. Ultimately, then, Kant does rely on empirical corroboration for
his claim that history is progressing, but relies on this data, as it were, apophatically: it is
only in registering an affect—namely, enthusiasm—that flashes up but disappears just as
quickly that Kant is able to add intuitive content to his otherwise merely formal idea of
progress. Or as Lyotard puts it, while the reflective and cognitive phrases are
heterogeneous they are also, in their very difference, compatible: “the same referent, a
given phenomenon taken from the field of human history, may serve by way of example
to present the object of the discourse of despair, but as a bit of guiding thread, it may also
serve to present analogically the object of the discourse of emancipation” {Enthusiasm
25). With ironic flexibility, the historical phenomenon can, for Kant, say two
diametrically opposed things at the same time, without generating, for him at least, either
a dialectical (i.e, productive) contradiction or an utterly hopeless antinomy. Indeed, it is a38

38 Again, it is tempting to read this psychoanalytically: this self-laceration represents enthusiasm’s
commitment to restraining its own jouissance, o f retreating from the Real o f desire.
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hopeful contradiction, as it were: phrases do not enter into a dialectical process and yet
there remains an assurance—curiously, an assurance that is all the more self-assured for
lack of empirical support—that reason’s ideas will be realized, against all odds, in actual
life.
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C hapter T w o

Wordsworth’s Gift of Prophecy

It remains nonetheless true that literature, beginning to become manifest to itself through the romantic
declaration, will from now on bear in itself this question o f discontinuity or difference as a question o f
form— a question and a task German romanticism, and particularly that o f The Athenaeum, not only sensed
but already clearly proposed— before consigning them to Nietzsche and, beyond Nietzsche, to the future.
— Maurice Blanchot, “The Athenaeum”

Biding time is wise, for in the end
It’s Time that’s going to settle accounts.
— Hugo von Hofmannsthal, The Tower

I. “As are unheard by all but gifted ear”: Wordsworth’s Apocalypse
Aside from Blake, Wordsworth stands out among the major Romantic poets as
having perhaps the most obvious investment in the poetics of prophecy. Unlike Blake,
however, Wordsworth’s treatment of prophecy is explicitly aligned with the conventional
sense of prophecy as prediction and positive knowledge, albeit in the mode of natural
supematuralism. This is in large part thanks to his treatment of memory as a broadly
unifying and synthesizing operation. For instance, in his Essays upon Epitaphs
Wordsworth, citing John Weever’s Discourse o f Funeral Monuments, notes that the
practice of writing epitaphs “proceeded from the presage of fore-feeling of immortality,
implanted in all men naturally” (27). The epitaph responds, in other words, to the sense of
the soul’s immortality that Wordsworth feels to be metaphysically necessary, an
“offspring” (29) of reason itself. In fact, the very existence of funeral epitaphs becomes,
for Wordsworth, empirical proof of the soul’s supermundane future in that such objects
symptomatically express something of the immortality immanent to reason:
If, then, in a creature endowed with the faculties of foresight and reason,
the social affections could not have unfolded themselves uncountenanced
by the faith that Man is an immortal being; and if, consequently, neither
could the individual dying have had a desire to survive in the
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remembrance of his fellows, nor on their side could they have felt a wish
to preserve for future times vestiges of the departed; it follows, as a final
inference, that without the belief in immortality, wherein these several
desires originate, neither monuments nor epitaphs, in affectionate or
laudatory commemoration of the deceased, could have existed in the
world. (30)
Here, prophecy is identified—rather counterintuitively, and yet in perfect alignment with
prophecy’s usual identification with conservative prediction—with memory. In this
treatment, prophecy relates to the future as if that future were always already a memory.
With the help of the epitaph, consciousness is able not merely to pay “tribute to a man as
a human being” but—in a line that echoes the imagination’s sense of “something
evermore about to be” {Prelude 6.542) —“includes this general feeling and something
more” (31). The epitaph thus seems to encompass and totalize time, to weave the past
into the future and therein unify subjects across the discontinuous moments of their lives,
gesturing ultimately to an enveloping plentitude beyond finite existence.
Memory becomes the form of Wordsworthian foreknowledge perhaps most
explicitly in “Tintem Abbey.” For the speaker’s recollection of his youthful “dizzy
raptures” (85) is, ultimately, converted into a promise of future restoration:
While here I stand, not only with the sense
Of present pleasure, but with pleasing thoughts
That in this moment here is life and food
For future years. (62-65)
In fact, with the introduction of Dorothy toward the end of the poem, Wordsworth seems
to gather time together or, to use his recurring figure, to harmonize different
temporalities. That is, Wordsworth casts Dorothy as an image of his own youthful self,
such that, as he says to her, “I behold in thee what I once was” (120). If this turns
Dorothy’s present consciousness into Wordsworth’s past—a form of “animal” (74)
consciousness, so he says, that had not achieved the self-consciousness of his mature
“purer mind” (29), one sensitive to the “still, sad music of humanity” (91)—then he39

39 All citations from The Prelude are, unless otherwise noted, from the 1805 version as edited by Jonathan
Wordsworth, M.H. Abrams, and Stephen Gill, in their parallel text edition.
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attempts, within this analeptic gesture, also to turn his own present consciousness into the
shape of the Dorothy’s future. With this temporal overlapping, Wordsworth tries to
galvanize his synthetic itinerary, one where no experience ought to be “unprofitable”
(53), or where youthful error and “loss” must somehow yield “abundant recompense”
(87, 88)—an economy discussed below in more detail, in the context of The Prelude, as
attempting to profit from prophecy. In fact, the speaker manages both to ‘recover’ and to
‘anticipate’ something that is altogether outside empirical experience. On one hand, his
memory goes beyond recalling details of the Abbey and his past self to include “feelings
too/ Of unremembered pleasure” (30-31) and “little, nameless, unremembered, acts/ Of
kindness and of love” (34-35). If we take him at his word, this seems to suggest that
memory somehow remembers the unremembered, that nothing can be absolutely beyond
all recall.40 On the other hand, the alterity of this past—“I cannot paint/ What then I was”
(75-76)—seems to become the motivating negativity, in a Hegelian sense, that catapults
consciousness beyond the past and the present, and into a transcendent state conducive to
participation in
[a] motion and a spirit, that impels
All thinking things, all objects of all thought,
And rolls through all things. (100-102)
In fact, Wordsworth’s tendency in “Tintem Abbey” to describe this unity in terms of
music links the prophetic “picture of the mind” (61) to perhaps the most explicitly
prophetic episode in The Prelude-, the dream of the Arab.
That is, the speaker in “Tintem Abbey” frequently describes the “sense sublime/
Of something far more deeply interfused” (96-96) in terms of musical harmony,
suggesting that his synthetic operation is fundamentally temporal or is a way of gathering
together not merely different static entities but different, dynamic forces into a mobile
form of coherence. Indeed, if the “eye [is] made quiet by the power / Of harmony” (47
48), opening perception into “the life of things” (49), it is, similarly, the “still, sad music
40 Glancing ahead, this is something Shelley’s Hellas and Prometheus Unbound, discussed in chapter three,
will complicate given that recalling forgetfulness as such might mean re-forgetting. In fact, this
remembering o f forgetfulness that results in the dismemberment (as it were) o f memory might be a way to
understand how a restricted economy o f expenditure, as explained below in more detail, can turn itself into
a general economy or how a relentlessly recuperative and synthetic exigency— like that o f prophecy taken
as prediction— can reach its limit when it aims to systematize that which is anti-systematic, resulting in
(characteristically Romantic) fragmentation or ironic, detotalized, or non-predictive forms o f prophecy.
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of humanity” that spurs consciousness beyond “the mighty world/ Of eye, and ear” to the
center of the speaker’s “moral being” (91, 105-106, 111). Harmony reappears in The
Prelude as the form of the relationship between the finite and the transcendent when that
relationship has been temporalized, that is, historically or allegorically distended. As
mentioned in the previous chapter, in Book Five Wordsworth relates an obscure,
prophetic dream, one that comes on the heels of an acute sadness played in the same key
as in “Tintem Abbey.” The speaker’s pain has a specific root: “it grieves me for thy state,
O man,” but, he says, “not for woes” so much as for the honest labour of “study and hard
thought/ The honours of thy endowments,” since these noble and worthwhile efforts will
ultimately be superfluous as “the immortal being/ No more shall need such garments”
(5.3, 5, 8-9, 23). The contradiction between human frailty—
[o]h, why hath not the mind
Some element to stamp her image on
In nature somewhat nearer to her own[?] (5.42-46)—
and the “highest reason in a soul sublime” (5.40) recalls the tension in the Essays upon
Epitaphs. But where Wordsworth’s Essay turns to the funeral monument in an effort to
mediate between the immortal soul and the mortal body, Book Five of the Prelude turns
to books and poetry. Specifically, the ‘book of poetry,’ condensed (in the Freudian sense)
into the shape of a shell, gathers together time and history in an orchestral crescendo:
“at the word,
The stranger,” said my friend continuing,
“Stretched forth the shell towards me, with command
That I should hold it to my ear. I did so
And heard that instant in an unknown tongue,
Which yet I understood, articulate sounds,
A loud prophetic blast of harmony,
An ode in passion uttered, which foretold
Destruction to the children of the earth
By deluge now at hand.” (5.90-99)
Echoing both the Deluge in Genesis and John’s apocalyptic vision, this scene presents
prophecy as a prelude to apocalypse. And as in “Tintem Abbey,” Wordsworth here
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figures harmony as the form with which to weave together an imminent future with the
present, death with the “deluge now at hand.”
There is a sense, in fact, that Wordsworth seeks to model his temporality on a
kind of mathematical logic that would serve as a universal substrate, something that could
be “the anchor of [his] purest thoughts” (“Tintem” 109). For the shell is the second of
two books described in this vision, the first a stone representing Classical geometry:
The Arab told him [i.e., the dreamer] that the stone—
To give it in the language of the dream—
Was Euclid’s Elements. (5.86-88).
Given its placement in Wordsworth’s book of Books, this book of Elements—an early
text on geometrical sciences—might raise questions about the elements o/books. This
episode could serve, in other words, as an invitation to look more closely at poetry, the
‘elements’ of figurative language, or to consider what units and relationships form and
organize the literary text. And yet, there is something ironic in this invitation. After all, it
seems as if the dreamworld encountered in this vision precisely does not adhere to the
kinds of laws sketched in Euclid’s treatise. For, in direct violation of Aristotle’s law of
non-contradiction—a law implicit in Euclid’s rigorously analytic system—it seems
possible for one thing to be itself and something else at the same time41:
Strange as it may seem
I wondered not, although I plainly saw
The one to be a stone, th’ other a shell,
Nor doubted once but that they both were books,
Having perfect faith in all that passed. (5.110-114)
So, with this invitation to consider the elements of books, we seem instantly to move
beyond the purview of mathematical relation: the epistemology represented by Euclid’s

41 Strictly speaking, Aristotle’s law, most explicitly and thoroughly discussed in Metaphysics Book IV,
chapter 3, states that “the same attribute cannot at the same time belong and not belong to the same subject
and in the same respect” and that “if a man were mistaken on this point he would have contrary opinions at
the same time” (736, 737). While Wordsworth’s description o f the dual status o f the books in the dream
does not quite violate the law in the precise terms o f its formulation by Aristotle, it is still in essence a
violation since Wordsworth’s ‘books’ do not merely acquire additional attributes but undergo a change in
their being— they are two entirely different things at the same time rather than being one thing with and
without the same attribute. And being, to be clear, cannot be an attribute since its addition or subtraction
alters the nature o f the subject essentially.
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Elements reaches the limit of its relevance when one poses the question of the elements
of books, for the latter seem to violate Classical physical and metaphysical laws. The
shell’s fractal geometry, then, would have to manage poetry’s unruly elements.42 Hence,
the harmony’s temporalization of a mathematical relationship between musical elements
represents something like poetry’s attempt to self-organize and to import Euclidian truth
to history and art—an idea Wordsworth will return to in Book Six when “the elements/
Of geometric science” inspire in him “a still sense/ Of permanent and universal sway”
named, simply, “God” (6.136-137, 151-152, 157). If initially poetry threatens to breach
the limits of conceptual order or to collapse axioms that must, as axioms, represent
“truths [that] hold good for everything that is and not for some special genius apart from
others” (Aristotle 736), the “blast of harmony” from Wordsworth’s apocalyptic
imagination animates Euclid’s static, geometrical coherence by introducing the temporal
completion of history in eschatology, suturing the logical gaps made by poetry through a
higher order synthesis.
Later in Book Five, Wordsworth compares the Arab in this dream to a poet and,
ultimately, to himself. The implication is that verse might aspire to a similarly complete
vision—that it might achieve apocalypse in the sense of unveiling timeless truths. Hence,
Wordsworth will aim to emulate the prophet—will literally follow in his footsteps—in an
effort to join elite cultural company:
In sober contemplation of the approach
Of such great overthrow, made manifest
By certain evidence, that I methinks
Could share that maniac’s anxiousness,43 could go
Upon like errand. Oftentimes at least
42 While the shell is not described in precise detail, the spiral-shaped sea-snail shell is most commonly the
kind o f shell one places one’s ear to— as opposed, for instance, to bivalves.
43 This is not the first time poetry and prophecy will be described in terms o f insanity. Earlier in The
Prelude Wordsworth associates prophecy and poetry with madness even as it is supposed to look through
the chaos o f the world o f contingent appearances and into the deep truth:
If prophesy be madness; if things viewed
By poets o f old time, and higher up
By the first men, earth’s first inhabitants,
May in these tutored days no more be seen
With undistorted sight. (3.151-155)
His subsequent assurance that “it was no madness” (3.156) thus seems to be difficult fully to trust, hinting
at the negative side o f prophecy illustrated more forcefully by Shelley and Blake.
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Me hath such deep entrancement half-possessed
When 1 have held a volume in my hand—
Poor earthly casket of immortal verse—
Shakespeare or Milton, labourers divine. (5.157-165)
Later, in Book Ten, Wordsworth again associates himself and his poetic vocation with
prophetic speech, taking the latter in a variety of respects—including denunciation and
warning—but ultimately as a form of totalization:
But as the ancient prophets were enflamed,
Nor wanted consolations of their own
And majesty of mind, when they denounced
On towns and cities, wallowing in the abyss
Of their offences, punishment to come;
Or saw like other men with bodily eyes
Before them in some desolated place
The consummation of the wrath of Heaven;
So did some portion of that spirit fall
On me to uphold me through those evil times,
And in their rage and dog-day heat I found
Something to glory in, as just and fit,
And in the order of sublimest laws. (10.401-413)
As in the dream of the Arab, Wordsworth here imagines that prophetic vision discloses
“sublimest laws” through the “consummation of the wrath of Heaven,” almost turning the
empirically visible violence of the French Revolution—the topic of Book Ten—into a
kind of Kantian Sign of History. Indeed, the French Revolution forms an important
context for this disclosure: the supplementary order imported by prophecy arrives
precisely when mundane law and order has been overturned by political revolt.
Specifically, this stabilizing, transcendent law counters the “Change and subversion”
(10.233) that “might be named/ A revolution” (10.236-237) in Wordsworth’s mind by re
inscribing revolution-as-revolt within the itinerary of revolution-as-natural-recycling.44

44 Geoffrey Hartman’s comparison o f two important, apocalyptic moments in the Prelude—the missed
experience o f crossing the Alps in Book Six and the ascent o f Mount Snowdon in Book Fourteen— squares
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Indeed, Wordsworth’s mixed feelings upon witnessing the crimes committed in Liberty’s
name45 suspend his active participation in revolt. In fact, a form of incessant rethinking
counters or recontains even his psychic revolutions: when he describes how “Inly [he]
revolved” (10.136), Wordsworth’s choice of words carefully excises any sense of
political upheaval and retains only the older sense of revolution as rotation. Within the
chaos of radical upheaval, Wordsworth’s prophecy again emerges as a form of control,
one that aims to weave historical and psychological discord together through the dynamic
logic of harmony, a kind of sensual dialectic that both cancels and preserves differences:
“Wild blasts of music thus did find their way/ Into the midst of terrible events” (10.419
420). By performing this sublimation, “poets, even as prophets” become responsible for
disclosing a rhythmic, harmonious, and organizing temporality demonstrative of how,
despite political or psychological chaos—in fact, in the very withdrawal from the social
into a private apocalypse spurred by such chaos—subjects and perhaps even history itself
remain abstractly “Connected in a mighty scheme of truth” (12.301, 302).
with the argument here in that, for Hartman, Wordsworth’s “tendency [is] to avoid an apocalyptic self
consciousness” ( Wordsworth’s 63). “Wordsworth does not sustain the encounter with Imagination” but
rather attempts to invest that imminent apocalypse back into nature, where the latter is understood as “a
motion and a spirit” (41, 42). And yet, if Nature is, at the same time, “a guide leading beyond itself’— if
Wordsworth mediates transcendence through nature, generating a kind o f “via naturaliter negative”— this
suggests a rhythm o f breach, followed by containment, followed by a breach o f that containment (42, 31).
As Hartman illustrates through a comparison o f biographical and compositional histories, then comparing
those orderings with the structural ordering o f events in the text itself, it is not clear that consciousness
finally achieves any ultimate illumination in the form o f absolute reflection. As Hartman notes:
The poet is suddenly renewed from an unexpected and casual source. The Simplon Pass and
Snowdon bring a twofold revelation that could have been sevenfold in John the Divine. But they
differ from traditional apocalypses by being purely natural and by not inevitably associating
rebirth and violent purgation. The Book o f Revelation that is Nature sees life dying into eternal
life with or without those apocalyptic labours. (67)
In fact, if the apocalyptic vision following the Simplon Pass represents the episode in which Wordsworth
“came once, and only once, face to face with his imagination” (61), it is important to recognize, in the
context o f prophecy’s relation to restricted and general economies, that even this moment o f ostensible
non-restriction, a moment when nature does not mediate the poet’s mind but where the mind becomes ab
solute, is still a form o f restricted economy. While the direct confrontation with the imagination explodes
Nature’s containment, apocalypse as such is another level or kind o f containment that might, in turn, be
displaced by a certain concept o f prophecy as temporal detotalization. Just as the Kantian sublime turns
imagination’s difficulty with presenting ideas into a sign o f Reason, therein exalting the mind through this
negative theology, so does Wordsworth turn the acute disconnection between expectation and experience
into “food” that sustains a grander sense the self as auto-productive.
45
The illustrious wife o f Roland, in the hour
O f her composure, felt that agony
And gave it vent in her last words. (10.352-354)
As the editors’ note to these lines from earlier in Book Ten explains, “Madame Roland was a major
influence behind the moderate Girondins. She was imprisoned in June 1793, and guillotined on November
9. Her last words are said to have been ‘Oh Liberty, what crimes are committed in thy name!”’ (378 nl).
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In the midst of his thinking about the French Revolution’s potential for social and
political liberation, Wordsworth echoes Moses’ democratizing wish that “all the LORD’S
people were prophets” (Numbers 11:29):
Yea, I could almost
Have prayed that throughout the earth upon all souls
Worthy of liberty, upon every soul
Matured to live in plainness and in truth,
The gift of tongues might fall, and men arrive
From the four quarters of the winds to do
For France what without help she could not do. (10.117-123)46
The speaker’s language, however, denies his ostensible desire by erecting barriers to this
universalization of enlightenment. For the speaker reserves this enlightenment for only
those souls “matured to live in plainness and in truth,” that is, souls that are in essence
already enlightened. Moreover, the rhetorical framework, “I could almost have prayed,”
suggests that the speaker did not in fact pray for universal illumination: the grammatical
formulation of the passage as a wish contains a latent rhetorical negation of that same
wish. Such restriction seems inevitable given Wordsworth’s persistent claim to special
election. Indeed, early in The Prelude Wordsworth makes clear that not just anyone can
be a poet, that, like the prophet, a higher power chooses this vocation on the subject’s
behalf:
To the open fields I told
A prophesy; poetic numbers came
Spontaneously, and clothed in priestly robe
My spirit, thus singled out, as it might seem,
For holy services. (1.59-63)
There is a sense, then, that Wordsworth believes himself to be “gifted.” In fact, later he
describes “the mind” as “gifted with such powers to send abroad/ Her spirit” (5.44, 47
48), using the term, there, to describe a form of generosity. Yet, what are the implications

46 The editors’ note to this passage suggests an allusion to Acts 2:3-4. While that is perfectly reasonable, it
seems that it might also gesture toward Numbers, especially given the context, in the Old Testament, o f
state founding and formation.
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of this word’s (i.e., “gifted”) manifold connotations? If poets and prophets, as the 1850
Prelude has it,
[h]ave each his own peculiar faculty,
Heaven’s gift, a sense that fits him to perceive
Objects unseen before (13.303-305),
what is the relationship between the sense of a gift as something offered freely and this
sense of giftedness as a power belonging to a subject and, especially in Wordsworth’s
case, greedily withheld from others? What are the consequences for thinking about
prophecy if the concept of the gift involves the conflation of these two diametrically
opposed gestures? And finally, how does this privatization of prophecy—Wordsworth’s
effort to turn prophecy into a property of the elected subject—undermine its social and
political force and effectivity? Closer inquiry reveals a faultline here in Wordsworth’s
synthetic, totalizing mode of prophecy, something that lies beneath the complications
encountered, below, with the spots of time, where their restorative economy reveals a
retraumatizing potential.

II. “Rare and almost threatening gift”: Prophetic Epistemologies

What exactly does it mean to call the Romantic prophet “gifted”? The word
“gifted” has to be read, here, in Wordsworth’s double sense, as both describing a
particular ability or skill as well as signifying generosity or prodigality—the prophet
gives to his or her people a narrative that warns, threatens, and promises.. .something.
The prophet’s generosity, however, is particularly complicated, and stages the curious
paradox of gift giving. Given Time, Jacques Derrida’s extended treatment of Marcel
Mauss’ anthropological studies of potlatch, proposes to “begin by the impossible” (1)—
namely, by the gift. The difficulty in starting with the gift is that the gift itself presents an
apparent aporia: “if the gift appears or signifies itself, if it exists or if it is presently as
gift, as what it is, then it is not, it annuls itself’ (Given 27). That is, when the gift is
recognized as a gift, it is immediately taken up in an economy of exchange. Any such
exchange of gifts, however, levels down the event of the gift through a formula of
equalization. Put otherwise, exchange—as an essential component of the notion of
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economy as such—when applied to gifts, annihilates the pure giving of the gift by
placing it in terms that make retumability possible. Such retumability—indicating, as
Marx has made clear, a structural equivalency—is, further, easily and almost seamlessly
appropriated by ulterior motives, transferring this potentiality into an implicit demand for
equilibrium and the insistence on some sort of compensation. Due to this nature of
economy and exchange, the gift is thus figured, for the receiver, as a debt. In order to
prevent the gift’s appropriation as debt through economization, sublimating the
singularity of an event that would actually breach the structure of economy itself, and to
try, instead, to think about the gift as such, Derrida turns to strategies involving
dissimulation, secrecy, and forgetfulness, invoking an ironic phenomenology. The gift,
apparently, must be disguised—must appear, but not as what it is—in order to be what it
is. But Derrida goes further than this, arguing that the essence of the gift is entangled in a
paradox that displaces essence (understood as a static quiditas or “whatness”): “the truth
of the gift,” he says, “is equivalent to the non-gift or to the non-truth of the gift” (Given
27). Only through this aporetic procedure can the gift, for Derrida, be approached—
which is to say that the gift, like the auratic original work of art Walter Benjamin
describes, must remain “at a distance, however close it may be” {Illuminations 222).
Only by giving nothing can generosity ‘appear.’ With this in mind, we might
reconsider the concept of false prophecy as it emerges in a rather curious episode in the
Old Testament’s Book of Jonah. Part of the problem for Jonah is that God cancels the
prophecy of Nin’eveh’s destruction after having the prophet announce this event. With a
narrative efficiency characteristic of the Old Testament, the prophecy, the peoples’
repentance, and God’s reconsideration all take place within just a few lines:
Jonah began to go into the city, going a day’s journey. And he cried, “Yet
forty days, and Nin’eveh shall be overthrown!” And the people of
Nin’eveh believed God; they proclaimed a fast, and put on sackcloth, from
the greatest of them to the least of them. Then tidings reached the king of
Nin’eveh, and he arose from his throne, removed his robe, and covered
himself with sackcloth, and sat in ashes. And he made proclamation and
published through Nin’eveh, “By the decree of the king and his nobles:
Let neither man nor beast, herd nor flock, taste anything; let them not feed,

75

or drink water, but let man and beast be covered with sackcloth, and let
them cry mightily to God; yea, let every one turn from his evil way and
from the violence which is in his hands. Who knows, God may yet repent
and turn from his fierce anger, so that we perish not?” When God saw
what they did, how they turned from their evil way, God repented of the
evil which he had said he would do to them; and he did not do it. (Jonah
3:4-10)
God’s change of heart, however, has rather serious consequences for Jonah’s credibility
given the definition of false prophecy offered earlier, in Deuteronomy: “And if you say in
your heart, ‘How may we know the word which the LORD has not spoken?’—when a
prophet speaks in the name of the LORD, if the word does not come to pass or come true,
that is a word which the LORD has not spoken; the prophet has spoken it
presumptuously, you need not be afraid of him” (18:21-22). Jonah’s success—the people
of Nin’evah do change and forestall the anticipated catastrophe—makes him appear to be
a false prophet. Jonah’s story suggests that a successful prophet is, strangely,
indistinguishable from false prophet, since nothing that is threatened materializes if the
warning is, as warning, successful.47 In other words, the social or effective force of the
language (the effect of the prophecy-as-threat) seems to run counter to the content of the
language (prophecy-as-promise), suggesting a kind of schizophrenic or internally, and
literally, preposterous speech. Prophecy, here, involves not an anticipation of the future
in the present but a conflict, where language’s content contradicts the immediate force or
effectivity of the same utterance, thus splitting the utterance into a kind of dialogue,
though one not in echoing harmony, as in Blanchot’s description, but rather suspended in
its own differend.
If a successful prophet looks like, or appears as, a false prophet, we might have to
reevaluate the relationships between prophetic speech, time, and historiography—that is,
the science of history, which, given its tendency, as Heidegger notes, to thematize its
object of inquiry, imposes a certain horizonal limitation on history’s appearance. If, for
47 Northrop Frye seems to emphasize only one side o f this doubled speech, considering prophecy’s
effectiveness as a warning tantamount to perfectly successful prophecy: “perhaps some prophet o f the age,
whether Blake or another matters little, may achieve the final triumph o f the prophet, a triumph accorded in
the Bible only to Jonah, who did not appreciate it, o f finding his prophecy o f impending disaster fail
because it is being listened to” (403).
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instance, the prophetic utterance is valid in some respects only in its non-effect—in its
promissory form—then what is the truth of prophecy, or what constitutes a felicitous
prophecy? Again, the prophecy’s effectiveness as a threat has an inverse relationship with
its own status as a promise; if it is successful in one of these registers, it must be
unsuccessful in the other. For example, if prophetic truth is taken as the adequation
between what is announced and the realization of the events described, prophecy as a
successful threat will always amount to false prophecy since its success would mean
forestalling whatever it anticipates. On the other hand, prophecy that fails as a threat may
be considered true—or at least, in the indefinite lead up to its prediction, not yet false.
Yet, this paradox illustrates how the non-event of a false prophecy is in some ways more
radically generous: for the effectiveness of the threat, the change that the threat solicits,
forestalls apocalypse, giving the community a future even if to all appearances nothing
has been given at all.48
The salient point here is that the internally divided nature of the prophetic
utterance suggests that establishing who is a true and who a false prophet—a matter
immediately relevant to Wordsworth’s self-fashioning—may be irreducibly complex,
perhaps even impossible. This is not merely because the event promised might remain
hovering in the to-come but also because the very concept of prophecy’s truth is radically
elusive: if it is effective as a threat—“rare and almost threatening gift” (Blanchot Book
85)—the truth of this generosity is invisible. For, the threat gives not just the future but
time to the community: time understood as the possibility of mobility, change, and
responsiveness or as an opportunity to revise the status quo in a gesture that, in fact,
outstrips prediction. Time here conditions liberation or what Ernst Bloch, discussed
further in chapter five, calls “exodus,” as it dissolves the habits and sedimentations that
make daily life, even when intolerable, seem to be natural and inevitable. Hence, if we
take the “truth of history” as merely that which appears or is available to historical
narrative, we seem to miss perhaps not the objects in history but certainly history’s
temporality and potentiality. That is, any transcendental concept of the truth of history
seems ill-suited to the matter, in that the gift of time is neither prescriptive nor objectively
48 As discussed in chapter five, Mary Shelley uses the division between the narrative and the narrative
frame in The Last Man to redeploy this difference between threat and promise across a fictional history,
thus opening up a new concept o f the future even in the ostensible annihilation o f humanity.
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present, but rather a kind of opening or opportunity. This problem of the gift of time in
prophecy will reemerge in chapter five, as Mary Shelley and Caroline Lamb both
consider the prophetic curse and the meaning of true and false prophecy in a context that
highlights the juridical logic of historiography.49
The problem of the prophet’s ‘gift’—where this gift is taken as a kind of
generosity that can emerge, as it were, only under radical erasure—contaminates both
Wordsworth’s poetry and, as discussed further in chapter four, William Blake’s texts. It
becomes for both a problem of narrative temporalization. The prophet inaugurates an
historical sequence by articulating a contract with the future. But, because what a prophet
announces is, from the perspective of the present, impossible or unimaginable in
actuality, the effect is to unsettle the point of inauguration itself in the very instant of its
determination. Hence, this contracted future equally resists such containment. Like death
in Blanchot’s critique of Heidegger, it is a future that simply cannot be related to with
any assurance despite its inevitability.50 For, as Blanchot suggests, “to foresee and
announce some future event does not amount to much if this future takes place in the
ordinary course of events and finds its expression in the regularity of language. But
prophetic speech announces an impossible future, or makes the future it announces,
because it announces it, something impossible, a future one would not know how to live
and that must upset all the sure givens of existence” {Book 79). Rather than providing
foreknowledge, Blanchot argues, “when speech becomes prophetic, it is not the future
that is given, it is the present that is taken away, and with it any possibility of a firm,
stable, lasting presence” {Book 79).
In other words, prophecy is not simply predictive but a speech that attempts to
undermine an actual state of affairs by placing present and future into a mutually
exclusive relationship, where the burden of this difference does not so much undermine
the supposed future as cancel or de-realize the present. The effect is to displace presence
as such, through an abrupt repudiation of the present. There is a sense, then, that what is
offered as a starting point for history is, perhaps, always self-conflicted or improper, in
49 See also Mark Cousins’ “The Practice o f Historical Investigation” in Post-structuralism and the Question

o f History.
50 Perhaps one could even say that the inevitability o f death is what ensures that the future can be known as
unpredictable. In a strange way, if death was not inevitable it would not be possible to determine it as
unpredictable since then it may never occur, thus setting it outside the very logic o f predictability.
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the sense of being unable perfectly to appropriate itself. This means that the prophetic
gift, when understood as a retraction of the present or actual, demonstrates a symptomatic
return to points of origin in an attempt to square the experience of the future with the
past—a past that that same future reveals as initially misunderstood or misapprehended.
Hence, narrative coherence will always attempt to economize the “rare and almost
threatening gift” of prophecy and the ambiguous temporality it opens. Narrative—
essentially temporal and yet resistant to temporality’s detotalizing force—attempts
nevertheless to mourn time. And yet, such a project is as ironic as it is interminable, since
time itself only emerges as a traumatic event or as something missed—or, in the terms of
chapter three, cfomembered. For time’s corrosiveness is violent and yet never present—is
always something we ‘return’ to through the memory o/forgetfulness or what Blanchot
calls “forgetful memory” {Infinite 314).
One can situate the problem of prophetic inauguration formally by focusing on
texts that claim to be anticipatory, such as preludes and prefaces. Indeed, if apocalypse is
concerned with the end of history, prophecy is, perhaps, concerned with how history—as
figure, narrative, genre, or experience—eludes totalization, how history opens to novelty,
and how one gains a sense for time through history, even if that means sensing time
indirectly in the rhythm of its arrests. However, inaugurating para-texts, like prophets, do
not simply begin works but attempt to anticipate the disruptive, alienating gift of the
future by writing the beginning in light of that future. The preface attempts properly to
locate a beginning by placing itself in a time before the beginning, such that beginning
can be understood as something yet to come. However, if with this gesture a preface tries
to give the beginning, it can do so only through intense self-negation recalling the
prophet’s mutilation, his or her disfiguration and defacement. In fact, this negation seems
to open another, in fact an absolute, gap between origin and goal, beginning and future,
given that there is a kind of infinite regress implied by such negativity. For when or how,
one could ask, does a prelude itself btgvcfi Can there be—or must there be—a prelude to
a prelude, a preface to a preface that would dig ever deeper into absence in a desperate
attempt to stage the beginning as something continuous with the future?
For Blanchot, such an abyss does indeed haunt literary beginnings and he gestures
toward this when he articulates the paradox that a writer “has no talent until he has
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written, but he needs talent in order to write” {Fire 303).51 Such existential writer’s block
(if you will) cannot be mitigated except by fiat or prefatory extemporaneity, as the
musical connotations of the word prelude suggest52—a usage consonant with
Wordsworth’s “grosser prelude” (2.433) designating an external stimulus in distinction
from the “one life” that is “invisible, yet liveth to the heart” {Prelude 2.430, 424). Hence,
Blanchot: “let us suppose that the work has been written” {Fire 305). Such a beginning,
however, seems to be irreducibly abrupt. In other words, the beginning is unprecedented
and inescapably unexpected. This sense of a prelude as mere positing53 seems to conflict
with the other sense of prelude as an anticipation of beginning: a “prelude” would be both
what is without precedent and that which serves as precedent, such that defining the word
one way or the other inevitably solicits its uncanny other. Like prophecy itself, the
prelude is both the ecstatic fiat that welcomes time’s corrosive negativity and the
defensive attempt to discipline that same negativity by presenting it as its perfect
opposite: a plan of all that will follow. This duplicity is responsible for the conflation of
the gift of prophecy with its own uncanny other, namely, trauma. The gift of prophecy
makes the beginning into something inevitably traumatic because prophecy announces a
future that must break with the beginning absolutely.54

51 Count Reinhard, commenting to Goethe concerning the Spanish revolution in 1820, says something
similar: “[Experience] arrives for individuals always too late, while for governments and peoples it is never
available. This is because past experience presents itself concentrated in a single focus, while that which
has yet to be experienced is spread over minutes, hours, days, years, and centuries; thus similitude never
appears to be the same, for in the one case one sees the whole, and in the latter only individual parts”
(quoted in Koselleck 34). Again, there is this problem o f precedence, where experience always seems to be
belated and unavailable right up until the point that it is outmoded— that is, it finally arrives as (already)
outmoded.
52 “Prelude: 3. Music. Originally: a short, often extemporized, piece o f music played before another in order
to tune an instrument or allow an instrumentalist to warm up {obs.). Now: (a) a piece designed as the
formal introduction to a musical work, esp. a movement preceding a fugue or forming the first piece o f a
suite” (OED).
53 This double aspect o f the prophetic utterance anticipates the discussion in chapter three o f Paul de Man’s
concept o f figural reading. For de Man, all texts become allegories o f their own radically deconstructive
self-displacement, a displacement immanent to all works in that a text’s performative dimension as pure
positing always undermines and is in turn undermined by the rhetorical or meaningful dimension, one
based not on positing but on the circulation or economy o f tropes. As Gaschd explains, in terms pertinent to
the description o f prophecy as a form o f positing (setzen ) and a form o f translation {übersetzen) or
mediation between the Divine and the human, any critical reading that would seek to translate the text into
critical insight can do so only by simultaneously repressing the act o f positing in that work, suggesting that
critical insight, like prophetic insight, is coincident with a certain kind o f blindness, or that all texts suffer
from a version o f the discontinuity within prophetic phenomenology.
54 In chapter four, section II, I retrun to this problem at length in the context o f Blake.
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There is, consequently, something both palliative and hostile about the prophetic
utterance. On one hand, prophecy, as prediction or as a preface in the sense of something
that prepares for the beginning, attempts to remove any discontinuity in history (and
between history and experience) through a contractual pattern that economizes the new
by rendering it, in effect, always already old. On the other hand, prophecy as an
impossible speech, as a radical positing for which no preface can prepare history (this is
where the preface emerges under its second aspect, as a perpetual retreat into absence)
creates a rupture in time or opens the rupture o f time—a cut or “crisis” in Koselleck’s
sense, as thought and life’s relation to the future has become intensely problematic.
Blanchot hints at prophecy’s violent prodigality when he concludes that
[w]e owe much, then, to the poet whose poetry, translated by the prophets,
knew how to transmit the essential to us: the primal eagerness, this haste,
this refusal to be delayed and attached. Rare and almost threatening gift,
for he must above all make perceptible, in all true speech, by the devotion
to rhythm and primitive accent, that speech always spoken and never
heard that doubles it with pre-echo, rumour of wind and impatient murmur
destined to repeat in advance, at the risk of destroying it by preceding it.
(Book 85)
If the “essential” here, in a deconstructive idiom, has something to do with radical
difference rather than totality—the ability of language to break from its immediate,
swaddling context and to be repeated or to be cited in the fixture—the poetry of prophecy
seems to give voice to such “primal eagerness” or “haste” of an inauguration that must
always be a kind of depression in or loss of full self-presence. If this ability to articulate
origination is a “rare and almost threatening gift,” it is because the Nothing that the gift
gives is really indistinguishable from retracting assurances and suspending narrative
continuity altogether. When the concept of the future that is given is itself the product of
a post-Revolution worldview, when the fixture is understood, for the first time, as
radically unprecedented, such a ‘giving’ does indeed meet the strange criteria of
Derrida’s gift, in that what is ‘given’ is uncertain(ty).
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III. Self-Fulfilling Trauma

Let us suppose that The Prelude has been written. In the first effort at his epic
proper, Book One of The Recluse, “Home at Grasmere,” Wordsworth invokes the
tradition of prophetic inspiration. At this point, however, such an appeal seems strangely
belated. Has he not already begun and has he not already called on his muse—that
“voice/ That flowed along” (1.6-7 [1799]) his childhood dreams—the river Derwent?
Why this redundancy of invocation? In fact, the entire passage hovers in limbo between
assertion and wish, poetic self-confidence and an “anxiety of hope” (11.371)—that is,
somewhere between the poetic subject’s assertion of pre-determined, almost Calvinist
election, as noted earlier, and his restless appeal to uncertain redemption:
Come, thou prophetic Spirit, that inspirest
The human Soul of universal earth,
Dreaming on things to come; and dost possess
A metropolitan temple in the hearts
Of mighty Poets; upon me bestow
A gift of genuine insight; that my Song
With star-like virtue in its place may shine,
Shedding benignant influence, and secure
Itself from all malevolent effect
Of those mutations that extend their sway
Throughout the nether sphere! And if with this
I mix more lowly matter—with the thing
Contemplated describe the Mind and Man
Contemplating, and who and what he was,
The transitory Being that beheld
This Vision, when and where, and how he lived—
Be not this labour useless. (836-852)55

55 These lines (and all subsequent citations o f “Home at Grasmere,” unless otherwise indicated) are taken
from Manuscript D as reproduced in Beth Darlington’s parallel text edition o f “Home at Grasmere,”
Cornell UP, 1977. The only significant variation from his later version o f the poem— i.e., that reproduced
in the posthumous 1888 Complete Poetical Works o f William Wordsworth— with respect to the passage
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While the speaker asserts his availability for inspiration, he nevertheless must solicit the
prophetic Spirit’s arrival. This raises a question concerning poetic invocation as such:
that is, if inspiration must be solicited, is the act of solicitation itself able to claim to be
inspired? Such a call to prophecy would seem, rather, to preface inspiration and as such
to be, itself, necessarily ««inspired and therefore unsupported and unstable. Indeed, the
ambiguity concerning the usefulness of this poetic labour, in the final line of the passage
above cited, is supposed to be clarified by the “gift of genuine insight.” Yet, given that
such assurances issue from a speech devoid of inspiration or predictive authority, any
confidence in this clarification to come seems misplaced. As this misplaced confidence
suggests, however, the invocation already performs the mixing it, ostensibly,
preemptively apologizes for. The disconnection between the “lowly matter” of “the Mind
of Man” and the “Vision” that this “transitory Being” is privileged to behold is something
already dissolved in the very moment that the difference is asserted. In a neatly
camouflaged rhetorical maneuver, the echo between the object “contemplated” and the
mind actively “contemplating”—the inspiring Spirit and the lowly speaker,
respectively—seems to mix up subject and object. The speaker’s mind is cast,
grammatically, as the active force while the inspiring Vision appears to be relatively
static. Like the boy of Winander, it is as if the echo of his own voice here returns to and
touches the speaker as something strange. His appeal to the “prophetic Spirit” returns to
fulfill that same request, carrying far into “the human Soul of universal earth” the gentle
shock, the “gift of genuine insight.” An “acoustical illusion” {Fragments 53), indeed.56
quoted, is that here Wordsworth’s invocation opens with “come thou prophetic Spirit” whereas later
versions begin “descend thou prophetic Spirit.” The earlier, Manuscript D version— dating likely
somewhere between 1812 and 1814 (Darlington 25}—has the virtue o f echoing the apocalyptic language
characteristic o f the Book o f Revelations, again suggesting that Wordsworth sees himself in some respects
akin to the biblical prophets.
56 In Philosophical Fragments, Kierkegaard describes the understanding’s claim to have originated the
unthought— its absolutely Other— and thereby to have comprehended the paradox as an “acoustical
illusion”:
[W]hen the understanding cannot get the paradox into its head, this did not have its origin in the
understanding but in the paradox itself, which was paradoxical enough to have the effrontery to
call the understanding a clod and a dunce who at best can say “yes” and “no” to the same thing,
which is not good theology. So it is with offence. Everything it says about the paradox it has
learned from the paradox, even though, making use o f an acoustical illusion, it insists that it itself
has originated the paradox. (53)
It is this illusion that would confuse the unthinkable with the thinkable, or would try to suggest that the
unthought could somehow have emerged out o f thought. In his own way, Wordsworth invites thought’s
Other into consciousness, as the prophetic call to prophecy echoes back to the speaker a subjective depth—
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This self-fulfilling prophecy of prophetic inspiration suggests that it is difficult in
Wordsworth to separate assertion from solicitation, fact from desire.

In fact, it is this

confusion that may prove to be most interesting. For, as Blanchot suggests in slightly
different terms, “literature encounters its most dangerous meaning—that of interrogating
itself in a declarative mode—at times triumphantly, and in so doing discovering that
everything belongs to it, at other times, in distress, discovering it is lacking everything
since it only affirms itself by default” (Infinite 355). Like literature’s unsettlingly
declarative interrogatives, prophecy’s assertive solicitation of inspiration oscillates
between self-confidence and self-doubt. Indeed, in the case of prophecy, this grammatical
and emotional confusion involves another, temporal confusion as it becomes difficult to
part past and present from the future. In Wordsworth’s echo logic, as it were, the arrival
of the future seems indistinguishable from a return of the past. And this ambiguity
structures those other, well-known moments of inspiration, the spots of time. The
insistence on negativity in these moments of supposed “future restoration” illustrates not
only the double gesture of the ecstatic gift but also a more depressing double gesture,
where an affirmative orientation to the future cannot be separated from a regressive,
traumatic itinerary. If Romantic prophecy is a gift that gives nothing objective—if the
prophet ‘embodies’ this absence as his or her giftedness, the generosity of a temporality
both offered and hidden by the antinomic nature of prophecy as promise and threat—then
it is no surprise that in the same instance as the future is proffered, it is revoked by
trauma: the arrival of the future is confused with its uncanny double, the return of the
absolute past. To be clear: this is not to say that Wordsworth is a failed prophet, per se,
but rather that Romantic prophecy is necessarily an involuted or disfigured mode of57

that is, creates in the speaker the very depth and power that is ostensibly discovered, as if latent, in the
subject.
57 This position o f the prophet, unsettled in his or her being by a desire that solicits another state o f
existence, is described well by Thomas Weiskel in the parallel but different context o f the psychology o f
the sublime:
But what is identity under the aspect o f desire? It is an image o f the self, a fictional “me” which
exhibits alternately two states corresponding to the myth o f continuity and the myth o f loss. The
first is a coincidence o f the “me” and the ideal, a kind o f epiphany o f narcissism in which the ideal
is already felt as a “self-presence” in the mind. But the absence-phase o f desire underlies this
fiction and can only be suspended momentarily by it. Identity contains an acknowledgement not
this time o f loss, but o f frustration. (154)
Wordsworth’s prophetic call to prophecy reflects something like the dominance o f this psychological
condition, the sense o f the self as perpetually frustrated by its own ideals.
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representing history, reflective of the unprecedented temporalization of history and the
epistemic break coincident with this new kind of time. As such, the opaque surface of the
future resembles a painful, originary beginning by flat.
Throughout The Prelude, Wordsworth’s goal—in a rather Hegelian formulation—
is the origin, where this origin figures variously as the home, nature, the mother and
father, the original self, and the original impressions experienced by that self: “How shall
I trace the history, where seek/ The origin of what I then have felt?” (1.365-6). In the
wake of increasing industrialization and the subject’s subsequent instrumentalization,
Wordsworth would telescope the past through the present and suture the increasingly
incoherent self together across time and space. But if the spots of time serve as so many
quilting points for the subject—original impressions that transcend and organize
history—such origins are complicated since their restorative power cannot be
distinguished from their damaging, traumatic violence. The same intensity that causes
these moments to stand out of time—they are as much stops as spots in time, or moments
that break time’s linearity—seems also to scar the psyche. Thus the desire to return to the
past overlaps with an anxiety that with this return, violence might be repeated, such that,
for the speaker, “the fear gone by/ Pressed on [him] almost like a fear to come” (10.62-3).
The spots of time, these original impressions that transport the speaker back to various
points in childhood and draw his life together, are at the same time indistinguishable from
traumatic impressions, events that alienate the subject from himself. This kind of origin,
what Benjamin might call “an eddy in the stream of becoming” (Trauerspiel 45), has
both a centripetal and centrifugal effect on the subject, marking the beginning of time and
development’s possibility but also marking time itself, thereby stalling the promised
futurity, the “future restoration,” such moments represent.
This temporal overlapping and the attendant affective disjunction, itself
structurally analogous to the prophetic call to prophecy, is couched in particularly gothic
terms when the ostensibly inspired speaker of “Home at Grasmere” describes his ultimate
project, namely, an epic on the sublimity of the human mind:
For I must tread on shadowy ground, must sink
Deep, and, aloft ascending, breathe in worlds
To which the heaven of heavens is but a veil.
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All strength, all terror, single or in bands,
That ever was put forth in personal form—
Jehovah, with his thunder, and the choir
Of shouting Angels and the empyreal thrones—
I pass them unalarmed. Not Chaos, not
The darkest pit of lowest Erebus,
Nor aught of blinder vacancy, scooped out
By help of dreams—can breed such fear and awe
As fall upon us often when we look
Into our Minds, into the Mind of Man,
My haunt and the main region of my song. (781-794)
At one level, this passage appears simply to take up the epical tradition of over-going the
predecessor; just as Milton aspired to transcend Classical epic with his treatment of the
Fall and redemption of humankind, so Wordsworth would pass Milton’s “Jehovah” and
“choir/ Of shouting Angels” coolly “unalarmed.” There is, however, something troubling
about this description of the mind. The speaker is on “shadowy ground” and has,
ironically, to “sink/ Deep” to regard a sublime power. The mind is deeper and darker than
might be expected from a speaker who “did [...] drink the visionary power” (2.331)—a
darkness recalling Dante’s Inferno and Aeneas’ earlier katabasis in Virgil’s epic. Indeed,
Wordsworth falls, Hyperion-like, into the “deep/ Recesses in man’s heart” (1.233) and
finds himself amid “huge and mighty forms that do not live” (1.424). Such “Unnam’d
forms” {Milton 15:18-19), as Blake might call them, refuse, however, passively to submit
to reason, and move “slowly through” (1.425) the mature poet’s mind just as they had the
mind of the young boy following his theft of the “elfin pinnace” (1.401). In other words,
if the mind is the speaker’s “haunt” in the sense of “home” or a well-known space, it is
also a haunted region. This double sense of the word “haunt” emerges forcefully in
“Home at Grasmere.” The speaker, in an attempt to establish his comfort beyond all
shade of doubt, says
No where (or is it fancy?) can be found—
The one sensation that is here; ‘tis here,
Here as it found its way into my heart
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In childhood, here as it abides by day,
By night, here only. (136-140)
The repetition of “here” seems, rather ironically, to undermine the declaration of comfort.
The speaker’s feverish, obsessive gesturing—“here...here”—sounds panicked, alarmed,
and, indeed, alarming, recalling what David Codings calls Wordsworth’s “Masochistic
Repetition” (69).
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The passage is too insistent to prove convincing, its intensity

unravelling its own semantic content—-just as the prophetic threat can undermine itself as
a promise.5859 Hence, in the very attempt to confirm homeliness, the speaker calls that
assurance into question. As with the prophetic call to prophecy, assertion and wish blend
together here, unsettling the stability of the origin in the very instant it is proffered,
revoking the comfort of the home in the same instant it is given. Strange, almost
threatening gift.
Nor is this the first time that anxiety will be confused with ease. In Book Four of
The Prelude, the summer vacation strangely imposes itself upon the speaker:
[CJomfort seemed to touch
A heart that had not been disconsolate,
Strength came where weakness was not known to be,
At least not felt; and restoration came
Like an intruder knocking at the door
Of unacknowledged weariness. (4.143-8)
While in “Home at Grasmere,” insistent claims to homeliness contribute to an unhomely
atmosphere, in Book Four of The Prelude, anxiety masquerades as restoration. Given the
private/public dichotomy implied by the image of a knocking intruder, this masquerade
suggests that the home is compromised—as in “Grasmere.” In a sense, when
“restoration,” the true master of the home, returns to his dwelling, he finds it occupied by
his enemy. If restoration is mistaken for the intruder then, in a terrifying reversal, those
barricaded inside the house must suddenly realize that their host is a foe. Indeed, this
reversal seems to suggest that the “restoration” Wordsworth will come to associate with
the spots of time may be deeply ambivalent. For instance, Collings suggests that “Home
58 See Collings’ discussion o f this particular passage, pages 39 and 139 o f Wordsworthian Errancies.
59 This recalls Paul de Man’s gesture to the “strategy o f denegation which calls a threat a shelter in the hope
o f thus laying it to rest” (Rhetoric 86).
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at Grasmere” is infected by a somewhat unruly, inauspicious allusion to “Guilt and
Sorrow”: the rhetorical “here... here” of “Home at Grasmere” recalls the tale of the
“lonely Spital,” and how it became “named the ‘Dead House’ of the plain” (150, 153). As
the speaker of “Guilt and Sorrow” relates, he
[h]ad heard of one who, forced from storms to shroud,
Felt the loose walls of this decayed Retreat
Rock to incessant neighings shrill and loud,
While his horse pawed the floor with furious heat;
Till on a stone, that sparkled to his feet,
Struck, and still struck again, the troubled horse:
The man half raised the stone with pain and sweat,
Half raised, for well his arm might lose its force
Disclosing the grim head of a late-murdered corse. (172-180)
Not only does the speaker seem to echo his own experience of being driven to the “Dead
House” by storms, but, as Codings notices, the horse’s incessant pawing anticipates the
behaviour of the speaker in “Home at Grasmere” and, I would add, the intruder in The
Prelude: both figures point incessantly to the home and yet, in this very gesture, ex-pose
the dwelling.
In short, the human mind and the childhood home, two places referred to by the
speaker as the “haunt, and the main region of [his] song” in “Home at Grasmere,” are
also haunted. This overlap illustrates the problem mentioned above, where attempts to
return to an original impression or place in order to stabilize the self may actually involve
a paradoxical self-alienation, as such a return—like Prometheus’ ambivalent attempt to
“recall” his curse in Shelley’s Prometheus Unbound—could prove to be re-traumatizing.
In other words, Wordsworth’s effort to return to the missed experience—to place,
specifically, the missed encounter of the gibbet-mast episode, as discussed in more detail
below—into a larger temporality of subjective Bildung, may in fact fail to economize that
non-experience. Despite the speaker’s confidence in reflection, certain peculiarly
recalcitrant materials or episodes resist his synthesizing narrative. After all, as Codings
suggests, Wordsworth is playing a dangerous game throughout The Prelude, as he
attempts to metamorphose error into exception, errancy into a confidence that
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should the guide [he] chuse
Be nothing better than a wandering cloud
[He] cannot miss [his] way. (1.17-19)
As Collings suggests,
Many readers have argued, taking their cue from the first book of the 1805
Prelude, [that] in writing about his crisis Wordsworth gets his poem
started and, in a sense, overcomes the crisis [...]. But he accomplishes
much more than this; making deviance from his vocation into a sign of
vocation, he envisions a mode of authorship which tolerates errancy and a
privilege that can still mark a person who is subject to human
waywardness. He need not attempt the impossible and become, like the
pedlar, exempt from human suffering or, like his fictional Hartley,
inseparable from nature. (123)
There is, indeed, a precarious strategy in Wordsworth that attempts to read failure as
success, damage as inspiration. For instance, following his decision not to pursue a
Cambridge fellowship, the speaker claims, punningly, to find recompense in “poetic
fellowship” with a company of authors:
The dread awe
Of mighty names was softened down, and seemed
Approachable, admitting fellowship
Of modest sympathy. (6.72-5)
This marks a perverse tendency in Wordsworth, where the poet “suggests that he was
elected as a poet, set apart not merely by the gods but by God himself, in a moment of
masochistic wounding” (Collings 151). In other words, it is part of Wordsworth’s claim
to prophetic inspiration: physical and psychological trauma is, as already discussed, a
defining feature of the prophet. And again, this makes it difficult to separate a future
orientation from the regressive, traumatic origin o f that very visionary perspective.
Hence, Collings’ description of Wordsworthian masochism serves as a reasonable
description of prophetic inspiration precisely because the latter follows from psychic or
even ontological violence, a radical penetration of the individual that is both damaging
and yet, strangely, desired:

89

In this extraordinarily risky move, Wordsworth suggests that cultural
dismemberment transfigures the world, that the dead who invade Salisbury
Plain give him an uncanny, original power when they wound him.
Wordsworth’s claims here are both outrageous and perverse; he at once
celebrates cultural disaster and imagines a masochistic vocation. The
world’s descent into total violence made him a poet—a magus who
receives his power when invaded by demons. (118)
Hence, Wordsworth’s claims to poetic mastery are based on a dubious substitution of
trauma (or blindness) for insight, or, again, a kind of Kierkegaardian “acoustical illusion”
that claims its radical Other as its own and seeks to ‘embody’ paradox. If the poet returns
to past traumas with the aim to narrate the missed experience, it appears that the power to
generate that superior, recuperative narrative itself rests on the careful maintenance of a
trauma that must never be exposed as such, for risk of abdicating the very inspiration
necessary for writing. Prophetic power seems predicated on traumatic involution and to
retain its inspired, motivating status only insofar as it wounds.
Modem trauma theory offers useful insights for the analysis of prophetic
psychology since prophecy offers a cognitive profile based on precisely the kind of
missed experience that sets the phenomenon of trauma in motion. For the prophet is not
merely violated, but is, for an interval, dispossessed of his or her identity. The prophet’s
consciousness, specifically, registers a temporal interruption and struggles subsequently
to reorganize itself; the prophet is severed from a smooth chronology and then must
narrate herself back into regularity. This is to suggest, then, that the contractual structure
of prophecy—as Blake has it, “if you go on So the result is So” (AnnWatson 14; E
607)—can be read as a symptom that attempts to manage the abrupt arrival of an
immanent, uncanny Other by projecting a fixed narrative as compensation. Prophecy’s
forward-looking, predictive dimension might be understood, then, as consciousness’
attempt to reestablish control of time and to re-mediate all events as they relate to the
subject, such that he or she would never be surprised by dangers, even and especially
apocalyptic dangers, as these wounds would be, as it were, lived through in advance.
Through predictive prophecy—or prophecy converted into prediction—the future would
become an extension of what Freud describes as consciousness’ defensive shield, which
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is tantamount to saying that the future is made conscious or known. Hence, the
proliferation of apocalyptic prophecies not only in the 1790s but also in contemporary
culture might be better understood as defensive mechanisms that aims to forestall actual
trauma by narrating apocalypse fictionally, in advance, in order to make the experience,
as it were, unmissable. Such narratives attempt, desperately and indeed futilely, to
prepare consciousness for what is unconscious, to place the rupture o f time itself within a
temporalized narrative, as if to bypass or over-bridge the moment of discontinuity—to
mourn in advance of loss, rendering that loss always already expiated.60
In Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Freud notes how “protection against stimuli is
an almost more important function for the living organism than reception o f stimuli” (27).
Hence, he presents two models of consciousness, where consciousness acts as a
membrane to regulate the flow of incoming data. In Cathy Caruth’s words, we might call
the first model “a model of quantity” where “the stimulus barrier protects the organism
from ‘too much stimulus’ coming from outside” (Caruth 132 n.7). In other words,
consciousness in this case deadens stimuli.61 The second understanding of consciousness
60 This argument bears comparison with Ted Underwood’s notion that the increasing interest in history in
Romanticism represents a kind o f sublimation o f religious forms o f comfort by secular modes o f thought, a
process wherein “the consolations o f Christian collective destiny were [...] replaced by those o f historical
fame” (“Afterlife” 242). Not that this transition is that simple. Underwood argues, counterintuitively, that
what catalyzes history’s secular consolations is not so much a fear o f forgetting or o f losing community but
a drive to maintain class distinctions and historical alterity. The “culture” history aims to preserve is
indissociable from class hierarchies insofar as the concept o f culture itself acquires, in the eighteenth
century, the sense o f specialized knowledge available exclusively to the social elite. Hence, Underwood
points out how “threats to the prestige o f culture can be felt as threats to the continuity o f history” (“Lives”
5)— that is, how what appear to be threats to historical memory are also threats to a sense o f class
superiority that historical thought would, in a rather conservative gesture, like in fact to maintain and
participate in. Hence, if history gained affective capital through its absorption o f desires for immortality
that had been, in earlier times, answered by theological dogma— and if it accomplishes this through a
concept o f historicism aware that “no monument or ideal can hope to be as fundamental, as absolute, as
change itself’ (“Lives” 5)— the immortality it offers coincides with the perpetuation o f a certain social
stratification.
Where Underwood’s thesis comes closest to mine is, then, in the dialectic o f the cultural
phenomena he considers: for just as history repackages immortality at the moment o f a broadly-felt
spiritual crisis, so does prophecy attempt to recapitulate eternity in the face o f time’s felt discontinuity. In
both cases, however, history and prophecy reveal and exacerbate the anxieties at their respective origins
and against which they were applied as antidotes. This is evident in the similarly ironic consequences
history-as-immortality and prophecy-as-prediction face: where in the former case the “deadness o f the past”
that tends to “emphasize its difference” (“Immortality” 443) from the present is necessary in order,
ironically, to preserve a grander sense o f continuity, in the latter case, prophets in Romanticism seems often
so obviously and persistently unreliable that the continuity they are supposes to generate tends toward its
complete inversion.
61 “But we have more to say o f the living vesicle with its receptive cortical layer. This little fragment o f
living substance is suspended in the middle o f an external world charged with the most powerful energies;
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follows “a model of time” (Caruth 132 n.7). That is, Freud sees the work of
consciousness itself as not only the psychic origin of our sense of time, but also takes
time to be the specific dimension of consciousness that mediates external impressions:
We have learnt that unconscious mental processes are in themselves
“timeless.” This means in the first place that they are not ordered
temporally, that time does not change them in any way and that the idea of
time cannot be applied to them. [...]. [...] [0]ur abstract idea of time
seems to be wholly derived from the method of working of the system
Pcpt.-Cs. [Perception-Consciousness] and to correspond to a perception on
its own part of that method of working. This mode of functioning may
perhaps constitute another way of providing a shield against stimuli. (28)
In this model, consciousness renders stimuli harmless to the psyche not so much by
deadening or diminishing their intensity but by placing stimuli in a linear sequence. Put
differently, consciousness, like the prophet’s if-then contract or Wordsworth’s translation
of the spots of time into palliative and productive moments in a larger, subjective
Bildung, seeks to provide a conventional narrative for experience. And yet it should be
immediately apparent that when Freud describes time itself as an agent of consciousness
he already betrays time: for time is not identical to narrative, development, or a coherent
logic. Time is not itself a form of ordering temporal things and yet that is how Freud
treats time. In effect, Freud’s concept of time protects consciousness from time through a
kind of denegation, that is, by treating time’s detotalizing exigency as its complete
inverse: namely, narrative.62 Just as the unsettling, discontinuous force of the prophet is
almost instantly transformed into its opposite—the version of prophecy as prediction or
the assurance of continuity—so time in Freud seems instantly confused with narrative.
This does not drastically alter the logic of trauma but rather indicates that there is
something, in the very theorization of trauma, that is uncanny: Freud and Caruth’s appeal
and it would be killed by the stimulation emanating from these if it were not provided with a protective
shield in this way: its outermost surface ceases to have the structure proper to living matter, becomes to
some degree inorganic and thenceforward functions as a special envelope or membrane resistant to stimuli.
In consequence, the energies o f the external world are able to pass into the next underlying layers, which
have remained living, with only a fragment o f their original intensity. [...] By its death, the outer layer has
saved the deeper ones from a similar fate [...]. Protection against stimuli is an almost more important
function for the living organism than reception o f stimuli” (BPP 27)
62 See chapter five for an analysis o f Mary Shelley’s Valperga in terms o f prophetic denegation.
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to time as the agent of retroactive organization confuses discontinuity with continuity,
confuses the recuperative, narrative exigency with a negativity that has more in common
with the elusive experience of trauma or confuses, as noted above in the case of
Wordsworth, anxiety with comfort.
At any rate, it is clear that the prophet is tom between an experience that is
beyond narration and the demand to narrate that experience. Perhaps this is why Caruth’s
definition of trauma sounds also like a description of a prophet’s possession by Divine
power:
Trauma is described as the response to an unexpected or overwhelming
violent event or events that are not fully grasped as they occur, but return
later in repeated flashbacks, nightmares, and other repetitive phenomena.
Traumatic experience, beyond the psychological dimension of suffering it
involves, suggests a certain paradox: that the most direct seeing of a
violent event may occur as an absolute inability to know it; that
immediacy, paradoxically, may take the form of belatedness. The
repetitions of the traumatic event—which remain unavailable to
consciousness but intrude repeatedly on sight—thus suggest a larger
relation to the event that extends beyond what can simply be seen or what
can be known, and is inextricably tied up with the belatedness and
incomprehensibility that remain at the heart of this repetitive seeing. (92)
In other words, trauma results when a risk to life is ‘experienced’ without this moment
being organized in terms of narrative sequence; the mortal danger is so direct or
immediate that it fails to enter into consciousness and fails to enter into chronological
ordering. The event seems to outstrip or to bypass the very system responsible for
rendering the phenomenal world intelligible.63 To be sure, the event is registered by the
psyche (the mind has “a larger relation to the event that extends beyond what can simply
be seen or what can be known”). However, ultimately it only enters into conscious

63 Freud does note Kant in this connection to his discussion o f time on page twenty-eight o f Beyond the
Pleasure Principle. For Kant, time is one o f the two intuitions (the other is space) that make up the
transcendental aesthetic, as outlined in the first few sections o f The Critique o f Pure Reason. As a matrix
that defines one limit o f possible experience, this notion o f time is particularly static.
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experience as a strange kind of return or repetition, originating somewhere “inside.”64 It
is a strange repetition because what is ‘repeating’ was never fully present in the first
place. For something to be present (ontologically) it would have to be in the present
(temporally) and that is precisely not the case with a traumatic event. As Caruth notes,
“the return of the traumatic experience in the dream is not the signal of the direct
experience but, rather, of the attempt to overcome the fact that it was not direct, to
attempt to master what was never fully grasped in the first place” (62).65
Part of the paradoxical ‘experience’ here—of this immediacy that is, nevertheless,
indirect—stems from the fact that when the risk manifests itself, it is essentially a
possibility with which the psyche is confronted in an intense fashion. In Caruth’s words,
the close, but missed, encounter with death means that consciousness is “faced with the
possibility of its death” (63, my emphasis). In fact, we could say that consciousness is
‘given’ this possibility since this is not an object. There is, after all, something odd about
an experience of possibility as such, since possibility might be defined—and is so by
Aristotle—as the ability not to be. In ‘encountering’ a possibility, then, consciousness
encounters a certain kind of absence or perhaps, in Ernst Bloch’s terms, to which chapter
five returns, something in the world that is “not-yet-conscious.” Hence, the apparently all
too direct encounter with violence is radically deferred or indirect in the same moment as
this immediacy, insofar as the ‘thing’ encountered (that is, possibility) is itself not actual
or coherent in its presence and is not available on the horizon of objective presence.
Trauma seems to mark an event of painful generosity. Hence, trauma understood in its
most generous mode is nothing other than prophecy: it ‘gives’ the subject time and the
possibility time as such opens in the actual; prophecy proffers what cannot be psychically
economized, which is why it can claim such prodigality. In a sense, then, the work of
mourning trauma is an attempt to return prophecy’s threatening gift, or to make it
64 “In trauma, that is, the outside has gone inside without any mediation” (Caruth 59).
65 Walter Benjamin understands this concept too and comes to it via Theodore Reik:
“For instance, we experience the death o f a near relative.. .and believe that we feel our grief in all
its depth..., but our grief reveals its depths only long after we think we have gotten the better o f
it.” The “forgotten” grief persists and gains ground; compare the death o f the grandmother in
Proust. “To experience [erfahrung] means to master an impression inwardly that was so strong
that we could not grasp it at once.” This definition o f experience in Freud’s sense is something
very different from what is meant by those who speak o f having “had an experience.” (Theodore
Reik, Der uberraschte Psychologe [Leiden, 1935], p. 130-132 qtd in The Arcades Project, 402
403 [K8,l-K8,2]; Benjamin’s ellipses and editor’s brackets)
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returnable, by registering the debt explicitly, by condensing the haunting ‘experience’
into a definitive mark.
This means that what is traumatic about trauma is less any single element or event
and more the felt difficulty with reintegrating time and narrative. For, trauma emerges in
the moment neither of experience nor the moment of missed experience but rather in the
moment when missed experience is experienced or where the missed encounter with
violence is registered as a miss. For instance, when Los in Blake’s Milton, upon
discovering the damage to both Palamabron’s Harrow and Satan’s Mills, declares, “this
mournful day/ Must be a blank in Nature” (8.21-22), the terrible damage wrought
encounters the temporal rhythms of nature and human calendars in the ‘form’ of vacancy
that will haunt the rest of the text as “self-annihilation.” Given that it is the experience of
the wow-experience of a decisive, empirical violence that contributes to the traumatized
condition, the traumatized individual is left in the precarious onto-epistemological
situation of “having survived, precisely, without knowing it” (Caruth 64; original
emphasis). One cannot seem to account for one’s own survival. That is, one knows one
has survived but cannot understand why or how this is possible. Traumatized survival
becomes a kind of sur-vival—a sort of over-living that defies explanation. In rather
Bataillian fashion, this suggests that annihilation becomes a ‘goal’ for the survivor as a
way to encounter the missed encounter—or to actualize the missed encounter that
managed, yet, to impact its full weight, as possibility, on the psyche, if not in a fashion
that allowed the psyche to integrate that violence into a narrative that it could then
understand or conceptualize rationally. Hence, the proleptic orientation of prophecy is
both implied here (the possibility of an encounter with what was improperly mediated)
and darkened, as the only way to correct experience—to synchronize history with
subjectivity—is to encounter a mortifying moment that would in some way ‘kill’ (in the
sense of negate) the subject by bringing the missed violence face to face with
consciousness.
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IV. ‘Profit’ and Loss: Banking on the Past

To suggest that the spots of time follow a traumatic itinerary that is
indistinguishable from their ostensibly recuperative claims—each vector here interrupting
the other’s aims—is not to say quite enough. For if Wordsworth deploys prophecy as
self-therapy this implies that the concept of the subject remains intact. However, to recall
chapter one, prophecy might represent a form of ecstasy or exposure to what is radically
temporal. Just as historiography tries to discipline time, so does prediction appropriate
and discipline this disturbing mode of prophecy. In other words, while noticing the
traumatic quality of the spots of time complicates their valiance and reveals a more
recursive operation in what might otherwise look like a triumphant process of subjective
cultivation, it neglects the more radical implications of the mystical tradition upon which
Wordsworth seems to draw. That is, the same phenomenon called “trauma” might almost
be renamed mystical “inner experience” were it not for a few crucial distinctions. First
among these distinctions is that the mystic does not seek to be cured of his or her
‘trauma’; for the mystic, the missed experience is not really a trauma at all—although
experientially it is analogous—in the sense that he or she does not recognize it as
something to try to force back into a conditional realm of discursive reason or narrative
coherence. Rather, there is an attempt to achieve and even to exacerbate that level of
shocking intensity. Such an attempt seems to want to hold open rather than absorb the
shock of time and pure possibility, to behold rather than shrink from a general economy
of expenditure. Indeed, this is to suggest that what might be most traumatic is time itself
in that time does not appear objectively and is totally misrepresented as narrative—
something the following section of this chapter addresses at more length in terms of the
imperceptible touch of time in Wordsworth’s gibbet-mast episode.
What is the relationship between mystical experience and the traumatic generosity
of prophetic temporality? For Georges Bataille, human existence is radically
discontinuous because it is essentially finite. Discontinuity is painful and results in
suffering. This finitude inspires defensive reactions, reactions that attempt to take account
of or to absorb this finitude through various kinds of (provisional) totalizations that allow
humans to claim mastery over death, effectively appropriating radical negativity to a
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broadly utilitarian system—a procedure, anticipating chapter three, analogous to what de
Man sees as criticism’s tendency toward blindness. Bataille terms these reactions
“projects.” Projects, however, represent an evasion of one’s being, for they aim to
postpone one’s encounter with being through variously protracted processes, turning life
into “a long deception” (Inner 39). “Narcotics” names these evasions or projects more
precisely, as they tend to insulate humans from discontinuity and make individuals feel,
at least superficially, better. Narcotics take various forms but what they all share is an
attempt to introduce comforting closure or totality for the subject. They do this by
appropriating negativity as a means to some kind of end, whether practical, intellectual,
or spiritual—an operation perfected, in Bataille’s estimation, by Hegel. Hence, narcotics
include a wide range of social and intellectual practices, all offering some kind of
imaginary totality or telos. This could include one’s role in political, social, and economic
reality and the sense of meaning one invents from this day-to-day activity. It also
encompasses the Judeo-Christian “nostalgia for salvation” (Inner 43) or any broadly
redemptive theism. In fact, the totality implied in any rational philosophical system must,
also, fall under the umbrella of “project” and, for Bataille, Hegel becomes a frequent
reference point in this respect: “The Hegelian man—Being and God—is accomplished, is
completed in the adequation o f project [in that the Hegelian absolute subject has] become
everything [and] does not fail, does not become comic, insufficient, but the private
individual, the slave engaged in the paths o f work' (Inner 80). Indeed, the most powerful
evasion—and with this Wordsworth’s project must come back into focus—might be the
concept of the autonomous subject itself, for “to seek sufficiency is the same mistake as
to enclose being in some sort of point” (Inner 88): “as ipse I wanted to be everything
(through knowledge) and I fall into anguish” (Inner 53). As Bataille summarizes, through
these sorts of projects and subjective Bildung especially “we turn away terrified [...]
from those truths without a way out: any means of escape [so goes the logic of the addict]
is good (philosophical, utilitarian, messianic)” (Inner 68).
Against this appropriation of discontinuity Bataille would “flee without end the
horror of a reduction of Being to totality” (Inner 36) or the pompous claim to ‘master’
finitude through dialectical work. For human being cannot be completely absorbed in
manufactured totality—not so much because humans have an excess of some sort but
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because there is, rather, a recalcitrant kind of negativity, something that remains idle,
useless, and that he will often associate with laughter and poetry: “poetry, laughter,
ecstasy are not the means for other things” {Inner 110). That is, if projects amount to the
“putting off o f existence to a later point”—“life [...] put off until later, from
postponement to postponement”—Bataille will posit that “inner experience is the
opposite of action” {Inner 46): it is the elimination of postponement. Bataille inaugurates
a general strike, as it were, where dialectical mediation is displaced in the name of an
existential as opposed to a mechanical form of self-understanding, a relation that asks
what it is to be human beyond the actions one performs for the sake of the projects one is
forced to participate in: “when the extreme limit is there, the means which serve to attain
it are no longer there” {Inner 50); “the annihilation of all middle terms [...] constitute^]
this negative mediation” {Inner 115). For only in this way, according to Bataille, can one
reintroduce the “extreme limit of the possible” that action represses: “in the will to
suppress pain, we are lead to action [...]. Action led in order to suppress pain moves
finally in the opposite direction from the possibility of dramatizing in its name: we no
longer tend toward the extreme limit of the possible—we remedy pain (without great
effect), but the possible in the meantime no longer has any meaning” {Inner 11, my
emphasis).
Bataille suggests, adapting Heidegger’s thought, that anxiety is what reminds one
of discontinuity—of one’s actual mode of being—by cutting through the comfortable
surface of projects that, while pleasant, limit our possibilities as human beings. Hence,
when Bataille, in the preface to Inner Experience, notes that “the self-acknowledged
suffering of the disintoxicated is the subject of this book” (xxxii), he announces that his
interest will be largely the experience of countering these narcotic countermeasures, of
challenging those inventions that place human being at a distance from itself. In stark
contrast to Wordsworth, the mystical, pseudo-project of Bataille’s own thought—his
abject project, as it were—involves catalyzing, rather than absorbing, torment. At its most
intense, in the “interior experience,” this torment and suffering becomes “rapture,” or an
experience of jouissance that is as painful as it is pleasurable: “invention, words rape
him. [...]. It is less a matter of contemplation than of rupture. It is however of ‘mystic
experience’ that I speak” {Inner 40); recalling prophetic (dis)possession, Bataille calls
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this “an ecstasy, a sudden rapture” {Inner 69). In contrast to the pseudo-continuity
solicited through discursive reason or narcotic projects, the radical continuity glimpsed in
mystical experience is beyond provisional totality, is absolute, and therefore annihilates
the subject, saving the subject from the illusory salvation offered by the very concept of
subjectivity. What is initially confusing, then, is that Bataillian ‘salvation’ is the same
thing as self-destruction, though not in terms of the wretched ascetic—“ifascesis is a
sacrifice, it is only so in a part o f itself which one loses with an eye to saving the other”
{Inner 23)—but rather through absolutely “excessive acts” {Inner 121). In fact, it will be
precisely to this distinction that we must return in chapter four in order more clearly to
see how Blake’s notion of redemption as “self annihilation” (14.22) in Milton serves as a
counterpoint to Wordsworth: for while Wordsworth invokes mystical transcendence in
his claim to prophetic election, he backs away from the radical subjective transformation
that that same invocation implicitly demands. In so doing, Wordsworth cannot help but
register the destruction of narcotics—of the self—in terms of a great injury.
What Blake calls “self annihilation” Bataille calls “sacrifice” and defines as the
movement of “contestation,” that is, the active attempt to annihilate projects or narcotics
in an effort to take the subject to his or her own inner limit where that subject glimpses a
more radical continuity with the Absolute beyond atomic subjectivity: “the opposite of
project is sacrifice” {Inner 136-137). Sacrifice, then, is only successful for Bataille if the
subject who sacrifices is also the object sacrificed—“Lest,” in Blake’s particularly
germane formulation, “the Last Judgment come & find me unannihilate/ And I be siez’d
& giv’n into the hands of my own Selfhood” {Milton 14.23-24). Any recuperation of the
“I”—any restriction of the general economy of expenditure by a restricted, recuperative
exchange—betrays the failure of sacrifice, a failure to spend without reserve, or a failure
to become resolutely hostile to the illusions of projects: “But I don’t attain the extreme
limit on my own and, in actual fact, I can’t believe the extreme limit attained, for I never
remain there” {El 42, my emphasis); “As long as ipse perseveres in its will to know and
to be ipse, anguish lasts, but if ipse abandons itself and knowledge with it, if it gives itself
up to non-knowledge in this abandon, then rapture begins” {Inner 53). Indeed, like the
gift, spending has to attain to annihilation if it is to escape mere exchange. This is why
Bataille will identify sovereignty—in a kind of parody of Hegel’s thinking—with
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absolute loss, not with any kind of control or victory. For what is ultimately slavish is to
participate in the master-slave dialectic, as the ‘master’ becomes a slave to the work, the
project of the dialectic, and the knowledge it produces as much as the slave does. To be
sovereign, for Bataille, is to elude this thoroughly bourgeois fate. Hence, the title of his
‘work,’ Inner Experience, is rather ironic: it is ‘inner’ not in the sense of being interior to
a subject but in the sense that “it is necessary to reject external means” (Inner 12); it is
‘inner’ only because it is not a public commodity. “Experience,” likewise, is not
something that a subject possesses or has, but is a word for the dissolution o f all
projects—especially subjective Bildung—and the jouissance that dissolves the subject in
an immediate encounter with the unconditional. As Blanchot comments with respect to
Rilke, “‘experience’ here means contact with being” {Space 87). “Inner experience” is the
mystical annihilation of discontinuous, finite existence that dissolves any boundary
between inner and outer, not unlike Blake’s sense of visionary art as a form of creation
that repudiates memory.66
Bataille is useful at this point in the discussion of Wordsworth as he provides a
framework for understanding how Wordsworth’s claims of mystical enthusiasm are
undermined through various economic processes, helping to explain why experiences that
would in Bataille or Blake tend toward mystical rapture must in Wordsworth adopt a
traumatic shape.67 In fact, from the mystic’s perspective, trauma is a kind o f Bataillian
narcotic in that it makes the subject’s recuperation its main project and even, minimally,
creates the condition and the demand for recuperating radical discontinuity. Trauma, in
other words, figures the jouissance of a general economy of expenditure in terms of a
debt, transforming what could be deemed a kind of disturbing generosity into a threat and
66 See chapter four concerning Blake’s comments on allegory in “A Vision o f Judgment” and Milton.
67 It is also important to note that the concept o f the sublime, even in its most negative moment o f
subjective disintegration, retains its status qua sublime only because it is absorbed again into a sense o f the
Ego’s reintegration at a higher, rational level that ultimately conserves and insulates the subject as such.
For if, as Thomas Weiskel argues, “the Romantic sublime was an attempt to revise the meaning o f
transcendence precisely when the traditional apparatus o f sublimation— spiritual, ontological, and (one
gathers) psychological and even perceptional— was failing to be exercised or understood” (4), then the
sublime, fundamentally, does not entertain the kind o f ecstatic, prodigal movement described variously by
Bataille and Blake but rather supplements reason. In fact, the sublime focuses, activates, and structures an
otherwise diffuse sense o f anxiety lurking beneath the increasingly prevalent sense, in the eighteenth
century, o f boredom: “Boredom masks uneasiness, and intense boredom exhibits the signs o f the most basic
o f modem anxieties, the anxiety o f nothingness, or absence. In its more energetic renditions the sublime is
a kind o f homeopathic therapy, a cure o f uneasiness by means o f the stronger, more concentrated— but
momentary— anxiety involved in astonishment and terror” (Weiskel 18).
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a wound. If prophecy appears psychically analogous to trauma, the very discourse of
trauma ensures that the jouissance of prophecy or total expenditure is funnelled back into
a restricted economy, such that the kind of prophecy that underwrites Wordsworth’s
poetry is—even in its darker iteration—ultimately synthetic and totalizing. Hence, while
Wordsworth’s spots of time are unable to become the purely restorative moments he
claims them to be, the recognition of their traumatic and re-traumatizing underside in no
way contests the general restriction of negativity that subjective Bildung performs
throughout The Prelude. That is, Wordsworth feeds on the negativity that he seems to
attempt to eliminate, something Codings likewise identifies when he argues that
Wordsworth attempts to turn failure into success, error into inspiration, and so on. Put in
terms of a pun that capture’s Wordsworth’s relationship to prophetic time, this illustrates
his persistent attempt to ‘profit’ from loss. That is, what may be more surprising than the
duplicity of the restorative-traumatic moment and the recursive temporality it
inaugurates, is that trauma—as a way of figuring jouissance as a debt—is far more akin
to restoration than it might appear, as it takes shape only if the possibility of a general
economy of expenditure is always already excluded or if the subject is already addicted to
the narcotic of egoism.68

68 The relationship between trauma and prophecy is complicated by the fact that prophecy is a deeply
ambivalent phenomenon that, on one hand, is identical to prediction and a restricted economy o f
expenditure and, on the other, hints at temporal detotalization or a general economy o f expenditure. So,
while the conventional sense o f prophecy would claim to offer an insight that goes beyond trauma’s
blindness, or that it successfully encounters trauma’s missed encounter, this is precisely not what prophecy,
under its other aspect, would propose. Such ‘insight’ would just be another kind o f blindness or another
restriction o f jouissance. In fact, this would be to confuse prophecy with mourning— a confusion I will
return to in the opening section o f chapter four. And this kind o f confusion is exactly how conventional
prophecy tries to discipline the discord that gives it rise in the first place. This is not to say, however, that
trauma’s more ostensibly recalcitrant negativity accurately models the kind o f exposure to which the
Romantic form o f prophecy is especially sensitive. This is because trauma, in figuring exposure as a missed
encounter, does not, in a sense, miss the encounter at all. Traumatic negativity does not really represent a
general economy o f expenditure— the corrosiveness o f time— since it invites the work o f mourning. Put
differently, when trauma makes exposure or jouissance into the kind o f negativity susceptible to or
available fo r mourning, this suggests that the missed encounter is not so much absolutely missed as it is
merely belated— that the miss is just a temporary and anomalous negativity that can always be reabsorbed.
In fact, even in the duration o f the miss, when experience is still outstanding, there is a kind o f closure in
the determination o f this very distance as debt. This sense o f recuperating negativity fits with the
formulation o f prophecy as prediction but not with the more ironic sense o f Romantic prophecy. So, while
trauma does offer a window on prophetic psychology, it does not seem quite right completely to identify
prophetic and traumatic negativity, unless perhaps that trauma can be enormously dilated into a complete
shape o f consciousness— that is, unless trauma can move out o f its containment in Wordsworth’s episodic
spots and become distributed across the entire surface o f the ‘work,’ as in texts like Blake’s The [First]

Book o f Urizen.

101

This exclusion can be sensed in biographical and historical terms given the larger,
cultural project Wordsworth’s self-professionalization represents. For instance, as
Thomas Pfau notes, Wordsworth makes the lyric the ultimate anticommodity, but only to
‘re-invest’ the affective and social ‘returns’ made on this genre in an adjacent type of
economy, namely the production of English middle-class subjectivity:
Yet even in that context [i.e., the rise in the commodity status of poetry],
Wordsworth consistently represented his poetry as an inalienable spiritual
progeny and would insist at all times on its categorical immunity from all
laws of commerce. In fact, he maintained, genuine poetry could only be
properly appreciated as the supreme anticommodity. Whatever its contents
or motifs, poetry had to be, in Wordsworth’s effective and often
persuasive conception, a strategy of defence against professionalization,
specialization, and the psychological vacuum resulting from a seemingly
interminable ascendancy, all of which had emerged both as the historical
foundation of his middle-class audiences and as the structural threat to
their psychological integrity. (Pfau 16)
Wordsworth’s retreat from absolute expenditure, in other words, might stem in part from
his historical situation, one where his very formation as a professional poet demanded a
measured resistance to an increasingly mobile middle-class milieu. As Pfau puts it,
“middle-class representation converged with the young discipline of political economy
and its entirely new, far more pragmatic mode of accounting for a given individual’s
moral and economic status within an increasingly permeable social fabric” through the
concept of “‘Professionalization’” (25), the institutionalization of the project of subject
formation.
In Wordsworth’s Profession: Form, Class, and the Logic o f Early Romantic
Cultural Production, Pfau is interested in how aesthetic cultural work in the late
eighteenth century produces the very middleclass that produces (and consumes) this
material; that is, Pfau is concerned with how culture produces itself. He suggests that the
production and consumption of art becomes the formative mechanism of class in lieu of
traditional forms of discipline and social organization that have been displaced by
broader access to emerging markets and the wealth available there. That is, the aesthetic,
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in terms that still echo the economic realm against which it is ostensibly positioned,
seems to cultivate and inculcate a set of ‘proper values’—acceptable ‘interest,’
reasonable ‘investment,’ et cetera—that are supposed to promote a sense of essential
Englishness and thereby gather together what looks to be an increasingly fluid, disparate,
and unpredictable social group mobilized via economic enfranchisement. In his final
chapter, on Wordsworth and Malthus, Pfau focuses on how both writers aim to curb
reproduction, both biological and artistic. The aesthetic is thus not a mere consequence of
historical circumstances but actively and dialectically engaged in an attempt “to contain
the spiritual and material debts of its history by reconstituting that history in the shrewdly
decontextualized form of a cultural heritage” (Pfau 4). One of the ironies here, however,
is that the very force that promotes a concept of middle-class coherence is the potential
incoherence of productivity: “Over time, such an alternately censorious or approving
relationship between the Wordsworthian poet and his prospective audience was to
fashion a once amorphous and mostly random ‘public’ into a cohesive middle-class
community that believed it had distinguished itself through its seemingly unlimited
imaginative mobility” (Pfau 9, my emphasis). Hence, there remains a very significant
tension between this unlimited imagination and the ostensibly natural—although in fact
rigorously disciplinary—literary and aesthetic forms in the period, something Pfau looks
at in terms of, broadly, the picturesque and, more specifically, the ballad, lyric, and
autobiographical genres.
Put differently, Wordsworth masterfully recuperates through cultivation—of
himself and his audience’s tastes—the very energy he sets free through inspired poetry.
This broader frame helps to illustrate how the traumatic dimensions of the spots of time
are the consequence and extension of this larger alchemy of affect. When Wordsworth is
placed into the longer view of the “volatile interaction between debt and imagination
brought about by the establishment and gradual assimilation of public credit” (Pfau 22), it
becomes clear that, for Wordsworth, to be a prophet is to make a profit—always to justify
and to account for one’s claim to value.69 That is, Wordsworth makes the most of his

69 Where Bataille seems to welcome a general economy o f expenditure, the absolute night o f what he calls
“communication”— wherein the terms in communication ‘share’ only a common, inoperative dissolution—
Wordsworth everywhere aims to illuminate or avoid this darkness, to formulate ecstatic loss as something
like a substantial quality or predicate o f an exceptional subject:
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rural dark materials—often scenes of loss and suffering—not perhaps in strictly financial
terms (although this possibility is also evolving) but in terms of cultivating a certain set
o f ‘charged’ affective relationships. Indeed, Wordsworth’s characteristically deadpan
description of “tragic sufferings” (7.501) suggests a reluctance to ‘spend’ emotion in
effusive transports or in less than ‘economical’ expressions; as de Man says, “the precise
shade of recorded affectivity, in Wordsworth, is so delicate in its refusal to make any
concession to notions of sensory experience that it acquires an amazing power of
recuperation in the face of the most unadorned destructions that the mind can imagine”
(Rhetoric 86).

Hence, Pfau can say of Wordsworth’s The Ruined Cottage that “the

intensity of beholding and describing the scene of social misery [...] reveal[s] how the
Picturesque [...] reproduces at the level of the symbolic the very same paradigm of
productivity, investment, and maximized returns that has left Margaret and her fellow
sufferers (or criminals) marooned in an economic wasteland of no speculative value to
national economy” (33). Crucially, Wordsworth never lets pain get out of hand, so to70
Unknown, unthought of, yet I was most rich,
I had a world about me— ‘twas my own,
I made it; for it only lived in me,
And to the God who looked into my mind.
Such sympathies would sometimes shew themselves
By outward gesture and by invisible looks—
Some called it madness; such indeed it was,
If childlike fruitfulness in passing joy,
If steady moods o f thoughtfulness matured
To inspiration, sort with such a name;
If prophecy be madness; if things viewed
By poets o f old time, and higher up,
By the first men, earth’s first inhabitants,
May in these tutored days no more be seen
With undistorted sight. (3.140-155)
In contrast to Wordsworth’s effort to ‘profit’ from his madness (“I was most rich [...] if prophecy be
madness”), Bataille argues that “we are only totally laid bare by proceeding without trickery to the
unknown” (Inner 5).
70 One might think o f the “matter-of-factness” (Rhetoric 87) with which Wordsworth’s narrators in texts
like The Ruined Cottage or “Michael” details the total destruction o f a family, or the terse conclusion to the
long, melodramatic passage, in the 1805 Prelude, on Vaudracour and Julia:
It consoled him here
To attend upon the orphan and perform
The office o f a nurse to his young child,
Which, after a short time, by some mistake
Or indiscretion o f the father, died. (9.904-909)
But then one might also think o f de Man’s own rhetoric. For, de Man seems similarly deadpan in his
treatment o f often very affectively charged moments in literature. If, for Wordsworth, this technique leads
to “an amazing power o f recuperation,” does this complicate de Man’s skepticism at the end o f a text like
“Shelley Disfigured”?
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speak—it is never wasted, insofar as it becomes an opportunity for another register of
feeling, of ‘investment.’ And it is this same sense of conservation that will ensure that the
spots of time will never enter a general economy of expenditure but will always be
recuperated as, in Freud’s words, “a lesser unpleasure” than absolute rapture. In fact, it is
tempting to refer to Batailie’s comments on Proustian memory as a commentary on
Wordsworth’s very similar operation. For, if it is “the triumph of time regained” that
Bataille sees as Proust’s “visible intention” {Inner 146), the same could be said of
Wordsworth. But then the critique of the former would have to apply to the latter, too:
The triumph of reminiscences makes less sense than one imagines. Linked
to the unknown, to non-knowledge, it is ecstasy freeing itself from a great
anguish. With the help of a concession made to the need to possess, to
know (deceived, if one likes, by recognition), a balance is established.
Often the unknown gives us anguish, but it is the condition for ecstasy.
Anguish is the fear of losing, expression of the desire to possess. It is a
stopping-point before the communication which excites desire but which
inspires fear. Should we give the slip to the need to possess—anguish just
as quickly turns to ecstasy. {Inner 147-147)
What this helps to clarify is that Wordsworth, because he cannot “give the slip to the
need to possess,” must encounter mystical experience not as rapture but as trauma.
Such recuperation is also an attempt to elude time, for time is a kind of absolute
expenditure: it extends beyond any kind of appropriation by being and is resistant even to
identification with the latent teleology of various forms of becoming (hence, both Hegel
and Heidegger absorb time into narcotic projects) or development. Time, like the irony
with which it shares a similar volatility and elusiveness, troubles all such determination.
Hence, projects often attempt to appropriate time itself either in the form of prediction or
more subtly through systematic schemes: processes of cultivation and development or
historical narratives that negotiate irrationality in the effort to install some kind of
clarifying continuity. The effect is once again to restrict time’s frightening prodigality, its
intense detotalization that gives the future to history and narrative in giving no-thing. As
Bataille notes, in a passage that could be read alongside Hiedegger’s commentary on
ontic historiography but that must also recoil onto Heidegger’s own project, “in common

105

conditions, time is annulled, enclosed within the permanence of forms or of changes
which are foreseen. Movements inscribed within an order arrest time, which they freeze
in a system of measures and equivalencies” {Inner 74). In fact, when Bataille suggests
that “‘catastrophe’ is the most profound of revolutions—it is time ‘unhinged’: the
skeleton is the sign of this, the outcome of decay, from which its illusory existence
emerges” {Inner 74), he gestures toward the temporalization of history in Koselleck’s
revolution of revolution. So, if prophecy is supposed to give time, one would always
depart from such a prophecy empty handed71: any communication of ecstasy that would
leave discourse intact would, in its very coherence and finitude, indicate its failure.
Wordsworth, through the spots of time, always ‘takes something away’ from his early
experiences, either in the form of traumatic or inspiring impressions (or both at once). In
any case, this amounts to the conversion of ecstasy back into economic exchange, of time
back into spatial narrative. That said, Wordsworth’s text undermines its own recuperative
tendency in a more radical way, as the spots of time reveal a senselessness from which
the speaker simply cannot profit. That is, temporality’s elusiveness deconstructs the
traumatic economy that would restrict history to narrative by opening a gap at the very
center of empirical impression; such a gap makes it impossible perfectly to absorb time
into narrative because it reveals the absent ground or immanent difference of the very
events that constitute narrative in the first place.

V. “the unimaginable touch of Time”

Book Eleven of the 1805 Prelude opens with the promise to document the trials of
the “Imagination, How Impaired and Restored,” suggesting a confident itinerary of
mourning and restitution. To this end, the poem turns to those “Points [...] within our
souls/ Where all stand single” (3.186-7), the spots of time. Such moments, with their
“renovating Virtue” (11.259), “Are scattered everywhere, taking their date/ From our first
childhood” (11.274-5). The speaker, then, suggests that such instants originate from a
moment of intense consciousness:

71 “Allegory goes away empty-handed” (Benjamin Origin 233)
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This efficacious spirit chiefly lurks
Among those passages of life in which
We have had deepest feeling that the mind
Is lord and master, and that outward sense
Is but the obedient servant of her will. (11.268-72)
This valorization of the controlling mind is, however, somewhat doubtful or, recalling the
prophetic call to prophecy in “Home at Grasmere,” perhaps wishful. For, in the episode
of the gibbet-mast, while the scene of “visionary dreariness” (11.311) that stands out in
the poet’s memory might indeed be the product of intense consciousness, that
consciousness is itself the consequence of an unconscious tension that primes or readies
the mind; while the “feeling, and diversity of strength” (11.327) in this scene is enshrined
for “future restoration,” it only has this power thanks to residual anxiety.
Thomas De Quincey, in 1839, famously recorded how Wordsworth understood
this psychological economy. De Quincey recalls an occasion when the expectation of
important news concerning the Peninsular War prompted both him and Wordsworth to
walk out and wait near the road. De Quincey describes the scene of anticipation and the
subsequent effects of disappointment on consciousness—for the intelligence did not
arrive during their wait—Wordsworth apparently articulated:
At intervals, Wordsworth had stretched himself at length on the high
road, applying his ear to the ground so as to catch any sound of wheels
that might be groaning along at a distance.
Once, when he was slowly rising from this effort, his eye caught a bright
star that was glittering between the brow of Seat Sandal and the mighty
Helvellyn. He gazed upon it for a minute or so, and then, upon turning
away to descend into Grasmere, he made the following explanation. “I
have remarked from my earliest days that if, under any circumstances, the
attention is energetically braced up to an act of steady observation, or of
steady expectation, then, if this intense condition of vigilance should then
relax, at that moment any beautiful, any impressive visual object, or
collection of objects, falling upon the eye, is carried to the heart with a
power not known under any other circumstances. Just now, my ear was
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placed upon the stretch in order to catch any sound of wheels that might
come down upon the lake of Wythbum from the Keswick road; at the very
instant when I raised my head from the ground in final abandonment of
hope for this night, at the very instant when the organs of attention were
all at once relaxing from their tension, the bright star hanging in the air
above those outlines of massy blackness fell suddenly upon my eye, and
penetrated my capacity of apprehension with a pathos and a sense of the
infinite that would not have arrested me under other circumstances. (641)
In the case of the gibbet-mast, the young Wordsworth’s consciousness is similarly primed
by an imminent apparition when he witnesses obsessive engraving, that is, writing
designed to keep a ghost confined by literally en-graving its murderous spirit:
Some unknown hand had carved the murderer’s name.
The monumental writing was engraven
In times long past, and still from year to year
By superstition of the neighbourhood
The grass is cleared away; and to this hour
The letters are fresh and visible. (11.293-98)
The townsfolk’s persistent repression of unruly spirits is tantamount to the “attention”
and “intense vigilance” mentioned by De Quincey. Yet, insofar as this repression
successfully forestalls the ghost’s return, so does the intense expectation of that return
‘inspire’ the speaker.
That is, for all of the effort, there is a sense that the letter cannot, finally, repress
the spirit, as the feeling of trepidation itself transcends localization. In the perpetual
postponement of the ghost, restless anticipation haunts the subject. In a manner of
speaking, the ‘spirit’ of the gibbet-mast escapes engraving precisely when anxiety72
721 am following here Collings’ reading o f what Douglass Kneale describes as the “‘monumental’ letters”
(137) inscribed by “Some unknown hand” (11.294) at the base o f the moldering gibbet-mast. Elaborating
on Kneale’s analysis o f Wordsworth’s complex rhetoric in this episode, Collings suggests that there is a
subtle reversal such that the maintenance o f the gibbet-mast constructs the townsfolk as ghosts, as agents
who haunt the grave in an effort to maintain the murderer’s en-graving:
Without a coffin, without a proper burial, this dead man threatens to become a ghost, and only the
engraved characters keep him in his proper place. The unknown hand carves the murderer’s name
not to memorialize him (to give him an epitaph) but, out o f vengeful desire or superstitious fear, to
keep him from returning to haunt the living. As a result, the anonymous engraver must continually
return to this spot, haunt it, and become the living counterpart to the ghost that he fears. (145-6)
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‘possesses’ the young Wordsworth, making him impressionable. In this, a certain notion
of history—history as linear narrative—could be said, also, to escape from inscription or
interment: for the past is perhaps not so decidedly past, nor the future something that can
be confidently predicted via precedent, as the unlikely intensity of the subsequent
experience attests. More specifically, there is here an existential awaking, as the
protagonist is not exactly impressed by the experience of the gallows, but rather made
capable, subsequently, of bearing impressions, thus revealing his historical receptivity,
his being-historical or historicity. This complicates the episode’s empirical language and
the ‘sense’ of history and time at play. For, the child-Wordsworth is left ««marked by his
experience at the gibbet only because he has been made eminently remarkable. Becoming
remarkable does not, itself, leave a mark, but rather, anticipating the formulation of affect
and memory discussed in chapter three, a hidden impression or an “obscure sense/ Of
possible sublimity” (2.335-6). So, while the scene of the gibbet-mast itself is not taken as
the restorative spot to which the mature speaker “repairs” in times of hardship, it is what
makes possible the deep impression left by the otherwise “ordinary sight” (11.309)—an
experience that will be one of these reparative spots. Hence, the renovating impression in
Wordsworth’s memory contains a double reference: not only does the spot of time recall
a singular, extraordinary scene but it necessarily, if secretly, gestures to the gibbet-mast,
to the preface of the impression, the unhallowed ground of engraving, or the disembodied
intensity of vigilance.73 In fact, this episode of exceptional impression deconstructs the
empirical logic of impression at work elsewhere in The Prelude.
The language of sensible impression is especially prominent in the 1799 Prelude.
There, for example, the speaker apostrophizes the “powers of the earth” (1.186) as agents
who
[ijmpressed upon all forms the characters
Of danger and desire, and thus did make
The surface of the universal earth
73 Taking the gibbet-mast episode as a fundamental element in the structure o f Wordsworth’s psycho-poetic
economy helps to explain the generalazibility o f Hartman’s apt description o f Wordsworthian lyricism:
The traveler— man, the secular pilgrim— is halted by an affecting image. And something peculiar
in the image, or the suspension itself o f habitual motion, or an ensuing, meditative consciousness,
brings him into the shadow o f death. That shadow is lightened or subsumed as the poem proceeds,
and the unusual image pointing like an epitaph to the passerby is transformed into a more internal
inscription testifying o f continuance rather than death. ( Wordsworth's 12)
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With meanings of delight, of hope and fear,
Work like a sea. (1.194-8)
Moreover, this monumental writing on the earth becomes the writing o f the earth as the
speaker becomes the ultimate archive or even the grave of history:
Distresses and disasters, tragic facts
Of rural history, that impressed my mind
With images to which in following years
Far other feelings were attached—with forms
That yet exist with independent life,
And, like their archetypes, know no decay. (1.282-7)
The speaker is eminently engravable. The impressions, moreover, are not superficial but
take on an “independent life” that emulates changeless ideas or “archetypes,” importing a
dubious kind of stability. For it is clear that the spots of time are the products of scarring
and borrow their traumatic itinerary from the imagery of Druidic sacrifice that punctuates
so much of Wordsworth’s poetry—moments that do not so much evade history as take
narrative to its trembling limit in uncanny repetition. This shift from engraving nature to
engraving the subject parallels the gibbet-mast scene as there, also, the speaker becomes
the ultimate surface of impression. As such, we might recall Locke’s subject—
particularly in his characterization of the mind as “white paper, void of all characters”
(2.1.2). Indeed, as Hugh Sykes Davies suggests, “so far as the notion o f ‘impulse’ [and
perhaps “impression”] goes, he [i.e., Wordsworth] was in general agreement with them
[the empirical philosophers], and his use of the word is not very different from the way it
is used in [...] Locke” (162). However, Wordsworth also departs significantly, if subtly,
from strictly Lockean epistemology given, for instance, “his insistence upon the potential
significance of ‘one impulse,’ of one experience rather than a host of others” (Davies
162); Wordsworth, in contrast to Locke, suggests that there can be exceptional
impressions.74 These impressions are not made exceptional through perception, attention,
or higher-order operations of reflection. They are exceptional, rather, because of the pre
existing conditions of the receptive subject. While the Lockean subject is “essentially
74 This particular point supports the observation that while “Wordsworth’s psychology and affective diction
are closely derived from the developed tradition o f Lockean thought, [...] his meanings are not” (Weiskel

22).
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passive and inactive” (Davies 157) at least in terms of the formation of Locke’s “simple
ideas,” Wordsworth’s subject, on the contrary, is radically agitated.
The point here is that the exceptional impression in the gibbet-mast episode is
lighter and yet more profound than any other, as it stages what Wordsworth, in the
“Mutability” sonnet, calls “the unimaginable touch of Time” (14); in the caesura at the
center of empirical impression, Wordsworth’s subject ‘senses,’ as it were, the radical
openness and uncertainty of temporalized history.75 This is to suggest that time itself is a
kind of missed experience and that the prophet’s suffering—taken either traumatically or
ecstatically—is a function of his or her immediate relationship to time’s own
extemporaneity. Like the forgetful memory or ‘dismemberment’ discussed in chapter
three in connection to Percy Shelley—a phenomenon that leaves Blanchot with a strange
epistemological residue, the sense that he will have known something—Wordsworth has
the ‘impression’ not that he knows time but that he will have known it, or that he had
known it once before. For if all we ever have of time is a memory, this is a strange, selfdisplacing kind of memory that recalls us not to something objective but rather to the
absence of presence or, better, the presence of absence, through a memory of
forgetfulness. Wordsworth will always come back to time’s absent impression, will
always experience the missing o f experience, in his spots of time precisely because he
does not directly return to the gibbet-mast episode but rather to the impressions it makes
possible, the impression that covers over even as it gently discloses this unstable ground,
one that writhes “like a sea.”
In fact, there is a sense, even in Locke, that the Tightness’ of time’s impression
troubles empirical logic. This is especially evident in Locke’s own version of the gibbetmast episode. For beyond Locke’s three best-known images of the mind—an “empty
cabinet” (1.1.15), the aforementioned blank paper, and a “dark room” (2.11.17)—there is
an often-overlooked fourth image: the mind as a tomb, its surface engraved by memory.
In Book Two of Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding, in the chapter “Of
75 What Jean-Luc Nancy calls the nonsignifying aspect or ground o f the image is something Wordsworth’s
experience o f the gibbet-mast helps to elucidate: “the image suspends the course o f the world and o f
meaning— o f meaning as a course or current o f sense (meaning in discourse, meaning that is current and
valid): but it affirms all that more a sense (therefore an ‘insensible’) that is selfsame with what it gives to be
sensed (that is, itself). In the image, which, however, is without an ‘inside’ [or metaphysical substance that
is different from its own appearance], there is a sense that is nonsignifying but not insignificant, a sense
that is a certain force (its form)” (Ground 10-11).
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Retention,” Locke suggests, in a strangely gothic passage, that memories fade just as
actual memorials erode over time: “thus the ideas, as well as children, of our youth, often
die before us: and our minds represent to us those tombs to which we are approaching;
where, though the brass and marble remain, yet the inscriptions are effaced by time, and
the imagery moulders away” (2.10.5). Locke’s metaphor here requires that we think of
ideas as buried corpses. Memorial plaques—memories—constitute a temporary and
fragile index: signs on dissolving surfaces that attempt, against time’s exhausting
violence, to ‘plot’ ideas. As in Wordsworth, there is a pressing danger here that
engraving, in every sense, will fail: even when engraving (in the sense of writing) in
Locke’s metaphor succeeds, engraving (in the sense of “keeping in the grave”) fails, as it
would call-up—literally re-member—the ‘corpse’ of meaning. Similarly, successful
engraving (in the sense of writing) in Wordsworth’s gibbet-mast episode does not prevent
but actually sustains a residual, haunting anxiety. This failure is, in each case, linked
directly to the properties of the respective impressionable surfaces: for sensitivity is the
necessary condition of impression even as sensitivity itself withdraws from positive
impression with “steps/ Almost as silent as the turf they trod” (1.331-332); sensitivity is
what grounds and at once ungrounds or volatiles impression, disclosing time’s elusive
unruliness through this subtle fluctuation.
It is this return of the violent, though strangely impalpable—so, empirically
‘missed’—experience of time itself that structures, also, the Christmas vacation spot of
time. The Christmas scene involves what Wordsworth, elsewhere, calls “the usury of
time,” an error or injustice committed by predictive “sages, who in their prescience
would controul/ All accidents” (5.379). Indeed, the precise terms of this predictive
exigency anticipates the young Wordsworth’s position as he waits above two roads,
expecting, along one or the other route, the arrival of a carriage to convey him home. In a
sense, the schoolmasters addressed in Book Five force the speaker down one of these
‘paths,’ teaching the student a lesson about mastering time that Wordsworth will wish,
later, not to have learned so well:
These mighty workmen of our later age
Who with a broad highway have overbridged
The froward chaos of futurity, (5.370-2)
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manage, laments the speaker, to “Confine us down/ Like engines” (5.382-3). In an echo
of Sin and Death who, in Paradise Lost,
[pjav’d after him [i.e., Satan] a broad and beat’n way
Over the dark Abyss, whose boiling Gulph
Tamely endur’d a Bridge of wondrous length, (2.1026-8)
these ridged masters would impose a deadly predictability on the “unreasoning progress
of the world,” failing to see that “a wiser spirit is at work for us” in such ostensible
errancy, or “even in what seem our most unfruitful hours” (5.384, 385, 388).
This “usury of time” that would impose a narrative sequence of events or a ‘single
track’ of experience is, in Book Eleven, derailed. Geoffrey Hartman notes, for instance,
how the speaker’s “anxiety of hope” (11.371) is complicated by his father’s abrupt death:
“the father’s death, which supervenes as an ‘event’ (1.309), converts that moment of hope
into an ominous, even murderous anticipation” (Unremarkable 24). Hence, “though there
is no intervention of vision or voice, there is [in this instance] something like a special,
burdened relationship to time. Wordsworth called the episode a ‘spot of time,’ to indicate
that it stood out, spotlike, in his consciousness of time, that it merged sensation of place
and sensation of time (so that time was placed), even that it allowed him to physically
perceive or ‘spot’ time” (Unremarkable 23). As mentioned earlier, spots in time are also
stops in time, as the notion of chronological progression is disrupted by the retro-activity
of the death, such that the ‘present’ moment of anxious hope had not been experienced,
as it were, felicitously, making its presence strangely absent or converting it into a mere
trace of itself: as if time and affect, as in the gibbet-mast episode, were out of synch.
There is, in a sense, a missed encounter with imminent death. Or, in terms of the
tyrannical schoolmasters, Wordsworth’s initially excessive hope to see a carriage as a
means to the imminent, happy holiday constitutes temporal usury, or demands an
experience from the future that ‘over taxes’ the future’s radical uncertainty. “In
retrospect, then, a perfectly ordinary mood is seen to involve a sin against time” as the
speaker’s desire to return home quickly “seems to find retributive fulfillment when the
father’s life is cut short ten days later” (Unremarkable 24).
Unlike the scene of the gibbet-mast, here the remarkable moment of temporal
sensitivity comes after the visionary dreariness of the scene—“the single sheep, and the
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one blasted tree,/ And the bleak music of that old stone wall” (11.381-2)—making that
scene impressive retroactively by introducing impressionability itself retroactively. With
a backward glance, the cryptic moment is revealed as withholding a deadly foreboding—
that is, the moment’s hidden prophetic quality is not so much exposed as recognized as
hidden, whereas this was completely overlooked in the original episode. The desire to
return home, to hasten time, and to determine the road on which the carriage would arrive
disguises the ‘real’ affect of the scene by arriving, too quickly, at a chrono-logic or too
abruptly establishing a narrative arc. Time’s usury, or prophecy as prediction, confuses
the prophet with profit—twisting the gift into a debt that seems cruelly expiated only by
the father’s death—and fails to heed Socrates’ example of profitless prophecy. For as
Kierkegaard relates, “it is a familiar fact that Socrates was quite proud of not taking
money for his teaching and often spoke of it with considerable bravado. Undeniably this
most frequently was said with deep irony directed at the Sophists, who charged so much
that in the opposite sense their instruction became almost incommensurate with money
and monetary value” (Irony 186).
In a similar vein, de Man’s “Wordsworth and Hölderlin” argues that a certain
anticipation of imminent death infiltrates the famous lines of sublime depth in Book Five
of The Prelude:
[T]hen sometimes, in that silence, while he hung
Listening, a gentle shock of mild surprise
Has carried far into his heart the voice
Of mountain torrents. (406-9)
De Man suggest that the verb “hung” is, itself, ‘echoed’ later on, in the description of
how “the churchyard hangs/ Upon a slope above the Village School” (417-18). Thus, de
Man argues that “the boy’s surprise at standing perplexed before the sudden silence of
nature was an anticipatory announcement of his death” (53-4). Moreover, for de Man,
this experience is something like a belated recognition of authentic finitude: “a lively,
pleasurably entertaining but destructive world strikes up against a reflective and silent
world what stands nearer to an authentic understanding of our situation” (55). This
“gentle shock” is stored in the boy’s affective battery, as it were, like an involuntary
memory or a memory trace only to return as an anticipation o f death, rather like the
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“anxiety of hope” passage that the speaker returns to as an anticipation o f death. In each
case, moments become proleptic only analeptically. As a restorative moment, then, this
description of suspenseful listening would aim to redeem the lost time of average
everydayness by hearing an even deeper, uncanny silence in the ‘original’ experience of
“mild surprise.” And yet, what this listening hears is an affirmation of fmitude, rather
than a more conventionally comforting narcotic, therein skewing the affective register.
For de Man, as if applying Bataille’s philosophy to literature, “the essential poetic
moment above all other poetic moments is that of the transition from one world to the
other”—that is, from a world that is “entertaining but destructive” to the “reflective and
silent world” (55). As such, poetry involves a layering of vision, where the poem
“illuminates this midpoint [between these worlds] from which it glimpses its inauthentic
past in the light of the precarious knowledge of its future” (55). Hence, for de Man,
experiences of ostensible failure in Wordsworth function as important points of authentic
insight, but only well after the fact—a delay Wordsworth himself dramatizes. As de Man
continues,
for the interpreter of history, it [the movement from act to interpretation]
is never a simple and uniform movement like the ascent of a peak or the
installation of a defensive social order. Rather, it appears much more in
the twilight in which for Wordsworth the crossing of the Alps was bathed,
in which the coming-to-consciousness is in arrears vis-à-vis the actual
past, and consequently is to be understood not as a conquest but rather as a
rectification or even a reproach. The future is present in history only as the
remembering of a failed project that has become a menace. (58-9)
In other words, there is something prophetic here, but not in the sense of simple
anticipation, for the future is not an abundance hidden within the present. Rather,
consciousness recognizes its own possible futures only in a moment of retrospection,
emphasizing a certain absence in the present or a missed encounter with presence.
Consciousness folds back on itself and seems to call to its earlier self—and the futures
pertaining to that earlier self—from a position of greater self-understanding, gathering
time together in a manner akin to Heidegger’s discussion of Sorge, “care,” in Being and
Time. Just as care gathers together the existential temporalities of Dasein, so
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Wordsworth’s sense of the future emerges through a process of retrospective redemption,
such that time’s forward orientation emerges only when crossed by memory’s retreat,
turning the present into something strangely missed, like Wordsworth’s ascent of the
Alps. For as de Man argues, “Wordsworth[,] through the gap that separates the
completion of an action from its understanding [,] [...] discloses a general structure of
poetic temporality,” where this temporality “lends duration to a past that otherwise would
immediately sink into the nonbeing of a future that withdraws itself from consciousness.
It is thus an act through which a memory threatened with its own loss succeeds in
sustaining itself’ (64). Yet, from the perspective of Romantic prophecy, the emphasis
here must be less on memory’s successful recuperation of the imminent loss of time than
the recognition that, in Wordsworth, time’s senselessness manages to express itself in its
very apophasis or retreat from sense. For, as discussed above, time itself does not
perform any protraction of memory or extension of consciousness.
This reversal, where a scene becomes remarkable—where its futurity opens up—
retroactively but only because hope is re-contained as ‘sin,’ seems to make it all the more
difficult to understand the spots of time as simply restorative. While the encounter with
the gibbet-mast can fade, at least partially, into the background of the subsequently
sublime vision, or where the echo of “hung” in Book Five can be conveniently
overlooked by the speaker and reader alike, it seems that the Christmas vacation episode,
specifically, makes unmistakably explicit that a return to the moment of waiting and
wishing must entail a return to guilt and sorrow. That said, this is a covert, even cryptic
form of guilt. Following Weiskel’s observation, if the speaker can truly feel guilty—
something he seems especially capable of throughout The Prelude—as opposed to merely
sad about the death of his father, this immediately implies some kind of moral
transgression. In other words, the emergence of guilt, and that it is the speaker’s “desires”
(11.374) that are corrected, suggests that the speaker, on some level, might wish for the
death of this father. This, alone, is perhaps too cliché, too bluntly Oedipal to warrant
extended analysis. However, there may be another dimension to this taboo longing: it is
no accident that the death of the father overlaps with the birth of the Son, as the young
speaker expects to return, specifically, to celebrate the Christ-mass holiday. The birth of
Christ anticipates the gift of death, the final sacrifice of the Son by the Father—the
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ultimate gift that would sacrifice sacrifice itself and transcend the violence and mourn the
trauma, definitively lose the loss—of pre-Christian society. Indeed, the contraction of
time performed not only in the anxiety of hope episode—where celebration overlaps with
regret, wishful contraction with belated protraction—but in the spots of time more
generally suggest that the birth of Jesus might, too, be read in terms of his final
crucifixion. The question of sacrifice resonates throughout The Prelude, such that the
Christmas vacation can hardly be read as an innocent time of festivity but rather links the
episode to broader worries about history’s violence.

IV. “Timely Utterance”

There is, specifically, a lingering fear in The Prelude that history, while
apparently progressing, may in fact be regressing, or that the possibility of regression
coincides with and haunts Bildung. Book Eight, Retrospect: Love o f Nature Leading to
Love o f Mankind, proposes to trace the moral development of the speaker, his emergence,
to recall “Tintem Abbey,” from “the coarser pleasures” of “thoughtless youth” to a more
refined awareness of “the still, sad music of humanity” (73, 90, 91). Beginning with
nature’s inspiration, the speaker claims to find, ultimately, “lovelier far than this” “the
heart of man” (8.144, 151). This evolution is, however, suspended by persistent
nightmares: “images of danger and distress/ And suffering, these took deepest hold on
me” (8.211-12). And before we get to any confirmation of progress’ traction, the speaker
relates—in the 1805 version, at least—one such “image of dark distress,” a story not
merely of loss but of a potential spiritual and moral regression. The speaker recalls the
tale of “a shepherd and his son” who, in the midst of an intensifying storm, sought “a
straggler from their flock” (8.223,225). Once separated, the son, returning to the
animal’s birthplace, “spied the sheep upon a plot of grass/ An island in the brook” (8.270
1). The lamb is poised on what looks like an alter—“It was a place/ Remote and deep,
piled round with rocks”—recalling images of what Wordsworth would perhaps
understand as pre-cultural sites of sacrifice, akin to the round, piled stones of Stonehenge
in “Guilt and Sorrow” and there associated with the “sacrifice [...] of living men”
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(123).
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The situation also involves, however, a problem of substitution, recalling but also

complicating Abraham’s near sacrifice of Isaac. That is, the boy tries to rescue the sheep
and “leapt upon the island with proud heart/ And with a prophet’s joy” (8.279-80).

76 This scene finds company with a series o f similar images that displace, according to Alan Liu’s
Wordsworth, The Sense o f History, the images o f Stonehenge that punctuate Wordsworth’s oeuvre. Liu
follows these transformations o f Druidic sacrifice from Salisbury Plain (1793) through the Pemeth Beacon
and Celtic mound in “ 1 7 9 4 to Wordsworth’s recorded memories o f Gibbet Moss, in Hawkshead, through
Adventures on Salisbury Plain (1795), The Borderers' (1796-7) Ruined Castle and bent tree, until finally
reaching the 1805 Prelude with both the vision o f Sarum’s Plain in Book Twelve and the gibbet-mast and
blasted Hawthorne spots o f time in Book Eleven (Liu 203). While Liu reads this transformation as a species
o f historical repression that substitutes prehistory for the pressing tensions o f the Revolution— what he calls
earlier “a sustained effort to deny history” (13) and later “a refugee flight o f forms, a rush to escape
history” (223)— it seems, rather, to offer a different mode o f history all together, one that, far from
repressing history, cannot repress history successfully, curling, therefore, into a more recursive, obsessive
pattern. Indeed, Liu’s thesis that Wordsworth aims to evade history relies on a concept o f history as a linear
narrative that has been ontologically hollowed-out and subsequently stitched together in a ‘recuperative’
epistemology. This approach yields what Liu curiously calls “positivism” even thought it quite explicitly
severs itself from any claims to knowledge o f reality as such.
That is, Liu is quick to sacrifice any existential analysis o f history, nature, or the subject: “ There is

no nature [...]. There is no time. There is no affection. There is no self or mind. Therefore, there is no
Imagination" (38; Liu’s emphasis). That is, as Liu elaborates later, “there is no nature except as it is
constituted by acts o f political definition made possible by particular forms o f government” (104). It is an
expansion o f this basically skeptical logic that underlies his other denials: there is no-thing aside from the
apparatus that make phenomena possible. In the absence, then, o f any grounding being, Liu can suggest, “if
there ‘is’ no history, then the relevant problem becomes the knowledge or sense o f history in the full sense”
(40). This approach has the virtue o f undermining transcendental schemes o f history and understanding
history as a discourse constructed by human understanding. The problem, however, is that this reduction o f
history to the sensible and the intelligible ignores the role o f the senseless and the irrational in the
emergence o f history— for history is a discourse that recognizes, addresses, and attempts to negotiate this
kind o f negativity. In fact, the disabling limitations o f Liu’s approach are perhaps most clear when it comes
to the possibility o f historicizing the rise o f historical consciousness. Unless Liu thinks consciousness and
human nature are unchanging and eternal ideas (which seems to conflict with his materialism), the
particular shape o f consciousness that spurs historical thinking— the historical “sense”— must itself have a
history.
Yet, in a strange way, Liu’s form o f history is predicated on the impossibility o f historicizing
itself. As he argues, the particular forms o f culture one can catalogue— political, economic, social,
aesthetic, discursive, et cetera— follow a logic o f “determinate arbitrariness” (43): beyond what is actual,
determinate, and empirically sensible, there is no kind o f order, only pure arbitrariness. The problem is not
that Liu rejects any immanent or transcendent order or that he argues strongly that order, in all senses, is an
invention o f the human intellect: that much seems perfectly consistent. The problem, rather, is that Liu
rejects the possibility that something insensible, irrational, or unconscious might have an effect on what is
sensible. The rejection o f this possibility, resultantly, makes it difficult to offer a compelling history o f the
emergence o f history, since the notion that the historical sensibility itself emerges out o f non-being— that it
is finite and non-transcendent— requires a willingness to see historical phenomenon as products o f perhaps
arbitrary but certainly more complex and perhaps inchoate desires, fears, hopes, and so on. For in an
important way, the emergence o f history as a discourse o f sense-making, while it cannot be explained by
appeal to one single phenomenon or explained by some form o f overarching teleology in human
development, still has causes— multiple, conflicting, and incoherent as they may be. Hence, Liu’s
“positivism”— one can positively know the determinate-if-arbitrary phenomena o f culture and history—
reflects precisely the kind o f historiography that detemporalizes history, that treats history only once its
corrosive negativity and immanent possibility has been disciplined enough to lend the historian his or her
privileged, stable, and in effect un-historical footing.
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Indeed, this metaphor of prophetic joy is, itself, inauspicious—stresses the violence rather
than transcendence of prophecy—given the provenance of the so-called “Brothers Water
(named/ From those two brothers that drowned therein)” (8.231-2) that serves as the
setting for the tale. Yet, it also sets an appropriate tone, as prophetic joy or ecstasy is, as
noted, impossible to separate from prophetic suffering—especially in the Old Testament.
The boy’s efforts do, indeed, prove tragic as
[ijmmediately
The sheep sprang forward to the further shore
And was borne headlong by the roaring flood. (8.280-282)
The line break between 281 and 282 heightens the sense of sudden loss, as the sheep
seems for a moment to have accomplished the leap; the preposition “to,” however,
disguises an implicit “toward,” such that the sense of relief, like the sense of relief upon
arriving home for Christmas in Book Eleven, proves awkwardly premature.
The scene’s symbolic implications, however, may prove to be even more
disturbing than this confusion of joy with loss-—a confusion not unlike the confusion of
comfort with anxiety discussed earlier. In one sense, this is a reversal of Abraham’s
substitution of the lamb for Isaac as the boy is trapped on the sacrificial alter: “so he
stood,/ A prisoner on the island” (8.287-8). It is not, however, simply a matter of
regression here but also, as seems repeatedly at issue in Wordsworth, of a confusion of
forward with backward movement in history. The Christian transcendence of sacrifice as
such—whether human or animal—involves a reversal of the Abrahamic reversal, where
the Father again sacrifices the Son.

Indeed, such a representation of the sacrificial scene

calls its symbolic efficacy or its role as the ground of a properly symbolic culture into
question. For as Collings suggests, “Wordsworth departs from the typical rendition of
human sacrifice as demonic violence,” arguing that “sacrifice is less the practice of
cruelty for its own sake than the sign of the failure to turn sacrifice into a symbolic act”
(29). The persistence of actual sacrificial practices suggests the failure of symbolization7

77 “The gentle Lamb was very roughly slaughtered in this doctrine. As though the God who stood over him
was a God o f simple fear, only to be appeased with bowls o f blood. The regression to barbaric times and
usages is gross indeed, and even more astonishing is the regression from ‘hallowed be thy name’ to this
barbaric conception o f God. [...]. Paul, with his Golgotha o f sacrificial death, revoked this mountain [i.e.,
Moriah or the place o f the ostensible end o f human sacrifice] and rewrote the Prophets” since they
frequently condemned sacrifice (Bloch Atheism in Christianity 175).
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or serves, perhaps, as a reminder that even such symbolization does not necessarily
suspend violence, but merely translates it into socially acceptable forms of political and
economic conflict (Collings 31). Indeed, one way to read Wordsworthian prophecy is as
an acute vision of the persistence of radical violence in culture that does not so much
predict the future as illustrate how contemporary, ostensibly progressive society is
haunted, occupied, or contaminated by the past and how this might limit the future to
repetition. Hence, if the prophet is typically understood as full of future knowledge,
Wordsworth refuses such an idealizing reading. Receiving the prophetic
mantel would make him one more instance of a familiar type, the prophet.
He defines himself instead as a failed prophet or rather someone whose
relation to prophecy could only be described in terms of deferral or failure.
His conception of the authorial self is not comforting; it is the site not of
vatic fullness nor of despairing emptiness (another version of the same)
[i.e., just as theology and negative theology both still affirm a Divine
essence], but rather as Francis Ferguson, in another context, has called the
“noncoincedence of the subject with itself’ (117). It is neither present nor
absent but both/neither present and/nor absent, positioned where it is not
and absent where it is, never capable of being isolated in its proper place.
(Collings 129)
A latter-day Jonah, the Wordsworthian prophet seems acutely aware of the failures of
successful symbolic substitution. As the pre-sense of that failure, the tale of the shepherd
and his son prefaces or foreshadows the “anxiety of hope” episode of Book Eleven. That
is, regressive sacrifice seems to infiltrate symbolic order when the reversal of Abraham’s
substitution of Isaac for the lamb is, itself, reversed, but in such a way as to illustrate the
potential regression in the Christian re-substitution of the victim—not only because this
gestures back to the Old Testament familial structure but because it suggests that even the
supposedly successful sacrifice o f sacrifice only enshrines social violence.
It is precisely this split road, where one cannot distinguish the path of regression
from that of progression, that complicates the act of psychic as well as geographic return
in the Christmas vacation spot of time—a confusion set in play through time’s palpable
elusiveness in the gibbet-mast episode, where time ‘appears’ not as a stabilizing entity
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but as the disconnect within sense. In the speaker’s anticipated return home, in other
words, one might see the return of the Son to the place of sacrifice and paternal
violence—given, especially, that Christmas commemorates the arrival of humanity’s
ultimate scapegoat and cannot but gesture, in the very moment of joyous celebration,
toward betrayal and tragedy: “My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?” (Matthew
27.46). Indeed, there are two senses in which the return to the father might be understood,
rather, as the ghostly and potentially threatening return o f the father. Moreover, this
haunting takes place in the very moment that the speaker has turned his trauma into a
source of solace, or has ostensibly absorbed a “beneficent influence” (11.278) from the
upsetting memory. First, as several critics point out,78 the
[m]ist
Which on the line of each of those two roads
Advanced with such indisputable shapes (11.379-81)
echoes Hamlet, where the father’s ghost appears as a “questionable shape” (1.4.43). In
fact, this line echoes and modifies Shakespeare’s double sense of “questionable” as both
“uncertain” and “subject to questions,” in that “indisputable” seems to suggest not only
certainty but something beyond or resistant to dialogue. In a strange restitution of past
experience, the bleak scene of waiting becomes, indisputably, pregnant with the future.
And yet this fullness or certainty of the moment’s relation to the future manifests itself in
a haunting return of the father. In other words, in hindsight, the speaker’s environment is
understood as ‘full’ of absence, full of the father’s impalpable, vaporous return. It is as if
the starkness and emptiness of the scene itself offered a missed hermeneutic potential.
It is, however, to precisely this empty fullness that the speaker “often would
repair and,” though a rather Shelleyan hydrological condensation, “thence would drink/
As at a fountain” (11.383-4). With this locution comes the second return of the father.
That is, the word “repair” is semantically rich and warrants special attention: from its root
in reparare, it means “to return to” as well as to “fix,” both denotations particularly
appropriate to Wordsworth’s apparent intention. The spots of time are, after all, supposed
to serve as sources “for future restoration” (11.342), and as such the frequent return

78 See Jonathan Wordsworth’s Borders o f Vision, page 63, and Jonathan Bate’s Shakespeare and the
English Romantic Imagination, page 116.
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(repair) to such spots ought to have a palliative (repairing) effect. Yet, the word seems
also to undercut both these meanings. For one, it introduces, subtly, a sense of doubling,
of pairing as “putting in pairs,” which invokes, irresistibly, the sense of paring as
“cutting.” But it also rather uncannily recalls the father. As Geoffrey Hartman notes, the
word “repair” is linked etymologically to “repatriate” and hence, via Latin, to words like
“patriarch.” Hence, in an ironic way, every time the speaker “repairs” to one of these
spots of time in an attempt to restore or renovate himself, he also, in the very same
gesture, returns to the father or, more problematically, solicits the return o f the dead
father—calls on the return of the very pain and suffering that he had promised, in the title
of Book Eleven, to move beyond.
Once again, paths cross and overlap such that the action of return, undertaken in a
therapeutic spirit, cannot help but invoke, simultaneously, the very source of guilt,
anxiety, or perhaps even violence it would like, ultimately, to translate into prophetic
inspiration—just as sacrifice is supposed to translate violence into symbolic sociability
and yet seems rather, in the Marxian reading, to perpetuate violence through socio
economic hierarchies. While some kind of amelioration does occur in each case, it is
impossible to impose an unambiguous significance on the ‘reparative’ impulse. Part of
this is because it is becoming increasingly difficult, following the French Revolution, to
rest assured—despite Kant’s argument—that history and the self are progressing as
“indisputably” as the shapes of death down Wordsworth’s paths. Or, in the words of
Nikolas Kompridis, just as Romanticism encounters a new, ambiguous sense of time
there is an increasing demand for a temporal ordering that this same period in fact
suspends: “as we are hurled forth into the future at an ever-accelerating speed, there is
less and less time and, therefore, more and more pressure to bring into some intelligible
pattern the shifting relationships between the past, the present and the future” (41). As if
in response to this demand, in Book Four of The Prelude Wordsworth offers an elaborate
simile that figures temporality in terms of a self-reflection. Yet, there are two significant79

79 Wordsworth’s “to which I oft repaired” (1.325) convinces Hartman that the word “inclines [...] toward
its original sense o f ‘return,’ or more specifically, ‘return to one’s native country,’ repatriare. [...]. The
relation o f ‘repair’ to its etymological source is as tacit as [an] unconscious process; so it may simply be a
sport o f language that when Wordsworth introduces the notion o f ‘spots o f time’ a hundred or so lines
before this, he also uses the word, though in its other root meaning o f ‘restore,’ from reparare”
(Unremarkable 236-237).
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ambiguities in this passage. First, it is unclear if the subject is supposed to invest the
landscape with order and coherence or, conversely, if the environment is supposed to
lend stability to the subject.80 Second, regardless of who is supposed to be stabilizing
whom, this particular image of temporal organization itself begins to lose its coherence;
ironically, the very process of temporal ordering becomes disordered. Like the nearly
impalpable sense of sensitivity disclosed in the gibbet-mast episode that is indicative of
the temporalized subject, this ‘image’ of time dissolves in and through its transparency,
retreating from visibility as quickly as sensitivity escaped from sensation or en-graving
from the tomb:
As one who hangs down-bending from the side
Of a slow-moving boat upon the breast
Of a still water, solacing himself
With such discoveries as his eye can make
Beneath him in the bottom of the deeps,
Sees many beauteous sights—weeds, fishes, flowers,
Grots, pebbles, roots of trees—and fancies more,
Yet often is perplexed, and cannot part
The shadow from the substance, rocks and sky,
80 In “The Rhetoric o f Temporality” de Man sees this as a persistent ambiguity in Wordsworth’s poetry as
well as in Romanticism more widely. De Man notes that “Wordsworth is more clearly conscious o f what is
involved here [i.e., in the relation o f the part to the whole in the Romantic symbol] when he sees the same
dialectic between self and nature in temporal terms” (204); in maintaining the continuity o f experience that
the symbol, according to Goethe, facilitates, Wordsworth would “borrow, so to speak, the temporal stability
that [the subject] lacks from nature, and [...] devise strategies by means o f which nature is brought down to
a human level while still escaping from ‘the unimaginable touch o f time”’ (204). And yet, de Man notes
that the ostensible “temporal” stability o f the symbol is undermined by this stability’s ambiguous aetiology.
It is not clear, for de Man, whether nature lends stability to the Romantic subject, or if subjective
contemplation organizes contingent, external impressions. In other words, translucent eternity and temporal
flux are not easily mapped onto subject and object positions. Hence for de Man “the contradiction [that, at
times nature seems to take priority over the self, and at other times the self seems to organize nature]
reaches a genuine impasse. For what are we to believe? Is romanticism a subjective idealism, open to all
the attacks o f solipsism [...]? Or is it instead a return to a certain form o f naturalism after the forced
abstraction o f the Enlightenment, but a return which our urban and alienated world can conceive o f only as
a nostalgic and unreachable past?” (204-5). De Man traces this ambiguity to a slippage in the romantic
critical vocabulary, where “the relationship between mind and nature becomes indeed a lot less formal, less
purely associative and external than it is in the eighteenth century” (203). Specifically, he notices how, in
the effort “to find terms better suited to express this relationship” between the subject and nature that
“words such as ‘affinity,’ or ‘sympathy,’ appear instead o f the more abstract ‘analogy,’” a change that
“indicates a gliding away from the formal problem o f a congruence between the two poles to that o f the
ontological priority o f the one over the other. For terms such as ‘affinity’ or ‘sympathy’ apply to the
relationships between subjects rather than to relationships between a subject and an object” (203).
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Mountains and clouds, from that which is indeed
The region, and the things which there abide
In their true dwelling; now is crossed by gleam
Of his own image, by a sunbeam now,
And motions that are sent he knows not whence,
Impediments that make his task more sweet;
Such pleasant office have we long pursued
Incumbent over the surface of past time—
With like success. (4.247-264)
In this metaphor, time is analogous to reflection. But the “surface of past time” is laden
with chronology’s sudden abridgement, such that looking into the past might be
indistinguishable from looking into the future. Hence, looking into the future,
prophetically, cannot then be distinguished from looking backward. For, this moment of
gazing into the water involves an irreducibly doubled vision, where the image of
submerged objects blends with the reflection of the sky on the water’s hyaline surface
and induces temporal vertigo. In fact, the logic of the simile demands more attention. Are
the objects visible below the surface supposed to relate, analogically, to the past? Do the
images reflected on the surface represent the present and the things, themselves, reflected
the (idea of the) future? Even as the image solicits these Platonic questions, it may be
impossible to determine an answer, for the spatial dimensions of “below” and “above”
collapse through the semi-transparency of water in the very articulation of the scene,
dissolving the hierarchy initially constructed.
For this is, again, the strangely unstable ‘sea of engraving’ discussed above. Like
Shelley’s “printless air” that manages to record marks from Panthea’s “belated plumes,”
her ‘delayed pen,’ in Prometheus Unbound, here the water column becomes a legible
surface even though it seems to be constitutively un-engraveable (after all, a boat cannot
move through frozen water), or just as quickly to allow what is ‘engraved’ there to float
to the surface {Prelude 2.1.34). In fact, if this passage makes an autobiographical
gesture—“now is crossed by gleam/ Of his own image”—this places the self within an
unreliable chronology and threatens the narrative reliability of the self-reflexive passage.
As de Man suggested, “the future is present in history only as the remembering of a failed
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project that has become a menace” (59); hence, one wonders if the drowned swimmer—
another face that “rose” unexpectedly “while from a boat others hung o’er the deep”
(5.450, 446 [1850])—signals the speaker’s interrupted, menacing self-reflection, which in
turn presents this past moment as the sudden, retroactive encounter with the future as the
speaker’s own imminent death. Such overlapping trajectories square with Weiskel’s
psychological point that “Wordsworth often seems to be reading the past as if it were the
future and the future as if it were the past, [because] memory and desire are linked as
derivatives from the [single sense of existential] vacancy” (144) that troubles the subject.
Put differently, this figure for autobiographical reflection—the very mechanism or
machinery of subjective Bildung and thus the heart of The Prelude's containing, narrative
logic—is marred not only by temporal disjunction but also by a complex echo between
the 1805 and the 1850 versions of The Prelude. The scene of the drowned man in Book
Five represents, in 1805, something of a solitary experience for the speaker, such that he
seems to meet the “ghastly face, a spectre shape” (5.472) more intimately. In 1850,
however, the passage both intensifies and dissipates the autobiographical coordinates, as
if putting the face under erasure. That is, Wordsworth inserts a phrase in 1850 that clearly
echoes the image, in Book Four, mentioned above, of “one who hangs down-bending
from the side/ Of a slow-moving boat” (4.247-8) when he describes, in the drowned
swimmer episode, how “from a boat others hung o’er the deep” (5.446). With this,
Wordsworth recalls the complex image in Book Four of autobiographical reflection but
displaces himself by diffusing the sight of the face amongst a crowd of others. Put
differently, the change in 1850 seems both to disclose and to cover over the parallel
between the scene of the drowned man (Book Five) and the meditation on self-reflection
through time (Book Four), suggesting a certain nervous affiliation between the speaker
and the corpse.
In a sense, then, the 1850 Prelude contaminates the autobiographical exigency by,
belatedly, rendering this exigency as a kind of anticipation of the subject’s death. This
again recalls de Man’s reading, discussed above: for de Man, the future is only ever
‘present’ in a kind of depressive or unconscious memorialization to which consciousness
always arrives late, for “coming-to-consciousness is in arrears vis-à-vis the actual past”
(59). Yet, for de Man, there is a sense in which the subject can, ultimately, ‘pay off this
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debt. The two, overlapping versions of the ‘same’ moment—with their mutually
exclusive expectations of, say, hope or anxiety, autobiography or death—are actually
reintegrated through an over-arching program of subject development. Narration comes
to the rescue: a diachronic structure eventually places the temporally aberrant trauma into
a determinate chronology—thus mitigating its haunting, uncanny force—even if that
determination is complex, as in de Man’s sense that the future is ‘present’ only in the
midst of memory’s protracted repayment plan. Yet this seems to ignore that the debt
levelled by “the actual past” may commit what Wordsworth, above, called “the usury of
time,” that the past’s future may demand an exorbitant payment that cannot, in fact, be
remitted by consciousness. After all, if the unconscious and irrational are not merely
privations of a universal coherence but irreducible aspects of reality, then they must
remain unconscious and irrational. In other words, both de Man and Hartman note
important discontinuities in Wordsworth’s project; however, both also seem to see those
discontinuities reconciled. For de Man, adopting something of an Heideggerian logic,
Dasein’s decision to take up its own death—even if this is made difficult by temporal
disjunctions—means, ultimately, escaping from an “inauthentic past” into a “reflective
and silent world” (55).
Something similar happens with Hartman in his discussion of Wordsworthian
prophecy. In The Unremarkable Wordsworth, Hartman distinguishes between apocalypse
and prophecy: where apocalypse marks “at once desire for and dread of the end being
hastened,” by contrast “prophecy [...] would seem to be anti-apocalyptic in seeking a
‘future restoration,’ or time for thought” (20; 27). Indeed, such an utterance that gives
time for thought would aspire to the traditional figure of philosophy whose “self-image is
of serene, poised reflection, in time, but not of it” (Kompridis 53). Or, “more radically
still ‘timely utterance’ means an utterance, such as prophecy, or prophetic poetry, which
founds or repairs time. The prophet utters time in its ambiguity: as the undesired
mediation, which prevents fusion, but also destruction” (Unremarkable 27, my
emphasis). Yet, does this not mistake time for narrative? For what would it mean to
“repair” time if time is discontinuity, detotalization, or dissemination without return?
Indeed, given Hartman’s reading of the word “repair” above, how could timely utterance
be purely restorative? Following the logic of the gift, if prophecy gives time this is only
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because it takes away certainty, including anything like a comfortable space for reflection
and contemplation.
The problem here stems from Hartman’s reading of “timely utterance” as the kind
of speaking that gives something tangible: “I am tempted, at last to make an assertion and
identify the ‘timely utterance.’ ‘Let there be light: and there was light’ utters itself in the
poet’s mind as a proof-text, that is, not only as a deeply subjective wish for the return of
the light whose loss was lamented in the first two stanzas, but also as that wish in the
form of God’s first words, His ‘Let there be’” (Unremarkable 161). If Hartman, however,
takes God’s existential fiat to mean “timely utterance” given its claim to radical
productivity, he nevertheless overlooks that such an exceptional ‘moment’—precisely
because it is so exceptional—might begin yet another traumatic cycle, that “let there be”
would have to make another cut in time just as it sutures a previous tear in experience. In
other words, Hartman and de Man both seem to read Wordsworthian prophecy as,
ultimately, restorative, or to agree too quickly that the reflective consciousness, spurred
by the spots of time, manages successfully to appropriate the subject’s becoming as
being—and that this is a goal to be sought after. Such readings overlook that, just as the
spots themselves are made possible by trauma, a trauma that must persist given its role as
ur-ground, so too is the autobiographical, narrative exigency itself haunted by a death it
cannot look at face to face. This is how the existential fiat complicates “timely
utterance”: The Prelude cannot ‘face’ the trauma at its center because it is itself a pre
face. As the preface to an exploration of the human mind, the text cannot figure but
seems, rather, only able to efface and rewrite itself, generating a traumatic gallery of
reflections that arise from both the future and the past.
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C h a pter T hree

Dismembering History in Percy Shelley’s Hellas

How am I to explain it, when 1 am quite certain that I remember forgetting?
— St Augustine, Confessions

Put out the light, and then put out the light.
— Shakespeare, Othello

Percy Shelley’s treatment of prophecy in his little-studied play Hellas (1821)
proves interesting precisely for how it undercuts anything like a simple relationship
between knowledge and history—a relationship already complicated in the Defence o f
Poetry when Shelley assures us that he does not “assert poets to be prophets in the gross
sense of the word, or that they can foretell the form as surely as they foreknow the spirit
of events” (513). Such undercutting is clearest in Hellas’’ disruption of forms of figuration
or the operations through which expenditure is typically restricted: specifically, the trope
of metaphor and the form of consciousness called memory. For even some of Shelley’s
best readers seem to think he “view[s] history as eternity’s self-alienating lapse from
unity, a lapse teleologically forced to return upon itself in an ultimate identity of origin
and end, Hellas and Greece,” where “spirit-as-tenor serves,” ultimately, “as the
originating ground for history-as-vehicle” (Ulmer 614). Hellas, however, resists exactly
this kind of closure. Indeed, “Hellas cannot sanction critical readings which, reversing
the trajectories of displacement, restore the text to history as its determining but occluded
truth” (Ulmer 611). This is because historical, contextual material is itself in process
throughout the text—something the sequential arrival of messengers, a technique
borrowed from Aeschylus’ The Persians, makes clear.81
81 In “Hellas and the Historical Uncanny” William Ulmer gestures on several occasions toward a radically
temporalized reading o f Hellas. Ultimately, however, he backs away from this possibility, suggesting rather
that “history [...] presuppose[s] a linguistic patterning” and that Hellas “organiz[es] its historical plot as a
tropical extrapolation” (613). That is, while Ulmer’s reading complicates the notion that history is Hellas's
transcendental signified, nevertheless he re-contains “thought’s eternal flight” (783-784) through a
particularly synthetic understanding o f metaphor as the structure o f Shelleyan history: “Hellas plots
history,” he says, “metaphysically as a dialectical variation o f metaphor” (614). In the readings below, I
follow Ulmer’s suggestion that history is actively and topically formulated in Hellas. I disagree, however,
that this formulation represents the expression o f an historical idea. That is, I disagree with the assertion
that Hellas “plots worldly events as the antitypes o f an other worldly dimension” (613). For this reduces the
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The play, in fact, abandons its plot to the unpredictable events immediately
contemporary to Shelley, namely, the Greek revolt that erupts in March 1821 against
Turkish occupation, ‘grounding’ its narrative on the shifting sands of this nascent
revolution and forcing the text to sustain mutually exclusive possibilities:
Semichorus I
If Heaven should resume thee [i.e., Greece],
To Heaven shall her spirit ascend;
Semichorus II
If Hell should entomb thee,
To Hell shall her high hearts bend. (102-105)
Shelley’s play consists of three scenes, book-ended and separated by visionary interludes,
wherein Mahmud, the Turkish ruler residing in Constantinople, hosts various messengers
who bring him news concerning the Turkish response to the Greek uprising.82 In an effort

text to a metaphysical play between essence and appearance when, in fact, for Shelley history’s essence is
appearance. Closer attention reveals that the terms— and times— ostensibly unified by metaphor cannot
remain successfully grafted onto each other. That is, the persistent resistance to metaphor in the text
suspends the ‘plotting’ Ulmer describes.
Indeed, this is why Ulmer’s suggestion that history in Hellas becomes uncanny is inadequate. That
is, Ulmer reads Mother Earth’s metaphysics in Prometheus Unbound through the images o f dark reflection
common in Hellas: “The coming age is shadowed on the past/ As on a glass” (805-806). For Ulmer, this
becomes a model for history, where time is divided from but haunted by its past, just as the world is
divided between an over- and an underground o f spirits that reflect one another:
For know, there are two worlds o f life and death:
One that which thou beholdest, but the other
Is underneath the grave, where do inhabit
The shadows o f all forms that think and live
Till death unite them, and they part no more. (Prometheus Unbound 1.191-199)
Because o f this dualism, Ulmer, who rightly identifies in Shelley’s use o f metaphor “the disfiguration
rather than recovery o f identity in similitude,” reads this displacement as putting “history at risk” (618,
617). Hence, rather than entertain the possibility that Shelley might here question Classical metaphysics
and historiography— the idea that “narrative unveils the essential laws o f history” as “cycles” (Ulmer
617)— Ulmer is motivated to refigure this disfiguration as a kind o f uncanny repetition. But as repetition,
history’s future is reduced to a variation on the past.
82 Shelley’s philhellenism means he valorizes early and small Greek military victories— particularly in the
Danubian Principalities— taking these events as the assurance o f Greek success:
The moon o f Mahomet
Arose, and it shall set,
While blazoned as on Heaven’s immortal noon
The cross leads generations on. (221-224)
Yet, the text cannot fully commit to this confident itinerary— something suggested by the fact that these
statements emerge most forcefully only in the chaotic miasma o f the interludes. Indeed, the Ottomans
quickly quashed the Danubian revolts, or what Mahmud calls “the Danube’s Day” (294), though they did
inspire wider revolt across the Peloponnese followed then by resistance in central Greece. At the time o f
composition, Shelley would have been moved by some o f these early successes. And yet, he must also have
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to gain insight concerning the fate of his Empire, Mahmud sends his agent, Hassan, to
solicit Ahasuerus, the Wandering Jew of Medieval folklore, through whom he solicits the
ghost of Mohammed the Second, the famous sultan who captured Constantinople in 1453
and brought an end to the Byzantine Empire. Just as this pattern of summoning figures
who, in turn, summon other figures anticipates the rhythms of The Triumph o f Life—
where urgent questions are answered only by new scenes of obscure import—so what
Ahasuerus offers is less a stable prediction of the future than the subtraction of any kind
of predictability. Ahasuerus’ ‘prophecy’—his is “a life of unconsumed thought which
pierces/ The present, and the past, and the to-come” (147-148)—in fact, withdraws
knowledge of the future, his incessant wandering symbolizing and anticipating the tread
of the “shape all light” in The Triumph, whose
feet, no less than the sweet tune
To which they moved, seemed as they moved, to blot
The thoughts of him who gazed on them, and soon

All that was seemed as if it had been not. (352, 382-385)
Yet, Ahasuerus subtracts certainty precisely to the same degree that he frees history from
disabling precedents of all sorts—patterns that lend stability to history but at the expense
of fundamental mobility or changeability. Thanks to Ahasuerus, the future Mahmud and
Shelley face could be unlike anything that had come before.
The central metaphor in Hellas, one that ostensibly ties time together by repeating
the past in the present, actually undermines historical continuity and, subsequently,
dialectical progressivism. Just as the spectre of Mohamed the Second is about to appear
to Mahmud, Ahasuerus remarks,
the Past
Now stands before thee like an Incarnation
Of the To-come. (852-854)
had a sense that, once the Greeks had lost the element o f surprise, the Revolution’s success would be
impossible to determine; his optimism would be tempered, in other words, by Mahmud’s more depressing
declaration that “the Greek has paid1/ Brief victory with swift loss and long despair” (287-288). Indeed,
Shelley seems to be aware that should Turkish reinforcements— “lofty ships” that are “freighted with fire
and whirlwind, [that] wait at the Scala” (283, 285) in Phoenicia— manage to elude the small but skilled
Greek fleet that, early in the conflict, often out-sailed their enemies, they may well put down the revolution
before it could gain any real traction.
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Ulmer reads this metaphor as “plotting” history—recalling Locke’s metaphor discussed
above in connection to Wordsworth—where the repetition of events stabilizes the present
and anticipates the future by incarnating precedents, in this case, elective ancestors, such
that the past is, as it were, meta-phorized, literally “carried over” into the present and
future. However, this reading overlooks the strangeness of this particular figure. If we
consider again the structure of the analogy, we see that the past is like an incarnation.
More specifically, this incarnation is qualified as the kind of incarnation demonstrated or
modeled by the “to-come.” This raises the question: what kind of incarnation can this
possibly be? The to-come is, precisely, not-yet—is possibility as opposed to actuality, or
a form of negativity that we might, following Heidegger, call “nullity.” In fact, if the tocome is understood rigorously, it is that which is always to-come and thus never really an
imminent arrival or presence—or rather, it is only an imminent arrival, arriving without
arrival. Put differently, the ‘figure’ offered to the past in this metaphor is a figure of that
which, itself, has no clear figure. To rephrase the metaphor, then, what it says is: the past
is incarnated in the same way as the to-come is incarnated, and is about to stand
objectively before Mahmud in this form. The irony becomes more palpable when so
phrased, as it seems that the quilting point between vehicle and tenor consists in their
‘shared’ absence of body, or in a common dis-figuration or dis-incamation. At this point,
the metaphor’s language of (re)incamation is completely inverted. So, while Ulmer is
right that the “like” in this passage ought to be emphasized, it is not because this analogy
simply accomplishes the identity of the past with the future. Rather, we have to pause, in
the midst of this intensely telescopic moment, and ask: what does it mean to identify two
‘things’ that, in Schelling’s terms, do not have being—namely, the past and future? How
does the operation of synthesis—or metaphor—function when the vehicle and tenor in
question are themselves already in a kind of ontological limbo? Is there not something
deeply ironic in this ‘identity’ predicated on vacancy?
This ironic figuration or self-blinding prophecy operates not only rhetorically but
also phenomenologically in Hellas by confusing synthesizing forms of consciousness.
For the specific task that Ahasuerus is asked to perform goes beyond mere prediction.
That is, Mahmud not only needs his troubled dreams—from which he “wake[s] to weep”
(Triumph 334) in the opening scene—interpreted; additionally, he needs these dreams, in
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the first place, to be remembered for him, hence his appeal to Ahasuerus whom he
describes as “A Jew, whose spirit is a chronicle/ Of strange and secret and forgotten
things” (133-134, my emphasis). Describing his situation, Mahmud reflects,
[t]hrice has a gloomy vision hunted me
As thus from sleep into the troubled day;
It shakes me as the tempest shakes the sea,
Leaving no figure upon memory’s glass. (128-131)
Mahmud, then, articulates a complex moment in consciousness, as he seems to have a
memory of something forgotten—his soul, like Wordsworth’s, “Remembering how she
felt, but what she felt/ Remembering not” {Prelude 2.35-6 [1805]). What does Mahmud
remember when he remembers that he has forgotten? How can he know that there is
anything to be remembered at all? For, how can an image leave its trace on the surface of
glass? With this problem we might again see Hellas anticipating the cadence of Shelley’s
later poem, The Triumph o f Life, where, as Paul de Man notes, “the movement of effacing
and of forgetting becomes prevalent in the text and dissolves any illusion of dialectical
progress or regress” (98). The action of memory seems, like the action of metaphor, to
elude its own regulating action and to suspend the history it might otherwise help to
shape as an object for consciousness.
What Mahmud recalls when he remembers his forgotten dream cannot be
separated from the very action of forgetting, of bringing back forgetfulness itself,
generating what Maurice Blanchot calls “forgetful memory.” Just as Prometheus’
forgotten curse in Prometheus Unbound cannot be recalled in the sense of “revoked”
without, at the same time, being recalled in the sense of “repeated,” so Mahmud’s
memory of forgetfulness threatens to turn memory inside out. Hence, memory, we could83
83 In The Infinite Conversation Blanchot reverses the expected trajectories o f memory and forgetting in a
way that helps to describe their relationship in Hellas and other o f Shelley’s texts, especially The Triumph
o f Life. Blanchot writes that “forgetting is the primordial divinity, the venerable ancestor and first presence
o f what, in a later generation, will give rise to Mnemosyne, mother o f the Muses. The essence o f memory is
therefore forgetting; the forgetfulness o f which one must drink in order to die” (315). In Blanchot, this
powerful, primordial forgetfulness is (dis)figured, somewhat unexpectedly, as an excessive brightness: like
Emily in Epipsychidion or the “shape all light” in The Triumph, the force resistant to figuration is here cast
not as deficient but rather as overwhelming— invisible for being too visible, the transparency o f pure
visibility. As Blanchot puts it, “forgetting is the sun: memory gleams through reflection, reflecting
forgetting and drawing from this reflection the light— amazement and clarity— o f forgetting” (315).
Memory here is the temporary interruption o f pure brightness, is the wrinkle in light caused by reflection,
shading, or other variations in intensity.
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say, is dismembered in every sense of that word: its synthesizing or recuperative action is
poisoned by and transformed into what Shelley, in the Hymn to Intellectual Beauty,
describes as “the memory of music fled” (10).84 Indeed, even prophetic consciousness is
infected through this memory. On the surface, prophecy appears to be the most resolute
form of historical ordering and discipline, one that masters contingency and time (and, as
discussed with Wordsworth and Freud, trauma) by relating to the future as if the future
were already a memory. In this sense, prophecy is a kind of hyper-memory called on in
precisely those moments—such as during violent political revolutions—when
consciousness loses its sense of orientation and craves the comforting supplement of
historical narrative. Yet, Ahasuerus’ image of prophecy proves remarkably disorienting
since it attempts to recuperate order through the ‘figure’ of absence. “Mistake me not!”
he says toward the end of the play,
[a]ll is contained in each.
Dodona’s forest to an acorn’s cup
Is that which has been, or will be, to that
Which is—the absent to the present. Thought
Alone, and its quick elements, Will, Passion,
Reason, Imagination, cannot die. (792-797)85
Phrased more starkly, the chiasmus suggests that the past and the future are to the
present, what Dodona’s forest is to the acorn. What complicates the analogy, however, is
84 Again, Blanchot’s comments are germane, for the phenomenology o f memory in Blanchot leaves him
with a very peculiar experiential residue suggesting that the oscillation between memory and forgetting,
while it cannot be grasped objectively, nevertheless leaves something in the wake o f its action, if only an
obscure sense that consciousness can open to or change into novel, yet unconscious shapes through the
generosity o f temporality: “I do not know,” writes Blanchot in The Step Not Beyond, “but I have the feeling
I’m going to have known” (112). How to unpack the dense efficiency o f this thought’s temporality? For
Blanchot here suggests, like Shelley, that if we ever come to knowledge it is only as a “memory o f music
fled.” For clarity’s sake, the statement could be protracted and rewritten thus: I anticipate a time in the
future when I will be able to remember having known something, even as precisely what that something is
has faded from memory. Or: I can remember ‘the before’ and ‘the after’ o f a memory that has, itself,
dissolved, such that the ostensible continuity o f experience figures as a strange kind o f abridgement, like
something is always already missing.
Blanchot’s sense, not that he knows but that he will have known, captures remarkably well not
only the reader’s experience with The Triumph o f Life but also the experience o f the characters depicted
therein, ‘Shelley’ and ‘Rousseau.’ For Blanchot would not say that the text is meaningless— that, in a de
Manian idiom, its performance as language annihilates its tropological meaning— even as he is willing to
entertain a radical negativity or temporality at the heart o f experience: the conversation, for Blanchot, does
not fall into this silence but is rather infinite, infinitely open to response and to the future.
85 See Ulmer, pages 618-619, for his reading o f this complex, layered analogy.
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the implicit relationship between, on the one hand, time’s horizons and, on the other, the
seed to the full-grown forest. Hence, if we follow its organic, vegetable logic, then the
abundance that the seed will grow into (namely, Dodona’s forests) is analogous to—is
identified with—the absence of past and future. While the seed implies immanent growth
and development, its coordination with presence and absence (the forest identified with
absence) suggests that such growth, as a process, cannot be fixed, or perhaps spatialized,
by what it branches into. In fact, while the metaphor recalls The Defence o f Poetry where
Dante’s poetic language is compared to “the first acorn, which contained all oaks
potentially” (528), it is also the case that, as Jerrold Hogle points out, we have here not an
acorn but only its empty shell, suggesting that the very representative of presence is
already curiously inane, like the sky at the end of the Act Three of Prometheus Unbound.
Once again, prophecy proves to give with one hand while it takes with the other. For the
reference to Dodona’s forests—the location of Zeus’ oracle—makes the analogy itself, its
aporetic structure, an image of prophecy, though an image that necessarily dissolves in
and through its formation as an image, just as memory has become identical to the
rhythm of forgetting. The nature of the relationship, after all, implies the growth o f
emptiness, leaving us only, as the acorn’s husk, the process of growth itself—a process
severed from a substantial body.
This inversion of prophecy helps to explain why Ahasuerus is in effect dismissed
in the same moment that he arrives at Mahmud’s court. That is, before Ahasuerus can
offer any kind of help to Mahmud, the latter asserts
but the unborn hour,
Cradled in fear and hope, conflicting storms,
Who shall unveil? Nor thou, nor I, nor any
Mighty or wise. I apprehend not
What thou has taught me, but now perceive
That thou art no interpreter of dreams;
Thou dost not own that art, device, or God,867
86 “In itself the eternal repository o f this thought-transition is empty— the ‘acorn’s cup’ without the seed—
because the germ it receives and then sends ahead is in motion from a parent-form toward a future
reincarnation. This ‘cup,’ in other words, is constant in being no more than a drive or facilitator turning
what recedes toward a different repetition o f a previous form” (Hogle 290).
87 “The oracle at Dodona is regarded by ancient writers as the first prophetic centre” (Morrison 96).
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Can make the future present. (752-759)
In fact, even after Ahasuerus manages to offer some commentary on the revolution and
on

Mahmud’s dream his words, according to Mahmud, rather than illuminating his mind,
“cast on all things surest, brightest, best,/ Doubt, insecurity, astonishment” (790-791).
With an impetuousness anticipating Asia’s frustration with Demogorgon in Prometheus
Unbound, who responds to her passionate questions concerning the benevolence of God
with a cryptic “He reigns” (2.4.28), Mahmud finally appeals to other agents for
information he hopes will be more satisfying.
As Ulmer suggests, Shelley’s Hellas says more about historicization as an activity
than about history as something objectively present. The play even seems less directly
to represent its historical moment than to translate the re-formative energy of political
revolt into a literary form, or better, a style of composition. In this sense, then, Hellas is
‘pre-historic,’ though in an affirmative as opposed to deficient sense. Indeed, since
Shelley aims to represent not “history” but the unruly temporality that forms a pre-sense
of the historical, he translates poetry and consciousness’s synthetic resources into
analytic, dismembering forces. Active becoming can, subsequently, ‘figure’ only pre
figuratively, where that term designates not so much an anticipatory sign as something
not-yet-figured and perhaps resolutely unfigurable. History here is unfigurable, in other
words, because it has been displaced by a technique. The inversion within metaphor,
memory, and prophecy throughout the text does not render history unreadable by casting
history as blindness—something close to de Man’s conclusions in his reading of
Shelley’s Triumph o f Life. Rather, Shelley effectively frees history from binding
determinations, renders forward thinking or pro-metheus unbound. By explicitly
obscuring the future’s eventual shape, the text in fact opens history to a novel sense o f
futurity. For, to recall Koselleck’s remarks in chapter one, in Romanticism “there occurs89

88 Ahasuerus seems to refer to both the war and the dream when he describes how
this Whole
O f suns and worlds, and men, and beasts, and flowers
With all the silent or tempestuous workings
By which they have been, are, or cease to be,
Is but a vision— all that it inherits
Are motes o f a sick eye, bubbles and dreams. (776-781)
89 “Shelley devotes Hellas to historicizing the present by narratively appropriating it [i.e., the present]”
(Ulmer 612).

135

a temporalization [ Verzeitlichung] of history, at the end of which there is the peculiar
form of acceleration which characterizes modernity,” what he will also call the “fruhen
Neuzeit—the period in which modernity is formed” (5). That is, Shelley’s text expresses
something not about the content of the future, but about how a new concept o f the future
might emerge, one that embraces the negating power of temporality rather than indulging
in the kind of “apocalyptic prophecy [that] destroys time through its fixation on the End”
(Koselleck 14).
Shelley’s strange treatment of figuration in Hellas stems from his thinking about
language’s relationship to thought more generally. In Speculations on Metaphysics,
Shelley argues that words are not identical to thought. In fact, words conceal as much as
they disclose: “Logic, or the science of words must no longer be confounded with
metaphysics or the science of facts. Words are the instruments of mind whose capacities
it becomes the Metaphysician accurately to know, but they are not mind, nor are they
portions of mind” (7.63). Indeed, even if Asia in Prometheus Unbound says that
Prometheus “gave man speech, and speech created thought” (2.4.73), this still maintains a
difference between the two realms even as it raises difficult questions of priority and
causation.90 Hence, early in the Defence, Shelley sounds positively skeptical, arguing that
words—thought’s mediator and veil—have no essential, natural, or motivated
relationship to ideas. Echoing Locke he asserts, “language is arbitrarily produced by the
Imagination and has relation to thoughts alone” (513). Nevertheless, Shelley grants poetic
language, language that is “vitally metaphorical,” a power his metaphysics denies in that
such language, he says, “marks the before unapprehended relations of things” (512, my
emphasis). This language somehow manages to articulate the relationship between
language and non-language; with a kind of enthusiasm, this language manages to put into
linguistic terms a relation that really exists outside of language. It can do this, however,
only if it maintains the very split it is supposed to suture. Like Kantian purposiveness
(without purpose) or the Sign of History—other attempts to relate without positively
linking human understanding to things in themselves—the identification of language and
thought through metaphor cannot be completed and must remain suspended in its active
90 Complicating the causal relationship between words and thoughts is the fact that the name “Prometheus”
can mean “forward thinking.” So, if speech creates thoughts, the agent responsible for this speech is named
thought, suggesting that thought creates the words that create thought.
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meta-phora. Without such suspension, one falls into Kant’s transcendental illusion or
what Shelley might describe as dead metaphor: language forgetful of its arbitrariness and
purely internal, self-relation. Hence, Shelley’s metaphors must always remain on the
move, must always wander away from perfect synthesis or undermine their own
totalizing action. This language must always remember the wound between ideas and
words. That is, even if poetic language is supposed to break from merely tropical
orbiting, it cannot perfectly coincide with thought. Poetry, rather, invites an infinite
conversation. Like phenomenal appearances in Kant, the figuration of thought through
language both gestures toward and yet denies access to thought in itself.
This problem of linguistic figuration is allegorized in Shelley’s treatment of the
Wandering Jew. This treatment takes place across a range of texts, linking Hellas'
Ahasuerus and his displacement of synthesis to a larger, phenomenological motif that
runs through several of Shelley’s works. For instance, in 1810 Shelley composes The
Wandering Jew; Or, the Victim o f the Eternal Avenger, introducing a character that will
resurface throughout much of his work, with Hellas marking his final explicit
appearance. According to the Medieval folkloric tradition, the Wandering Jew is cursed
to roam the earth until the Second Coming for taunting Jesus during the Passion.
Recalling the story of Cain, God marks the Jew on the face. This disfigured figure thus
plays a complex role in Shelley’s thinking about prophetic mediation. For if the Jew’s
body bears God’s wounding mark, then he becomes in effect the sign o/God—something
like Blake’s “Divine Revelation in the Litteral expression” {Milton 49.15). Shelley’s Jew,
then, embodies poetry’s vital metaphoricity for being forced—to recall Mathew Arnold’s
germane phrase—to wander “between two worlds, one dead,/ The other powerless to be
bom,” that is, between a past and a future that ‘resemble’ each other only through their
shared non-being. While the Jew’s life is coextensive with Christian history, he lives as a
counterhistory to the ideology of progress and even as a countertrope to the logic of
hermeneutic synthesis. For he reveals on his own flesh, to adapt Benjamin’s famous
words, that “there is no document of civilization which is not at the same time a
document of barbarism” {Illuminations 256); through the Jew, Shelley finds a powerful
expression of the tyranny, violence, and regression within ostensible progress. In fact, in
The Wandering Jew, the protagonist—named here Paulo—is unable to narrate his own
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story: while he represents the quilting point between particular and universal history, he
suffers from a remarkable narrative deficit that emerges through a self-interrupting use of
language. If the Jew is supposed literally to embody writing, if his wandering is a
performance of meta-phora incarnate or a kind of allegory of writing, he walks toward
the kind of open, dis-incamated future to-come described through Mohamed the Second’s
ghost. Despite the attempt to make metaphor suddenly literal through the Jew’s body, the
endlessness of his wandering, like the fragile texture of his autobiography, tends in fact
once again to ex-pose synthesis.
For instance, before the optics of dissolution encountered in Hellas and familiar in
The Triumph o f Life, Shelley has already identified the prophet’s vision as less a mode of
insight than a form of blindness. That is, typically, prophetic vision—like Wordsworth’s
“loud prophetic blast of harmony” (Prelude 5.96)—attempts to organize disparate
elements into a whole that is, in every way, sensible. In fact, vision becomes visionary
when, like Kant’s enthusiast, feelings project themselves into the supersensible: a seer
makes the insensible or non-sensible meaningful not through a sixth sense but rather
through an enhancement of his sensorium that makes his natural senses supematurally
sensitive. In Shelley, vision specifically is connected with knowledge and self
knowledge. In his discussion of Classical drama in the Defence, for instance, he remarks,
[n] either the eye nor mind can see itself, unless reflected upon that which
it resembles. The drama, so long as it continues to express poetry, is as a
prismatic and many-sided mirror, which collects the brightest rays of
human nature and divides and reproduces them from the simplicity of
these elementary forms, and touches them with majesty and beauty, and
multiplies all that it reflects, and endows it with the power of propagating
its like wherever it may fall. (520)
Ironically, then, when the main characters in The Wandering Jew, Paulo and Rosa, first
meet in a complex scene of mutual seeing, vision becomes indistinct. This episode takes
place shortly after Paulo, the Wandering Jew, rescues Rosa, a nun, from a convent in
Padua. Recalling Agnes’ imprisonment in Matthew Lewis’ The Monk, the text suggests
that Rosa is about to be punished by a brutal Abbess for indiscretions that remain
unnamed. In fact, the language and imagery in the scene suggests that the Abbess is on
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the verge of committing human sacrifice. Rosa, “fainting” (1.147), is bom to “the fatal
shrine” (1.183) by a group of nuns amidst a crowd whose “confused and open clamors”
(1.176)—again, recalling the vigilante crowd in The Monk—suggest strong opposition to
the proceedings. Given her name, it seems additionally inauspicious that “The roses from
[Rosa’s] cheek are fled/ But there the lily reigns instead” (1.148-149) and that she should
be carried over a path of “fresh roses strew[n] upon the ground” (1.163). Paulo, observing
the scene, witnesses Rosa’s sudden dash for the doors and, quickly navigating the crowd,
manages to intercept her and bear her off just as she loses consciousness.
Hence, the first meeting proper between Paulo and Rosa occurs when she awakes
from this trance—as if waking from the dead. In a gesture characteristic of Shelley’s later
work, where, as William Keach notes, Shelley’s reflexive imagery courts a kind of
tautology that proves more confusing than coherent,91 Paulo’s gaze at this moment seems
to interrupt Rosa’s own, slowly returning vision:
Rising from her death-like trance,
Fair Rosa met the stranger’s glance;
She started from his chilling gaze,
Wild it was as the tempest’s blaze,
It shot a lurid gleam of light. (1.238-243)
This is a strangely self-baffling image of vision. Not only is the gaze described as both
“chilling” and a “blaze,” the sense of awakening—of emerging from a trance—is met
with a scene that is hardly less perplexing. Even the light itself, rather than illuminating
anything, is “lurid,” recalling an earlier image within the church whence Rosa fled with
Paulo: an image that describes how light penetrated the “saint-cipher’d panes” and
“tinged the pillars with varied stains” (1.91, 93). Like Paulo’s “glance”—suggesting not
only a look but a kind of deflection, a delicately redirecting touch—the lurid light
emerges through swaddling mists, a mere “gleam.”92 Crucially, this image of gazing has
the same effect on Rosa as it does on Shelley’s ostensibly synthesizing tropes. That is,
this image of mortifying vision inspires a simile that seems, structurally, suddenly to
91 See especially pages 75-78 for Keach’s subtle analysis o f how the “indeterminacy in Shelley’s similes [in
Prometheus Unbound] doubles the stylistic process o f drawing together ‘external actions’ and ‘operations
o f the human mind’ into a perceptual continuum” (78).
92 According to the OED, “Gleam” (v.1 intr.) can mean, “to shine either with emitted or reflected light; in
mod. use chiefly, to shine with a brightness subdued by distance or an intervening medium.”
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swoon, abandoning its clarifying momentum in a Blakean “paralytic stroke” (Urizen
19.46). Continuing the picture of Paulo’s eye, the narrator begins to offer a simile only to
abandon the trope before the antecedent “As” can meet the corresponding “So”:
A secret spell of sudden dread,
A mystic, strange, and harrowing fear,
As when the spirits of the dead,
Drest in ideal shapes appear,
And hideous glance on human sight—
Scarce could Rosa’s frame sustain,
The chill that pressed upon her brain. (1.243-249)
Shelley here seems like he is about to offer an image of vision only to offer, instead, a
scene of the failure of the image. And yet, this blindness proves residually illuminating in
that it performs the psychological turmoil responsible for Rosa’s fainting spell and
anticipates the narrative disconnect Shelley inserts toward the end of the fourth canto
(4.370) in place of a direct description of Rosa’s death.
Just as the vital metaphoricity of poetic language gains privileged access to a
world veiled by language insofar as this metaphor defamiliarizes or disfigures “dead”
(512), ossified terms and perceptions, so the Wandering Jew’s incessant movement
embodies and acts out, as it were, such estrangement. Indeed, his gaze is similarly
disorienting or even blinding but not only because it terrifies Rosa. Rather, Paulo and
Ahasuerus’ gazes seem routinely to see nothing: “why did he [i.e., Paulo] gaze on
vacancy,/ As if some strange form was near?” (2.97). And yet, this vision of nothing does
not resolve into something static or present; rather, the vision of invisibility—like the
memory of forgetfulness—infects vision with invisibility, or turns seeing into blindness.
For instance, Paulo makes claims for a superior kind of vision, characteristic of
conventional expectations concerning prophetic “seers”:
I pierce with intellectual eye,
Into each hidden mystery;
I penetrate the fertile womb
Of nature; I produce to light
The secrets of the teeming earth,
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And give air’s unseen embryos birth:
The past, the present, and to come,
Float in review before my sight. (3.232-239)
This power—its language echoed in Ahasuerus’ words in Hellas, noted above—however,
is radically mitigated by Paulo’s difficulty in facing his own history when he attempts to
narrate his life to Rosa and his only friend, Victorio93:
At this short retrospect I faint:
Scarce beats my pulse—I lose my breath,
I sicken even unto death
Oh! hard would be the task to paint
And gift with life past scenes again;
To knit a long and linkless chain,
Or strive minutely to relate
The varied horrors of my fate. (3.431-438)
As if reversing positions with Rosa or taking up her earlier vision of his gaze, Paulo
swoons when he encounters his own history and the prospect of its figuration. The “long
and linkless chain,” like a temporal version of Prometheus’ shackles or a metaphor
anticipating the chained train of historical figures displayed in The Triumph, seems to
bind and, for being a narrative he cannot bear to form, unbind Paulo—to submit him to a
history of inescapable violence and yet to hint that such a seemingly interminable
suffering eludes teleological closure.

* * *

Paulo’s enhanced vision reaches its limit when it comes to autobiography, for this
would ask him reflexively to figure disfiguration as such. Indeed, just as Enlightenment
93 Victorio is introduced at the beginning o f Canto 2. For reasons that remain unclear, Victorio abandons
his “Illustrious [...] name” (2.44) to follow Paulo. Ultimately, however, he betrays Paulo not only by
seducing but also accidentally killing Rosa. Recalling the plot in Romeo and Juliet, Victorio aims to create
the impression that Rosa has died so that he can kidnap her without incurring Paulo’s wrath. To accomplish
this Victorio relies on a potion concocted by a Witch. Victorio expects the potion only to mimic death. The
Witch, however— acting through Satan’s influence— gives Victorio a potion that is in fact lethal. Hence,
while Paulo successfully rejects Satan’s Faustian proposal in Canto 3, Satan seem to circumvent Paulo’s
resolve by killing Rosa and alienating Victorio.
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history cannot perform a history of itself, cannot understand its own way of knowing as a
necessary consequence of a particular shape of (un)consciousness, so any static image of
Paulo’s own life seem to elude and collapse vision. Yet, if Paulo cannot figure his
history, his history actively disfigures him, gesturing through this very resistance to
figuration toward a realm beyond all figuration—but one that cannot be tailored to the
metaphysics of presence. In this sense, we are close to Paul de Man’s conception of the
text as a kind of double, self-conflicting phenomenon that premises its meaningfulness on
an act of positing that is radically meaningless. Indeed, while de Man’s legacy has in
recent years experienced its own sort of defacement, his thought is worth reconsidering—
while acknowledging its specific limitations—as his approach to poetic language opens a
way to re-conceptualizing Shelley’s relationship to history in terms of prophecy as
detotalization.
De Man treats figuration as an existential process, where anthropomorphism is
rigorously distinguished from tropes like metaphor, prosopopeia, and metonymy.
Anthropomorphism expresses the positional power of language.94 Forming into the
human is understood as existential creation—‘making human’ in the sense of creating the
human. This act of creation is anterior to meaning and is too abrupt, immediately
expressive, or performative to be contained in the circuit of tropic signification.
Metaphor, contrastingly, structures the way that meaning—the tropological, rhetorical
side of language—circulates; it is precisely what fails to acknowledge, or veils, the
existential positing of language, language as positional and contingent.95 Hence, de
Man’s readings seem inevitably to repeat a reciprocal re-veiling: “language posits and
language means (since it articulates) but language cannot posit meaning; it can only
reiterate (or reflect) it in its reconfirmed falsehood” (Rhetoric 97). As Chase summarizes,

94 In “Anthropomorphism and Trope in the Lyric,” de Man explains that “‘anthropomorphism’ is not just a
trope but an identification on the level o f substance. It takes one entity for another and thus implies the
constitution o f specific entities prior to their confusion, the taking o f something for something else that can
then be assumed to be given. Anthropomorphism freezes the infinite chain o f tropological transformations
and propositions into one single assertion or essence which, as such, excludes all others” (241).
95 As Cynthia Chase puts it, “[t]he deictic function o f language [...] itself involves a conflict between the
function o f language as postulation or act and its function as figure or representation. [...]. Once the
representational function o f language is seen to take place by means o f figure— by the assumed and
imposed resemblances, the ‘aberrant totalizations’ o f metaphor— language has to be conceived not only as
representation, cognition, or constatation, but also act. Predication entails not simply knowing, erkennen,
but positing, setzen ” (89).
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“predication involves the necessary but impossible combination of these two functions:
the positing of a relationship. To posit a relationship, de Man implies, is a contradiction
in terms, since to posit or to postulate implies an arbitrary act not determined by any
existing relationships, which sets up what had no previous existence, no relationship with
other existing things” (90). One of these two dimensions can, then, figure—in the sense
of emerging as something distinct—only through the temporary suppression of the other:
“language functions as the representation of meaning only in blotting out the positing
power that enables it to act as language” (Chase 94).
De Man’s methodology, resembling in part Shelley’s insistence on language’s
self-reference, could be described as a kind of philology, taking the literary artwork as a
strictly textual object always uncomfortably positioned between meaning and being.
From this perspective, reading always remains divided between language’s
representational meaning and its existential performance: what language does is not what
it means and any close analysis of the latter will necessarily detotalize itself as it
approaches an insight about its own being. Any critical reading would, then, have to
suspend the closure of its own hermeneutic claims—claims made within the same
tropological circuit as the text’s own meanings—since the performance of language
always simultaneously dislocates or renders radically provisional whatever meaningful
relationships might emerge. Hence, every reading becomes an allegory of reading, in the
specifically Benjaminian sense of that term. That is, for Benjamin, allegory does not
mean a simple transposition of ideas, the hypertext, into a particular dramatic expression
or particular hypotext. Rather, Benjamin compares allegory to melancholy, where the
former becomes the latter when it searches endlessly for its lost origin of pre-symbolic
plenitude. Hence, in de Man’s formulation, “whereas the symbol postulates the
possibility of identity or identification, allegory designates primarily a distance in relation
to its own origin, and, renouncing the nostalgia and the desire to coincide, it establishes
its language in the void of this temporal difference” {Rhetoric 210). Allegory, taken in
this particularly fragmented sense, describes the nature of the relationship between the
meaningful, constative side of texts and the performative, positing action of those ‘same’
texts. This is not, indeed, to say that the performative aspect of language—language’s
‘being’—is, for de Man, some kind of presence, or that, as Rodolphe Gasche points out,
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that textual performance is not subject to the same kind of displacement to which it
subjects tropes.9697Rather, it seems closer to the volatility, described in chapter one, of
irony, which is itself a kind of temporality. What this concept of reading leads toward,
then, is not a transcendent signified—not some ultimate system or unity that, as in New
Criticism, reconciled paradoxes in the name of some kind of aesthetic satisfaction.
Rather, as Geoffrey Hartman argues in “Looking Back on Paul de Man,”
[wjhat reading produces [for de Man] is not so much a replica or
restitution of “inner experience,” as something more akin to vertigo than
to understanding [recalling de Man’s suggestion in The Rhetoric o f
Temporality that irony is always the irony o f understanding]. The sense of
vertigo had been associated in Blindness and Insight with the discovery of
temporality: the sense of time as a process without synthesis, repetitive,
unreconciling, leading to death rather than to a recognition of permanence,
and therefore no more ‘authentic’ than the more naive state it demystifies.
(9)

For de Man, any form of reading that aims to clarify or to explain a text’s meaning
necessarily reaches the apex of its insights in a moment o/blindness, in that the very
systematic intricacy and nuance of hermeneutic operations imposes a totality on a
medium that must, in its performative aspect, undo or at least render fundamentally
provisional these same totalizations.

07

96 In the opening chapter o f The Wild Card o f Reading: On Paul de Man, Gasch6 illustrates how de Man
employs terms from speech act theory in order to expose the implicit, awkward attempt by plain language
philosophy to confront the old problem o f linguistic reflexivity so important in Romanticism. Beyond this
revelation, de Man aims to displace the totalizing efforts o f absolute thought through a concept o f
deconstruction as rigorous rereading, necessitated by the self-conflicting tensions within all texts between
their performance and their content. This oscillation between meaning and performance specifically cannot
be resolved: if de Man dismantles “the totalizing specular configurations” o f tropes, he equally insists that
“there cannot be a new totalization on the basis o f the concept o f language as action” (37, 36).
97 For instance, near the beginning o f Blindness and Insight, de Man describes how all o f the critics he
studies in the subsequent text illustrate a kind o f radical blindness. This is not for any kind o f deficiency o f
thought or lack or rigor on the part o f the figures under analysis; rather, it is because o f a deep paradox in
the nature o f the relationship between linguistic meaning and linguistic performance, where the refinement
o f the former depends on the repression o f the latter. This is why, as Gasch6 explains, de Man’s
deconstruction renders readings o f texts themselves unreadable: “if to read is to understand a text and if to
understand means thematically, aesthetically, or conceptually to totalize a text, then the production o f
insights into the mechanics o f the text will certainly render that text opaque and unreadable” (23). Hence, a
rhetorical reading will always suspend its own authority and will, itself, always have to be reread. Again,
this perpetual displacement o f reading gestures toward allegories o f reading in that reading itself becomes
allegorical or self-dislocating— or perhaps, critical. Deconstruction then “takes place as an endless
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So, the very totalization constitutive of meaning amounts to a repression of the
process through which that meaning can be formulated, such that an insight is
coextensive with a certain kind of blindness. Just as the vision of the Wandering Jew
(both the vision he has and the picture o/him) becomes disfigured at the very moment of
vision’s reflexive self-looking, or in a prophetic mode that purports to be a form of
privileged, visionary insight, so “theory,” as “seeing,” becomes for de Man
indistinguishable from blindness: theory becomes the resistance to theory.

Indeed, the

Wandering Jew exposes history as a version of blindness in de Man’s sense, in that for
both “history is not temporal” insofar as it “maintains the myth, for example, of [...]
dialectical relation” (“Looking” 7) as a progressive Bildung: an error of seeing that is
itself revealed as an error by Ahasuerus and Paulo’s non-predictive prophecy.
Shelley seems committed to a division between linguistic meaning and being that
can only be suspended through a literary style based on the measured and deliberate
dissolution of the very mechanisms of synthesis—metaphor, simile, memory, prophecy,
history, and the life of the Wandering Jew himself—that de Man, similarly, would see as
agents of insight’s blindness. Shelley, however, in contrast to de Man, highlights rather
than diminishes the affective dimension of this suspension. Indeed, as Hartman notes, “de
Man’s eloquence concerning [the] vertigo [induced by time’s disfiguring force] is
unsettling in a critic who renounces affect” (9). This disinterestedness—something that*

process— there are deconstructions to the second, third, and so forth, degree— paradoxically, because [such
readings, despite their negativity, necessarily] relapse into the thematic” (Gasche 26), something Rajan
notes concerning de Man’s own ‘reading’ o f Shelley’s The Triumph o f Life: “for one thing, de Man (as he
would be the first to admit) has provided a ‘reading,’ by making form take the place o f a vanishing content
through a hypostasis o f the poem’s method” (Supplement 326). De Man’s unusual approach to The
Triumph “sees the diegetic level o f the text as preempting all attempts to approach it thematically. All
interpretations o f the poem hitherto have assumed that it ‘says’ something, that it has a content other than
the process o f its own language” (Supplement 325). That is, de Man sees critical readings o f Shelley’s text
as begging the question rather in the same way as ‘Shelley’ and ‘Rousseau’ beg the question within the
poem: they imply, with every inquiry after stable origins and meaning, that there is a stable origin and
meaning, just as the critics who attempt to perform either archaeological re-membering or some form o f
hermeneutic analysis presuppose the text’s basic coherence. And yet, de Man’s realization o f this is itself
an insight that might totalize the text. Hence, de Man’s reading practice could take as its motto Othello’s
ostensible tautology— “put out the light, and then put out the light.” Insight is a blindness that must be
illuminated even as that illumination itself another kind o f blindness.
98 As Wald Godzich explains in the preface to Resistance to Theory, “etymologically, the term [i.e.,
“theory”] comes from the Greek verb theorem, to look at, to contemplate, to survey” (xiv). This is, further,
not observation in the sense o f mere intuition, aesthesis, but rather observation by an authority.
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becomes, in Neil Hertz’s reading, nearly perverse"—stems from de Man’s sense of the
subject as the product of a basically mechanical, linguistic operation. The self is the
ostensible ground of autobiography. For de Man, however, this self is a fiction created
through the reflexive action of auto-bio-graphy such that this genre’s claims to a ‘deeper’
coherence or unity amount to a distortion of its true provenance. In other words, the
operation that produces the subject cannot be permanently divided from the realization
that the subject is indeed produced rather than merely discovered. The process of
production so exposed necessarily displaces any appeal to concepts like authentic
subjectivity or the real self. Hence, autobiography performs a double gesture: on one
hand, it gives a face to the self, in the sense of forming the being—such as it is—of the
self, performing the action of self-making. On the other hand and in the same stroke, this
self-generation displaces any claims that that image might make to a transcendent
essence. In other words, autobiography puts the “face,” as the foundation of a narrative of
development, under erasure or identifies autobiography with defacement: it ‘marks’ the
face as a way to reveal the self as the fiction it is and to disrupt (or vitalize in Shelley’s
sense) the tendency for this process to be mistaken for a stable substance. As de Man
says, “despite the perfect closure of the system, the text contains elements that not only
disrupt its balance but its principle of production” (76). Hence, a text like de Mein’s
“Autobiography as De-Facement” seems especially germane to a reading of Shelley’s
Wandering Jew, whose autobiography is literally a history of his own defacement. That
is, the Wandering Jew would seem to be the exemplary figure for de Man’s thesis about
the self-effacing nature of autobiography—something encountered in the preceding
chapter when, reading between the 1805 and 1850 Prelude, Wordsworth’s
autobiographical exigency overlaps with the image of the drowned swimmer. Why, then,9

99 “De Man would have us register this pathos but not be quite taken in by it: hence the parenthetical
warning not to confuse ontology and psychoanalysis. But, like the admonition to “avoid the pathos o f an
imagery o f bodily mutilation” we began by noticing in [de Man’s] Kleist essay, this warning is hard to
heed: at best— and this is, if not de Man’s point in issuing such warnings, at least one consequence o f our
reading o f them— we can acknowledge the “predicament” they place us in. That is, we can acknowledge
that a tug-of-war between “analytic rigor” and “poetic persuasion” is unavoidable in each act o f
reading/writing— in Yeats’s, in de Man’s, in our own— and acknowledge it all the more readily when the
felt pressure o f some other reader’s pathos, here [i.e., in a passage from de Man’s dissertation] the
imposition o f the words “matricidal indifference,” seems at once so palpable and so gratuitous” (Hertz 91).
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does de Man completely ignore this character, one so prominent in Shelley’s work? A
response to this question requires a closer look at de Man’s treatment of tropes.
In de Man’s conception of subjectivity, reflexive figuration—the moment when
one would think that the most stable synthesis is established, a kind of perfect selfconsciousness—is the same moment that the subject is displaced and figurative action is
interrupted. To illustrate his point, de Man turns to Wordsworth—an exemplary
Romantic autobiographer. For it seems that Wordsworth finds the tools of selffashioning—words and metaphors—always to solicit the death of the figure they
putatively help to formulate. De Man recalls Wordsworth’s comments in his third essay
on epitaphs:
Words are too awful an instrument for good and evil to be trifled with:
they hold above all other external powers a dominion over thoughts. If
words be not (recurring to a metaphor before used) an incarnation of
thought but only a clothing for it, then surely will they prove an ill gift;
such a one as those poisoned vestments, read of in the stories of
superstitious times, which had the power to consume and alienate from his
right mind the victim who put them on. Language, if it do not uphold, and
feed, and leave in quiet, like the power of gravitation or the air we breathe,
is a counter-spirit, unremittingly and noiselessly at work to derange, to
subvert, to lay waste, to vitiate, and to dissolve. (2.84-85)
For Wordsworth, if words are—as Shelley would have it—representations of thought and
not thought incarnate, then they are not merely misleading but positively mortifying. Yet,
the conditional “i f ’ in Wordsworth’s essay inserts an essential ambivalence into the
passage. On one hand, it suggests that Wordsworth believes words are indeed
incarnations of thought, that thoughts and words together form the tissue of
consciousness and that he is merely imagining the unhappy epistemological situation that
would follow were that not the case. On the other hand, this protracted surmise, coupled
with an “i f ’ that suspends any perfectly clear determination of Wordsworth’s position on
the issue, suggests that, once again, he is making a declaration in an interrogative form,
that he is hoping for what he asserts to he the case. It is through this oscillation that de
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Man illustrates his concept of autobiography as defacement. In fact, he locates this
oscillation in a single verb in Wordsworth’s poetry, the word “hang.”
De Man points out that Wordsworth focuses on this word in this 1815 “Preface,”
describing there the “mind in its activity” (31) when confronted with Virgil, Shakespeare,
and Milton’s metaphorical usage of the word “hang,” in effect making the word, by a
kind of allusive metonymy, the figure o f metaphor (or figuration) itself. He then turns to
some instances from The Prelude where “hang” and other forms of the same verb seem to
be overdetermined and, specifically, to gesture toward death. In “Wordsworth and
Hölderlin,” de Man cites Book Five of The Prelude where the boy of Winander “hung/
Listening,” foreshadowing his own grave in a churchyard that “hangs/ Upon a Slope
above the Village School.” In fact, with this last image, Wordsworth seems quite
specifically to echo Shakespeare’s image of plants on the cliffs of Dover, cited in the
1815 “Preface,” from King Lear, “half way down/ Hangs one who gathers samphire” (31,
Wordsworth’s emphasis).100 This similarity is important because, de Man argues, if
Wordsworth uses the verb “hang” as the example o f metaphor in the 1815 “Preface” he
does something rather disturbing when, in his poetry, “his own use of ‘hangs’ [...] in
many key passages reveals [...] a remarkably consistent pattern” (Rhetoric 88-89) of
invoking mortality. In other words, “hang” is a word that is supposed to be the exemplary
figure of figuration for Wordsworth. Yet, at the same time it is always, in his poetry,
imminently mortifying or threatening to disfigure the human. The ambivalence
surrounding Wordsworth’s use of the word “hang” as a figuring and disfiguring term
echoes the ambiguity concerning the relationship between words and thought: it is
possible that words—the pre-eminent tools of figuration—could be the agents of death if
it turns out that their relationship to ideas does not follow the model of incarnation.
This sheds some light on de Man’s treatment of autobiography. His point is,
again, that the very action of (topical) figuration is indistinguishable from the action of
disfiguration (since this figuration totalizes and therefore misrepresents the performative
fiat). But if de Man can place added stress on Wordsworth’s figure for (dis)figuration
(i.e., “hang”), what happens if we do the same to de Man’s own figure for tropes? In

100 A slight misquotation: Edgar says, in fact, “Half-way down/ Hangs one that gathers samphire” (4.6.15
16, my emphasis).
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describing the reciprocally constitutive relationship between fiction and ‘reality’ in
autobiography—an action that, as noted above, suspends any appeal to authentic being
and is therefore (dis)figuring—de Man borrows an image from Gérard Genette who
describes the relation as a kind of “tourniquet” (in Rhetoric 70). Rather than a dialectic
between a real person and his or her semi-fictional text, “the autobiographical moment
happens as an alignment between the two subjects involved in the process of reading in
which they determine each other by mutual reflexive substitution” (Rhetoric 70). De Man
comments on this situation that, “as anyone who as ever been in a revolving door or on a
revolving wheel can testify, it is certainly most uncomfortable” (Rhetoric 70). In other
words, de Man’s figure for the kind of self-reflection performed in autobiography is a
revolving door. More specifically, the revolving door is the figure for the exemplary
trope of autobiography, prosopopeia: “prosopopeia is the trope of autobiography, by
which one’s name [...] is made as intelligible and memorable as a face” {Rhetoric 76).
Yet, there is something discordant in this set of parallel figures of (re)tuming.
Prosopopeia is the exemplarily trope of autobiography. The revolving door is the
exemplary trope of tropes. The trope of tropes (i.e., the revolving door) is, then, used as a
metaphor for the action of autobiography, or prosopopeia. Hence, the revolving door is an
image of prosopopeia. What is odd is that this turns an action of personification—an
action that is eminently human and humanizing—into a purely mechanical operation.
Given that de Man would rigorously distinguish between trope and anthropomorphism,
this does not cause a problem. However, it seems rather difficult to ignore that
prosopopeia inevitably shades into anthropomorphism as both are eminently humanizing
operations.
Hence, the image of a revolving door does not merely displace the notion of
dialectical progress with an endless turning reminiscent of Romantic irony. It also
suggests a kind of dehumanization given its industrial smoothness, this stainless steel
finish that bears no permanent, organic traces—just like the work of art in the age of
mechanical reproducibility. For this is an image of stark anonymity: a door designed to
lubricate high traffic areas or to facilitate the swarm of workers or shoppers entering and
exiting generic spaces. In fact, a “revolving door” does not merely suggest indifference or
an absence of qualitative change when used, rhetorically, to describe a form of
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participation or interaction. Beyond this, it literally makes people into cogs in a wheel. In
short, de Man seems to have made the operation of humanization—of human self
figuration and autobiography—or prosopopeia itself identical with the relentless turning
of indifferent and “dark Satanic Mills” (Milton 1.8).
The most humanizing narrative form, bio-graphy, winds up being understood as
the displacement of what is, at root, a totally inhuman or at least non-human action.
Indeed, de Man’s surprising claim, in the final lines of “Autobiography as De-Facement,”
that “death is a displaced name for a linguistic predicament” {Rhetoric 81), testifies to
this strange subordination of consciousness and life to language.101 So, to make a reply to
the question posed above—why does de Man ignore what would seem to be an
exemplary instance of autobiography as defacement, Shelley’s Wandering Jew?—one
answer might be that Shelley’s defaced figure of autobiography and of history as such is
an irreducibly and explicitly corporeal being. The Jew is a character that cannot be
separated from his suffering even as he embodies and performs acts of writing; the Jew is
a kind of allegory o f writing. Rather than reducing human consciousness and self
reflection to linguistic operations, Shelley’s various treatments of the Wandering Jew
infuse history and writing with irreducibly affective and biological dimensions. Hence,
Jean-Luc Nancy’s discussion of the image may offer a useful corrective to de Man’s
analysis of figuration. That is, Nancy unfolds figuration’s wider, phenomenological
dimensions in that the image cannot be separated from desire, affect, and even the drama
of sacrifice—in Batillian terms—as a way of rendering the mundane sacred: “the image
is desirable or it is not an image” {Ground 6).
As Nancy argues, the image is not merely a kind of appearance but a force that
includes an element that withdraws from figuration and generates, with this retreat, the

101 As noted in chapter one, Blanchot is interested in a similar kind o f tension but considers the play
between meaning and being in broader phenomenological and existential terms. In fact, if de Man will
reduce human life and death to a linguistic operation, Blanchot will stress how linguistic operations are in
fact intimately related to human existence, as if to promote language to the status o f sentient being rather
than demote sentient being to the status o f linguistic mechanisms. For in Blanchot’s analysis, language in a
sense ‘kills’ the things it would name by replacing their substantiality with a mere sign. Blanchot will admit
that this notion o f linguistic murder seems a bit dramatic and qualify his point: ‘to kill’ must be taken
essentially as ‘to limit.’ And yet, the stakes introduced by the language o f life and death still resonate here
in that this limitation can only obtain in the case o f truly finite things. There is a sense that the word— that
language— is thus not so much a killer as the emissary o f death, a reminder that whatever it names is finite.
See Blanchot’s “Literature and the Right to Death” in The Work o f Fire.
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opaque, seductive relation of fascination: “the distinct,” or the distinction through which
the image distinguishes itself from the background of continuous, homogenous things,
stands apart from the world of things considered as a world of availability.
In this world, all things are available for use, according to their
manifestation. What is withdrawn from this world has no use, or has a
completely different use, and is not presented in a manifestation (a force is
precisely not a form: here it is also a question of grasping how the image
is not a form [or figure] and is not formal [or, perhaps, not figural]). It is
what does not show itself but rather gathers itself into itself, the taut force
on this side of forms or beyond them, but not as another obscure form:
rather as the other of forms. It is the intimate and its passion, distinct from
all representation. It is a matter, then, of grasping the passion of the image,
the power of its stigma or of its distraction (hence, no doubt, all the
ambiguity and ambivalence that we attach to images, which throughout
our culture, and not only in its religions, are said to be both frivolous and
holy). (Ground 2-3)
The image for Nancy is like de Man’s topological figures in that both emerge as
meaningful units by distancing themselves from sheer being. And yet, while de Man will
see this in terms of an opposition that remain internal to language—between linguistic
meaning and performance, between trope and pure expressiveness—Nancy’s language
invokes a wider range of human experiences, linking the image’s distinction to a kind of
“unbinding” (Ground 3) from the purely continuous realm of being that recalls the
unbinding of Shelley’s Prometheus as the amelioration of enormous suffering.
Indeed, in a gesture that contrasts de Man’s, Nancy will describe the image’s
communication of its own difference and distinctness—its situation as a point of joining
and dividing or what throughout The Inoperative Community he calls partage—as “the
distance of the touch, that is, barely touching the skin” (Ground 4). There is a fleshiness
and sensitivity in Nancy’s analysis of the image that invites rather than repudiates the
consideration of the psychological and emotional consequences of the oscillation between
figuration and disfiguration—that is, the very disfiguration or violence that operates in or
as the action of establishing the finitude of, and therein making, figures. This violence of

151

the image is something Nancy and de Man both recognize but frame in very different
terms. Hence, it is no accident that Nancy’s analysis of the image should actively evoke
the condition of Shelley’s Wandering Jew—indeed, Nancy’s chapter on the relationship
between the image and the holocaust suggests a strange kind of affinity with Shelley’s
character—whereas de Man’s analysis of autobiography as defacement seems so distant,
even eerily silent. Indeed, Nancy describes the portrait (the image of the image or the
auto-image) in terms of its affective gravity; the portrait is not merely a picture but
“extracts something, an intimacy, a force” from the viewer and in so doing leaves as its
emissary a disfigured figure who uncannily resembles Shelley’s protagonist: “[the
portrait] throws it [this intimacy it extracts] in front of us, and this throwing [jet], this
projection, makes its mark, its very trait and its stigma: its tracing, its line, its style, its
incision, its scar, its signature, all of this at once” (Ground 4).

* * *

De Man displaces self-reflection and autobiography through a particularly
mechanical operation of language. Shelley, too, displaces this self-appropriation by
inverting operations typically associated with subjective and historical synthesis. Yet
Shelley seems concerned not merely to expose history or the self as forms of blindness
but also to gauge the affective and psychological toll of this instability. For it does seem
to take a toll; it is not a simple thing, for instance, to gaze passively on the triumph of life
represented by Ahasuerus and Paulo. So, while they may respond differently to time, both
de Man and Shelley expose a similarly problematic, discontinuous concept of temporality
at the heart of subjectivity and history. As Gasche notes, “all of de Man’s concepts are
drawn without exception into a maelstrom of temporalization” heralding the impossibility
of conceptual closure: “time prevents the conceptual atoms from exercising their
epistemological grip, their totalizing work, by preventing them from closing upon
themselves” (33). In other words, time is anathema not only to predictive forms of
prophecy but also to history as a form of progressive narrative, recalling Koselleck’s
discussion of historical temporalization. With the change in the perception of history
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from a naturalistic (circular) revolution to something inclusive of revolution as revolt, the
future and the past begin to look very different—and much more like history in Hellas.
In fact, speaking of Chateaubriand as a figure straddling the abyss of dividing
historiographies, Koselleck offers an anecdote uncannily germane to Shelley’s play and
de Man’s notion of reading as allegory:
A parallel of the new and the old revolutions was drawn up in 1797 by
Chateaubriand in emigration, whence he drew conclusions from the past
for the future in the customary manner. But he was soon forced to realize
that whatever he had written during the day was by night already
overtaken by events. It seemed to him that the French Revolution, quite
without previous example, led into an open future. Thus, thirty years later,
Chateaubriand placed himself in a historical relation by republishing his
outdated essay, without change of substance, but provided with notes in
which he proposed progressive constitutional prognoses. (37)
As with Hellas, historical material here loses its materiality: the past abdicates its didactic
function in the same moment as the future, as something now thoroughly unprecedented
becomes opaque. The present, consequently, is overtaken and taken over by relentless
change, shrinking to an Augustinian “vanishing point” (258). Or, as Shelley put it in “A
Philosophical Review of Reform,” such unstable “events [...] are the rapidly passing
shadows, which forerun successful insurrection, the ominous comets of our republican
poet perplexing great monarchs with fear of change” (7.17). Indeed, if Edward Gibbon’s
History o f the Decline and Fall o f the Roman Empire casts Mohammed the Second’s
siege of Constantinople as the “funeral oration of the Roman empire” (8.168), Shelley’s
decision to revive Mohamed suggests a more uncertain, spectral future. That is, the fall of
the city represents, for Gibbon, an irreversible condition of utter destruction—the city
“was irretrievably subdued” (8.172)—implying that his concept of history is itself fatally
linear: “the final extinction of the last two dynasties which [...] reigned in Constantinople
[...] terminate the decline and fall of the Roman empire in the East” (8.180). Shelley,
however, displaces this telos, opening the history of Greece through his invocation of the
same instant in which Gibbon’s history concludes.
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“Could one say that metonymic deconstruction is thus linked in a systematic
manner to a metaphoric deconstruction of temporal categories such as those of anteriority
and posteriority?” (Gasche 33) When history becomes an allegory of itself or when the
Wandering Jew, as the figure of history, undertakes autobiography, then it is not merely
that meaningful narrative content or stable subjectivity is displaced. Additionally and
fundamentally, the very divisions of time into past, present, and future enter into a kind of
allegorical vertigo of non-synthesis. Just as “allegory [...] is a disfigured metaphor whose
totalizing potential is metonymically laid out (and, thus, subverted) in an endless process
of narrative” (Gasche 31), so history itself in Hellas becomes allegory through a
prophecy that disfigures figures and a prophet who is the disfigured figure of historical
figuration. Thus rendered, history breaks from the past that, under conventional
circumstances, it would simply narrate. Put otherwise, the non-dialectical or perhaps
negative-dialectical operation that informs de Man’s practice of rhetorical reading offers
a set of terms and operations that prove useful for describing how prophecy functions in
Shelley and in other Romantic texts—in this study, Blake’s Milton will prove
exemplary—not as a simply unifying code but, rather, as an ambivalent form of
organization that tends, like texts in de Man’s treatment of them, to disorient
consciousness to the same extent that it orients and collects thought. Yet, unlike de Man’s
approach, the texts under consideration here and in the other chapters do not easily
relinquish their psychological and affective import. For prophecy, responding to an
experience of time made possible in specific historical circumstances, cannot explain its
own rise in terms of a merely rhetorical operation, and therefore resists being reduced to a
purely linguistic operation. Indeed, if prophetic consciousness emerges in part in
response to the French Revolution’s displacement of the Classical concept of return, then
it makes sense that it should also appear in texts that highlight other, similar revolutions:
the American and English (i.e., Cromwellian) revolutions in Blake, the French
Revolution in Wordsworth, the Irish Rebellion in Lamb, Medieval Italian and imagined
future ‘revolutions’ in Mary Shelley, and, in Percy Shelley, the Greek revolution.
Hellas dramatizes the allegorization of history’s autobiography, a process that
inverts prophecy’s predictive, synthetic, or restrictive exigency and opens history to a
general economy of expenditure. This is perhaps most palpable—in every sense—in the
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ambivalent treatment of branding, stamping, and other similar actions of marking
throughout the text. This ambivalence undercuts Hellas' philhellenism. Indeed, Hassan
gets so carried away describing the Greeks’ valour that when Mahmud chides him—
“your heart is Greek, Hassan” (454)—Hassan can explain his feelings only through
appeal to a kind of temporary schizophrenia:
It may be so:
A spirit not my own wrenched me within
And I have spoken words I fear and hate. (455-457)
And yet the theological alliances cannot perfectly square with the political divisions. That
is, if the Greeks are aligned with Christianity and the Turks with Islam, Ahasuerus’
particular fate tends to undermine the ameliorative connotations of the Holy Crosses that
appear as encouraging beacons to the Greeks but as “ominous signs” (601) to the
Turks.

For one cannot help but recall Ahasuerus’ scared brow—the sign of God’s

disproportionate wrath—when one of the messengers relates how signs
[a] re blazoned broadly on the noonday sky.
One saw a red cross stamped upon the sun;
It has rained blood, and monstrous births declare
The secret wrath of Nature and her Lord. (602-605)
It is, similarly, ironic that Ahasuerus’ advice to Mahmud to “look on that which cannot
change-—the One,/ Unborn and undying” (768-769), should recall the description of
eternity a few lines earlier—within one of the interludes—that figures the continuity of
history and of thought’s eternity in terms of a stamp:
But Greece and her foundations are
Built below the tide of war,
Based on the chrystalline sea
Of thought and its eternity;
Her citizens, imperial spirits,
Rule the present from the past,
On all this world of men inherits102

102 Indeed, the introduction o f Ahasuerus as a representative o f the third major monotheistic faith, Judaism,
complicates any simple binary opposition between Islam and Christianity in Hellas.
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Their seal is set. (696-703)
In the same moment as the text attempts to ensure Greece’s victory through metaphysical
appeals to the timeless realm of ideas—an assurance, again, that Ahasuerus rather boldly
repeats in Mahmud’s presence—the language of stamping, of the past indelibly marking
the present, seems to call into question the benevolence and moral superiority of the
Christian Deity.
If the Cross is supposed to signal Greek liberation, it cannot avoid also signalling
perpetual slavery. In fact, the Chorus of Greek women, condemning “Slavery! thou frost
of the world’s prime” at the hands of the Turks, describes bondage in terms uncannily
close to Ahasuerus’ predicament:
Thy [i.e., Slavery’s] touch has stamped these limbs with crime,
These brows thy branding garland bear,
But the free heart, the impassive soul
Scorn thy controul! (676, 678-681)
With a reversal recalling Aeschylus’ model-text, Shelley’s conflicting use of this imagery
effectively trades schadenfreude for a kind of universal sympathy.103 If the Cross
represents Christian liberation from Islamic oppression, it also suggests that that
liberation is itself prone to another kind of oppression, therein casting Greek and Turk,
Christian and Moslem, into a kind of inoperative community of ‘common’ non-mastery.
After all, while the call of “Victory!” signals the defeat of the Greeks by the Turks, this
becomes for Mahmud, the putative victor, a mere byword that promises the sad fate
illustrated in his vision of Mohammed the Second—“for thy subjects thou,/ Like us, shaft
rule the ghosts of murdered life” (882-883)—and a depressing repetition of violence:
Spirit woe to all!—
Woe to the wronged and the avenger! woe
To the destroyer, woe to the destroyed!
Woe to the dupe; and woe to the deceiver!
Woe to the oppressed and woe to the oppressor!

103 In an interesting reversal not unusual in Greek tragedy, Aeschylus elicits the audience’s pity not for the
Greeks but for the Persians, specifically Atossa and Xerxes. While The Persians certainly has its didactic
aspect— the invaders, we are led to believe, are punished by the Greek Gods for their arrogance— the text
anchors itself, in affective terms, in the tragic suffering o f the ostensible enemy.
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Woe both to those that suffer and inflict,
To those who are bom and those who die! (893-899)
Jerome McGann argues that this kind of frustration “culminates when Hellas,
hopelessly divided against itself, falls apart in the final act” (41). That is, the Choms,
after imagining “a brighter Hellas” that emerges upon return to a golden era through an
economy that would aim to calm down revolution (as revolt) through a reidentification
with revolution (as return), cries “O cease! Must hate and death return?” (1066, 1096)—
as if the return of better days, a “loftier Argo” or “another Orpheus” or “a new Ulysses,”
must also bring with it the violence it seeks to circumvent (1072, 1074, 1076). However,
the sense of universal min generates precisely the kind of sympathy Kant described in his
discussion of the French Revolution as a Sign. If the text does not resolve its negativity
dialectically in a vision of concrete progress, this does not mean history or the text simply
collapses in impotence. If anything, the text’s final injunction, “Cease! drain not to its
dregs the urn/ Of bitter prophecy” (1098-1099), suspends the conservation of cyclical
closure, trading the history of violence and the violence of history for an unknown future.
This ambivalence caries over in formal terms as well when Shelley uses
Aeschylus’ The Persians as his template for Hellas. In so doing, he generates another
level of reflexive gesturing through citation. Just as Mahmud, in calling on Mahomet the
Second, would “cite one out of the grave to tell/ How what was bom in blood must die”
(810-811), so does Shelley’s text gesture to specific antecedents, though on two different
levels. On one hand, Mahmud performs the same action as Atossa in The Persians when
she calls on the ghost of her late husband and Xerxes’ father, Darius. On the other hand,
Shelley’s decision to echo Aeschylus’ formal techniques means that Hellas, as a whole,
performs a similar kind of solicitation of the dead. Indeed, Shelley seems to mine The
Persians for the image of prophecy that will reemerge not only in Hellas but also, earlier,
in Prometheus Unbound. That is, while Mahmud in Hellas has only an obscure vision
that involves a choms of Greek women and disembodied voices that he can hardly even
remember, the “trouble in [her] heart” (164) that disturbs Atossa’s dreams in The
Persians104 looks something like a scene from Prometheus Unbound:104

104 In his Compositions from the Tragedies o f Aeschylus (1795), John Flaxman includes an engraving o f
Atossa’s dream, emphasizing the impact o f this episode on Romantic readers o f The Persians.
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Two beautifully dressed women seemed to appear to me, one decked out
in Persian robes, the other in Doric clothing. In stature they were
conspicuously larger than people are today, and they were faultlessly
lovely; they were sisters of one race. One of them lived in her fatherland,
Greece, which she had obtained by lot, the other in the land of the
barbarians. A conflict between these two arose, as it seemed to me. When
my son found out about it he tried to restrain and mollify them; he
harnessed them both beneath his chariot and put a yolk-strap beneath their
necks. One of them towered proudly in this gear, taking the reigns
submissively in her mouth, but the other stuggled, tore the harness from
the chariot with her hands, dragged it violently along without the bridle,
and smashed the yolk by the middle. My son fell out. His father Dareios
stood close by, pitying him. (181-197)
Shelley seems carefully to translate this allegorical vision of nations into Asia and
Panthea. He adopts, for instance, the filial relationship between these spirits, Asia calling
Panthea her “sweet sister” (2.1.14). Further, Asia, as the geographical quality of the name
suggests, is an updated version of the woman “in Persian robes,” that is, the spirit of the
Eastern nation. Panthea, then, represents “the other in the Doric clothing” or Shelley’s re
vision of Aeschylus’ figure of Greece. That is, more precisely, Panthea is not simply
exported from The Persians. Rather, the figure of Greece is radically refigured, or even
dis-figured, as a kind of placelessness that implies universality, or pan-theos. In
something as subtle as Shelley’s translation of these figures, then, he manages to make
ancient Greece the ancestor and eventual inheritor of the spirit of the Romantic age.
If Asia and Panthea represent avatars of allegorical figures encountered in The
Persians, then it seems almost as if Prometheus Unbound serves as a prophetic spirit, one
invoked—as it were—by Hellas just as Mahmud invokes Ahasuerus. And, just as
prophetic agents in Shelley often do not offer clear signs so much as make supplementary
referential gestures, it seems that Prometheus Unbound does not so much explain the
prophecy in Hellas as open on to another prophetic scene wherein historical and political
elements are (de)composed. Hellas seems to be just another “waking dream” that is
“hastening onward,” another scene in the triumph of history (Triumph 42, 47).
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Prometheus Unbound, in other words, “leaves [its] stamp visibly upon the shore/ Until
the second bursts,” until Hellas, that is, again reformulates Aeschylus’ prophetic imagery,
“so on [the reader’s] sight/ Burst a new Vision never seen before” (Triumph 409-411).
This reconfiguration unbinds what might otherwise seem like the fairly conventional or
restricted economy of prediction in Prometheus Unbound. For when Asia instructs
Panthea, “Lift up thine eyes/ And let me read thy dream” (2.1.55-56), the obscurity of the
vision nevertheless recovers the dream as an echo whose insistent “Follow, follow!”
(2.1.163) propels the sisters and the narrative toward Jove’s crisis and the subsequent
utopian vision of the future represented in Act Four. That is, Shelley offers a very
affirmative vision of not only the future in Prometheus Unbound but of futurity,
suggesting that the future as a dimension of temporality is something that the present can
make sense of in advance:
And our singing shall build,
In the Void’s loose field,
A world for the Spirit of Wisdom to wield;
We will take our plan
From the new world of man
And our work shall be called the Promethean. (4.153-158)
This strongly predictive dimension may derive in part from Shelley’s engagement with
Aeschylus’ Prometheus Bound, wherein Prometheus’ mode of foresight is clearly
predictive:
Wait, what am I saying?
I know how it all turns out:
no unforeseen
heartbreaks for me.
I see,
I do what I am bound to do, and take the consequence
as best I can. (152-158)105

105 J.S. Morrison elaborates on this point in the context o f Greek concepts o f prophecy and practices o f
divination in the ancient world, noting that
Aeschylus puts into the mouth o f his hero an account o f the arts o f civilization which he claims to
have brought to mankind. Sandwiched in between medicine and mining, we find a description o f
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Admittedly, it is not necessarily that Shelley’s Prometheus predicts what the future will
precisely look like; but, in prophetically announcing and pronouncing the Promethean
Age, he suggests that this future is continuous with human thought and language—
Prometheus’ gifts to humanity—and that history comes to a somewhat Hegelian end in
the sense of achieving Absolute selfhood. This closure of history places emphasis on
prophecy as a predictive, synthesizing form of consciousness.
Contrastingly, Asia and Panthea, through whom prophecy emerges as a kind of
dialogic imagination, are unable to curtail their allusiveness to The Persians and their
anticipation of the warring nations in Hellas', if prophecy as prediction correlates to a
bound pro-metheus, Shelley’s unbinding of all typical forms of synthesis means that he
instigates a breach in stable identity. These associations with the past (Aeschylus’
Greece) and the future (Shelley’s Hellas) complicates Prometheus Unbound's transitional
role by involving the very agents of prophecy in a nexus of relations that fuel a general
economy of expenditure. That is, Shelley’s hyper-reflexivity means that while Aeschylus’
text is used as a model for figuration, it just as quickly flits out of sight, such that the
trace it leaves, Prometheus Unbound, becomes the new model for Hellas. The Persians
stands before Prometheus Unbound just as Prometheus Unbound stands before Hellas.
But then this series is short-circuited: for Hellas attempts to recall the model for its
model, The Persians, directly, just as Mahmud bushes Ahasuerus aside and calls on
Mahomet the Second. Mahmud is left only further disoriented by the various prophets he
interrogates. Similarly, Shelley’s adoption of The Persians' form does not close Hellas'
referential potential by ‘getting back to’ the source or origin of figuration. Rather, the
the arts o f divination which may serve as a concluding summary although it also reminds us that
there were branches o f the mantic art which we have been unable to touch:
And many ways o f prophecy I put in order, and first interpreted what must come o f
dreams in waking hours, and the obscure import o f wayside signs and voices I defined,
and taught them to discern the various flights o f taloned birds, which o f them favourable
and which o f ill foreboding, and the ways o f life by each pursued, their mating season,
their hatreds and their loves for one another; the entrails too, o f what texture and hue they
must appear to please the sight o f heaven; the dappled figure o f the gall and liver, the
thigh-bone wrapt in fat and the long chine I burnt and led man to the riddling art o f
divination; and augury by fire, for long in darkness hid, I brought to light. (110-111)
As hinted at in the above passage, divination in Classical Greece involved a range o f slightly different
practices, drawing distinctions between not only passive divination (omina oblativa) and active divination
{omina impetrativa) but more precisely between augury as performed by a mantis, sacrifice conducted by
an hiereus, and dream interpretation undertaken by an oneiropolos (Morrison 146, 92). The salient
commonality for the present investigation is that all these forms o f divination aim to extend understanding,
to render the strange familiar, or to eliminate ambiguity.

160

attempt to close history, to return Greece to Hellas by returning Hellas to The Persians, is
unbound by Prometheus' ambivalent temporality, Asia and Panthea’s relation to the past
and the future. Like the reciprocal prefacing between Blake’s texts, discussed in the next
chapter, the rhythm of deferral that emerges between Shelley’s texts reflects the shape of
forgetful memory first encountered in The Wandering Jew but that recurs and gains
intensity in Prometheus’ memory of the forgotten curse, Mahmud’s memory of his
forgotten dream (also a kind of curse) and, finally, as the fragmentary, narrative form of
The Triumph o f Life. The Wandering Jew is the embodiment of autobiography’s
defacement and becomes an allegory for reading history as allegory: that is, for reading
history as temporally detotalized rather than as a symbolic synthesis composed by
metaphor. The counterhistory he embodies is not, however, restricted to him alone.
Anticipating Mary Shelley’s universalization of history’s violence in The Last Man, when
the Jew’s historicity finds expression in Shelley meta-textually, detotalizing Shelley’s
oeuvre, he opens the future to something not-yet-conscious through a prophecy of pure
exodus.106

106 In chapter five I turn to Ernst Bloch’s notions o f exodus and utopia (as something not-yet-conscious) as
modes o f formulating the kind o f ambivalent prophecy theorized throughout this project. Indeed, Bloch’s
concept o f prophecy elaborates on the Judaic understanding o f history implicit in the (dis)figuration o f
Shelley’s Jew.
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C hapter Four

“And heard/ The poet mutter his prelusive songs”: Blake’s Beginnings
Irony [...] knows it has the power to start all over again if it so pleases; anything that happened before is
not binding.
— Kierkegaard, The Concept o f Irony

I. “labourers divine”: Remembering and Dismembering Milton

The prevailing critical narrative of Blake’s oeuvre suggests that his early texts,
including the Lambeth books, represent defective, incomplete efforts at a systematic
mythology, one adequately realized only in the later illuminated books, Milton and
Jerusalem, where “every word and every letter” experimented with in the ‘primitive’
works finally “is studied and put into its fit place” {Jerusalem 3). This idea of retroactive
arrangement operates on a model of apocalyptic redemption, as if the “iconic space of the
illuminated book” (Raj an “System” 384) rescues its own prefatory materials from
obscurity. In fact, from the perspective of the achieved telos, Blake’s minor prophecies,
thanks to their dramatic fragmentation, negatively predict the synthetic whole that will
perform hermeneutic salvation. For instance, Northrop Frye argues that “all of Blake’s
poetry, from the shortest lyric to the longest prophecy, must be taken as a unit and,
mutatis mutandis, judged by the same standard. This means that the longer and more
difficult prophecies will have to bear the weight of the commentary” (5). In this, Frye
seems to turn his reading of Blakean prophecy—the contractual pattern, “if you go on So
the result is So” (AnnWatson 14; E 607), implying a restricted and predictive form of
prophecy—into a model for reading Blake: “we must accept in Blake a certain amount of
prophecy in the literal sense of anticipating the probable future, and must see in his
conception of Deism a mental attitude which is still with us, the monstrous hydra which
is the perverted vision of human society as an atomic aggregate of egos instead of as a
larger human body” (54). In other words, Blake’s ‘corpus,’ in Frye’s estimation, must
depart from the atomic and atomizing chaos of the Lambeth books to culminate in
“autobiography in Milton, and with history as cosmic autobiography in Jerusalem’'1
(Rajan “System” 389).
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Indeed, Milton does attempt in several ways to absorb and re-organize the often
dense and nebulous productions typical of Blake’s art up to the major prophecies,
suggesting—at least on first glance—that these later works operate according to the
conventional sense of prophecy as conservation, prediction, and economic restriction.
Milton does this, for one, by way of citation: the literal incorporation (and figural
‘digestion’) of earlier characters, passages of text, and concepts. As early as Milton's
third plate, for instance, Blake’s Bard offers a condensed version of The [First] Book o f
Urizen. In fact, upon observing Urizen’s (de)formation, Los seems to re-embody the
speaker from Blake’s “Memorable Fancy” in The Marriage o f Heaven and Hell (18-20)
who identifies the Angel’s “dark visions of torment” (Urizen 1.13)—a conglomeration of
nightmare images including “black & white spiders” and “the head of Leviathan” (18)—
as something “owing to [the Angel’s] metaphysics” (19), confirming that the “Eye
altering alters all” (E 476). For when Los looks upon Urizen’s formation “his immortal
limbs/ Grew deadly pale; he became what he beheld”(M/7/on 3.28-29), effectively
intellectualizing and in some sense ameliorating the confusion of agent and patient in
Urizen described more traumatically and mythopoetically in terms of a physical fracture:
“Urizen was rent from his [Los’] side” and the wound “heal’d not” {Urizen 6.4; 7.4). The
description of human formation similarly seems to combine the language of involution
and vegetable growth familiar from Urizen with the notion that “mans desires are limited
by his perceptions” (E 1), asserted not only in short prose tracts like “There is no Natural
Religion” and “All Religions are One” but also explored dramatically in The Book ofThel
and in the dialectical relationship between innocence and experience in the Songs. For if
“the five Senses” are “the chief inlets of Soul in this age” {Marriage 4), the language in
Milton neatly frames these inlets also as barriers that “shut” perception “in narrow doleful
form[s]”: the “Eye of Man a little narrow orb closd up & dark” and “the Ear, a little shell
in small volutions shutting out/ All melodies” {Milton 5.19, 21, 23-24). In fact, the entire
tenor of the Bard’s song detailing the destruction of Palamabron’s harrow and Satan’s
mills seems to elaborate on the destructiveness of “Satans mildness” and “pity false”
warned of more briefly in “A Poison Tree” {Milton 7.21, 29).107

107 “If you account it Wisdom when you are angry to be silent, and/ Not to shew it: I do not account that
Wisdom but Folly” (Milton 4.6-7)
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There is a sense, perhaps, that in Los’ declaration of sorrow—“this mournful day/
Must be a blank in Nature” {Milton 8.20-21)—he attempts to mourn the trauma of the
Lambeth books, suggesting that Milton returns to the past in an effort of textual or artistic
self-therapy. Indeed, the damage occasioning this day of mourning follows from the
failure properly to divide and organize labour. The problems begin when Satan
soft intreated Los to give him Palamabrons station;
For Palamabron retumd with labour wearied every evening
Palamabron oft refus’d; and as often Satan offer’d
His service till by repeated offers and repeated intreaties
Los gave to him the Harrow of the Almighty [.] {Milton 7.6-10)
Whether from lack of experience or, as Leutha later claims, her own unobserved and illadvised attempt “to unloose the flaming steeds/ As Elynittria use’d to do,” this role
reversal proves disastrous in that Satan leaves Palamabron’s “horses [...] mad! his
Harrow confounded! his companions enrag’d!” {Milton 12.11-12; 8.17, 18). Blake here
rewrites the Satanic hubris of Paradise Lost as failed apprenticeship, turning a
metaphysical allegory of Evil’s fall from Good into a question of Greek “virtue”
understood in the Classical sense of technical knowledge, craft, or skill.108 Further, the
nature of the tools and labours in question reinforces the notion that the Bard’s song
illustrates the history of Blake’s own writing practice and the sense that earlier texts
represent the ‘uneven soil’ that Milton will aim to cultivate for future, organic growth.
Hence, Los’ problem with dividing and organizing labour is also Blake’s problem,
especially in the Lambeth books, of organizing and dividing poetic labour. The tool at the
centre of the dispute, Palamabron’s harrow, is an agricultural implement, similar to a
plough. As the Oxford English Dictionary describes, a harrow is a sled or “heavy frame
of timber (or iron) set with iron teeth or tines, which is dragged over ploughed land to
break clods, pulverize and stir the soil, root up weeds, or cover in the seed” (OED nl).
The harrow is, in other words, a tool that performs a kind of engraving. Additionally, it
facilitates sowing or invests the space of the field with a kind of potential that will
literally bear fruit just as the surface of Blake’s page continues to bear intellectual fruit.

i°8 “•j'hg wor(j ‘virtue’ attaches false associations to the Greek arete, which meant primarily efficiency at a
particular task” (Guthrie 72).
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The harrow, taken reflexively as a figure for Blake’s artistic practice in Milton, rakes over
and recycles earlier, fragmentary texts and submits them to the mechanical divisions of
agricultural labour and the organic temporality within seasonal rhythms.
This agricultural imagery and the sense of manual labour is complicated,
however, given the double sense of the word “harrow”: as a verb, “harrow” means to
plunder and cannot be invoked without recalling Christ’s harrowing of Hell. Like the
farming practice that materially resembles Blake’s artistic technique, Christ’s actions
represent preparation and organization—the prelude to apocalypse. Yet, the theological
connotations stress a new relationship in that harrowing refers to a kind of rescue,
redemption, or re-collection. Going beyond the allusion to Blake’s material practices, the
theological connotations of the act suggest that the Bard’s song in Milton is concerned
specifically with the mode of labour represented in illuminated engraving, a type of
‘harrowing’ that aims to establish a universal and metaphysical organization based on re
covering—in the double sense of redeeming and planting in soil—the rich but unstable
potential within textual fragments. So, the Bard’s song becomes a parable about the
necessity for artistic autonomy when it comes to performing the kind of harrowing—
inspired re-writing—necessary to produce illuminated texts. For the artist need not appeal
to or rely on external authorities to ‘ameliorate’ his struggles—“The eagle never lost so
much time, as when he submitted to learn of the crow” (Marriage 8.39). Rather he must
turn inward, or in Blake’s case back to the texts that populate his creative ‘underworld,’
and harrow up not lost souls but textual predecessors. In other words, Blake rewrites
Christian redemption as citation, such that theological harrowing becomes a material
practice to the same extent as the physical act of engraving enters into a new contract
with divinity in the form of the illuminated book.
Milton aims to redeem earlier works—effectively converting those works into
pre-faces to the countenance represented by the proper name, “Milton”—including not
just Blake’s works but John Milton’s, through ‘harrowing’ or divine citation. This re
collection—like the effort Mahmud makes in Hellas to “cite one out of the grave”
(810)—seems, however, to introduce disorder in the very action o f organization. That is,
agricultural harrowing neatly lines the field and Christ’s harrowing separates the damned
from the saved. Yet, Blake’s treatment of the divisions or what he calls “classes” of
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people seems to confuse the conventional, Calvinistic understanding whence the
categories are derived:
[There are] Three Classes of Men regulated by Los’s Hammer.
The first, the Elect from before the foundation of the World:
The second, The Redeem’d. The Third, The Reprobate & form’d
To destruction from the mothers womb: follow with me my plow! (6.35
7.3)
The Bard’s call to follow his plow here invokes the harrow and its ordering exigency
even as it suggests a new direction, one that might cut across the neat divisions of the
Calvinistic-Platonic classes described. For later we find that the Reprobate are free, the
Redeemed victims of what Blake elsewhere calls “Priesthood” (Marriage 11, E 37),
while the Elect are the truly damned. Indeed, Milton’s act of self-annihilation, discussed
below, amounts to a kind of de-election since the “Selfhood” is identified with “Satan”
(Milton 14.30) and Satan is earlier identified with the Elect.109 So, later on when “Los
stood & cried to the Labourers of the Vintage” that they “must bind the Sheaves not by
Nations or Families” but by “Three Classes” (25.16,26)—effectively “separating what
has been mixed” (25.28) in what sounds like a revision of the parable of the Sower in the
Gospels110—he just as quickly confuses the distinctions he has demanded his workers to
observe:
The Elect is one Class: You
Shall bind them separate: they cannot Believe in Eternal Life
Except by Miracle & New Birth. The other two Classes;
The Reprobate who never cease to Believe, and the Redeemd,
Who live in doubts & fears perpetually tormented by the Elect
These you shall bind in a twin-bundle for the Consummation[.] (Milton
25.32-37)
Here the Elected individual proves to be the self-satisfied hypocrite whom John Milton,
in Aeropagitica, described as a “heretick in the truth,” one who “believe[s] things only
because his Pastor sayes so” rather than basing belief on a deeper, critically examined

109 “the Class o f Satan shall be calld the Elect” (Milton 11.21)
110 Matthew 13:1-23, Mark 4:1-20, Luke 8:1-15.
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rationale (n. pag). Blake seems to invert the meaning of the second class as well: the
Redeemed, contrary to the sense of successful completion denoted by the name, are here
described as perpetually striving toward the status denied them by the Elect, perpetuating
self-victimization. Finally, it is the Reprobate, whom one would expect, given the sense
of criminality the word implies, to be damned, that prove to be most faithful. In other
words, in this reorganization of classes Blake has managed to disorganize and revise the
concept of organization itself, suggesting that “faithfulness” means not perpetual stasis
but rather ongoing self re-creation as immanent reprobation. This seems, then, to displace
the sense of harrowing as absolute, apocalyptic recollection, in that this new kind of
faithfulness incorporates the negativity necessary for change and responsiveness. Indeed,
when Blake warns us to “Expect poison from the standing water” (.Marriage 9.45), he
echoes Milton’s description of a more active form of faith: for Milton likewise insists
“that our faith and knowledge thrives by exercise, as well as our limbs and complexion.
Truth is compar’d in Scripture to a streaming fountain; if her waters flow not in a
perpetuall progression, they sick’n into a muddy pool of conformity and tradition”
(Areopagitica n. pag.).
Milton continues this rhythm of (dis)organization—a rhythm that complicates the
purely recuperative sense of prophecy typically associated with the major prophecies—
through its redundant and layered mapping. That is, throughout the text Blake writes
psychodrama as geography, then again as history, as personal vision, as biography, and
finally as autobiography. Consider, for instance, geography: taking his cue from Jacob’s
re-nomination and metamorphosis in the Hebrew Bible111 that sees the subject divided
geographically according to the biological dictates of Israel’s progeny, Blake maps the
universe through spiritual entities, the Four Zoas:
Four Universes round the Mundane Egg remain Chaotic
One to the North, named Urthona: one to the South, named Urizen:
One to the East, named Luvah: One to the West named Tharmas[.] {Milton
19.15-17)
This mapping becomes more complex when Blake turns various human institutions into
cities: Allamanda is commerce (27.42), Bowlahoola is law (24.48) and Golgonooza is
111

Renamed “Israel,” Jacob becomes identical to the nation itself. See Genesis 32:24-32.
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“Art & Manufacture” (24.50). But then this map is again transposed or remapped in terms
of the body when “the City of Golgonooza/ Which is the spiritual fourfold London” is
located “in the loins of Albion” (20.39-40). In fact, Milton’s spatial trajectory or “track”
that describes his descent through the universe seems to pass through variously
overdetermined “states,” places that are politically defined nations, physical organs of the
body, and psychological categories:
And the Four States of Humanity in its Repose,
Were shewd them. First of Beulah a most pleasant Sleep
On Couches soft, with mild music, tended by Flowers of Beulah
Sweet female forms, winged or floating in the air spontaneous
The Second State is Alla & the third State Al-Ulro;
But the Fourth State is dreadful; it is named Or-Ulro:
The First State is the Head, the Second is in the Heart:
The Third in the Loins & Seminal Vessels & the Fourth
In the Stomach & Intestines terrible, deadly, unutterable (34.8-16)
This redundancy of organization, one that goes so far as to take organ-ization literally,
does less to establish a single, simplified picture—an apocalyptic totality—than to
suggest, ironically, a perpetual displacement of the very systems of organization
themselves, the next coming to supplement the previous like Shelley’s messengers in
Hellas. Writing psychodrama as geography, history, personal vision, biography,
psychology and so forth, in an effort to appropriate the internal order of each system,
seems in fact to undermine Milton's ostensible narrative simultaneity and to displace total
conceptual or visionary unity.
If classes (dis)organize different groups of people, states (dis)organize
individuals. For instance, Milton offers a metaphysical commentary on subjectivity,
calling the reader to “Distinguish [...] States from Individuals in those States./ States
Change: but Individual Identities never change nor cease” (32.22-23). In other words,
“state” here seems to be understood as a way of being that could include a psychological
type in addition to a material, physical, political, or geographically determined place.
Indeed, the text reveals that “selfhood” is one particular state of being, one that is
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sometimes named “Satan,” and that might be analogous to the class of the Elect.112
Hence, Milton’s difficult task—one that rewrites his investment in Cromwell’s political
revolution as subjective transformation—is to change his ‘state’ in this broader
application. In fact, Milton has to become the very state o f re-stating, in every sense. Put
differently, he must become the state in or of revolution:
And thou O Milton art a State about to be Created
Called Eternal Annihilation that none but the Living shall
Dare to enter[.] (32.26-28)
“Milton” is the state of the re-vision of states—a shape of consciousness that can “Judge
[...] of thy Own Self’ precisely “What is Eternal & what Changeable? & what
Annihilable!” (32.30, 31). In other words, “Milton” seems to name the state wherein the
individual emerges in terms of his or her radical individuality, a state that pushes beyond
its own initial demarcations to become ‘identical’ with individuality. But with this Milton
does not fall into Satanic self-possession because the individual itself is understood not to
be a mode of permanence but rather merely the punctual location of the power of self
annihilation. For what Blake calls the individual could be called the imagination: “The
Imagination is not a State: it is the Human Existence itself/ Affection or Love becomes a
State, when divided from Imagination” (32.33-34). The individual as imagination is, then,
the power of re-stating—a power that will “never change nor cease” and yet will never
ossify, either, since it is nothing other than productive negation that displaces itself
endlessly.
In On the Relationship o f the Fine Arts to Nature, Friedrich Schelling describes a
type of vision capable of truly visionary insight, offering a reflection on art uncannily
germane to Blake’s method of revealing the imagination as a power of re-stating through
the destruction of outward form. It is what Schelling calls the “spiritual eye” that
“penetrates the exterior and feels the active force” within nature and art (in Wirth xi). As
Jason Wirth explains, “the spiritual eye [...] intimates the unprethinkable future in a
thing, that is, its ‘creating life’ and its ‘power to exist’” (xi). As such, this eye does not

112 In one o f many complex allusions to Paradise Lost, Blake here seems to elaborate on Satan’s assertion
that Hell is a ‘state o f mind’: “Which way I flie is Hell; my self am Hell” (4.75). That is, while Satan
discovers that Hell is a mode o f the s e ifs being, Blake suggests that the self itself is Satan— almost
inverting even while preserving something o f Satan’s insight.
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see what is merely sensible; as in Blake’s art, the effort here seems to be to gain insight to
the larger realm of perception, precisely what the five senses deny—for the senses allow
access to the perceptible only insofar as they radically circumscribe that same realm
according to the finite limitations of the sensory organs. Yet, just as Schelling will insist
that “we must go through the form in order to gain it back as intelligible, alive, and as
truly felt” (in Wirth xi), so Blake’s discussion of states in and of creation takes the reader
beyond any static form and, instead, to the imagination as the vitally metaphorical power
to re-form—politically, psychologically, and artistically. Indeed, if Milton’s redemption,
displacing the economy of harrowing as pure re-collection, coincides with self
annihilation, so too will Schelling insist that the feeling gained through the spiritual eye
relies on the destruction of the very form that serves, in its beauty, only as a provisional
mediator: “only through the completion of form can the form be annihilated” (in Wirth
xi).
This sense of Milton as a state that seeks, through an ‘embodiment’ of negativity
visible to the spiritual eye, to express the surging, heterogeneous power of the
imagination, turns inside out Blake’s effort to formalize and contain psychodrama as
biography and autobiography. As in Shelley’s treatment of the Wandering Jew,
(auto)biography is, in Milton, coextensive with defacement. When confronted with the
task of mourning or harrowing Blake’s dark materials, Milton’s biographical and
autobiographical power to synthesize history according to the model or scheme of
subjective Bildung seems to break down. This is because the totalizing form itself is
infected by discontinuity, the body of the text defaced, as it were, by its ostensible
prefaces. If the subject is supposed to form the ground upon which to formulate Blake’s
visionary system, the ‘state’ of self-annihilation (in scare quotes since this is the sate of
re-stating) as the telos of Milton’s redemption seems to disperse even as it gathers
together elements from earlier works in Blake’s oeuvre. In fact, the text subtly
complicates the idea of foundation. For just as the Bard’s parable has the effect of
“Shaking the roots & fast foundations of the Earth in doubtfulness” (14.8), so his
description of the state of Jerusalem—again, a “state” in every sense—remains teetering
precariously on the edge of destruction given that the speaker’s ambiguity opens the
concept of state foundation to radical ambivalence:
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The Surrey hills glow like the clinkers of the furnace: Lambeths Vale
Where Jerusalems foundations began; where they were laid in ruins
Where they were laid in ruins from every Nation & Oak Groves Rooted
Dark gleams before the Furnace-mouth a heap of burning ashes
When shall Jerusalem return & overspread all the Nations
Return: return to Lambeths Vale O building of human souls
Thence stony Druid Temples overspread the Island white
And thence from Jerusalems ruins[.] (Milton 6.14-21)
On one hand, the passage suggests that Jerusalem represents the original foundation of
England, that Druid temples are the material traces of this original culture, and that it is a
matter not of Jerusalem’s arrival but rather its return. On the other, the passage repeats
that these foundations “were laid in ruins.” This could mean that the foundations were set
amidst ruins of a previous civilization or amidst Blake’s own artistic productions
associated with his time living in “Lambeths Vale,” that is, the Lambeth Books. The
phrase, however, also says that the foundations in question were destroyed. It becomes
impossible, in other words, to quarantine the sense of foundation from the destruction of
that same foundation, of grounding from ungrounding, turning the most basic notion of
architectural organization and ordering into disorder.
It is on this note that one could turn from the various and overlapping forms of
essentially spatial ordering described thus far in terms of harrowing, mapping, and
building to questions of temporal ordering. Just as forms of spatial ordering introduce
disorder, so Milton cannot quite assimilate its temporally prefatory materials. As the
constituent elements of the sublime vision that Milton is poised on the verge of revealing,
these materials function much like the sense organs throughout Blake’s work: apparati
that facilitate to the same extent as they hamper perception. Put differently, Blake offers
another version of prophetic ambivalence in that Milton's prophetic status seems divided
between a conservative concept of prediction, apocalypse, and redemption and a “Wild
Thyme” {Milton 31.51) that deranges those very forms of continuity. More specifically,
Blake highlights this ambivalence in and through his treatment of prefaces. As literary
performances of temporal inauguration, prefaces seem to act like prophets, standing
before a narrative, inaugurating a set of events, and unifying that narrative of events from
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the outset. However, a closer look at the nature of the preface and Blake’s treatment of
them suggests that here, too, an ostensibly organizing phenomenon is internally divided.
In this case the break is particularly temporal and involves the prefaces’ antithetical
commitments to the future and the past. This, then, turns Milton’s prophetic dimension
away from the ostensible advance to “the Great Harvest & Vintage of the Nations”
(Milton 43.1), diffusing the intensity of monumental vision by redirecting attention to the
powerful negativity that makes re-vision possible. Finally, this is to suggest that the
recuperative vision of prophecy cannot, ultimately, accomplish the work of mourning,
cannot completely absorb Urizen’s traumatic origin(ality). Hence, if Urizen is a prophetic
text it is so only as that which—like Wordsworth—calls to prophecy in an effort to
ameliorate a loss of narrative and subjective coherence: Urizen, performing the
‘inaugurating’ violence (discussed below) of what Schelling will describe as the
maddening circulation of potencies, calls forward to Milton’s predictive vision as a form
of mourning and yet contaminates that same recuperation by insisting upon prophecy’s
traumatic ‘foundations.’

II. Prelude to the Beginning

The discussion of Blake’s prefaces benefits from a distinction between beginnings
and starts. A start is one kind of temporal formulation and distinct from that of the
beginning. A start would be comparatively unproblematic: one could locate a start
wherever one pleased and could precipitate a start without any inconvenience. A
beginning, on the other hand, would involve a point of absolute precedence and
anteriority, and in this sense would involve a different temporal matrix from the start—
that is, would not be on the same horizon as a start. For one can always make a start;
people, every day, can and do make starts. And one can always abandon something and
start again. This was evident in chapter two, as Wordsworth, for instance, seems always
to be starting The Prelude over again. A start, however, cannot make the same existential
claims as a beginning: it does not relate to the things that emerge from the start in the
same way as the beginning does, since the start is annihilated by the work to come. A
beginning, then, is in some sense eternal or beyond time, as Schelling would speak of an
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eternal beginning in the Ages o f the World: a beginning that “never ceases to be a
beginning” (17).

This is not a start that one can move away from or beyond, but a

radical positing that has to contend endlessly with the abyss that is its logical condition of
(im)possibility. The beginning is what holds open the perpetual possibility of a start
without, itself, starting; this is why it demands its own temporal horizon. So, when
Wordsworth and Blake both try in their respective works to recuperate the beginning, the
difficulty with such projects presents itself symptomatically, namely, in terms of the more
discrete, literary conundrum of how to start a text about beginning. Hence, the “false
starts” (Rajan “System” 385) witnessed in several of Blake’s Lambeth books,
Wordsworth’s series of Prelude s, and Shelley’s repeated invocation of the Wandering
Jew, who seems always to stand on the threshold of a history that will properly begin the
work of healing and mourning. Because these works seek the more radical beginning—
either cosmic in Blake, subjective in Wordsworth, or historical in Shelley—they offer a
way for what cannot easily be figured in chronological sequence (that is, beginning) to
‘appear,’ but only as a kind of unfeasibility, unreadability, or recalling the terms of the
preceding chapter, disfiguration: a ‘pre-face’ in every sense. Perpetual starting figures the
failure to recuperate beginning. This is registered in the effort exerted by both
Wordsworth and Blake to start the text from a place of sufficient but ultimately
unreachable anteriority. Wordsworth gestures at this anteriority most explicitly in the
“Intimations Ode,” although it is also behind the linguistic and logical acrobatics of the
‘prophetic’ call to prophecy discussed in chapter two. This is the effort to solicit and to
claim artistic authority in the same breath, and leads to the temporal problem whereby the
future seems to open only though a gesture of retrospection—an attempt to contain time
through experience even as the experience o/time’s impalpable impression betrays the
futility of such delicate webs of tenses.
The preludia in question113114 are, then, the disfigured figurations of a radical
beginning, where beginning is a force, dimension, or ontological structure that exceeds
any kind of finite localization: the beginning is what creates the possibility of starting but
also what makes every particular start into a kind of betrayal (in every sense) of the
113 All references, unless otherwise specified, are to the 1815 version o f Ages o f the World.
114 The ‘preludes’ that I have in mind are works from the Lambeth period, particularly the minor prophecies
and the Books o f Ahania, Los, and Urizen.
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beginning. The beginning does not start because it is the very ability to start, to negate, or
to inaugurate. In being this power, the beginning must always remain in the beginning,
can never be reduced to or appropriated by the particular projects that might make a start.
For if the beginning started, if it took on flesh, as it were, and became past, it would
foreclose the possibility of any new starts, would revoke the horizon it opens for new
starts, and existence would be rendered completely, sequentially determined. Hence, from
a practical perspective, if there is to be existential freedom, the beginning must not start.
This is not because the beginning is some kind of transcendental signified or idea—if it
does not start, that does not mean that it rests in self-sufficiency. Rather, it is because the
beginning does not have being itself that it can function as the ‘ground’ of starts. The
temporality of beginning recalls the abyss of anteriority that would solicit the infinite
regression of prefaces to prefaces that Blanchot—noted above—sees as the paradox
whereby one can start writing only if one has already written. The start, by contrast, is the
fiat that ruptures this cycle, almost like the emergence of the Godhead out of Schelling’s
rotary motion of the potencies (discussed below), calming primordial turbulence into a
dialectical process—at least temporarily. Such a fiat inaugurates a development only
temporarily because ultimately it cannot quite silence the beginning, or cannot quite
overcome and absorb the negativity of beginning. The start cannot put the beginning in
its proper place, as it were, such that when starts themselves become the centre of
attention, they reveal their susceptibility to regression.115

115 “To put this in modem terms, the infinite greatness o f creating Beginning is lost now, with this future
facing Veni creator spiritus, in the infinite smallness o f a Beginning which is no more than a beginning, a
state o f pure need. Nor is this new Beginning any once-and-for-all, mythical, pre-earthly creation o f the
universe, leaving room only for beings which are in themselves complete. It is, rather, a simple X, an Alpha
present in all being. Incomplete and unobjective in itself, it draws man on through the transient darkness o f
each moment in the Way o f the World. It is the Not-there o f each present Moment, which, still veiled to
itself and seeking itself, truly ‘evolves’ into being in and through World-process and its experimental
forms, for it is their primary stimulus and driving-force. Its place in human history is at the decisive front o f
the Experimentum mundi, where man lies equally open to everything and nothing, to fulfillment and to min,
and where the world is in high labour as the Laboratorium possibilis salutis. The topos o f Way— and, even
more so, End— is the same endless forward-looking openness, not the closed topos o f the astral myth with
its ‘eternal iron laws’; it is the great topos o f the Future, still full o f objective and really available
possibilities for birth, development and experimental forms o f fulfillment; the topos where the X o f the
Beginning runs ever onward in the still immediate, unmediated, unobjectified, unmanifested Here-and-now
o f each present moment. [...]. The true world is here still uncreated, it has its being in newness— which is
quite the opposite o f the antiquarian mythology o f Deus creator and o f an utterly complete, fulfilled
Beginning.” (Bloch Atheism in Christianity 221)
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With Blake, we see how prefatory negativity resists complete chronological
discipline through his struggles with starting his minor prophecies—that is, with
initiating those texts that are supposed, in turn, to constitute the prefatory material for
Milton. In other words, when we consider Blake’s attempts to initiate various texts, we
see how the abyss of the beginning irritates and even revokes the starts it makes possible
or how, in the words of Michel Foucault, the “ceaseless rending open” of the origin’s
retreat and return “frees the origin in exactly the degree to which it [i.e., that same origin]
recedes” (334).116178The very struggle to start would be a sign of the beginning, not the
beginning ‘itself—in scare quotes since, to adapt a Schellingian gambit, we can say what
a beginning is but not that it is. Put differently, Blake’s preludia represent locations of
mediation where eternity (as eternal beginning) intersects time (punctual, discrete starts),
just as the prophet is the immediate mediator of the divine Word.

The anteriority that

the prelude or preface claims therefore echoes the prophet’s complex position not merely
in terms of his ostensible anteriority respecting historical events.

1 1o

The analogy between

preface and prophet, in addition, discloses a common traumatic economy: just as the
prophet is traumatized not so much by simply missing an experience but by the attempt to
encounter, by narrating, the missed experience with the unconditional, so too do Blake’s
prefaces writhe under the impossible demand to reconcile eternal beginning with
chronological starts—a problem Foucault will see, more broadly, as “the foundation for
116 For Foucault, “what is conveyed in the immediacy o f the original is [...] that man is cut o ff from the
origin that would make him contemporaneous with his own existence; amid all the things that are bom in
time and no doubt die in time, he, cut o ff from all origin, is already there” (332). To say, then, that the
beginning never (properly) begins means to register a shift in the very concept o f origin such that modem
consciousness, “as opposed to the things to whose glittering birth time allows to show in all its density, is
the being without origin, who has ‘neither country nor date,’ whose birth is never accessible because it
never took ‘place’” (331-332). The origin’s return, for Foucault, becomes its palpable retreat in precisely
the way the beginning insists within the start or in the way Urizen’s genesis is also his dismemberment.
Indeed, if Foucault’s aim is “to make visible that rent, devoid o f chronology and history, from which time
issued” (332), his goal parallels Blanchot’s and repeats the delicacy o f the latter’s phenomenology o f
literature. For Blanchot’s “literature” is a form o f writing that has, in Heidegger’s sense, become concerned
about its own being and has asked the question o f being which is inseparable from the question o f time.
117 In fact, this intersection reflects Schelling’s sense o f eternity as a concept that includes rather than
excludes time. Traditionally, eternity is thought o f as outside o f time, as beyond the effects o f temporal
determinations. Schelling, however, imagines eternity distributed in terms o f temporal categories— there is
an eternal past, eternal present, and eternal future— because “the true eternity does not exclude all time but
rather contains time (eternal time) subjugated within itself. Actual eternity is the overcoming o f time” (43).
This will prove important later on in Section IV when considering how Blake sees the eternal within the
temporal as the eternal capacity for temporal re-determination.
118 As noted in the Introduction, the etymology o f the word “inaugurate”— “To make auspicious or o f good
augury” (OED 3)— suggests that the notion o f starting is subtly related to the notion o f prophecy.
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our experience of time, and, since the nineteenth century, as the starting-point of all our
attempts to re-apprehend what beginning and re-beginning, the recession and the
presence of the beginning, the return and the end, could be in the human sphere” (333).
When this aporia reaches its most reflexive, anxious peak in the abyssal regression of
prefaces to prefaces, Blake’s prophetic time overlaps with Kierkegaardian irony as
perpetual inauguration, revealing itself as neither predictive nor apocalyptic, but as an
elusive, detotalizing itinerary.
In other words, Blake is full of false starts because he cannot properly start. But
what would it mean to start properly? In a sense, Blake’s relentless rewriting, character
recycling, and internal citation witnessed, as discussed above, especially in Milton leads
one to ask: what if there is no such thing as a proper start? Can there really be a start that
is perfectly self-appropriating or self-contained? Would this containment not preclude the
action of self-transgression or self-transcendence that would seem to define a start? The
fact is, there are only ever ‘false starts.’ One cannot start except ‘falsely,’ or through a
loss of total coherence and the distribution of ‘property’ because a start places the very
notions of the “total” and “coherent” into crisis: the start would suspend the totality as
such and demand coherence to reconsider its systematization in light of the new.
Moreover, since starts do not emerge out of nothing, every start is also an end to
whatever it breaks from. Hence, Ian Balfour, following Blanchot, will make much of the
sense that prophecy is, in the first instance, already “pervasively citational” (“Future,”
117): the prophet repeats, or cites, the words of the God in his or her ‘original,’ inspired,
and ostensibly immediate utterance. The presence—and the present it seems to occupy—
of prophetic speech is fractured by this referentiality (to say nothing of the
aforementioned conflict between prophecy as, simultaneously, promise and threat) that
gestures toward an always anterior power or proper be(ginn)ing. For instance, Blake’s
prefaces in Europe: A Prophecy and America: A Prophecy reflect this fracturing such that
not only do the individual texts struggle with the placement of the preface but the
question of priority also arises between the texts, as they enter into a dizzying series of
reciprocally prefatory relationships. Ultimately, Blake suggests that there are only ever
‘false starts,’ but that, consequently, the sense of error the word false carries has to be
ejected: starting and starting imperfectly, inappropriately, or through temporal
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discontinuity—so, in other words, starting traumatically, split from identity like the
prophet’s ‘original’ citation—are one and the same.119
This sense of inaugural negation is particularly overdetermined in the Preludium
of Europe. The “nameless shadowy female” (1.1) who gives birth to the revolutionary
forces of Ore seems, herself, barely to exist. If she is the figure who would “labour into
life” other figures, it is also clear that this prodigality does not preserve her own life: each
birth will, she laments, “cause [her] name to vanish, that [her] place may not be found”
(1.9, 5). The shadowy female is “consumed” and “devoured” in her productivity, leaving
her only a brief glimpse of her “fruits”: “I see it smile & I roll inward & my voice is past”
(1.10, 2.5, 2.16). In fact, she remarks explicitly on this exploitative economy, where
production or producibility suffers abjection despite its labours:
I bring forth from my teeming bosom myriads of flames.
And thou [Enitharmon] dost stamp them with a signet, then they roam
abroad
And leave me void as death:
Ah! I am drown’d in shady woe, and visionary joy. (2.9-12)
This female becomes the void or the negativity of a preface; she is nothing but a point of
departure. In other words, she is, herself, a prelude—a (dis)embodied figure of Europe's
Preludium, where that introductory text is itself already divided from its beginning by
another preface, its own, literal, ‘fairy-tale’ beginning. Or better, she is like Shelley’s
Ahasuerus, disfigured in her attempt to mediate between eternal beginning and finite
starting.
This passage from Europe is temporally overdetermined, as it were, not only
because the female’s existential evacuation and the Preludium’s fairy-tale preface
displace the text’s ‘proper beginning,’ but also because Europe (1794) is anticipated at
the end of America (1793): “Till Angels & weak men twelve years should govern o’er the
strong,/ And then their end should come, when France receiv’d the Demon’s light”
(America 16.14-15). America is a prophecy of a prophecy. But if such redundancy seems

119 See Stanley Comgold’s “Error in Paul de Man.” 8.3 (Spring, 1982), pp. 489-507. Where a “mistake” is
wrong an “error” is— echoing David Codings’ discussion o f Wordsworth— a kind o f opening or
opportunity. Hence, the falseness o f starting could be understood as something like an error in time— but
only if time itself is recognized as error.
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an attempt at perfect historical synthesis—an attempt to stabilize chronology or to
establish one thing as definitively precedent and another as definitively subsequent—the
effect is, in fact, quite the opposite. For, once the abyss of the origin is discovered,
attempts to close over such negativity look rather like self-delusions. In fact, the
historical, material conditions of production suggest a significant reversal of America's
apparent priority: for it is Blake’s experience of the French Revolution that inspires his
imagery and serves as the affective foundation for America. Hence, if America acts as a
preface for Europe in terms of the order of composition and historical chronology, it is a
preface that is itself the product o f what it ostensibly anticipates, projecting its own
‘beginning’ into the future.120 Rather than smooth temporal progression, Blake’s texts
seem to suspend the creative fiat in what could be described, anticipating the discussion
of Schelling’s historiography below, a vertiginous “rotatory movement” (Ages 20),
leaving us with a series of preludia that do not steadily evolve into an actual system but
rather perpetually displace each other, flickering in and out of existence like his shadowy
female.
Indeed, Blake’s prefaces tend to undermine the kind of “system completed in
Jerusalem,” where the “the apocalyptic (en)closure of history through art” follows from
an “alignment between space and time,” visual images and text, reminiscent of the
economy of the “icon, the Book as Logos” (Rajan “System” 384). In fact, the tension
between beginning and starting, aesthetically presented in Blake’s prefaces, temporalizes
the problem he faces when he tries to write myth as history—or in Tilottama Rajan’s
120 This offers a supporting example for David Carroll’s argument about how self-reflexive representations
often displace rather than complete a discourse. In the context o f Jorge Luis Borges’ “Chinese taxonomy”
and Foucault’s reading o f Diego Velazquez’s Las Meninas, Carroll notes that “if the first step for the
archeologist is to understand the rules o f each epistemological ‘game,’ then the next step, the critical step,
is to approach the point where Order itself—rather than any particular order— is in question, the point
where the various orders break down and open onto alternative possibilities. The paradox o f self
inclusiveness indicates that the order o f all orders is also the point o f disintegration o f order” (56-57). In
Blake’s case, this insight could be carried forward from America and Europe— where the prophecy o f
prophecy displaces rather than consolidates narrative and historical coherence— to Milton, in that Blake’s
inclusion o f him self as a character in his later text does not so much absorb alterity into a single biography
or work. Rather, Blake’s self-representation has both an orienting and disorienting effect. On one hand,
Blake’s appearance locates the text in determinate material, geographic, historical, and even physical
circumstances, for Milton’s star descended, as ‘Blake’ says, “on my left foot falling on the tarsus, [and]
enterd there” (Milton 17.50). On the other hand, the inclusion o f ‘Blake’ displaces the name, and the
poem’s title, “Milton” by introducing another author. Indeed, this redundancy even undermines ‘Blake’s’
firm footing, as it were, insofar as Miltonic inspiration— represented in the star falling on his left foot and
Los’ incandescent arrival— is indistinguishable from self-annihilation.
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analysis, to ‘embody’ the Kristevian abject and ‘organize’ Deleuzian intensities. Rajan
describes this difficulty as ontological and rhetorical catachresis, a kind of disfigured
allegory, in her reading of The [First] Book ofUrizen as illustrative of “a nomadic
textuality, which survives by assuming the form of the history that disfigures it”
(“System” 395).121123That is, in contrast to the totalized, apocalyptic vision associated with
the “Sublime Allegory”

of the illuminated book—one that neatly quarantines

differences according to different ‘levels’ —the “dominant figure of the Lambeth books
is [...] catachresis, a figure in which tenor and vehicle cannot be separated, the vehicle
seeming at times to be its tenor” (Rajan “System” 387, 388). As Rajan explains,
[sjuffice it to say here that allegory is the figure of separation as well as of
the exegetical translation of matter into spirit; catachresis, by contrast, is
the figure of unreadability: it is the form taken by what Julia Kristeva calls
the abject, as the state in which spirit remains glued to matter, like Los to
Urizen. In abjection, which is a pre-thetic rather than synthetic identity,
things cannot be separated and predication cannot occur because subject
and object are confused, as are inside and outside, spirit and body.
Catachresis is the rhetorical form of abjection, because it jams together
phenomena that cannot be seen in the same space and confuses the figural
and literal aspects of metaphor. In a text such as Urizen, catachresis blocks
vision (as a form of imaginative predication), because the figural is stuck
to the literal, thus figuring the way that vision itself is stuck to the
materiality of history. To put it differently, catachresis is the site at which
these texts confront something radically inhuman, a materiality that Blake
grasps as “history.” Whereas Hegel anthropomorphizes history by figuring
it as a phenomenology of mind, Blake disfigures this organicism by

121 “These texts [i.e., the Lambeth books] are caught in the impossibility o f their own writing, as a process
in which Blake articulates, cancels, and (dis)figures the system that he can produce only in and as its
abjected parts” (Rajan “System” 385). Indeed, while in texts like “ Urizen, Ahania, and The Book o f Los
[...], the scene o f writing extends throughout the entire text,” Rajan notes how “in Europe and America this
disfiguration is thematized and confined within the preludia” (“System” 385).
122 In Rajan, “System,” 387, citing Erdman’s edition, 730.
123 As suggested in the previous section, while there is a totalizing drive in the text it is not clear that Milton
could be identified with “Sublime Allegory” (E 730) since its ordering exigency overlaps with a
disorienting ‘project’ o f self-annihilation.
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grotesquely overlaying Urizen’s body on the map of the world, so that the
body is outside itself—as an inside that is neither inside nor outside.
(“System” 388)
The prefatory fiat that betrays the beginning and inaugurates a prophetic temporality—an
ambivalent trajectory split between progress and regress—constitutes a kind of temporal
catachresis, a collapse of linear narrative in the very instant of time’s inauguration. For
The [First] Book o f Urizen is also a kind of preface to the predicted system of the
illuminated book,124 one that tends however to revoke the very start toward systematicity
and illumination that it seems to make.
What, after all, are the implications of Blake’s decision to inaugurate Milton
through a condensed citation of Urizen? In what sense, that is, is Urizen an ‘inaugural’
text? For Urizen, as a figure of beginning—and in this relation, another figure of
Romantic prophecy—becomes dismembered, distributed, and disfigured in the very
process of creation and literal organ-ization. We see this in the atomized and
compartmentalized stages of his creation and in the discrete features of each moment,
such that putting Urizen together looks very much like taking him apart. For instance, in
an allusion to Eve’s creation from Adam’s rib, “Urizen was rent from his [Los’] side”
(6.4). Urizen emerges through a wound that “heal’d not” (7.4), as if anticipating the
struggle Los will face, subsequently, of organizing Urizen’s body as the substrate or
material of all creation not just in the ‘first book’ of Urizen but in the subsequent books
of Urizen, as it were, represented by Milton. In fact, there is another, formal or structural
division in this act of creation. At the beginning of chapter Two of Urizen, the text
introduces an abstract “solitary one in Immensity,” “Urizen so nam’d” (3.43, 42). When,
near the end of chapter Three, Urizen is tom from Los’ side, this seems to be a second,
conflicting genesis that is more concrete and organic than the preceding version. In this,
124 Rajan makes a distinction between the system as a Kantian integration o f parts and the illuminated book
as a form o f phenomenological “reduction” to essential structures, where the latter frames the former: “as
the containing form o f the system, the illuminated book accomplishes what the system by itself cannot. For
whereas the system as verbal construct can do no more than contain difficulty— in the double sense o f the
word contain— the composite artifact o f the illuminated book ‘reduces’ difficulty within the intricacy o f a
figured surface, allowing us to look rather than read, to assimilate the text as art rather than experience”
(391). Put differently, the illuminated book does not so much “reduce” difficulty in the sense o f diminish
difficulty as reorganize the catachrestic intensities o f the Lambeth books in a manner recalling Caruth’s
description o f how consciousness uses narrative sequencing as a means to negotiate traumatic events
without necessarily deadening their intensity. (See the discussion o f trauma in chapter two.)
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Blake may subtly echo the inconsistency in the Book of Genesis itself, the curious double
beginning presented there: where Genesis, chapter one, describes an abstract God
hovering over the void, part of the way into chapter two a second version of creation,
centered on the creation of humans and the Garden of Eden, takes over the narrative. In
other words, even before looking at how the body is deconstructed in its construction,
Blake separates the abstract from the organic story of genesis—in a possible allusion to
the Hebrew Bible—as if to insist on the negativity implicit in the origanary claims of the
traditional narrative.
Chapters four and five of Urizen detail the slow, almost torturous formation of
Urizen at the hands of Los. In fact, the body is parcelled out even as it is welded
together—
Los beat on his fetters of iron;
And heated his furnaces & pour’d
Iron sodor and sodor of brass (10.28-30)—
and wrapped in root-like sinews of organic tissue: “His nervous brain shot branches/
Round the branches of his heart” (11.11-12). Urizen’s formation—both a hetero- and
auto-production—moves from skeletal to connective and soft tissues, and finally to the
organs of sensation in a cataract of images that are only barely cauterized through the
successive seven “Ages” of “dismal woe” (10.42, 43): a framework that parodies God’s
creation of the cosmos in seven days. Urizen is effectively dissected, then, when the
narrative details his creation with such minute particularity: from his “vast Spine” to his
“Conglobing, Trembling” blood, Urizen is layered over by “ten thousand branches” of
nerve fibre (10.37; 11.5, 6). These fibres are slowly wrought into sense organs: his eyes
form as, plant-like, tissue climbs “on high into two little orbs,” after which forms “two
Ears in close volutions” (11.13, 21). Finally, the rest of the organs—“Two Nostrils,” “his
channeld Throat,” and “Tongue” (13.1, 7, 8)—grow into themselves before the final
corporeal organization, the spatial orientation of the body in the world:
Enraged & stifled with torment
He [i.e., Urizen] threw his right Arm to the north
His left Arm to the south
Shooting out in anguish deep,
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And his Feet stampd the nether Abyss
In trembling & howling & dismay. (13.12-17)
In other words, while the text seems to offer a linear pattern of successive, organic
integration, the violent detail through which this development appears seems almost to
segregate the organs, and the stages in which they emerge, from each other. Rather than a
beautiful totality where the parts disappear seamlessly into the whole, we have here a
more awkward, Frankensteinian image of a body of fragments merely conglomerated
rather than subtly implicated.
Not only does the body of Urizen seem to dissolve in and through its very
condensation but, further, the initial, abstract, pre-incarnation version of genesis insists
on negativity throughout its series of phenomenal appearances. Hence, while traditional
criticism on Urizen insists on establishing a positivity preceding creation (identified with
the Eternals), one may stay closer to Blake’s revolutionary thought in understanding
negation and affirmation, depression and expansion, and even necessity and freedom as
“identical” in Schelling’s specific sense—that is, not as the same things, but as deeply
mutually constitutive yet resistant to sublation. Specifically, the first description of
creation in Urizen is complicated since Urizen’s emergence into actuality follows a
pattern of negations as opposed to affirmative positings. The cosmology of Urizen’s
‘birth’ through the affirmation of absences, in other words, parallels irony’s and the
preface’s negative freedom. Urizen is “unknown, unprolific” (3.2), and yet he is
constituted through this same obscurity and reticence. That is, even in negating
knowledge and production, the scaffold or possibility of knowledge and production is, at
least, introduced—-just as Socrates introduces the way to positive knowledge, though not
that knowledge itself, through infinite absolute negativity.
For instance, the initial description of Urizen—echoing the prelude to Europe—as
“a shadow” (3.1) or something “unseen” (3.10) marks a negation of sight that,
nevertheless, introduces the possibility of vision.125 Indeed, if vision is one of the first

125 It is tempting to compare this problem with forming the image o f Urizen and o f the Shadowy Female to
one o f Kierkegaard’s first ‘images’ o f Socrates as a figure o f disappearance: “if we now say that irony
constituted the substance o f his [Socrates’] existence (this is, to be sure, a contradiction, but it is supposed
to be that), and if we further postulate that irony is a negative concept, it is easy to see how difficult it
becomes to fix a picture o f him— indeed, it seems impossible or at least as difficult as to picture a nisse [or
elf] with the cap that makes him invisible” (Irony 12).
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categories to emerge-—negatively—as a form or structure for finite perception, then it
makes sense that the poem should, itself, fall into this structure when it comes, finally, to
its first positive declaration: “changes appeared" (3.9; my emphasis). It is telling, in other
words, that changes are here reflected in terms not of being so much as of vision; the
poem seems to use only the language made available to it by the order of creation
described within the poem itself. The parallel emphasis on an absence of space (“void”
[2.4], “vacuum” [3.5]) along with sight also makes possible this first “appearing,” as in
addition to vision “appearance” implies a topology. The specific repudiation of vision
and space in the opening lines of Urizen, then, forms a metaphysical skeleton (paralleling
Urizen’s physical skeleton) onto which thought’s categories, and the phenomena they
make possible, can cling.
This is very little, almost nothing. Hence, it is quite appropriate that appearing
should be limited to the most basic possible form: the universe is here a two-dimensional
place where not things but merely “shapes” (3.14) form Urizen’s first opponents,
inaugurating “conflictions” (3.14) that, if we recall The Marriage o f Heaven and Hell,
imply a growing—although perhaps not yet forceful—momentum.

The pattern

continues with sound. Urizen’s “silent activity” (3.18) introduces the possibility of sound.
Until this point in the text there is no auditory horizon whatever. This specific, acoustical
way of organizing the universe—indeed, organizing the universe through human
organs—is not broached until silence is mentioned. To be sure, silence is not ‘heard’ as
silent until the introduction of the auditory sense itself. The appearance of silence, in
other words, opens the sphere of discourse even if silence would seem to be the least
obvious emissary of language. Finally, death, the decisive image of finitude, emerges in
much the same way as vision, space, and sound: “Death was not, but eternal life sprung”
(3.39). In this assertion of death’s absence, life and death as oppositions emerge for the
first time. Perhaps we could even say, then, that death is the “springing” of eternal life,
that it is the localization of eternity that makes possible in turn a beginning, a springing
point, or an ursprung.
This is to suggest that the poem performatively parallels the process of the
creation it describes, building itself lexically and formally in tandem with the universe126
126 “Without Contraries no progression” (3)
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depicted in its content. One problem with this, however, is that—as Paul Mann points
out—“by (re)writing Urizen, in effect by taking Urizenic dictation, Los ob-literates and
los-es himself. By binding Urizen he binds himself’ (55). If language helps to generate
the universe, its dialogic nature also works against any stable, simple economy of
producer and product. This is most apparent in The Book o f Los, where “Still he [Los] fell
thro’ the void, still a void/ Found for falling day & night without end” (4.32 -33). This
passage is particularly arresting since the syntax places “still” within a gap between
“void” and “void,” as if within a kind of void between voids. Hence, we might read “still
he fell” as either a continuing, eternal falling or a motionless, frozen falling—as either
“he continued to fall” or “he became still.” These paradoxes culminate in what sounds
like a void founded or established for the sake of falling, anticipating the ambivalent
treatment of Jerusalem’s foundations—as city, spirit, and Blake’s illuminated book—
discussed above in Milton, there described as “laid in ruins” (6.15). The text at this point,
in fact, raises an interesting, larger question about how any kind of grounding works:
something important to consider in preparation for the discussion, below, of Schelling’s
history. For in a sense, an act of grounding requires groundlessness, or an abyss.
Grounding is only really possible or necessary if there is no ground in the first place. As
Leslie Hill, commenting on Blanchot’s abyssal thinking, puts it,
[f]or any act of foundation to be possible at all, it must first be preceded by
an absence of foundation. Such prior absence is thereby a necessary
condition of any possibility of foundation; however, to the extent that it
insists, as it necessarily must, on the belatedness and fragility of any such
moment of foundation, any such condition of possibility is also a condition
of impossibility. The laying of foundations, as it were, is an activity that
may take place only within a bottomless abyss; and it is the bottomless
abyss that constitutes the only reliable foundation, albeit a foundation that
is always already an absence of foundation. (55-56)
This Blanchotian, Blakean, and ruinous foundation mirrors the working and unworking
of Schelling’s “rotary wholes” (92): points of circulation and condensation that, as Rajan
notes, represent “both the production of new forms in ‘discontent,’ and the rotation
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around their own foundations that perpetually unworks these wholes by returning them to
the annular drive in which they have their origin” (“Psychoanalysis” §29).
In fact, this groundlessness or abgrund transects every actual instance of
grounding, as any consideration of the initial act—the start’s reference to the beginning—
recalls that the condition for the possibility of that grounding is the impossibility of
grounding, or the abyss. Or, just as the abyss makes (a provisional kind of) grounding
possible, it also makes perfect, total, or complete grounding impossible. This parallels the
logic of beginning discussed above, in that beginning is something like the temporal
abyss of such (im)possibility. Hence, in Urizen, as a book detailing the beginning of all
things, including knowledge and the knowable, the incomprehensibility that is the
condition of possibility for interpretation perpetually returns like the repressed or insists
across the entire surface of the work, like Ahasuerus’ scar. We see here in fact a concept
of origin akin to Schelling’s contradiction-as-origin, as well as a refusal to ignore the
abgrund no matter how disconcerting it might be. So, whereas, in Geoffrey Hartman’s
words, “the Bible’s ‘in the beginning’ [is] a limiting concept, which tells us not to think
about what went before” (Criticism 119), Blake’s Book of Genesis, in contrast,
relentlessly calls attention to its ‘founding’ contradiction. In its role as an inaugurating
book, Urizen thus seems to complicate the division of labour between preface and work.
That is, the preface seems in some sense to un-work the work or to represent what
Blanchot calls the work of the absence of (the) work: not merely non-work, but the work
o f non-work. Indeed, Blanchot goes so far as to see the workless preface as something
like the exemplary ‘work’ of Romanticism:
Romanticism, it is true, ends badly, but this is because it is essentially
what begins and what cannot but finish badly: an end that is called suicide,
madness, loss, forgetting. And certainly it is often without works, but this
is because it is the work o f the absence o f (the) work, a poetry affirmed in
the purity of the poetic act, an affirmation without duration, a freedom
without realization, a force that exalts in disappearing and that is in no
way discredited if it leaves no trace, for this was its goal: to make poetry
shine, neither as nature nor even as work, but as pure consciousness of the
moment. (Infinite 352-353, my emphasis)
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For worklessness is neither work nor non-work, but rather the work of idleness, a
‘project’ that works at its very deconstitution as a project, just as Bataille says of his
Inner Experience: “the opposition to the idea of project—which takes up an essential part
of this book—is so necessary within me that having written the detailed plan for this
introduction, I can no longer hold myself to it” (6). Hence, the negativity of self
annihilation formalized as the absolute preface in Blake’s Milton begins to look like
Bataille’s Inner Experience—an abject project—and Schelling’s strange picture of
history in Ages o f the World, a history trapped in the preface to history. That is, if Los is
Blake’s “Eternal Prophet” (Urizen 10.17; Jerusalem 75.7),127 Milton remains divided
between his organizing work and Urizen’s disorganizing pre-face, the project of
prophetic apocalypse suspended by Urizen’s ambivalent dialectic of self-generation and
self-destruction. A closer look at Blake’s treatment of time as both an organizing and
disorganizing apparatus helps to justify this philosophical company. For, just as Blake’s
appeal to temporal simultaneity seems also to reveal time’s immanent self-difference, so
does Schelling’s appeal to temporal simultaneity in an effort to ameliorate the ontological
and epistemological contradictions that attend the Godhead’s revelation in actual history
prove more problematic than he might have anticipated.

III. “Till hoary, and age-broke, and aged”: Schelling’s Past

The division between the preface and the work proper, like that between the
beginning and the start, represents an effort at dividing labour. What Blake’s Milton
suggests is that while such division is ideal—this seems to be the gist of the Bard’s
cautionary parable—nevertheless the lines of demarcation prove unstable and perhaps
positively disorienting. For if the preface and prefatory materials are supposed to form
the foundation for the start of the work, these same materials actually dissolve and
suspend linear development at the same time. Like the irreducible ambivalence of
Romantic prophecy, where prediction is coextensive with the unpredictability to which it
responds, the preface both invokes and revokes the work to come. That is, the preface in
Blake, as Kierkegaard says in his little-studied Prefaces, “does not run errands on behalf127
127 In Milton Los is called “the Prophet o f Eternity” (7.38).
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of the system” (6): the preface becomes absolute.128 Rather than simply introducing the
work, the preface under this aspect enters onto a regressive course, such that prefaces
preface only other prefaces, the work’s foundations repeatedly “laid in ruins.”129 In an
effort to combine Blake’s treatment of labour and Bataille’s distinction between restricted
and general economy, this absolute preface could be read as an example of what
Blanchot, noted above, calls the work of the absence of (the) work.130 That is, a closer
look at how the preface invites abyssal regression reveals that it exacerbates rather than
ameliorates the gap between the preface and the work proper. If the division of labour
according to a preface/work opposition is supposed to enhance productivity and
128 As Todd Nichol suggest, Kierkeggard’s short text, Prefaces (1844), “continues in comic mode the attack
on Danish Hegelianism initiated in earlier works and soon to be more fully developed in Stages and
Postscript” (xi). That is, in Neils Thulstrup’s words, Prefaces “showed the comical aspect o f [Hegel’s]
energetic system building” (366) since these prefaces, authored by Kierkegaard’s “Nicolas Notabene,”
stand alone, as if dwelling on the very inessentiality Hegel ascribed to the preface in his own “Preface” to
the Phenomenology. For as Notabene notes well in the preface to Prefaces, “the preface as such, the
liberated preface” is his chosen genre. This is a type o f writing that “must then have no subject to treat but
must deal with nothing, and insofar as it seems to discuss something and deal with something, this must
nevertheless be an illusion and fictitious motion” (5). In other words, Notabene’s book o f liberated
prefaces, a collection o f prefaces to books that do not exist, is not put to work but, rather, foregrounds the
recalcitrant worklessness o f the preface in order subtly to undermine Hegel’s confidence in rational
systematicity: for Hegel’s conversion or sublimation o f Kantian, static antinomy into dialectical Bildung
merely reorganizes what remains a deep belief in reality’s ultimate rationality and cognizibility.
Kierkegaard performs his critique, in other words, simply by insisting on and agreeing with Hegel’s own
insight.
129 It is easy to overlook that this phrase must be taken in a truly ambivalent sense— that is, not merely as
the rejection o f foundation but as the exposure o f the foundational exigency. The attempt to establish
foundations remains insistent even if an abyss perpetually displaces actual foundation.
130 In “Literature and the Original Experience,” a long essay in the middle o f The Space o f Literature,
Blanchot describes literature’s beginning as just this kind o f absolute preface, one that suspends the work to
come in perpetual anticipation: “the work says this word, beginning, and what it claims to give to history is
initiative, the possibility o f a point o f departure. But for its own part it does not begin. It is always anterior
to any beginning, it is always already finished. As soon as the truth one thinks one draws from it comes to
light, becomes the life and the action o f daytime’s clarity, the work closes o ff on itself as if it were a
foreigner to this truth and without significance” (228-229, my emphasis). In other words, Blanchot sees an
insuperable gap between the work’s infinite power to initiate and its limited incarnation in a particular
work— a dualism that repeats Kierkegaard’s description o f Socrates as pure initiation without positive
content, a beginning that does not itself become absorbed by the start o f any project. The reticence o f the
beginning resists the work’s reduction o f negation to “determinate negation,” a form o f finitude that
facilitates “the transition [...] by which the progress through the complete succession o f forms comes about
o f itself’ (Phenomenology 48). Blanchot reformulates the work’s negativity not by denying the dialectical
unfolding o f spirit or the existence o f particular works or projects, but by turning the work into the very
absence o f the work, by putting the work to work at worklessness. This is something we have already seen
performed in Blake and Kierkegaard as each dwells on a mode o f inauguration that is not simply the start o f
a project but rather precisely the suspension o f anything like a complete work. The preface in Blake and
Kierkegarrd is the work o f the absence o f (the) work that Blanchot describes. For, as Blanchot insist, the
work’s becoming absent relies on a return to its own origin not as what is most proper to it but as a radical
exclusion: “the work says the wor[d] beginning," and yet “in itself it remains mysterious, excluded from
the initiation and exiled from the clear truth” (229).
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efficiency, what happens, in fact, is that prefatory negativity infects labour itself with a
form of negativity resistant to dialectical Bildung. The preface, ironically, prevents the
work from getting to work. The absolute preface—or the preface under its abyssal
aspect—performs the work of work’s absence, where this means neither work nor non
work, but the work o/idleness, putting work to work in worklessness.131
Milton's fraught relationship to its own originating materials displaces the work
of mourning, redemption, and illumination. That is, on one hand, the text actively and
explicitly pursues apocalyptic vision through a restricted economy of expenditure. On the
other hand, the text blurs the division of labour it thematizes. Blake’s treatment of time,
specifically, offers a way to read this self-conflicting gesture as a case study in Romantic
prophecy. As with the other modes of textual and conceptual ordering—mapping,
biography, autobiography, prefacing, et cetera—Blake’s prophetic mode reformulates not
merely the subject’s experience of or relation to time: additionally, Blake reimagines and
reconceptualizes time itself. For if time, taken as narrative regularity, can in some cases
be understood as a way to mitigate traumatic negativity by putting it to work in
mourning, Blake does not in fact allow time to become completely identical to narrative.
That is, if Blake will call time “the mercy of Eternity” (24.72), this form of comfort is
also a delusion of Beulah. In fact, Schelling’s treatment of time as an organizing schema
in Ages o f the World supplements Blake’s discussion, in Milton. For like Blake’s Major
Prophecies, Ages aspires to a total picture of history and is structured according to a
predictive model of past, present, and future. Moreover, it seems to elaborate, in its
content, a concept of time amenable to the restricted economy of prediction that is
supposed to lead to God’s historical revelation. However, Schelling’s text reveals a
persistent counterplot where time’s ability to ameliorate onto-theological contradictions
proves, in fact, to intensify those contradictions.
131 This is something Rajan gestures toward in her discussion o f Blake as a labourer, noting that “the
extraordinary coherence o f the early texts at the level o f the issues they address allows us to speak o f
Blake’s ‘work’ in the sense o f labour. But their stylistic diversity complicates any attempt to naturalize
perspective by abstracting what is said from how it is said, and thus to make labour yield a ‘work’ in the
classic sense o f a finished product” (214). Further, she argues, “labour suggests an attempt to produce
something, a belief, in the value o f what one is doing as an activity if not as something that continuously
corresponds to truth. But labour does not necessarily result in progress, except in very local ways: hence the
early Blake’s arrangement o f his text in a nonlinear array that prevents the reading process from becoming
complacently teleological” (214-215). One could compare the notion o f the work o f the absence o f (the)
work to this sense o f labour.
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The three ages of Schelling’s Ages o f the World never resolve themselves into an
unproblematic narrative of progression despite the implicit promise of coherence and
totality contained in the past, present, future structure into which his project, in the
Introduction, is broken. Specifically, Schelling parallels forms of knowing and means of
expression with these ages: “the past is known, the present is discerned, the future is
intimated. The known is narrated, the discerned is presented, the intimated is prophesied”
(xxxv). This tidy logic that, again, treats prophecy as a form of prediction and reinforces
a broader sense of coherence amongst temporalities, seems, however, to become very
complicated—perhaps totally undermined—as Schelling explores the past and questions
of first principles, beings’ origins, and God’s ground. Ultimately, to what extent can “the
known” or “narration” apply to the past when the beginning is a form of intense
negativity? For “the beginning,” says Schelling, “really only lies in the negation. [...]. It
is a negation of the starting point and the actually emerging moment is an overcoming of
this negation [...]. Negation is [...] the necessary precedent iprius) of every movement.
[...]. What wants to grow must foreshorten itself and hence, negation is the first transition
whatsoever from nothing to something” (16). In fact, later in the text this past is
characterized not as the “known” but, rather, as precisely what is ««known: “there is no
dawning of consciousness (and precisely for this reason no consciousness) without
positing something past. There is no consciousness without something that is at the same
time excluded and contracted” (44). Indeed, “left to itself, nature would still lead
everything back into that state of utter negation” (31). Hence, the past, as the ground of
consciousness—as something that is absolutely past in the sense that it was never once
present, ever—is unconscious, even as it enables knowledge and, in fact, forestalls God’s
psychosis by sublimating the ground that He contains but is non-identical with. In other
words, in the preface to Schelling’s Ages the text projects a linear historical and narrative
ordering in terms that imply a regular progression from past to present to future;
however, when it comes to unfolding the text proper, consciousness seems unable to
move forward, as it does so confidently in Hegel, or elude entirely the possibility of
regression.
Yet, early on, Schelling cleaves to the promise of total vision, imagining a future
when something like Blake’s illuminated book will successfully marry the subjective and
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objective worlds in a positive philosophy of revelation. In his own preface to the First
Book, “The Past,” Schelling speaks quite confidently that his text “contains some
preparation for that future objective presentation of science” (xl). At the same time, with
a curious sort of hesitation, Schelling describes the unification as something
messianically to-come when he muses, “perhaps the one is still coming who will sing the
greatest heroic poem, grasping in spirit something for which the seers of old were
famous: what was, what is, what will be. But this time has not yet come” (xl). Like the
conventional reading of Milton's timeframe, Schelling places his own work in the instant
immediately preceding apocalypse. Yet, upon closer inspection this instant, as in Blake’s
text, seems not to be as pregnant as initially supposed. Just as Milton’s additive and
organizing exigency displaces total vision or perfect redemption—for if Milton redeems
himself it is not by achieving a unified or greater selfhood but precisely by entering into
the state of radical re-stating—so too does Schelling’s effort to unify “the world of
thought and the world of actuality” (xl) suggest that that unification is always only a
‘provisional’ arrangement, in the double sense of prophetically “intimated” rather than
knowingly “narrated” but also temporary rather than permanent. That is, Schelling finds
it impossible to follow his initial plan, becoming, rather, trapped in the beginning. Failing
to ‘work out’ (from) its own age, the book of “The Past”—or what could be called
Schelling’s absolute preface to absolute history—infects with worklessness the prospect
of the “recollection of the primordial beginning of things” through a reading of “history
according to its external forms” (xxxix), the philosophy of revelation.
For instance, Jason Wirth points out that “Schelling composed multitudinous
versions of Die Weltalter, including numerous versions of the first book (The Past)”—
there were, in fact, “more than twelve quite different handwritten versions of the first
book” (vii). At the level of textual production, this difficulty with beginning the system
recalls Blake’s Lambeth period. But it also, and more importantly, performs materially
the kind of “rotatory movement” (20) Schelling describes as the (an)archaic ‘foundation’
of all existence. For Schelling, “the first nature is, with regard to itself, in contradiction”
(12). This is because there are three, mutually excluding original forces or “potencies”
(11)—recalling Rajan’s description of Blake’s characters as Deleuzian intensities—that
constitute the primordial scene, as it were, of metaphysics. For there to be any kind of
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development—indeed, for there to be something rather than nothing—Schelling supposes
that there must be an original opposition, an originary difference that would create the
conditions for differentiation and therefore knowledge.132 Based on the three-fold nature
of God as [l]“the outpouring, outstretching, self-giving being, [...] [2] an equivalently
eternal force of selfhood, of retreat into itself, of Being in itself’ (6), and [3] the unity of
these two principles, Schelling offers a triadic model of “the eternal Yes,” the “eternal
No,” and a “third term or the unity of the Yes and the No” (11).
While each of these potencies “has the same claim to be that which has being”
(10)—a claim that would necessarily be made against the claim of the other two—this
does not preclude establishing a necessary pattern or order of displacement. While the
potencies are “equipotent,” nevertheless “a Before and an After,” a “prior and posterior
[...] between the forces” (33) must emerge, otherwise there would be nothing but eternal,
homogenised stasis—something denied by human experience. Like the strangely
“unprolific” (Urizen 3.2) offering that inaugurates Urizen—a negativity that spreads, in
fact, throughout Blake’s corpus via various prefaces—Schelling argues that “the
beginning only really lies in the negation,” where negativity is understood as “not a mere
feebleness or lack in the being, but active negation” (16, 32): “that God negates itself,
restricts its being, and withdraws into itself, is the eternal force and might of God”
(15).133 Yet, if negation is in this primordial ‘position,’ it seems that this ensures that all

132 Knowledge, somewhat counterintuitively, relies on a radical contradiction between subject and object—
a contradiction that knowledge’s mediation does not eliminate but rather ameliorates through “a closer
determination” (75) o f that contradiction. For if knowledge collapses into the object it seeks to know, “if
the visionary [individual] lacks this [mediating, dialectical] organ or intentionally pushes it away from
themselves in order to speak immediately from vision, then they lose their necessary standard and are one
with the object and, for any third person, they are like the object itself’ (xxxviii). Whatever the visionary
comes to ‘know’ in this way he or she knows “without, however, being certain o f it” since the visionary is
unable “to hold it steadily in front o f ’ him or herself (xxxviii-xxxix).
133 Harold Bloom’s description o f God according to Jewish mystical traditions suggests something o f the
deep affinity in Schelling’s work with certain Kabbalistic doctrines:
In a perfectly, I think, Kabbalistic way [...] Yahweh may have come into existence by this act o f
Zimzum, this act o f contraction or withdrawal, which means that he diminished himself in order to
get started. Which I find fascinatingly parallel to Walt Whitman, in which I again follow Scholem:
who used to say in conversations with me, that in a secular world somehow Whitman by some
miracle without knowing anything about Kabbalah had in effect reinvented his own Kabbalah, and
I think that is true. Whitman throughout Song o f Myself and elsewhere is always saying that he is
expanding, that he is getting to contain more and more multitudes, that his sense o f self is steadily
increasing. But in fact he too is always contracting and withdrawing. He is endlessly elusive and
evasive, and the worlds that he creates and ruins also seem to come from some process o f self
withdrawal.
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evolution or development will progress only insofar as it remains susceptible to
regression, that Schelling"s foundations are, like Jerusalem’s, “laid in ruins.” So, if the
order of the potencies can be established as the No, the Yes, and the unity of No and Yes,
Schelling bends this line of progressive amelioration into a circle: “that originary,
necessary, and abiding life hence ascends from the lowest to the highest. Yet when it has
arrived at the highest, it retreats immediately back to the beginning in order again to
ascend from it” (19). What follows is a picture of chaos. For the “unremitting movement
that goes back into itself and recommences” (21) constitutes an “annular drive,” an
ongoing contest between each potency’s mere being and each potency’s desire to have
being,134 wherein
[tjhere is only an unremitting wheel, a rotatory movement that never
comes to a standstill and in which there is no differentiation. Even the
concept of the beginning, as well as the concept of the end, again
sublimates itself in this circulation. There is certainly a beginning of the
potency in accordance with its inherent possibility, but this is not an actual
beginning. An actual beginning is only one that posits itself as not having
being in relationship to that which should actually be. But that which
could be the beginning in this movement does not discern itself as the
beginning and makes an equal claim with the other principles to be that
which has being. (20)
Recalling the tidal rhythms of Shelley’s Hellas and Triumph o f Life as well as Blake’s
serial prefacing (where earlier works become prefaces retroactively), nature for Schelling
acts as “an allegory of this perpetually advancing and retreating movement” (21): “one
generation comes, the other goes. Nature goes through the trouble to develop qualities,
aspects, works, and talents to their pinnacle, only again to bury them for centuries in
oblivion, and then start anew” (21).
Nevertheless, as the progressivism of his Introduction suggests, Schelling
attempts to illustrate how historical, actual progression finally breaks from the orbit of
this annular drive. In this, he develops a concept of existential temporalities that emerge
134 Schelling frequently distinguishes between “mere Being,” or being in itself, and “having being” in the
sense o f an existent being (22-23). Mere being, or pure being, is an “intermediate” (64) concept, in that it
generates a third option between the extremes o f having being and nothingness.
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through the agency of the eternal Godhead—temporalities that, as in Koselleck’s
analysis, will fracture the purely cyclical concept of revolution. That is, “the blind
obsession and craving of the first [nature] only grows silent before something higher”
(22). This “Other that is outside” the “insensate movement” (23) of rotation is able to
convince the potencies to abate since it offers a state of being that is more attractive. The
Godhead’s strange ontological status as “that which in itself neither has being nor does
not have being” offers, specifically, an image of blissful “pure equivalence
(indifference)”—that is, not passivity or ignorance but a kind of distilled calmness, a
“will that wills nothing” and therefore does not suffer (24). Indeed, the Godhead acts as a
salve: “that which is higher, magically, so to speak, rouses in that life [i.e., the “eternally
commencing” life of the potencies] the yearning for freedom. The obsession [Sucht]
abates into yearning [Sehnsucht], wild desire turns into a yearning to ally itself, as if it
were its own true or highest self, with the will that wills nothing, with eternal freedom”
(28). Put differently, the Godhead performs a cut and projects—or perhaps abjects—the
potencies, creating in this instant the distinction between God’s ground as nature and
God’s freedom as spirit. This distinction is also essentially temporal. The Godhead puts
the cyclical itinerary of the annular drive into the past, into the unconscious, absolute
prehistory of history: a past that was never present even once, since it remains anterior to
any kind of narrative or historical development of consciousness. At the same time this
scission opens up an absolute future. Like Ahasuerus’ ‘figure’ of the future in Hellas, this
is a future always to-come. In contrast to the compulsive existence of the annular drive,
“yearning nature has in itself the possibility to come to Being, to subject [...], to the stuff
of actualization” (28); and yet the future in which this possibility glimpses its own
actuality remains, at this point, purely formal.
“How the pure Godhead, in itself neither having being nor not having being, can
have being is the question of all the ages” (40). That is, the question of how the Godhead
can be both indifferent and actual at the same time is a question that the temporal division
into eternal and yet differentiated ages helps to explain. Schelling argues that it is not at
all paradoxical to suggest that different times exist, in their difference from one another,
at the same time. That is, time for Schelling is problematically related to representation,
as he hints at in his turn, near the ‘conclusion’ of Ages, toward the positive philosophy.

193

For instance, time is understood to contain eternity rather than to be time’s outside or
other: “the true eternity does not exclude all time but rather contains time (eternal time)
subjugated within itself. Actual eternity is the overcoming of time” (43); “it is not empty
(abstract) eternity, but that which contains time subjugated within itself’ (44). Eternity is
not merely separated from time here but includes and exceeds time. Hence, it is not
absurd to refer to the negating potency as “eternal beginning” (17) for Schelling, as the
eternal is now a modification of what is an essentially temporal predicament. The
eternal—God Himself—can have a beginning in the sense of a qualitative distinction
from its present or future. And yet that beginning is never or was never completely within
time. That is, there is a beginning that is eternal in the sense that it would, from time’s
point of view, span and include all punctual instants—just as the beginning opposed,
above, to particular starts spans, includes, but is not reducible to such starts since it is
their condition of possibility. This is close to how Blake imagines the infinite in the
finite, the eternal in the temporal. For, as Isaiah says in The Marriage o f Heaven and
Hell, from the right perspective he “discover’d the infinite in every thing” (12.9).
Time is especially important in Schelling for how it helps to navigate the
ontological conflicts in God’s historical revelation. That is, we reach “the highest
conceivable contradiction” (75), says Schelling, as God, if He is to reveal Himself, must
accord being both to the Yes and the No—God’s power of positive revelation and His
power to abstain from the limitations that attend any determination—at the same time: a
blatant contradiction that can be ameliorated “only though a closer determination of it”
(75). In other words, the Absolute can have being simultaneously as “the No and the
Yes” if “one of them is prior, as ground, and the other is posterior, as grounded” (76).
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In this reasoning, the No is the ground of the Yes or is the abyssal (un)grounding that is
the condition for any grounding whatever. Hence, if “God as the Yes and God as the No
cannot have being at the same time” (76, Schelling’s emphasis), God can have His being
as both at different times—and these different times can exist simultaneously, “if A is
posited, then B must simply still persist as the prior, and hence, in such a way, that they135

135 This ability to have being in these two different modes is something denied earlier in Ages. This denial
is responsible for the torturous rotatory motion o f the potencies, as each struggles, in the primordial
beginning, against the others to secure its own exclusive being— until, as noted, the pain is converted into a
more diffuse “yearning” in the voluntary renunciation o f desire in the face o f the Godhead.
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are nonetheless at the same time, in different times” (76, Schelling’s emphasis). Hence, in
the words of Milton, for Schelling “Time is the mercy of Eternity; without Times
swiftness/ Which is the swiftness of all things: all were eternal torment” (24.72-73).
Treating time this way means that the Yes gains a degree of consistency or
stability, although it is never completely free from the dissolving ground of the No.
Indeed, Schelling refers to the same physiological process as Blake in order to describe
this organ-ization of the negative and positive into past and future: namely, pulsation.
That is, both Schelling and Blake seem to rewrite God’s ontology as human physiology,
in effect incarnating eternity. Yet, Schelling’s use of the analogy differs from Blake’s and
helps to expose the emptiness of what might seem to be an apocalyptic a-temporality.
Blake, for instance, condenses all history into a single spasm:
For in this Period the Poet’s Work is Done: and all the Great
Events of Time start forth & are conceived in such a Period
Within a Moment: a Pulsation of the Artery. (29.1-3)
However, as Schelling’s closer consideration of pulsation illustrates, it is impossible to
invoke such a process as an image of perfect totality since the heart’s rhythm involves
two equipotent, opposed, though sequentially ordered forces. Hence, for Schelling the
temporal organization of the potencies into a prior and a posterior
can be represented as a systole and a diastole. This is a completely
involuntary movement that, once begun, makes itself from itself. The
recommencing, the re-ascending is systole, tension that reaches its acme in
the third potency. The retreat to the first potency is diastole, slackening,
upon which a new contraction immediately follows. Hence, this is the first
pulse, the beginning of that alternating movement that goes through the
entirety of visible nature, of the eternal contraction and the eternal re
expansion, of the universal ebb and flow. (21)
In other words, Blake’s appeal to a pulmonary temporality to ‘organize’ the history of his
artistic work, similar to his effort in Urizen, cannot be successfully totalizing, at least not
in the mode of apocalypse. Like other attempts in Milton to order its prefatory
materials—“for each matter only flourishes when it is in its place” (Ages 29)—it seems
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that the image of pulsation, while suggesting a literally vital historical synthesis, works
actively against apocalyptic arrest.
But does this mean that Schelling’s organization of time manages to determine
more closely the kinds of contradictions he and Blake identify, respectively, between
nature and spirit or finite sense and infinite perception? The fact is that Schelling’s
description of different times remains problematic. For in what sense can something be
said to have being when the condition in which it can have that being is, say, the past or
the future—that is, a condition that itself does not have beingl

In fact, the having-being

of the No is being’s negation: the No has its being as that which dissolves being. So, if
time allows God to move out of pure indifference, the actuality of the Yes is countered by
the activated negation of the No. The goal will not be, then, to find a way for the No and
the Yes to have being at the same time, since the No really never has being, or its having
being is identical to its essence as the negation of determinate existence. Rather, the aim
is to think of a way to place the No and Yes into a relation that does not instantly
deteriorate into contradiction, something Schelling hints at when he overlaps temporal
succession with the logic of the “ground” and “grounded.” Time is a way to insulate the
Yes from the corrosive power of the No without necessarily separating the two: hence,
the past becomes the (un)ground of the future. Time offers Schelling a way to quarantine
the No from the Yes, to elude the perpetual suspension of the actual that becomes the
essence of Kierkegaard’s irony, as discussed above, when the No ‘has being’ as active
negation, such that the positive unfolding of the Godhead (the Yes) is not immediately
annulled. The No, then, is not simply past (for it never was in the present, never made
past by time’s passage) but is in an absolute past or is always already past. And yet, this
past keeps pace (as it were) with the Yes of the present: the No is distinct from but never
more or less distant, as it were, from the Yes. Again, as the ground-grounded logic
suggests, the two terms maintain a somewhat steady relationship. Hence, with the
concept of “different times” Schelling can imagine the Absolute as assuming being in all
its forms—even if those forms are mutually cancelling—at the same time, because the
different times, in which the Absolute has different forms of being, are, themselves,136

136 “One can speak o f the Being o f what has being (presence) and the being o f what does not, strictu sensu,
‘have’ being,” namely, “the past, the future” (Wirth xxxi).
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“different, at the same time, nay, to speak more accurately, they [i.e., the different times
and, ergo, the forms of being in those times] are necessarily at the same time” (76).
This problem of temporality’s coordination with actuality and possibility finds
another mode of expression in Schelling’s attempt to unify and yet compartmentalize
God through the process of historicization. As Rajan notes, “Schelling’s sense of history
in the 1813 Ages, as a process of ‘constantly re-embody[ing]’ ‘archetypes’ that are
visions of ‘the innermost thoughts of God’ and ‘visions of future things’” continues in the
1815 version as well (“Psychoanalysis” §7).

For instance, toward the beginning of Part

B—a section that recurs to the beginning of Part A in an effort to detail more clearly the
“life of the individual potency” (55)—Schelling describes a deep connectivity between
the opposed forces, suggesting that even within the primordial night of contraction there
is something that reaches out and “seeks in a natural way to attract its higher self’ (56).
However, Schelling has, with a somewhat Blakean exuberance, overdetermined his
dialectic of forces; as in Milton, there is an almost hyper-organization where each
particular organ seems to determine the text absolutely—in the sense of
unconditionally—such that the work never quite merges into one body.137138 For instance,
the negating potency develops psychoanalytically into the unconscious, the grounding
alterity that is abjected in the moment that consciousness emerges: “there is no dawning
of consciousness (and precisely for this reason no consciousness) without positing
something past. There is no consciousness without something that is at the same time

137 Rajan also gestures to the philosophical background o f the key terms: “the idea o f the prototype or
ectype derives from Jean-Baptiste Robinet’s post-Spinozist De la Nature, which sees nature as a historical
process o f working out an original ‘prototype’ through time, although Robinet is arguably less
anthropological than his successors” (“Psychoanalysis,” §7).
138 Here I have in mind Rajan’s description o f unconditional thought as a way o f (dis)organizing positive
sciences or o f introducing what she calls, following Foucault, a “counterscience” (“Psychoanalysis” §6)
that would perform a critical function— in Kant’s sense— by exposing the limitations that particular “fields”
might, counter-intuitively, impose on thought:
As Hegel argues, positive sciences are sciences that do not recognize their concepts as finite, as
capable o f being unbalanced by their “transition into another sphere” (Encyclopedia 54). They are
thus constituted as what Pierre Bourdieu calls “fields,” with their own self-confirming rules and
“regularities,” their own “network” o f “objective relations between positions” within which a
particular kind o f “capital is . . . efficacious” (94-114). Absolute knowledge, by contrast, is not
total but unconditional knowledge, the following o f a particular direction or connection for its own
sake, without regard for its potential to “derange” the whole (Schelling, First Outline 26). Thus in
Ages Schelling gives geology an “archeological” role (in Foucault's sense) in the science o f nature,
even at the cost o f disturbing a Naturphilosophie through which philosophy had colonized Nature
as a region o f spirit. (Rajan, “Psychoanalysis,” §3)
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excluded and contracted” (44). In other words, we move with this psychology into
history, for “the unconscious is posited as the past of consciousness” (44, my emphasis).
On top of this determination, Schelling will also formulate his distinction between spirit
and nature: “in nature, the spirit knows itself as the one who was because it posits nature
as its eternal past” (45). Thus, the unity of the whole will demand quilting points that
function in these different though overlapping registers. Hence, the language of “types”:
for this process offers a model for temporal sedimentation applicable in both
psychological and geological realms. Indeed, this language marks Schelling’s attempt to
return to the predictive prophecy of his Introduction.
In an effort to propel history out of the past, Schelling argues that something like
the future inheres within primordial negation in the form of a possibility or prototype:
“the soul, awakening from the depths of the unconscious, does not accomplish its
graduated course without higher guidance. For already in its first awakening it is deeply
stirred by the dark intimation that its actual model is in the world of spirits” (59). That is,
Schelling casts the differentiated ages of the world into a scene of desire where
“everything prototypical” is “pulled toward its ectype” as if “through a natural and
irresistible inclination” (59). In a strange way, this regressive trajectory becomes,
ultimately, progressive. For if “the higher order (A ) is pulled toward nature [i.e., A ], it
a

is pulled away in the same proportion from its superior order (from the A )” (59). The
prototype’s attraction to its ‘earlier’ self generates, out of this very regression, a
coincident progression by disclosing and activating the attraction of its own higher
potency. Like the legs of John Donne’s compass, when one potency retreats its prototype
inclines toward it sympathetically. In essence, Schelling repeats the logic of the 1813
version where “history develops unproblematically through nature as a ‘ladder of
formations’ that is still conceived as a prophetic poem, in which the ‘creative spirit’ sees
the ‘spirits of things’ and ‘make[s] them corporeal’ so as to ‘unfold a complete image of
the future world’ (154)” (Rajan “Psychoanalysis” §8). This movement is like that
encountered in “Tintem Abbey.” When Wordsworth grafts the recollection of his earlier
self onto Dorothy, he suddenly embodies his own future, leaping forward in the same
instant as looking backward, finding a prototype in his own ectype. With this rhythm,
where history ascends through spiritual peristalsis, the Godhead, Schelling notes,
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“beh[olds], as if in a glimpse or vision, the entire ladder of future formations” (59).
However, a closer look at this “ladder” suggests that there is some doubt about the
transition from possibility to actuality. This, in turn, casts doubt on the predictive sense of
prophecy as an attempt to totalize history.
The predictive sedimentation of types begins to unravel “in the being of the
second potency or of that which is the substratum of the spirit world” (64). Looking more
closely at how the ages are ordered “typically,” Schelling notes,
[a]s the spirit world is the prototype of nature and all things of this
external world are depictions of what nature beheld in the inner world, so,
in turn, that universal soul is the immediate prototype of that which is
creating the spirit world. What is thereby produced in the spirit world is
just the ectype, or what is actual, of that which lay in the universal soul as
prototypical or possible. (65)
In other words, nature is the ectype of the spirit world. From the perspective of nature,
the spirit world is prototypically embedded in nature and allows nature to reach forward,
through obscure prophetic signs, to its higher possibility. At the same time, the spirit
world is the ectype of the universal soul. From the perspective of the spirit world, the
universal soul is prototypically embedded in the spirit world. The spirit world is the
actuality of the universal soul just as the universal soul is the possibility of the spirit
world. Similarly, nature is the actuality of the spirit world just as the spirit world is the
possibility of nature. Hence, the middle term or the spirit world is, under one aspect, the
prototype of nature, a mere possibility toward which nature tends. Under another aspect,
however, the same spirit world is the ectype of the universal soul, is the actuality that
grounds the possible. Put more starkly, this means that the middle, mediating term or A
located between nature (A1: necessity, unconscious, past) and the Godhead (A3:
possibility, knowledge, future) turns out to be actual and possible at different times, at
the same time.
Indeed, this uncanny, double identification of the “intermediate” (64) concept
circles back to the problem, noted above, of different times, where the past and future—
as dimensions that do not have being—are, strangely, supposed to enable God to have
being in different, contradictory ways in different times, while those different times
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themselves exist at the same time. For Schelling, in what seems like a desperate effort to
ensure the possibility of a transition from negative to positive philosophy, suddenly
reverses the alignment of ectype-actuality and prototype-possibility. As if passing
through the Blakean vortex of the second potency’s ambivalent mediation as both actual
and possible, Schelling recasts the moment as neither actual nor possible. In this way,
Schelling seems to project actuality into the future while at the same time retaining the
notion that the future is embedded in the present and past as actuality. That is, returning
to his distinction between having and not having being, Schelling argues that the “initial
life of blind necessity,” or the torturous rotation of the potencies, “could not be said to
have being because it never actually attained continuance, Being, but rather just remained
in striving and desire for Being” (48). This is a surprising statement since, as noted, it
seems to turn the actuality of the spirit world’s ectype—that is, nature—into a prototype.
To model this again on “Tintem Abbey”: just as Dorothy begins as William’s ectype only
to turn William into his own prototype—to synthesize William’s possible future with his
present actuality—so does the Godhead’s indifference, which had initially been
considered the purest possibility, begin to look like the only kind of actuality. Ultimately,
the condition o f actuality in which the prototype is supposed to reside, as a possibility,
seems itself to become prototypical in the face of a prototype that has been re-determined
as what is most actual. Again, prophecy seems to announce the future in an irreducibly
ambivalent manner that, as in this case, revokes the present as much as it predicts
actuality.
The notion of different times means God can have being and yet maintain the
freedom of neither having nor not having being, insofar as time distances and gathers
these contradictory postions together. This concept, however, undermines what had been,
in Schelling’s Introduction to Ages, a very uniform trajectory from past, to present, to
future. For, if what potentially has being—God’s historical revelation—is posited
prophetically in the future, then it is posited as being and not being at the same time. This
is because the future itself seems determined as not-having-being and yet also as the only
dimension wherein being achieves the continuity necessary to claim actuality. What
started as a prophetic itinerary following a restricted economy of prediction begins to
look, in other words, increasingly and irreducibly ambivalent. The simultaneity within
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difference or the difference within simultaneity that the concept of different times is
supposed to offer as a way through the aporia of God’s dual nature as both necessary and
yet also “the most voluntaristic being” (5), reveals a schizophrenic ontological condition.
For, if God can have being in mutually exclusive ways only within a system of order
(time) that cannot, itself, claim anything but mere being, this seems to make prophecy as
prediction look remarkably similar to Blanchot’s prophecy: the retraction of actuality and
presence. Indeed, a closer look at how these ages are supposed to be embedded in each
other revealed that, within the very tissue of prophetic connectivity—that is, within the
logic of ectype and prototype—the possibility usually associated with the future reverses
position with the past’s usual association with actuality. Intensifying the ambivalence of
his appeal to different times, Schelling’s prophetic prototype becomes indistinguishable
from ectypal regression, such that the actuality of God’s revelation in the future can be
confirmed only insofar as this assurance revokes nature’s actuality, or subtracts the past
that is supposed to be the unconscious ground of consciousness.

IV. “the tide of Time”: Time and Eternity in Milton

The relationship described in Schelling’s Ages between the No (aligned, in the
terms of this chapter, with the eternal beginning) and the Yes as punctual, finite,
unfolding events (analogous to the notion of starting), may be useful for rereading
Blake’s ostensibly predictive temporality, especially the relationship between the eternal
and the temporal that forms in the moment of inspiration—the moment of prophetic self
annihilation—in Milton. Specifically, Schelling helps to illustrate how time’s organizing
function works, coutnerintuitively, to forestall apocalypse and to offer, in its place, a kind
of mundane transcendence in the form of an open, unpredictable future: a future wherein
whatever is posited in the future both has and does not have being, is both most actual
and merely possible at the same time. In Blake, as in Schelling, the infinite and the
eternal seem to be not outside of but rather within the finite and temporal world. Blake
suggests as much in the opening line of Auguries o f Innocence:
To see a World in a Grain of Sand
And a Heaven in a Wild Flower
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Hold Infinity in the palm of your hand
And Eternity in an hour. (1-4)
This vision seems to counterpoint the more depressing movement in Jerusalem where
Los, “Fearing that Albion should turn his back against the Divine Vision” (45.3),
witnesses the imagination’s slow destruction by tyrannical negations: “Every Universal
Form, was become barren mountains of Moral/ Virtue: and every Minute Particular
hardend into grains of sand” (45.20-21). Echoing his assertion that “every thing that lives
is holy” (America 8.13), later in Jerusalem Blake notes that “every Minute Particular is
Holy” (69.43) and that imaginative (re)vision—a form of reflexive seeing wherein “the
eye altering alters all” (E 476)—attempts to reveal the world that is within the grain of
sand rather than reducing the world to dirt’s blunt materialism. In other words, Blake
turns the reduction of transcendence to the mundane into a resource such that the
transcendent, rather, infects the mundane—redeeming, as it were, the commonplace
rather than negating redemption. Indeed, as discussed below in more detail, this is one
step toward Blake’s phenomenological reconceptualization of notions like transendence
and metaphysics.
For instance, toward the end of Jerusalem, Los offers his most extended
description of how “General Forms” or the “perfect Whole” of divine vision is immanent
to the particular:
he who wishes to see a Vision; a perfect Whole
Must see it in its Minute Particulars; Organized & not as thou
0 Fiend of Righteousness pretendest; thine is a Disorganized
And snowy cloud; brooder of tempests & destructive War
You smile with pomp & rigor: you talk of benevolence & virtue!
1 act with benevolence & virtue & get murderd time after time:
You accumulate Particulars, & murder by analyzing, that you
May take the aggregate; & you call the aggregate Moral Law:
And you call that Swelld & bloated Form; a Minute Particular,
But General Forms have their vitality in Particulars: & every
Particular is a Man; a Divine Member of the Divine Jesus. (91.21-31)
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As Blake says in his annotations to Reynolds, “Distinct General Form Cannot Exist” (E
638). Rather, the “Grandeur of Ideas is founded on Precision of Ideas” and the “Singular
& Particular Detail is the Foundation of the Sublime” (E 636, 637). The very concept of
wholeness is here reformulated.

Rather than a totalization achieved through

aggregation, wholeness means a mobile process or exigency—a force rather than a
thing—glimpsed through time’s relentless negativity. For, if Los is “murderd time after
time” and forced, therefore, to re-create himself time after time, artistic wholeness seems
to include and even rely on the “time after time,” or the intervals of fmitude. If, for Blake,
“only when vision is determinate, minute, and particular does it conduct to or contain
infinity” (Weiskel 67), this is because the very concept of the infinite does not signify a
state of changelessness, is not a heaven of utter boredom. Rather, Blake’s sense of “the
perfect Whole” shares an uncanny relationship to negation that is essential to the
maintenance of a notion of wholeness that is not reduced to Urizenic books of brass but
rather invites the indeterminate as an opportunity for re-determination, re-vision, or—as
noted in the context of Milton—poetic re-stating. In short, this is a wholeness that
includes and celebrates the imagination as an active force. Just as the individual is
nothing other than the eternal vitality of the imagination that makes different states
possible and moves between them without being reducible to any one permanently13914014—
states like selfhood, or Satan, that tend to impose a single vision of the universe—so the
notion of wholeness here does not mean stasis but rather an activity, drive, or perhaps
desire that will always seek to displace “negations” (hierarchical relationships in
oppositions that remain static through time) with the more creative, supple relation of
‘contraries. »141

142

139 Allan Vardy makes a similar point, though he emphasizes Blake’s distinction between negations and
contraries in order to illustrate how the goal o f rational totalization seems to replace productive contrariety
with stultifying negations:
Totalization may be internally valid in a rationalist model o f knowledge, but it becomes a fallen
activity when it attempts to extend its authority into all other domains— when it takes itself as the
sole structure o f knowledge and thus confuses knowledge and method. In other words, Blake’s
poetics erode the power o f recuperation by exposing it as the product o f a negating fiction. The
Blakean sublime must be a contrary formulation. The pathos o f loss and/or terror, rather than a
condition to be superseded (the negative stage) must, instead, serve as the necessary sympathetic
gesture in constituting the sublime— its contrary. Sublime aesthetics are thus always constituted by
a contrary o f pathos and sublimity. (6)
140 “The Imagination is not a State: it is the Human Existence itself’ (Milton 32.32).
141 There is a Negation, & there is a Contrary
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Beyond the “time after time” rhythm of Los’ Miltonic self-annihilation, this
concept of an immanent vision of wholeness is clearly modulated by temporality, as the
pun on “minute” suggests: within the closely determined (minute) particular, is a unit of
time (a minute). The minute as a temporal unit cannot be disjoined from the minute as the
particular physiological or anthropomorphic embodiment of the absolute, eternal, and
divine vision. At every minute—finite, particular, fleeting—there is the possibility of an
eternal vision, such that one might say of the minute what Blake says of the Moment in
Milton:
For in this Period the Poet’s Work is Done: and all the Great
Events of Time start forth & are conceived in such a Period
Within a Moment[.] (29.1-3)
The central action of inspiration and self-annihilation in Milton takes place in this
Moment, a formulation both minutely determined and measured by the temporal minute.
That is, time’s redemption in Milton means overcoming the empty infinity (akin to the
process of mere aggregation identified and criticized in Jerusalem) promulgated by the
Elect and affirming the finite infinity of the imagination: the “minute particular” as the
essence of imaginative vision in its complex temporality and embodied form. For if this
is an absolute vision it is also only temporary, available for just a minute. More
specifically, the Moment is to the minute what the individual is to a state. The individual
is eternal. This does not mean that it is a self-contained substance but rather that it is the
subjective desire that spurs the process of re-vision and subjective re-creation. Likewise,
the Moment names the ecstatic potentiality planted within each minute not as a secret
presence so much as a renovating caesura or void that particularizes the particular minute
by de-totalizing time. In Milton, the focus is on finding the moment—or formulating such
a moment—that “renovates every Moment of the Day if rightly placed” (35.45). This is a142
The Negation must be destroyed to redeem the Contraries
The Negation is the Spectre; the Reasoning power in Man
This is a false Body: an Incrustation over my Imortal
Spirit; a Selfhood, which must be put o ff & annihilated always (Milton 40.32-36)
142 As Hazard Adams comments, Milton's distinction between negations and contraries “is somewhat
cryptic, but there is help elsewhere in Blake, where we learn that the negations Blake particularly dislikes
and believes to be responsible for much modem error are good/evil, soul/body, and object/subject, all in his
view being the production o f reason” (433). Negations are narrow, one-sided binaries that are, in effect,
structurally hypocritical given that the privileged term in each case denies its dependence on the
subordinate term.
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dimension of time that will not allow time to be absorbed into the apocalyptic calendar of
the Elect and that will not be codified by Satan’s “Watch Fiends” (35.43) (clock fiends)
who divide life into oppressive watches or narrow perspectives.
It should be clear by this point that the renovating moment is not based on
memorialization, as it is in Wordsworth’s spots of time. Rather, Blake’s renovating
moment is more reflexive and represents a concept of self-transcendence coeval with the
imagination as a self-transcending faculty—a faculty of finite infinitude. Put in terms of
the larger concerns in Milton, the moment of inspiration, which is also the moment of
self-annihilation, demands a temporality that allows for a vision of the eternal, although
not an eternal vision: in contrast to the sequential and aggregative temporality that is
complicit with self-aggrandizement, subjective mastery, and universal, rational
determination, the moment of inspiration is both minutely particular—it happens at a
particular time and place: to Blake in Lambeth Vale, at his cottage—and yet also re
organizes time itself as a scheme of self-understanding. The renovating moment affects
not only other moments but, first and foremost, begins with se/f-renovation. This
suspends both the restriction of the individual to the here and now and the sublime
projection of the self into eternity. The Moment, like Schelling’s construction of time in
Ages, enables the Yes and the No—invention and reinvention—to have being in Blake in
a gesture that fundamentally displaces traditional metaphysics. It is not so much a matter
of interrupting time in order to liberate the subject from temporal, historical
determination, as it is of re-determining those determinations, and of holding open,
through the moment in each day, the possibility always of reformulating prevailing
systems—which is rather different from rejecting all determination or systemetization as
such. For, when Blake famously declares in Jerusalem, “I must Create a System, or be
enslav’d by another Mans” (10.21), he suggests that systemetization is inevitable and
necessary but can be related to as a task more or less affirmatively. Hence, Blake’s time
is “free” in a sense very close to Schelling’s concept of freedom: for Schelling, freedom
means neither an escape from determination nor the ability to make a simple choice
between inessential options; rather, freedom is the power to take up the necessity of
determination, to create a system, or to choose one’s necessary self rather than receive it
passively from external authorities.
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This possibility of radical re-determination or freedom applies, as suggested, to
time itself. In fact, time—ironic negativity—is nothing other than this power of immanent
redetermination. This is precisely how the eternal (moment) resides ‘within,’ and yet
remains irreducible to, a time or a particular unit (minute) of time. Rather than the eternal
being outside of and at some kind of distance from temporality, the eternal for Blake is
the ability, ‘within’ time, always to be renovated or restructured: for time is neither
reduced to its objective expression in a clock or calendar nor, at the opposing pole,
reduced to pure contingency. To anticipate Ernst Bloch’s terms addressed in more detail
in chapter five, time for Blake emerges as a transcendence without transcendence—a
relation of contraries, the moment and the minute—and therefore has immediate
consequences for the treatment of subjectivity. If, for Wordsworth, the spots of time are
supposed to quilt subjectivity together through negation and determination, by contrast,
Blake’s contraries resist the self-aggrandizement of sublime recuperation
by refusing to supersede one of the terms in the contrary opposition. The
poet experiences “the grandeur of inspiration” {Milton, 43, 2), but does not
do so by superseding the fallen condition of his basic humanity. No effort
is made to overcome this unstable flux, and in fact the inspired state
cannot be achieved without its contrary, the fallen state; inspiration works
through its contrary relation to error, and error inevitably occurs as the
result of any effort to stabilize inspiration into dogma. This contrary
engagement creates the productive “energy” of Blake’s poetics. Any effort
to stabilize a perception of the sublime by superseding the fallen condition
from which it sprang is a negation, and precipitates a more terrible fall into
utter blindness to the very possibility of vision. (Vardy 5)
Blake’s sublime—and the subject who is ostensibly galvanized in this aesthetics—is
more deconstructive, dispersed. Blakean transcendence involves a momentary glimpse of
radical imagination—“the Human Form, Divine” {Jerusalem 27.58)—but does not
necessarily economize this as a subjective power or as something the self dominates via
Reason’s (in Blake’s terms, the Spectre’s) totalizations. This pointedly contrasts the self
aggrandizement of the Wordsworthian sublime. Indeed, by identifying self-annihilation
with inspiration, Blake illustrates, through this starkly contrasting idiom, how
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Wordsworth can maintain a certain sense of the self only by withdrawing from the
general economy prophecy exposes—as if Wordsworth did not choose a good profession
if a stable subjectivity is what he wanted. That is, Wordsworth, as presented earlier, is
akin to Blake’s image of the fallen John Milton on his couch in eternity. For Wordsworth
seems to prefer the unannihilated self and desires to achieve the status of the Elect. As
one who is anxious to be among the Elect, then, Wordsworth falls into that class Blake,
as discussed above, names the “Redeemed,” those “Who live in doubts & fears
perpetually tormented by the Elect” (.Milton 25.36).
Milton’s ostensibly predictive itinerary, one that especially in the final plates
appears to look forward to an imminent apocalypse, is suspended by its mournful
relationship to the Lambeth books. As discussed above, the renovating moment’s action
of self-annihilation—applying this action not just to the selfhood but to any dogmatic
concept of narrative history, any ossified state, allowing the imagination, as the repetition
of Urizen in Milton suggests, to re-state creation—seems to import rather than cancel the
radically provisional or workless nature of the Lambeth period. As in Schelling’s
prophetic narrative scheme, on one hand the eternal is understood as within rather than
outside time and that, as a result, time can ameliorate the otherwise painful contradictions
of eternity through its division of God into simultaneous but distinct temporal states. Yet,
on the other hand, this same reformulation of time and eternity introduces into God a
radical negativity that seems to undermine the confidence of the original prediction of
God’s eventual revelation in history. For, the past and the future into which God’s
psychotic unconscious and potential-for-being, respectively, are projected are themselves
dimensions without being. Hence, one way to talk about time’s role in the system is as
the power for immanent re-determination, a kind of prophetic negativity that emphasizes
how the pro-visional (in the sense of coming before and anticipating the future) is always
provisional (or subject to a reformulation of its own logic). Or, again, it means that the
work of mourning the illuminated text is supposed to perform never quite manages to
overcome trauma, such that, as in Schelling, God remains in a state of dismal woe: “we
will not shun presenting even that primordial being (the first possibility of God externally
manifesting) in the state of suffering that comes from growth” (101).
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Just as Blake’s ‘systematic’ “counterpractice [...] finds expression in a writerly
use of form that is phenomenological rather than postmodern and that therefore generates
a perspectivism that is not relativism” (Rajan Supplement 199), so his treatment of time
does not equal indifference to narrative coherence so much as open the possibility of the
perpetual refiguration of causal and temporal relationships.143 For, as Mark Bracher
usefully notes, in the context of Blake’s Milton and in language that complements
Vardy’s discussion of how Blake’s treatment of subject formation eludes a
Wordsworthian and Urizenic agglomeration,
the way in which time makes whole [...] is not through uninterrupted
aggrandizement or positivity. Rather, it moves toward fulfillment by a
continual negation of immediate, present actuality. We normally see time
in terms of duration or endurance, and thus we depict it as “baled & aged.”
But in truth time is entelechy—continuous change and transformation and
eternal renewal; it is a continuous morning (and mourning) or new
beginning, that creative power through which novelty enters the world. As
such it is mediation between the actual and the non-actual, the “Spirit of
Prophecy,” which grasps the possibility at the heart of actuality and
realizes that possibility. Because of the constant transformation which it
produces, “time is the mercy of Eternity; without Times swiftness/ Which
is the swiftness of all things: all were eternal torment” ([Milton] 24:72-3).
Since the very nature of existence is based upon finitude and
incompleteness, which manifest themselves as torment, without time—i.e.,
change—these torments would never be mitigated in any respect. (142)
Blake’s time, in other words, neither merely aggregates nor does it form, as Plato
quipped, the image of eternity, as its ostensible duration is an a-temporal concoction.
“The effect” of such a concept of time, as Leonard Deen suggests, “is not only to put off
the vision of apocalypse but to redeem time, to show eternity in time by showing us that
‘Eternity is in love with the productions of time,’ as Blake puts it in the ‘Proverbs of
Hell’” (185). Hence, time’s eternal beginning is immanent to time just as Blake’s God is
143 Or as Rajan says later on, “although it is true that an open form unbinds us from the mimetic claims o f
chronology and allows for visionary rearrangements that defy historical limits, mobile forms open windows
into eternity only as part o f a perspectivism that reinscribes vision in a field o f relations” (Supplement 203).

208

not objectively in the world but within the same imagination that invents Him: “All
deities reside in the human breast” (Marriage 11).
Blake offers a minute particular of this detotalizing temporality with the image of
a solid crystal whence two streams spring:
In this Moment Ololon descended to Los & Enitharmon
Unseen beyond the Mundane Shell Southward in Miltons track

Just in this Moment when the morning odours rise abroad
And first from the Wild Thyme, stands a Fountain in a rock
Of crystal flowing into two Streams, one flows thro Golgonooza
And thro Beulah to Eden beneath Los’s western Wall
The other flows thro the Aerial Void & all the Churches
Meeting again in Golgonooza beyond Satans Seat. {Milton 35.46-53)
Ololon’s descent parallels Milton’s and seems to gather together the text’s action in a vast
simultaneity. Indeed, in Susan Fox’s reading, “all the perspectives of the poem [i.e.,
Milton] are focused on a single event [and] that event takes place in a single instant which
takes Blake fifty pages to describe but has no measurable duration” (xii). For Fox, “the
principle of simultaneity” and “the principle of multiple perspectives” (6) are reflected in
this image of temporal suspension where the rivers marry through transparency their
urgent motion with the firm, perpetual stasis of the crystal. However, the text counters
time’s reduction to a static dualism or negation.144 That is, the “Wild Thyme” shifts
perspective on time again, not only through its punning language but also the synesthesia
wherein time’s expression shifts from the visual to the olfactory. As Vardy notes, “by
creating the contrary, temporal and eternal, the poet subverts the ideological attempts to
secure the eternal (through dogma) and makes possible the eternal moment immanently
held in each moment of the temporal flux” (9). Put differently, if the Moment in Milton
tends toward a simultaneity that appears similar to a conventional understanding of the
eternal as an apocalyptic revelation that is atemporal, it is important that we remain
sensitive to Blake’s almost Schellingian sense of eternity’s temporality. Hence, one must

144 “Negations are not Contraries: Contraries mutually Exist:/ But Negations Exist Not” (Jerusalem 17.33
34).
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remain somewhat skeptical of Fox’s tendency to reintegrate—in Blake’s terms, to
negate—the diverse perspectives she rightly observes. For as Rajan notes,
[perspective, according to [Fox], is an angle of deviation, to be measured
in relation to “the comprehensive criterion of eternity.” But in the early
texts perspectives are juxtaposed rather than cinematically superimposed,
the bard’s song being counterpointed against Earth’s answer and not
hegemonically placed above it. The fact that we pass through various
perspectives serially, and that we cannot occupy them at the same time,
suggests that we need a new perceptual vocabulary to describe the
perspectivism of the early Blake. {Supplement 210)
Such perspectivism seems necessary not only for the early and middle Blake but also for
Milton. It is, after all, eternity that Milton has to leave in order to redeem himself through
self-annihilation, suggesting that the text undertakes a very deliberate detotalization of
vision, that it seeks to dissolve selfhood in “the tide of Time” {Milton 22.25). In fact, it
remains unclear if the various divisions of Milton necessarily coalesce around the proper
name. On one hand, the language of “folding”145 suggests not merely multiplication but
also closing or compacting: a way of generating multiples through division but without
compete separation. On the other hand, however, the nature of inspiration, addressed
below in more detail, seems to involve a kind of subjective exposure and displacement
that does not return to any kind of contained self. In fact, readers of Milton gesture

145 Blake uses the image o f folding almost obsessively in Milton. For instance, Man is “Four-fold” (20.17)
while the Polypus is “A self-devouring monstrous Human Death Twenty-seven fold” (34.26). Moreover,
“Moral Virtue” is described as a “cruel two-fold Monster” (40.22). In fact, the central action o f redemption
involves reconsidering the “Six-fold Miltonic Female” (41.31)— an allusion to Milton’s three wives and
three daughters without whom Paradise Lost could not have been written. In her discussion o f Schelling’s
1815 Ages, Rajan describes the relationship between negative and positive forces in terms o f folding—
though understood in a more Deleuzian way— as well:
But unlike the 1813 version, which schematizes the two forces in a dialectic o f distinct wills, or in
contrast to the 1811 version, which sees the negating force as a usurper {WI 23), in 1815 the two
wills constitute an “annular drive . . . in which there is no differentiation”: neither “a veritable
higher nor a veritable lower” ( W3 20), as the two exchange places, each becoming the outside or
inside o f the other, in a relation o f folding rather than o f contraries leading to progression.
While there is too little time and space here to go into much detail, folding offers a model for
conceptualizing difference and identity in a way that might be closer to what Blake describes as a contrary
as opposed to a negation. Schelling’s rather uncanny concept o f dialectic, likewise, benefits from
comparison to the figure o f folding as a way o f understanding how terms in ostensible opposition can also
form, in his special sense, an “identity” (8).
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toward—even as they retreat from—this destabilizing effect in their discussions of the
Moment’s proximity to experiences like ecstasy and epiphany.
In “Providence and the Moment in Blake’s Milton,” for instance, Peter Alan
Taylor argues that “in Blake’s Milton a similar conception of providence [to that
described in Paradise Lost] emerges, a providence which operates in two ways: through
history in the form of the ‘Seven Angels of the Presence’ and in the timeless moment of
inspiration where it is embodied in the figure of Ololon. These two aspects of providence
are brought together in Book the Second of Blake’s poem in the symbols of the Lark and
the Wild Thyme” (44). This synthesis “in the moment of grace” or “the moment of
creative inspiration” (Taylor 52) is, however, darkened by the hint of sacrifice that
attends the Wild Thyme passage: “etymologically, the word thyme is derived from a
Greek verb meaning ‘to offer a sacrifice’ and Luvah is the form of Jesus seen as a
sacrificial victim. Within this context, the purple flowers of the Wild Thyme become only
the burial garments left at the tomb, its odour representing the spices used to preserve the
dead, and Ololon becomes the woman weeping at the empty tomb” (Taylor 56). This
observation would seem, then, to complicate Taylor’s larger argument that some kind of
“providential circuit is completed” (58) when the Wild Thyme and the Lark merge and
diverge in the same instant:
The Lark and the Wild Thyme emerge from the same point as the fountain
[of crystal] with its two streams. The Lark spirals up through the conical
twenty-seven heavens of historical time, and the Wild Thyme, the pun
emphasizing it as a symbol of unregulated time, opens within to Eternity,
expanding conically within its open centre. These two cones converge in
the moment of inspiration in the form of a double spiral emanating in
opposite directions from the same point, a figure which Blake calls a
“vortex.” The vortex unites the eye of the poet with object perceived; it is
therefore essential that the character Blake witness these events, for it is
actually in the mind of the poet that the providential circuit is completed.
These events occur in the moment that transcends time, the moment Blake
describes near the end of the vision of Golgonooza that ends Book the
First of Milton. (Taylor 57-58)
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While the moment might well be described in terms of one vortex intersecting another
and opening a kind of infinity within the finite, Taylor’s reading seems to overlook the
disintegrative and radically pro-visional aspect of this phenomenon, mistakenly
suggesting that history is completed here in a single vision.
That is, Blake’s moment does not transcend, in the sense of “escape from,” time.
Time in fact is nothing but local or minute self-transcendence. Rather, the moment seems
to mark a point of radical transition that disorients as much as its orients the subject, for it
can have the effect of displacing the very coherence o f subjectivity. For instance, on one
hand, when one—inspired—passes through a vortex, he gains perspective on the plane of
existence he has just emerged from:
when once a traveller thro’ Eternity
Has passd that Vortex, he perceives it roll backward behind
His path, into a globe itself infolding; like a sun:
Or like a moon, or like a universe of starry majesty,
While he [i.e., the traveller] keeps onward in his wondrous journey on the
earth.
(Milton 15.22-26)
On the other hand, as Milton falls from eternity through the vortex and into “the Sea of
Time & Space” (15.46), the points of orientation described earlier, where “the eye of man
views both the east & west encompassing/ Its vortex; and the north & south, with all their
starry host” (15.28-29), become patently unreliable:
in its vortex Milton bent down
To the bosom of death, what was underneath soon seemed above.
A cloudy heaven mingled with stormy seas in loudest ruin. (15.41-43)
As in Dante’s Inferno, reorientation can be disorienting. Dante and Virgil climb up (or is
it down?) Satan, frozen at the centre of the earth, pass through the centre of gravity,
and—in a moral as well as cosmic sense—radically re-orient the trajectory of the
Comedia. In a temporal as opposed to spatial register, Milton’s decision to “go to Eternal
Death” {Milton 14.14) suggests that chronology—a mode of organization one might gain
perspective on once passing through its vortex—becomes confusing, as the deadly pun on
Wild Thyme implies. Or, like Kierkegaard’s moment discussed in chapter one, Blake’s
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moment paradoxically unifies and divides: if Kierkegaard’s moment ‘works’ by
displacing the very understanding that would claim comprehension, so does Blake’s
moment function both as a determinate, local, and embodied temporality as well as a kind
of eternity insofar as that determination can be reformulated “time after time.”
That is, rather than completing a “providential circuit,” which implies an univocal
vision of what exists, in a metaphysical scheme—that is, precisely the kind of vision that
would become the dogmatic basis an Urizenic law applied without distinction to both lion
and ox—the moment’s ecstatic or wild energy necessarily deconstructs coherent vision
because it suspends the subject in a texture of perspectives that are not merely the
privations of a superior, transcendent authority. As Bracher argues,
[t]he rock of crystal portrays the definite and determinate actuality of the
moment, while the fountain embodies the moment’s ecstatic aspect. The
fact that the ecstatic [aspect] arises out of the self-enclosed, impervious
aspect indicates that integrity and invulnerability, on the one hand, and
ecstasis, on the other, are not mutually exclusive, but rather are, in fact,
mutually implicit. For ecstasis presupposes a definite, determinate
actuality which is to be surpassed, and definite actuality occurs, as we
have seen, only by virtue of activity, which is in its very nature an ecstatic
or self-differing movement beyond the status quo. (220-221, Bracher’s
emphasis)
Indeed, this sense of ambivalence—where the poet has one foot in time and the other in
eternity, as it were—might be better described in terms of epiphany, a suggestion that
again invites contrast with Wordsworth’s renovating moment. For as C.C. Barfoot notes
in “‘Milton Silent Came Down my Path’: The Epiphany of Blake’s Left Foot,” “it is with
Wordsworth that taxonomists of the literary epiphany have usually begun” (61), thinking
of his spots of time in particular. For Barfoot, epiphany is not merely a sudden insight but
“the disclosure of the sacred in the mundane” (61) or the profound in the apparently
superficial. Milton is, in particular, open to this reading given the famous image on Plate
15:
Then I saw him [i.e., Milton] in the Zenith as a falling star,
Descending perpendicular, swift as the swallow or swift;
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And on my left foot falling on the tarsus, enterd there. (47-49)
Blake’s left foot is, after all, a literally pedestrian site for inspiration, making the instance
stranger by its contrast to the gravitas of the event—something anticipated in the text by
Los’s strange form of mourning upon discovering the damage done by both Satan and
Palamabron:
Then Los took off his left sandal placing it on his head,
Signal of solemn mourning: when the servants of the Mills
Beheld the signal they in silence stood, tho’ drunk with wine. (8.11-13)
In a gesture of reversal recalling not only the vortex but also the crucifixion of St. Peter,
who according to tradition is crucified upside down, Los atones for Satan and
Palamabron’s mutual betrayals through a ‘pedestrian’ image.
As Barfoot argues, it is between the minute Milton’s star enters Blake’s left foot
and the minute wherein Los “stoop’d down/ And bound [Blake’s] sandals on in UdanAdan” such that Blake might “walk forward thro’ Eternity” {Milton 22.8-9, 5), that the
“redemptive journey takes place” (Barfoot 69). For Barfoot, however, these minute
particulars or particular minutes of (pedestrian) inspiration do not constitute the essence
of epiphany. Rather, they are merely gestures that hint at the proper epiphany, which
Barfoot takes as the revelation of the renovating Moment that Satan cannot find,
discussed above in terms of time’s immanent ecstasy or the power in each minute that is
not reducible to the minute:
There is a Moment in each Day that Satan cannot find
Nor can his Watch Fiends find it, but the Industrious find
This Moment & it multiply. & when it once is found
It renovates every Moment of the Day if rightly placed[.] (35.42-45)
At this point, however, Barfoot makes a somewhat overhasty equation between Blake and
Wordsworth, arguing that “these lines in which Blake describes a moment out of time,
inaccessible to the pressures of material existence, are clearly equivalent to Wordsworth’s
famous ‘spots of time’ passage in the Prelude (XII, 11. 208ff.)” (74). While the verbal and
superficial similarities are indeed enticing—especially if one recalls that Wordsworth’s
spots claim, after several revisions, to have a “renovating virtue” (11.259, my
emphasis)—the simple equation overlooks Blake’s hostility to memory, a hostility tied to

214

his reformulation of metaphysics and inextricable even from his ethics. For Blake will
oppose imaginative or creative vision to memory formalized in the work of allegory. In
Milton, for instance, in the same instant as Milton recognizes that his unannihilated
selfhood is Satanic, he details his various errors, asking rhetorically, “What do I do here
before the Judgement? without my Emanation?/ With the daughters of memory, & not
with the daughters of inspiration^]” (14.28-29). In “A Vision of the Last Judgment,”
Blake will be even clearer about this opposition, where the daughters of memory
represent a closed economy of correspondence that, for Blake, is a weak form of
creation—if it deserves that appellation at all: “The Last Judgement is not Fable or
Allegory but Vision Fable or Allegory are totally distinct & inferior kinds of Poetry.
Vision or Imagination is a Representation of what Eternally Exists. Really &
Unchangeably. Fable or Allegory is Formed by the Daughters of Memory. Imagination is
Surrounded by the daughters of Inspiration who in the aggregate are called Jerusalem” (E
544). Ultimately, then, Milton’s redemption requires that he “cast off the rotten rags of
Memory by Inspiration” {Milton 41.4), that he welcome rather than resist the Shelleyan
“dis-memberment” of inspiration in a manner that Wordsworth, as argued in chapter two,
was unable or unwilling to do.146
If Wordsworth’s ego reads inner experience as trauma, Blake’s valorization of
productive vision means displacing the restricted economy of memory that aims to
totalize the self through (auto)biography such that prophecy’s discontinuity need not be
reduced either to purely damaging or religiously ecstatic extremes. That is, Blake’s
perspectivism suggests a phenomenological as opposed to a traditionally metaphysical
sensibility. Hegel’s phenomenological response to Kantian metaphysics meant
fundamentally re-conceptualizing Kant’s dualism and the nature of the thing-in-itself.
While for Kant, phenomenal appearances remained merely allegorical, as it were,
146 Harold Bloom, in his notes to Erdman’s edition o f The Poetry and Prose o f William Blake, makes a
similar claim to Barfoot’s, arguing that “the whole o f this sequence” played out around the moment that
Satan cannot find on plates 35-36 “finds a clear parallel in Wordsworth’s account o f ‘spots o f time’ in The
Prelude, for like Wordsworth Blake is concerned with renovation, and a renovation initially dependent
upon mundane experience” (840). However, given the complex nature o f Blakean renovation as a form o f
self-annihilation, it seems, again, dubious to suggest that Wordsworth and Blake are performing basically
analogous acts simply on the basis o f a common term. Indeed, in his annotations to Wordsworth’s 1815
Poems, Blake is clear that Wordsworth’s understanding o f the imagination pits “the Natural Man [...]
against the Spiritual Man Continually” (654) since Wordsworth cannot see what is for Blake a fundamental
truth: namely, that “Imagination has nothing to do with Memory” (655).
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Hegel—in Slavoj Zizek’s compelling reading—argued that the ‘thing’ is really the force
of negation: it is not just that there is no thing-in-itself for Hegel, but that the thing-initself is negation, thus opening the possibility of a more dynamic, dialectical method that
would see Spirit unfolding through time as various shapes of consciousness, free from the
illusory supervision of the Kantian Thing.147 Hegel’s response to Kant might find a
parallel in Blake’s response to what he would term Science and Philosophy. As Donald
Ault argues, describing a position that might broadly be called metaphysical,
“Newtonian narrative” presupposes that behind the text lies a single
unified field (ur-narrative, privileged originating event, state of
consciousness, and so on) whose essential features do not irreconcilably
and incommensurably conflict with one another but can (in theory at least)
be fully captured through systematic analytic explanation. In such a view,
discrepancies between textual details merely reflect errors of perception or
memory in characters or in the narrator. [...] [However,] Blake’s whole
enterprise constitutes the irreducible presence of multiple interfering and
incommensurable structures that operate 1) to rule out a pre-existent
underlying world which surface events (i.e., those narrated by the linear
text) partially rearrange and partially distort, and 2) to generate a narrative
field in which the past is not finished and closed but incomplete and
open—alterable and revisable.
That is, instead of a prefabricated underlying single world or urnarrative [...] that supports the details of the surface narrative [...], Blake
substitutes a transformational process at the service of (and brought into
existence by) the temporally unfolding surface narrative itself. (3-4)
In other words, Blake’s dissatisfaction with allegory and the memorial form of poetic
production so central to Wordsworth seems to stem from the former’s re-vision of the
metaphysics wherein an obscure substantiality holds human experience and
understanding in Urizenic thrall. As Rajan argues, Blake’s response is to forward an

147 For Hegel, the “Thing is itself nothing but a lack, an empty place; [...] beyond the phenomenal
appearance there is only a certain negative self-relationship because o f which the positively given
phenomenal world is perceived as ‘mere appearance’— in other words that ‘the supersensible is therefore
appearance qua appearance’” (Zizek Sublime 193).
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almost cubist philosophy, something Ault describes as a “transformational narrative
ontology” (5). The phenomenology of surfaces in Blake displaces metaphysical readings,
displaces the assumption of a fundamental presence and reality outside of human
consciousness and experience that philosophy can approach only asymptotically—that is,
melancholically—reducing all thought to some kind of distortedness. Hence, a more
enabling perspective would consider Blake’s “use of surface” as “phenomenological, in
that reality is not denied but does not exist as a transcendental signified” (Rajan
Supplement 211).
Time in Milton is indeed structured and particular, something made clear in both
the architectural specificity of the “wondrous buildings” (28.45) constructed by Los’s
Sons corresponding to different units of time and the organic temporality that seems to
envelop those works: “A Moment equals a pulsation of the artery” (28.47). But if times
are structured, these are not particularly stable buildings; like all the comforts of
Beulah—and time regulated as narrative or predictive prophecy can be considered one
such comfort—there is something deceptive or misleading about this construction. For
unlike Wordsworth’s moment that predicates its renovating virtue on recollection and the
promise of recovery and retroactive totalization, Blake’s moment renovates time itself. In
terms of the discussion of Blake and Kierkegaard’s prefaces above, this means that even
in Milton the poet’s work is not done in the sense of “finished” but rather that work, as
labour, is perpetually performed in and through a temporality that is itself subject to
reformulation. The poet’s work is only ever “done” in the sense of “actively performed,”
the term, in Blake’s usage, performing a kind of semantic self-annihilation by eliminating
its own sense of limitation. Put differently, narrative and history are myths, although this
is not to say that they are not real or that they have no truth. Rather, if history is neither
absolutely true nor a picture of reality as such (this kind of mimesis has been displaced by
phenomenology), it is still, like all myth, a construction necessary for life: while
contingent, such myth is far from arbitrary. Blake takes myth seriously. Myth is not so
much a distortion of the truth as a provisional formulation of a reality that can only ever
be formed provisionally, because there is no transcendental signified to submit
appearances to as some kind of ultimate tribunal. The provisional, here, again becomes
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pro-visional. This is a kind of prophecy that does not or cannot claim metaphysical truth
since there is no transcendental presence to appeal to or to compare with.
Pro-vision, rather, is a form of seeing that successfully distinguishes “States from
Individuals in those States,” since “States Change: but Individual Identities never change
nor cease” (Milton 32.22, 23). That is, the states humans necessarily exist within are,
nevertheless, subject in some measure to human will, re-determination, or reinvention:
that is, they are subject to the power of the Imagination, which is itself not “not a State”
but rather, as noted earlier, “the Human Existence itself’ {Milton 32.30-32) and eternal in
its detotalizing temporality. Temporal particularity is necessary and describes the shape
of human life and yet ought not to be severed from its contrary, the renovating moment or
the infinite power to annihilate a particular version of temporality and to retemporalize
experience. Because all states are deeply provisional, there is a sense in which any
particular vision might ultimately be aborted. If, in other words, a state is something
created like a work, the provisional nature o f these states or works suggests that they are
akin to prefaces: starts that do not necessarily escape from the beginning, from the
negative dialectic of the work of the absence of (the) work, from the unexampled moment
of inspiration. So, if it would be mistaken to reduce time to timelessness or a concept of
eternity as exterior to time—to confuse Blakean prophecy with apocalyptic, totalized,
tyrannical vision—it would be just as mistaken to consider oneself the passive victim of a
concept of history that would brook no human intervention or re-determination. Hence, if
Fox argues that “all the actions of [Milton] occur in the last measurable segment of the
moment, the last fragment of time itself, the instant before apocalypse puts an end to
time” (18), such a dire vision is owing to her metaphysics. For that fragment itself
fragments; the renovating moment of Blakean prophecy redeems time not by returning it
to an illusory Eden of plenitude but by revealing time itself as a state about to be created
and re-created—like Milton himself.
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C h a p t e r F iv e

“The dark destiny that involves us”: Caroline Lamb, Mary Shelley,
and the Supplement of Prophecy

Creatio est exodus, non est restitutio in integrum
—Ernst Bloch, Atheism in Christianity

I. Prophetic Rebellion as Counterhistory

The ambivalence between prophecy’s vatic fullness and ironic emptiness is, in the
case of the poetry discussed in the preceding chapters, expressed at the level of selfdisplacing tropes, figures, images, and rhetoric. Indeed, Coleridge’s apt description of
poetry as “an interpenetration of passion and of will, of spontaneous impulse and of
voluntary purpose” (206) suggests how Wordsworth, Shelley, and Blake generated their
particularly compact networks of affects and effects. The shapes of consciousness that
emerged in the preceding, poetic works gained depth and richness in part from poetry’s
hermeneutic extravagance, occasioned by the poets’ mingling of clear goals with more
accidental experiments: because verse relishes its complexity, any aspect of form or
content can echo, counterpoint, intensify, or undermine any other aspect in ways that are
impossible ever completely to stabilize. Poetry retains a persistent recalcitrance or
inassimilable strangeness that renders any particular reading fundamentally provisional,
thus inviting perpetual rereading. Prose, in contrast, tends to operate according to a
comparatively dilatory economy. Hence, if the paradoxes of prophetic consciousness
tended in Wordsworth, Shelley, and Blake to find expression in or as minute particulars,
these same kinds of paradoxes find expression in the prose of Caroline Lamb and Mary
Shelley both through a series of micro-events that can be gathered across the texts’
surfaces and also through the extended representation of prophetic characters. The novels
discussed below trade some of poetry’s contingency and evocative thrust for a more
deliberate and controlled delineation of content. That is, ideas, like characters and plots,
unfold serially, developing and organizing themselves more patiently over a longer
course of articulations. In other words, these novels—given their comparatively
expansive or roving forms of expression—seem, at least superficially, to parallel
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Enlightenment history’s form of discourse. For prose stresses the effects of the intervals
between pregnant, formative moments of intense consciousness just as Enlightenment
history attends to and collects the minutiae surrounding signal events.
That is, prose, typically, dwells on the spaces between Wordsworth’s spots of
time, as if to shape its world through a calmer, inductive accretion of detail rather than
bold strokes of sudden deduction akin to supernatural inspiration. Hence, prose is just as
complex as poetry, though its complexity functions differently and demands a different
approach from the reader. For instance, given the elongated nature of prosaic expression,
it is particularly difficult consistently to orient and frame one’s reading for the work’s full
duration—a work that, especially in Lamb’s Glenarvon and other Gothic texts, revels in
digression. That is, where Wordsworth, Shelley, and Blake’s densely constellated poetry
demand interpretive analysis in order to parse overdetermined instances, Lamb and Mary
Shelley’s prose requires a stronger hermeneutic synthesis. Hence, in the latter case, it is
particularly important to approach texts with a theory—a way of seeing—lest meanings
disperse into empty underdetermination: that is, lest reading fail to condense its idea and
turn, therefore, into Borges’ map of the world—a map that is ‘perfect’ only because it is
covers every inch of the globe it is supposed to represent. In this chapter on female
prophecy in Lamb’s Glenarvon and Shelley’s Valperga and The Last Man, Ernst Bloch’s
concept of atheism in the Bible affords such orientation by modeling the function of
prophetic negativity in the context of prose and of history conceived as a form of prose.
This particular concept of prophecy, however, complicates the notion of
hermeneutic synthesis and the comparison of these prose works to Enlightenment
historiography. That is, as Bloch helps to illustrate, prophecy in Lamb and Shelley is less
a discrete element or concept than a force. Indeed, reading prophecy here does not
inductively produce an “idea” of prophecy but rather unleashes a mode of negativity that
detotalizes the prose of the world in each novel. In fact, the force of prophecy in Bloch,
Lamb, and Shelley reintroduces a kind of poetic density that will displace the
comparatively neat boundaries within the fictions composed through prose’s measured
and methodical forms of delineation. Hence, the effect of prophecy on the novels
discussed below goes far beyond its episodic thematization—though readings may indeed
begin with or remain focused through discussions of prophetic figures and acts in each

work. Prophecy, that is, also becomes part of a larger performance of the text’s self
displacement and re-determination that loosens its relationship to Enlightenment history’s
own deeply prosaic structure. That is, going beyond their status as narratives about
prophecy, the form taken by Lamb and Shelley’s texts gestures toward a concept of
prophetic narrative.
* * *

In his late and little-studied Atheism in Christianity, Bloch forwards a concept of
prophecy that redeploys for practical, revolutionary purposes the detotalizing thrust of the
Romantic prophet.

That is, Bloch offers a way to think the political through prophetic

negativity without necessarily instrumentalizing prophecy. In that will serve as a model
for reading Lamb and Shelley’s novels, Bloch’s analysis casts the Bible as an
insurrectionary manifesto, though one corrupted almost immediately by political and
religious institutions that would diminish its subversive energy by transforming imminent
social and political change into a doctrine of transcendence that easily justifies and
therefore perpetuates worldly inequality and tyranny. Bloch’s task is thus to recover the
political radicalism of the Bible in an effort to affirm human agency and historical
effectiveness, to wrest Christianity from what Blake, in the preceding chapter, described
as the stagnant ideology of the Elect.148149 To this end, Bloch insists on a kind of local
148 Late in the text, Bloch is explicit concerning how his notions o f hope and utopia— key terms from his
more well-known works— while concrete, are still resolutely negative insofar as they remain non-dogmatic
and non-prescriptive, thus distancing him from Utopian Socialism and similar programs: “To speak
unmythologically, the Negative is present at the heart o f Process-as-such, motivating it as a process o f
healing salvation; for there would be no process at all if there were not something there that should not be
there, something to serve as a constant threat. What would become o f the militant dialectical primacy o f the
principle o f hope if there was not a highly actual (though not as yet decisive) presence o f Nothing (that is,
o f possible total defeat) to set it o ff as the postulate o f All (that is, o f possible total fulfillment)? [...].
[T]here is enormous Utopian potentiality in the world: potentiality for an Optimum educed from an
undefeated Negative” (248).
149 In fact, this is consistent with Zi2ek’s concluding comments in The Puppet and the Dwarf: The Perverse
Core o f Christianity, where he sees the radical potential o f Christianity as its own immanent sacrifice o f the
institution it has become. This gesture comes very close to Bloch’s notion, discussed here in more detail,
that the core or essence o f Christianity is— somewhat “perversely,” in Lacan’s sense— a kind o f atheism.
Zi2ek writes:
At the very core o f Christianity, there is another dimension. When Christ dies, what dies with him
is the secret hope discernible in “Father, why hast thou forsaken me?”: the hope that there is a
father who has abandoned me. The “Holy Spirit” is the community deprived o f its support in the
big Other. The point o f Christianity as a religion o f atheism is not the vulgar humanist one that the
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eschatology—essentially, the necessary finitude of beings and projects—that is corrosive
to all trans-historical totalization, even and especially the total violence of apocalypse.
Bloch’s prophecy is therefore resolutely negative or non-positing—his is not the utopian
socialist’s programmatic Marxism. This negative utopia finds its most complete
expression in a work like Mary Shelley’s The Last Man where, as discussed below,
history’s rational, dialectical progress is forced to encounter its own repudiated
worklessness in the form of absolute biological violence—the kind of violence
quarantined by Percy Shelley in the Wandering Jew but universalized by Mary Shelley’s
plague. At the same time, Blochian prophecy is not in the least nihilistic.150 Through his
focus on revolutionary figures such as Moses, Job, and Jesus, Bloch seeks to recover the
Bible as a utopian text, though in his specific sense of “utopia” as something concrete,
this-worldly, and yet not available to a priori formulation. That is, for Bloch, a correct
reading of the Bible—and for Lamb and Shelley, a corrected reading of institutionalized
history—helps to illustrate the concrete possibilities that inhere in the actual and are, yet,
unrealized or non-coincident with what is.
The nature of this latent possibility finds its most explicit formulation in Bloch in
The Principle o f Hope as the “not-yet-conscious,” a form of pre-consciousness that
anticipates the intersection between ripening concrete, historical conditions and
imagination’s inventions, thus opening the world to a novel form of consciousness itself,
to a shape of thinking that could not previously be thought from within existing forms of
thought. Like Lamb’s suspension of the Hegelian concept of expressive causation in
history in Glenarvon or Shelley’s double negation of prophecy in Valperga and The Last

becoming-man-of-God reveals that man is the secret o f God (Feuerbach et al.); rather, it attacks
the religious hard core that survives even in humanism, even up to Stalinism, with its belief in
History as the “big Other” that decides on the “objective meaning” o f our deeds. (171)
150 Bloch will associate prophecy with this mundane eschatology— or popular revolution— and contrast it to
the transcendence o f apocalyptic destruction. In fact, he will read the former as the condition for the latter:
“the prophets preceded the apocalyptic writers in every sense, not least in their Utopian temperament, so
radically different from that o f late Judaic Wisdom literature— a literature which people tried, so to speak,
to hook on to the lightning in the Eschaton. Indeed without the conversion o f heaven and earth which the
prophets intended, the genre o f apocalypse would be unthinkable. It would lack its specifically Hebrew
element— Prometheus” (Atheism 105-106).
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Man, Bloch considers how discourses change through a reflexive, self-critical
relationship with the thought they make possible.151 As Bloch writes,
[t]he Not-Yet-Conscious in man belongs completely to the Not-YetBecome, Not-Yet-Brought-Out, Manifested-Out in the world. Not-YetConscious interacts and reciprocates with Not-Yet-Become, more
specifically with what is approaching in history and in the world. And the
examination of anticipatory consciousness must fundamentally serve to
make comprehensible the actual reflections which now follow, in fact
depictions of the wished-for, the anticipated better life, in psychological
and material terms. From the anticipatory, therefore, knowledge is to be
gained on the basis of an ontology of the Not-Yet. (Hope 1.13)
For Bloch, the Bible retains hints of precisely this kind of openness to novel shapes of
consciousness. Those hints emerge in the various a-theisms of the text: that is, in
moments that counteract the priestly notions of “re-ligion,” of “binding back” to some
kind of origin or metaphysics that absorbs the future into a regressive itinerary (or
restrictive economy) of either Platonic anamnesis or Judeo-Christian redemption. In
contrast to these night-dreams of civilization that limit the world to a static being rather
than entertaining substantial becoming, Bloch’s reading of the Bible aims to reveal that
“there is always an exodus in the world, an exodus from the particular status quo. And
there is always a hope, which is connected with rebellion—a hope founded in the
concrete given possibilities for a new being. As a handhold in the future, a process which,
though by no means achieved, is yet by no means in vain, thanks to the never-abating
pregnancy of its solution, our solution” (Atheism 121-122).
The not-yet-conscious, the a-theism that allows consciousness and history to exit
from the status quo, is not a positive content. Rather, in comparison to the infinite
absolute negativity of irony, Bloch is interested in a kind offinite existential deficit that
suspends any historical or epistemological apocalypse that would claim to totalize the
world. Indeed, this renovating absence is situated not merely in but as the future of being,
151 Discourse here is taken in the Foucaultian sense, as a condition o f possible thought. This formulation
clearly recalls Kant though, unlike Kant’s Categories, Discourses are historically and materially determined
rather than transcendentally deduced. For Foucault, thought’s conditions are not, in other words, derived
only from thought itself but also from the particular world consciousness is necessarily embedded within,
lending an historical, social, or political dimension to critical epistemology.
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turning away from a Platonic “metaphysics [that] has become paralyzing, transfixing,
indeed even underhanded in the way it has established its Behind, its Up-there, and
become a ready-made handhold—in the way it has bolted a static door in the face of the
real Meta, the Tomorrow within the Today” (Atheism 66). Rather than detecting ‘“true
being’ [...] beneath every disturbance—whether it was called (omina sub luna caduca)
Idea, Substance or, equally handy, Matter[—][t]he new philosophy [...] both despite and
because of its real Meta, is by no standard just more old metaphysics. For its relationship
to the Not-yet-manifest does not allow of the slightest hint of an ‘ontos on[,\ of an
ontology, therefore, that being inwardly agreed and settled as the Behind-there, has
already got everything completely settled and behind it” (Atheism 66). Bloch’s
nontology, if you will—recalling Percy Shelley’s “process” (Hogle) or Blake’s anti
Newtonian perspectivism (Ault)—sees the future open up in the very immanence of the
void as the possibility of a real becoming. In Bloch’s words, ii[t]he being that conditions
consciousness, and the consciousness that processes being, is understood ultimately only
out o f that and in that form which and toward which it tends. Essential being is not Beenness; on the contrary: the essential being of the world lies itself on the Front” (Hope 18,
Bloch’s emphasis). So rather than a predictive itinerary, Bloch’s form of prophecy breaks
from conventional metaphysics insofar as that metaphysics relies both on a notion of
Being’s plentitude or fullness and binds all possibility to the excavation of an immanent,
universal Truth. That is, “the dialectically concrete Utopia and the Possibility—
‘Substratum’—of the Novum does not belong to the old metaphysics with the
reasonableness [...] of this simple binding-back, this bare re-ligio” {Atheism 69). Bloch
adopts, rather, the “subversive and un-static heritage of the Bible [...] which, in the
exodus from the static order, showed itself far more as pure protest, as the archetype of
the Kingdom of Freedom itself,” though one that is, at the same time, “the abolition of
every On-high which has no place for man; as a transcending with revolt, and equally a
revolt with transcending—but without transcendence” {Atheism 69).
Reading the Bible, counterintuitively, as a protest against transcendence is for
Bloch what marks the Hebrew shape of thought as essentially historical in contrast to the
Greek or Hellenic thought that will be responsible, in part, for the conflation of Jesus as
the “Son of Man” with Jesus as “Kyrios-Christos”—that is, a confusion between Jesus-
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as-human, as described by the Apostles, and the universalized, deified form of Jesus-asGod.

The sense of thought’s and being’s constitutive incompleteness creates the

condition for a concept of history that is not only fundamentally messianic but also
temporalized: the future remains open and uncertain. Indeed, Bloch emphasizes that God
describes himself not in terms of presence but in terms of possibility, necessitating
temporal protraction: E h’je ascher eh’je, “I will be what I will be.” Hence, at its root, the
Exodus impulse in the Bible is not mere restlessness or a lack of patience. Rather, it is the
fundamental non-identity in the very concept of the Absolute itself. Exodus does not
name merely the exit from one or another determinate, oppressive situation (although it
does mean this too) but rather reflects the very principle or power of that movement. This
includes the movement of history itself that opens not just a new future but a new concept
o f the future:
Exodus from every previous concept of Yahweh [i.e., any oppressive
authority] was now possible, with this Futurum as the true mode-of-being
of that which is thought of as God; more possible than it had ever been in
all the interpolated promises to Abraham. The Bible-of-Exodus became
possible: of Exodus away from and against the Pharaoh who, in the person
of Yahweh himself, had made only Egypt, not Canaan—not the “new
heaven and new earth.” —In short: the rebellion, the prophetic witness, the
Messianism of a no longer merely underground Bible has, in the Moriah
of Eh j’e ascher eh je, broken half-way out into the light of freedom.
(Atheism 92-93)
Just as active “contraries” ought not to be reduced to static, hierarchical “negations” in
Blake—just as the state is always re-stated in imagination such that “Milton” is only ever
a “State about to be Created” (35.27, my emphasis)—so this notion of Exodus ought not
to be confused with something finally determinate, as if Exodus could exit from itself,
could cancel itself and rest. As Bloch insists, “this exodus is not one away from Exodus
itself ’ (Atheism 122). Rather, Exodus ‘as such’ is what defines the historical dimension of
Hebrew thought. This is a tense negativity that Bloch, echoing Blanchot’s description of 152
152 “The lordly, majestic element o f apocalyptic thought does, as we shall see, lead away from the innate
humanness o f the archetypal Son o f Man; but there is still a long way to go to the later Hellenistic picture
o f the Kyrios-Christos who does not dwell among us, but descends upon us from on high” (Atheism 162).
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prophetic speech as “a wandering speech” (Book 79), will describe as a “wandering
Where-to, not only in the desert, but in time” (Atheism 93).
Bloch thus reads the Hebrew prophets as agents of this restless negativity of
temporality—a force that is both deeply temporalizing and yet susceptible to repression.
For even the more complex, dialectical historical paradigms tend toward the totalization
of particularity insofar as they aim for some kind of explanatory power, a power that
must be in some sense a generalization and (retroactive) organization. For Bloch, in other
words, the Hebrew prophet, protesting the intolerable condition of the present, reveals the
present’s relative contingency and instability, reveals the void of the not-yet-conscious
that betrays the state’s claim to total rationality or plentitude, as if nothing other than the
present state, in terms of its fundamental logic or universal grammar, were possible.

In

a sense, this is to suggest that the concept of exodus becomes, in the prophets, a new form
of genesis itself, as if to reverse the order of the first two books of the Hebrew Bible. For
“the verbum mirificum of the one who founds and saves calls forth in the prophets the
very creative essence of a World creator and infuses it into the promise of a very different
Genesis—one which at last is just” (Atheism 105); it is the “awaited and not in any sense
the remembered Genesis that blossoms forth” (Atheism 105) in the prophet’s (as it were)
peripatetic locutions. And it is precisely this new sense of genesis itself—the ability of
life to modify its own conditions or to determine itself to some degree autonomously—
that marks Hebrew prophecy’s distinctive historicity. In contrast, Cassandra’s paralysed
and paralysing relationship to history—she can see the future but is fated not to be
believed by others—defines, for Bloch, the Greek concept of prophecy as a kind of tragic
fatality, a “passive type of augury” (Atheism 103). That is, when Greek prophecy trades
human finitude for timeless ideas—just as Greek thought tries to turn the merely human
Jesus into a manifestation of a transcendent idea, the aforementioned Kyrios-Christos—it153

153 There is a tension between the possible and the impossible in history that the prophet serves to highlight.
For there is a sense— following Z iiek ’s reading o f Henri Bergson— that what is thought o f initially as
impossible (some kind o f new future, say) is recognized as possible through history but only retroactively,
such that history is always a rhythm where the “simultaneously probable and impossible” event is recast as
the simultaneously “real and possible” actuality (Zi2ek 159). This suggests that possibility, oddly, opens up
only after a certain foreclosure. And yet, the implication is not that possibility’s contingency is absorbed
into total determination. Rather, more troublingly, if possibility’s ambivalent futurity can open up
retroactively, then this suggests that what the State deems most stable— what is definitely prohibited—
becomes, in fact, deeply uncanny in that this impossibility is identical with the possible.
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sacrifices thought’s active relationship with historical becoming. Cassandra can predict
the future only insofar as she is rendered effectively impotent or passive. Bloch thus
suggests that the difference between the Greek and Hebrew treatment of Jesus models the
different attitude concerning the relationship between historical prediction and historical
agency: the intensification of prophetic prediction undermines agency; positive
knowledge is inversely related to effective praxis. Or, put differently, potential agency
broadens precisely to the degree that the negativity of Exodus and the not-yet-conscious,
the hallmarks of Hebrew historical ‘consciousness,’ suspend predictability.154 Indeed, in
the novels discussed below the Greek mode of prophecy is associated with disabling,
sexualized violence and undercut by a second, Hebrew form of prophecy.
That is, in the Greek mode, as in all predictive itineraries, time is spatalized and
history is reduced to the mere presentation of what always already is. In contrast, the
Hebrew model—Bloch takes Jonah’s prophecy as exemplary—enables active
participation in determining one’s own history:
The specific prophetic contribution to this order [...] lay in the idea of an
unstimulated cooperation o f free moral choice in one's fate, right up to the
very last. This cooperation is like a new switching-over of the points, and
it marks the difference between the prophet Jonah and the destruction of
Nineveh which he averted (without, it is true, comprehending it), and the
Greek “prophetess” Cassandra, who could only foresee the curse of the
Atrides, without being able, by any appeal for conversion, to forestall it. It
[i.e., Biblical prophecy] is the first preaching and proclamation of the
moral trend which goes the opposite way. the Novum is here, right up to
the point of “Repent, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand,” and the
almost theurgical words “Repent therefore, and turn again, that your sins
may be blotted out, that times of refreshing may come from the presence
of the Lord” (Acts 3.19f.). The prophets taught a mature freedom of
choice extending even to fate; they taught the power of human decision.
That is why they all speak of the future not as an immutable category but

154 Consciousness is in quotation marks here as it is becoming clear that Hebrew prophecy and
historiography is closely related to the non-conscious and even the unconscious.
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hypothetically, as a changeable, chooseable one. {Atheism 102-103,
Bloch’s emphasis)
Put differently, the Hebrew form of prophecy introduces the possibility—and the
complication—of a contingency that has historical, causal efficacy. While history might
not be simply or directly manipulable, the Biblical prophet suggests that there is a
complicated and somehow reciprocal relationship between determinate will and historical
circumstances, or that at least cause cannot be located in a single overriding agent or
force.
In the texts considered below, the female prophets act as historical critics by
gesturing to the closures and systemic repudiations on which prevailing historical
discourses rely. That is, the texts complicate the narrative coherence of Enlightenment
and Romantic, dialectical history by complicating the place of women and female
prophets in that narrative. Hence, despite the many differences in content between
Lamb’s Glenarvon and Shelley’s Valperga and The Last Man, one vital similarity is that
each text exposes how temporal discipline through universalizing narratives or official
history is complicit with and even relies on disciplining the alterity of the female. For
instance, Lamb’s prophetess, Elinor St Clare, serves as a figure for Lamb’s complex
treatment of history as a material practice—a practice that constructs Glenarvon as a
reliquary of private artefacts as well as a snapshot of the 1798 Irish rebellion. For just as
St Clare rejects her own Cassandrian foresight in an effort to de-determine Irish history,
so Lamb’s tendency to over-saturate her narrative’s history, to turn historical narrative
into the effect of manifold and irreducibly overlapping causes, effectively dislocates
anything like an Hegelian or Marxian concept of expressive historical causality. In this
respect, Louis Althusser’s discussion of historical overdetermination and structural
causation offers a way to theorize Lamb’s concept of history as a nascent critique of
rational concepts of history in the nineteenth century. So, if Glenarvon is typically
understood as a roman á clef about the scandalous affair between Lord Byron and
Caroline Lamb—wife of the future Prime Minister of England—a closer look at how it
complicates causation and historical representation suggests that the text’s designation as
a form of allegory is deeply misleading: for, Lamb, like Blake, displaces the closed
economy of substitution by offering conflicting and competing material hypotexts. In this
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way, Lamb’s narrative makes a kind of Blochian exodus from the shadow of Byron and
the one-sided history that has essentially foreclosed any literary reading of Glenarvon,
treating it typically only as a footnote within the life of Byron.
In Valperga, Mary Shelley looks more closely at predictive, Greek prophecy in
terms of a curse; again, for all their differences, this is a theme all three novels share.
Indeed, through her treatment of Beatrice, the prophetess of Ferrara, Shelley takes this
one step further, suggesting that prophecy is in fact politically and socially dangerous—
as if the curse might be, like the plague in The Last Man, contagious. Hence, Beatrice and
other prophetic characters in the text—in fact, all characters that seem to be associated
with any kind of temporal determination, including even Pepi the usurer, who turns
another kind of excessive ‘profit’—are subject to hellish punishment. Indeed, what is odd
is how excessively the text polices prophecy and other superstitions given its Medieval
context. For while modem readers might understand predictive prophecy as kind of
superstition, the sense of an integrated, unified, or essentially completed time seems
consistent with the universe depicted in Dante’s Comedia: a worldview that Valperga
explicitly invokes in the text’s opening pages. Hence, Valperga's hostility toward
prophecy can be read symptomatically as an indication that prophecy is beginning, in the
historical moment depicted, to emerge as a supplement. The logic of the supplement in
the context of prophecy, as argued throughout this study, suggests that the rise of
prophecy as a predictive mechanism is coextensive with the intensification of the
discontinuity it is intended to ameliorate; if prophecy is called on to supplement the sense
of historical regularity, this solicitation and supplementation hints at a more profound gap
or deficiency in the discourse of history itself. Hence, Shelley’s treatment of Beatrice and
other prophetic figures exposes how the male-dominated institutions charged with
historical disciplinarily—in every sense—become almost schizophrenic: in their attempts
to repudiate the very supplement they solicit to reinforce the sense of social and political
coherence that is revealing itself more and more as the incoherent will-to-power of
tyrannical men, these institutions wish both to eliminate and to ignore the evidence of
their own failure as institutions. When the text aims to eliminate its own prophetic
symptoms this only, ironically, draws more attention to prophets as symptoms and to the
hypocrisy behind this attempted elimination.
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Finally, Shelley frames The Last Man in terms of sibylline prophecy. In so doing,
she places her text within a particularly disabling concept of prophecy that highlights the
connection between the perfect determination—that is, elimination—of contingency and
sexualized violence. As the myth of the Sibyl (discussed below) illustrates, rational and
universal history relies on literally disciplining female ‘irrationality.’ Indeed, within the
novel’s narrative, Evadne, echoing Virgil’s Dido, represents the threat of female desire—
a threat that bears directly on ideologies of nation and state-building as the material
instantiation and perpetuation of reason. For it is no accident that Evadne, hailing from
Greece, is the mysterious architect whose designs for the state’s archive—that is, a new
national gallery—fascinate Raymond. Raymond’s rejection of Evadne thus repeats the
repudiation of femininity and female desire that forms the very foundation—figuratively
and literally, in this case—of the political state. Shelley, however, refuses to allow this
treatment to pass unnoticed. Hence, what the plague unleashes is something like what
Kant calls “natural revolution” (Conflict 161): a disorder so fundamental that it threatens
not only all rational projects but even the project of reason itself, the promise of the
eventual unity of ‘faculties.’
So, if The Last Man aims in some measure to validate female sexuality, this is not
accomplished through fictional wish fulfilment or utopian scenarios. Shelley, rather,
seems intent not to frame her project in terms of utopia. Unlike Percy, there is here no
Promethean Age. Unlike Blake, there is no redemption—even if that concept of
redemption is radically reformulated as self-exposure. This is because utopian framing
would only reiterate a disabling ideology: something elaborated on in detail through the
violent attack on the faculty of imagination in both Valperga and The Last Man. Rather,
The Last Man functions as history’s purgative. Shelley’s text is not a completely
depressing vision of humanity; despite appearances, she does not simply detail the
victory of entropy wherein the world ends with a whimper. Rather, she imagines a total
historical catharsis: Shelley’s fictional spelunkers and actual readers are able to
experience the end—as both completion and elimination—of a particular form of history
or ideology by living through it fictionally. This is why the frame of the narrative in The
Last Man is so important: in stark contrast to Cassandra’s curse or Beatrice’s fate—that
is, in contrast to the form of prophecy that dominates history inside each narrative—the
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subject outside the frame is, in fact, in the position of Jonah, one witnessing an immanent
yet only possible future. Greek prophecy is here encased in Hebraic prophecy, catalyzing
a negative dialectic where the negativity of total depopulation is, itself, negated. That is,
while Evadne’s Greek or Cassandrian prophecy155 negates the rationality of the state and
the progressive history articulated by the state, her prophecy is itself negated. Recalling
both Kierkegaard and Bloch, this double negation constitutes the infinite absolute
negativity that suspends the actual world, opens an exodus from the state (of history), and
becomes the concept of hope.
What Althusser in his “Letter on Art” says of Tolstoy, Balzac, and Solzhenitsyn
could be said equally of Lamb and Shelley’s texts. What these authors have in common is
that they “give us a ‘view’ of the ideology to which their work alludes and with which it
is constantly fed, a view which presupposes a retreat, an internal distantiation from the
very ideology from which from which their novels emerged. They make us ‘perceive’
(but not know) in some sense from the inside, by an internal distance, the very ideology
in which they are held” (204, Althusser’s emphasis). As aesthetic productions, Lamb and
Shelley’s texts are not perhaps explicit critiques of history; and yet, the works under
consideration use prophecy to gesture toward their own histories in strange and
provocative ways. Like the repetition of “here... here” in “Home at Grasmere” discussed
in chapter two, the emphasis in these works on their respective historical situations has an
oddly alienating effect. That is, this gesturing creates a shutter or syncopation between
historical cause and effect—between the conditions and relations of (historical)
production—that opens a space for thinking about history as ideology. This tremor
promises not an escape from ideology so much as the possibility of an immanent critique
of the historical discourses within which each text must work. In contrast to
Wordsworthian harmony, this syncopation or non-identity within cultural productions—
this immanent Exodus in Bloch’s terms—represents the persistent irritation performed by
temporality’s transcendence without transcendence. Hence, one can frame the critique of
155 Barbara Jane O ’Sullivan’s “Beatrice in Valperga: A New Cassandra” helps to bring out Shelley’s
abiding interest in the figure o f Cassandra across several o f her texts. But where O’Sullivan reads Shelley’s
“Cassandra complex” (140) as a calculated pessimism— “the prophetess is a tragic character whose
example is ultimately debilitating rather than liberating” (142)— intended to undercut Percy Shelley’s
optimism, my reading tends rather to see Mary Shelley invoking but also actively negating this disabling
mode o f prophecy. This becomes a way to reintroduce Bloch’s principle o f hope: a kind o f negativity that
can be critical and yet still optimistic.
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history-as-ideology in terms of the ambivalence constitutive of prophecy, wherein
prophecy’s predictive exigency is displaced by prophecy’s ironic ‘foundation’ in an acute
sense of historical discontinuity, revolt, and revolution.

II. Splitting Heirs in Glenarvon

In contrast to a brand of historical fiction that weaves fictional plots around actual
historical figures and events without essentially questioning or displacing history itself,
Caroline Lamb’s Glenarvon formulates history in terms of idolatry. That is, history no
longer serves as a stable background but becomes fetishized: history is objectified and
treated explicitly as a discourse of mystified veneration. Lamb does this in order to draw
attention to and undermine what Blake calls “Priesthood” (Marriage 11): to remind
culture that its deified values are in fact “genetic” in Nietzsche’s sense—that is, produced
in and through human, not divine, agencies. Hence, throughout Glenarvon, historical
material is quite ironically collected in a reliquary and put on display. The consciousness
with which this is done suggests less that the novel falls victim to fetishism than that
Lamb, in a very canny and Byronic move, draws attention to social mechanisms of self
delusion including history’s self-legitimizing narratives. Most importantly, though,
Lamb’s historical idolatry does not ultimately culminate in a reassertion of authenticity:
the idol is not replaced with the icon, history’s relativity and plasticity are not cancelled
by a new transcendence. Rather, history thus fractured from any appeal to the
iconography of Natural Law reveals the prophetic negativity of temporality that enables
what Bloch, above, described as transcendence without transcendence. With its own form
of double voice—one both vengeful and humorous, and encapsulated, as discussed below
in more detail, in the rhetorical form of the pun— Glenarvon experiments with different
ways that history and aesthetic production relate to each other. The text, in other words,
thematizes the more and more ambiguous causality that emerges within a hopelessly
idolatrous economy of representation, something noticeable in the novel’s strangely
distant intimacy with the 1798 Irish Rebellion. Moreover, Glenarvon formalizes the
problem of historical cause and effect by incorporating material remainders from Lamb’s
affair with Byron—objects that in effect are Byron insofar as Byronic identity becomes
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absorbed in a growing celebrity economy—and casting the text as an irreverent reliquary
of these non-totalizable fragments.
As John Clubbe notes, “twentieth-century readers” of Caroline Lamb’s Glenarvon
“have not dealt kindly with the novel” (208). The treatment is understandable. For even if
one hesitates to dismiss the text outright, as earlier critics have, as “the product of
hysteria” (Chew 141) or “diseased sexuality” (McDayter 156), the work remains a
clumsy melodrama populated by shallow, often one-dimensional characters. While
Clubbe promotes a return to the text, he still considers Glenarvon's value to be its
“biographical and social” insight, the novel gaining a merely derivative value as a
“portrait of Byron” (208). Beginning in the early 1990s, a series of studies by people like
Peter Graham, Malcolm Kelsall, Gary Kelly, and Duncan Wu expanded Lamb’s profile
and looked more closely at how she appropriates Byron’s own style and persona. While
often insightful, these works still characterize Lamb as Byron’s parasite. Most recently,
work by Clara Tuite, Leigh Dickson, and Paul Douglass (whose three-volume Works o f
Caroline Lamb was published just last year [2009]) have considered how the materiality
of the Byron-Lamb affair informs both of their literary productions: Douglass, for
instance, argues that Lamb wrote “with an understanding of the economic market place
and readers’ expectations” (xvi), that she was much more calculating than has hitherto
been acknowledged. By loosening—though not severing—the bond between Lamb and
Byron, Douglass affords Lamb a wider range of concerns and opens her oeuvre to new
hermeneutic experiments. In this vein, Dickson suggests that Lamb’s primary concern is
the “Whig aristocracy” and her own “historical moment of cultural production” (371,
370); and Ghislaine McDayter gestures toward Lamb’s investment in Romantic “politics
and philosophy” (162). Building on this trend, it is fruitful to look more closely at
Lamb’s treatment of history and historical representation in Glenarvon. For while Lamb
adopts a Byronic stance toward historical representation, her concern is not exclusively
with the representation of Byron (in her text and more widely) but with, in Lamb’s
language, a certain concept of “idolatry” as historiography.
Lamb experiments with a concept of idolatry and a practice of material collection
throughout Glenarvon that adapts the complex form of identity that Byron calls
“mobility” and which he defines, in a note to Don Juan, as “an excessive susceptibility of
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immediate impression” (1071 n869). “Mobility” describes a kind of contagious
personality, the notion that identity, in Jerome McGann’s words, “involves a structure of
social relations” (40) and remains receptive to changes in social contexts. This
atomization of the subject complements the growth of what Tom Mole terms the
“branded identity” (16) of Romantic celebrity. In contrast to idealist notions of
subjectivity as perfect self-appropriation, the Byronic subject seems, increasingly, to be
distributed throughout culture and to become radically susceptible to misappropriation,
plagiarism, or piracy. That is, the self is neither completely particular nor completely
universal but rather hovers between the two extremes, like what John Plotz calls a
“portable property,” a “third term between ‘abstract commodity’ and ‘autochthonous
thing’” (17). This mobility deconstructs the binary between proper and improper self
appropriation by re-conceiving subjectivity as always already misappropriated, as
radically absorbed by a set of socio-cultural relations outside the subject’s total control.
Hence, if this absorption is the norm, if misappropriation defines the proper self, then one
must suspend the pejorative prefix, the mis-: misappropriation implies transgression only
because it implicitly retains a metaphysical nostalgia for proper self-possession as the
ground of the authentic self, the self as property.
When identity is thus unmoored—or, rather, moored in a more complex,
nebulous, and indeed concrete way—the concept of sincerity changes in a manner that
has implications for matters of historical representation. Given no single, self-contained
essence against which to gauge dissimulation, the subject enters into a play of pure
simulation, a situation where a “mask” covers not a face but only another mask. Hence,
sincerity metamorphoses into a kind of fidelity to contingency; what is most sincere is
nothing other than the subject’s responsiveness to his or her surroundings. In fact, it is the
subject’s attitude toward this version of social being that re-situates ethical
determinations. For, as McGann notes, not all “lying” amounts to “cant”: “lying” betrays
an awareness of the melancholy of simulation, whereas cant, like a recalcitrant dogmatist,
“reifies these deceptions” (McGann 69). Ultimately, idolatry, as developed in Glenarvon,
is in the historiographical register what Byron’s notion of sincere lying is in the ethical
register. Idolatry, in Lamb’s hands, names a kind of representation that resists the closure
imposed by transcendent notions of identity. It is intensely anti-mimetic. That is, Lamb’s
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‘idolatry’ is a form of appearance that is not anxious about how it misrepresents essence
because it displaces the very metaphysics o f appearance/essence. Like Hegel’s translation
of the Kantian Thing into the negative moment in a dialectical process, or Blake’s
rejection of a Newtonian universe in favor of a more phenomenological sense that reality
is consciousness’ complex activity, Lamb does not valorize idolatry’s conventional,
pejorative sense as a deficient form of representation but aims rather to displace the
conventional logic of re-presentation itself. Just as Blake retains a healthy suspicion of
any claim made by a single, overriding agent to determine history, so would Lamb view
such claims to truth as the most reprehensible cant: a reification that denies the simulation
that produces its putative truth. In fact, Lamb’s idolatry anticipates a concept of history
that could be glossed, following Louis Althusser, as a “process without a subject [...] or
goal(s)” (Essays 56): history as a phenomenon that cannot be explained as simply the
effect of a final or an efficient cause.156
As discussed in more detail below, Althusser’s theorization of causality represents
a critique of the totalizing exigency found in modem concepts of history based on some
form of expressive causality or the notion that history’s events are expressions of a
rational, transcendent order, code, or Spirit.157 This is especially apparent in comparison

156 “We are forced to say in this connexion that scientific history, like all history, is a process without a
subject, and that scientific knowledge (even when it is the work o f a particular individual scientist, etc) is
actually the historical result o f a process which has no real subject or goal(s). That is how it is with Marxist
science” (Essays 56).
157 In Reading Capital, Althusser will insist that “Marxism is not a Historicism” precisely because he sees
historicism’s claims to ground its existence as a science on Absolute Knowledge as hopelessly ideological.
Early in his fifth chapter Althusser writes:
I should like to suggest that, from the theoretical stand-point, Marxism is no more an historicism
than it is a humanism [...]; that in many respects both historicism and humanism depend on the
same ideological problematic; and that, theoretically speaking, Marxism is, in a single movement
and by virtue o f the unique epistemological which established it, an anti-humanism and an antihistoricism. Strictly speaking, I ought to say an a-humanism and an a-historicism. (119)
Later, Althusser explains in more detail why Gramsci’s notion o f Marxism as an “absolute historicism”
marks an effort only to de-transcendentalize Marx’s lingering Hegelianism, not to historicize Marxism in
accordance with Hegelian concepts o f history. That is, Marxist history, or historical materialism, must for
Althusser abdicate any claim to explain history rationally in a linear narrative o f cause and effect, precisely
because the notion o f a guiding cause or Spirit that expresses itself in particular forms o f consciousness is
too “pure”— is thus a false, ideological image that covers as much as it discloses the political unconscious
o f class conflict, alienation, and legal violence:
If Marxism is an absolute historicism, it is because it historicizes even what was peculiarly the
theoretical and practical negation o f history for Hegelian historicism: the end o f history, the
unsurpassable present o f Absolute Knowledge. In absolute historicism there is no longer any
Absolute Knowledge, and hence no end for history.
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to Winckelmann. As Meinecke writes, “Winckelmann’s new historical sense was already
in evidence in his discovery of a succession of styles in art, and the connections between
the life of art and the whole life of a nation, particularly with its political destinies. In
making this discovery, it is maintained, he superseded both the hitherto prevailing
antiquarian approach to works of art, as well as the more reflective and argumentative”
(240). In other words, Winckelmann is in the vanguard of German historical thought
because such thought is predicated upon the notion that history expresses the immanent
coherence of a period—the “spirit” of a particular people in a particular moment. For
Althusser, however, this “expressive causality” is precisely the problem with the
nineteenth-century concept of historicism: “the Marxist does not have the same structure
as the Hegelian totality, and in particular it contains different levels or instances which do
not directly express one another” (Althusser Reading 132). As Jameson notes, according
to Althusser, “any rewarding use of the notion of a historical or cultural period tends in
spite of itself to give the impression of a facile totalization, a seamless web of phenomena
each of which, in its own way, ‘expresses’ some unified inner truth” (27). Hence,
Jameson reads Althusser’s dictum, above cited, that “history is a process without a telos
or a subject” as “a repudiation of such master narratives and their twin categories of
narrative closure {telos) and of character (subject of history)” (29). This is not to suggest
that Althusser rejects history as such; rather, he will insist on displacing rather than

There is no longer any privileged present in which the totality becomes visible and legible in an
“essential section,” in which consciousness and science coincide. The fact that there is no
Absolute Knowledge— which is what makes the historicism absolute— means that Absolute
Knowledge itself is historical. (132)
Absolute Knowledge is absolute for Hegel not because thought comes to an end but rather because thought
understands itself, is perfectly self-relating. For Althusser, such perfect self-relation as the basis for any
analysis o f history amounts to something like the Marxian superstructure determining the base, abstract
thought determining actual relations, which in fact obscures the complexity o f competing, contingent
motives in actual reality. Hence, if the social, political sphere can be thought o f as some kind o f totality in
Marxism, it “does not have the same structure as the Hegelian totality, and in particular it contains different
levels or instances which do not directly express one another” (132). Hence, Hegelian Absolute Knowledge
does not represent a static totality or the end o f thought and o f history in the sense o f apocalyptic
destruction. Rather, it represents the complete explication o f the grammar o f thought and o f history such
that thought and history will continue within the closure o f the end, an end without and ending. Yet, if the
Absolute does not achieve totality in the sense o f a finished actuality, it does impose a relatively simple
concept o f historical dialectics such that Hegel maintains a kind o f totalization at the level o f cause or
Spirit, claiming that that totalization describes the space o f thought and history and cannot be displaced.
For the unity o f this Spirit is absolute precisely because it sees no relation outside o f itself—it is absolute
(“without relation”) since it claims to account for all determination or to embody all determining force in
itself.
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merely inverting Hegel’s dialectic by illustrating how contradiction as such is massively
“overdetermined” (Althusser For Marx 101). History thus acquires, retroactively, the
appearance of totality and yet remains internally fragmented since, as Jameson points out,
historical phenomena relate “by way of their structural difference and distance from one
another, rather than by their ultimate identity” (Jameson 41).

1 SR

Lamb tends in a similar direction insofar as her text displaces the ostensibly
allegorical (“expressive”) dimension of the roman á clef in favour of a more nebulous,
Althusserian understanding of cause and effect. Lamb displaces Hegelian synthesis—and
even the Marxian notion of determination “in the last instance” by economic forces—by
thematizing the parallel and irreducible histories at the level of Glenarvori* s process of
production. Starting from a similar sense of history’s irreducibly complex or
overdetermined nature, Althusser rejects both mechanical and expressive cause and
develops a concept of structural causality. In this model, cause is qualitatively different
from effect but is effectively coincident with its effect, becoming something—to use a
Kantian or Foucaultian turn—like the condition of possible effects. In Lamb’s treatment,
if cause can be understood in this way, as the conditions of production within a particular
historical moment, she too emphasizes how these conditions are impossible perfectly to
stabilize, making it impossible perfectly to map the relationship between cause and effect
and to reduce history to a single narrative arc. Any attempt to produce a snapshot of the
relations of production in historical life would be double, triple, or perhaps infinitely
(over) exposed. This is not to say that cause does not exist or function: cultural products
can indeed be thought of as the effects of some kind of causal network. It is, however,
impossible perfectly to determine this relationship, impossible to eliminate the reflexive
influence of such ‘productions,’ and therefore impossible entirely to quarantine effects158
158 In For Marx, Althusser calls the Hegelian version o f contradiction “the ‘weakest link’” (94) in Hegel’s
historiography because in Hegel the terms in contradiction oppose each other in an ideal space,
unencumbered by the range o f forces that in reality muddy the simplicity o f such opposition. Indeed that
muddiness could be called ideology— or rather, the failure to see and to acknowledge the muddiness or
distortion itself is ideological. That is, what is ideological or misleading about Hegel’s understanding o f the
relationship between terms in contradiction— what could in Marxian terms be glossed as, say, class
conflict, or the gap between the conditions and the relations o f production— is that an “Hegelian
contradiction is never really overdetermined” since it overlooks how “the ‘contradiction’ is inseparable
from the total structure o f the social body in which it is found, inseparable from the formal conditions o f
existence, and even from the instances it governs; it is radically affected by them, determining, but also
determined in one and the same movement, and determined by the various levels and instances o f the social
formation it animates” (101).

237

from causes. In other words, Lamb’s version of structural causality—like her treatment of
idolatry—is not a skeptical endorsement of mere contingency or arbitrariness but rather
suggests that any simplification of the relationship between history and historical
representation is an ideological error. Rather, history’s overdetermination means that
there always remains an obscure kernel of inassimilable negativity, a kernel that amounts
to the very preserve of the possible within the actual. Causal overdetermination as a form
of indeterminacy becomes the condition for the possible re-determination of the socio
cultural scene—for the possible revolution of prevailing logics—by complicating the
nature of causation itself.
In order to understand how Lamb’s ironic treatment of idolatry and causality
inform her historical sensibility, it is necessary to look at the social and material
conditions of Glenarvon's production. Lamb’s novel, published in May of 1816, was an
immediate success in large part because it was an enormous scandal. For readers soon
recognized the text as a code. To be sure, “the popularity of Glenarvon rested on the
widespread assumption that it described [Lamb’s] relations with Byron”—a well-founded
assumption since “it includes Byron’s letter announcing the end of their affair” (Wu 143).
Byron had an intense if brief affair with Lamb in the summer of 1812. The relationship
and its aftermath were full of theatrical scenes that seem to find their way, obliquely, into
Glenarvon's narrative, suggesting some kind of complex causality. It was also a
relationship full of rather odd exchanges of material objects—a materiality emphasized in
Lamb’s decision to paste Byron’s actual letters into her text, attributing them to
Glenarvon. For instance, Lamb’s gift of her own pubic hair and request for Byron’s
reciprocation is one particular exchange critics have enjoyed recalling. In fact, Byron,
taking advantage of the similarity between his own and Lady Oxford’s hair, responded
with a prank, returning his newest paramour’s hair in place of his own. Writing to Lady
Melbourne, he refers to this as the “double hair” (Letters 3.37) episode. While there are
several other material artifacts—a miniature portrait, rings, buttons, et cetera—involved
in Lamb and Byron’s correspondence, it is important to single out the hair, specifically,
for two reasons. First, it is an organic, bodily token that gestures toward the status of
Glenarvon as a reliquary. As a reliquary, however, Glenarvon does not amount to a
sentimental mourning of Byron’s absence. Rather, the work undermines history’s claim
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to internal coherence and the common assumption that material objects are somehow
more reliable for historians, since these objects acquire complex and conflicting
valorizations that cannot be reduced to their mere objectivity. Second, it forms the basis
for the plot structure in Glenarvon—a recognition that helps not only to set the novel’s
tone but radically to revise conventional expectations concerning the relationship
between historical, material conditions as causes for aesthetic, fictional effects.
The aim here is to consider two ‘levels’ of history—levels, however, that form not
a stable, hierarchical scheme (as in a simplified Marxism’s base-superstructure model)
but that tend rather to (un)ground each other. First is the cultural history o f Glenarvon's
construction through Lamb’s practice of material collection: this includes the trinkets and
charms from her affair with Byron that make their way into her text. Second is the
treatment of history in Glenarvon, understood, specifically, as a kind of deconstructed
idolatry—that is, a form of idolism that actively rejects the metaphysics that would
reduce idolatry to a false or deficient mode of representation. The important question
becomes how these two ‘levels’ of history communicate with each other or how they are
mediated. For the effort to synthesize the history o f and the history in Glenarvon
demands a concept of history that breaks radically from providential models of historical
representation as well as from Enlightenment forms of historiography that insist on a
qualitative distinction between history and romance. In other words, the importance of
looking at the material conditions of Glenarvon's production is not so much to ‘explain’
the relationship between the work’s content and its historical context, as to re-consider
the very nature of that relationship.
Glenarvon is set in Ireland during the 1790s and explicitly maps its narrative onto
important historical events such as the third Battle of Ushant, on June 1, 1794, the battle
of Camperdown, on October 11, 1797, and, more broadly, the Irish Rebellion of 1798.
The plot, however, focuses on what might seem to be, given its setting, a relatively
peripheral history: the seduction of the fictional Calantha Delaval, daughter of the Duke
of Altamonte, by the charismatic and mysterious leader of the United Irishmen, Lord
Glenarvon. With a typically Gothic series of deceptions, the text slowly unfolds
Glenarvon’s participation—via his alter-ego, Viviani—in a plot concocted by Calantha’s
aunt, Lady Margaret, to ensure that the Duke’s estate is entailed to her son, Buchanan, by
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murdering Albert, Calantha’s brother and the Duke’s infant heir. That is, Lady Margaret
hopes her son Buchanan will marry Calantha—to whom, as the only child, the estate
would be entailed—thereby acquiring legal access to a wealth that Lady Margaret would
otherwise be excluded from. Rather than kill the child, however, Glenarvon-Viviani has a
peasant’s child murdered in his place and sends the heir to Italy to be raised in secret by
his associate, Count Gondimar. But when Lady Margaret rejects Glenarvon’s romantic
advances despite his services, he palliates his ego through various conquests, seducing
and betraying first the prophetess Elinor St Clare (discussed below in more detail), then
Calantha, and finally the Irish nation as a whole. For not only does he lure Calantha into
an adulterous affair only to abandon her but also, upon regaining his hereditary titles, he
turns traitor and joins the English campaign against the very rebels he helped to organize,
including St. Clare, from whom he had already romantically detached himself.
As this plot might suggest, Lamb’s text is comical and witty rather than
hysterical. That is, she turns Byron’s “double hair” prank discussed above into her own
“double heir” plot. In fact she doubles the doubling, as both Albert and Glenarvon
represent ‘doubled’ heirs: in each case the authentic heir is replaced by a similar-looking
but inauthentic other. With an absurdity reflecting a certain cool and measured reflection,
Lamb entertains a pun at the heart of her text that both reflects and redeploys the complex
history of material exchange with Byron. In other words, while one might hesitate to
agree with Jeffery Cass that Glenarvon's transgressiveness lies in its allusion to and
promotion of the stoicism embodied by Calantha’s namesake in John Ford’s The Broken
Heart (1633), an awareness of Lamb’s humor, nevertheless, helps to free Glenarvon from
its characterization as a purely reactive, sentimental work that derives all its value,
negatively, from Byron. In fact the pun, as the rhetorical or structural model for the
relationship between history and romance—a model that reflects a more nebulous
concept of causality—helps illuminate the odd way that Lamb both highlights and
diminishes the place of Irish history in her text.
Glenarvon seems conflicted in terms of its investment in Irish politics and
history—a conflict that bears precisely on the question of prophecy taken in Bloch’s
terms as the immanent negativity of historical revolution. That is, the text appears willing
both to entertain its own determination by historical circumstances and yet to reserve a
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kind of veto, a power simply to detach itself from those conditions, that is represented
most explicitly by the prophets in the text, Camioli and Elinor St Clare. Elinor is the
daughter of Camioli, a man “who, misled by a fine but wild imagination, which raised
him too far above the interests of common life, had squandered away his small
inheritance; and had long roved through the world, rapt in poetic visions, foretelling, as
he pretended, to those who would hear him, that which futurity would more fully
develop” (5). Camioli, however, considers his own gifts, his “comprehensive view [of]
the universal plan of nature—unnumbered systems performing their various but distinct
courses, unclouded by mists, and unbounded by horizon—endless variety in infinite
space!” (6), to be a kind of curse. Upon leaving the infant Elinor to be raised by his
brother and sister-in-law, Camiloi prays, “may the God of Mercy avert from you the
heaviest of all my calamities, the power of looking into futurity” (6). In fact, Camioli
wields this strange power as a weapon when, years later, an embittered Elinor threatens to
ignore his requests for a deathbed interview: “oh hasten [Elinor]; for in the frantic agony
of his [i.e., Camioli’s] soul, he has cursed thee; and if thou dost not obey the summons,
with the last breath of departing life, he will bequeath thee his malediction [i.e., his gift of
prophecy]” (282). And indeed he does curse her with the ‘gift,’ his only heritable
property: “your father’s spirit has forsaken him: there is no recall from the grave. With
his last words he bequeathed his curse to the favourite of his heart; and death has set its
seal upon the legacy. The malediction of a father rest upon an ungrateful child!” (283).
The damaging element of the curse here seems to be that Elinor is tied to a
destructive fate, one she is, terribly, able to see in advance and yet can do nothing to
alter.159 As in the case of Cassandra, mentioned above, Apollo’s penetrating and allilluming light has become completely transfixing. In fact, the restrictive nature of this
inheritance emerges as a motto early in the text: “He [Avondale] now perceived the
bracelet on the floor of the room she [Calantha] had just quitted: and looking upon it,
read, without being able to comprehend, the application of the inscription, ‘Stesso
sangue, Stessa sorte [the same blood, the same fate]”’ (26). Prophecy, as prediction or
total determination, is here linked to blood and the body, suggesting a kind of biological

159 Early in the text, a gypsy reads Calantha’s palm and accurately determines that she will “meet, unwept,
an early end” (76). Fortune, in this way, becomes especially tyrannous.
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determinism that recalls God’s tyrannical curses in the Old Testament that would damn
families through several generations. The veto, however, that grinds against this
oppressive sense of inevitability resides in the plot’s ambiguous and ambivalent
relationship to the Irish Rebellion. For just as the Rebellion, according to several
historical sources, could likely have been successful—had, for instance, bad weather not
blown the Fraternité, carrying General Hoche, “out into the Atlantic” (Elliott 324) or if
the remaining commanders, sitting off the shore near Ireland’s Bantry Bay, decided to
invade with the substantial forces they had available—and just as the history of Ireland,
England, and France might then have been radically different from its eventual course, so
does Glenarvon flirt with revolution and appear unwilling to commit its own narrative to
one particular course of events. That is, the text enjoys its proximity to the furor and
uncertainty of the Rebellion without necessarily absorbing an historical narrative that, by
1812, would be, at least in Ireland, a well-known tragedy. This flirtation takes shape in,
as mentioned, the plot’s cautious willingness to frame itself within the political and
historical terms of Ireland in the 1790s. For instance, Glenarvon’s return to Ireland has,
according to Buchanan, entirely political grounds: “he [i.e., Buchanan] then talked of
Ireland; described the dreadful, the exaggerated accounts of what had occurred there; and
ended by assuring Gondimar, that the young Glenarvon was not dead, but was at this time
at Belfont, concealed there with no other view than that of heading the rebels” (81).
This places Glenarvon at the centre of the Rebellion. In fact, Lamb seems quite
explicitly to parallel Glenarvon with Wolf Tone, the eloquent leader of the United
Irishmen famous for his 1791 pamphlet, Argument on Behalf o f the Catholics o f Ireland,
aiming to unite Irish Protestants and Catholics against the common foe: English
occupation. In fact, upon returning to Castle Deleval from her extended stay in London,
Calantha mentions an address written, historically, by Tone but attributed in the narrative
to Glenarvon:
Lady Augusta, eager to talk, exclaimed—“Did you meet any of the patrole
[s/c] ?” “Possibly—but I was reading the address to the United Irishmen,
and could see, therefore, and think of nothing else” [said Calantha]. “Are
you aware who is the author?” “No: but it is so eloquent, so animated, I
was quite alarmed when I thought how it must affect the people.” “You
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shock me, Calantha,” said Mrs. Seymour. “The absurd rhapsody you
mean, is neither eloquent nor animating: it is a despicable attempt to
subvert the government, a libel upon the English, and a poor piece of
flattery to delude the infatuated malcontents in Ireland.” Lady Augusta
winked at Calantha, as if informing her that she touched upon a sore
subject. “The author,” said Lady Trelawney, who affected to be an
enthusiast, “is Lord Glenarvon.” (101)160
The history of the Rebellion is not limited to Glenarvon’s organization of the United
Irishmen.161 The text makes a concerted effort to map its narrative over the military
struggles of the 1790s, as when the Delevals and company are invited to “dine on board
the Royal William on the [1st] of June, in commemoration of that day and its success”
(139).162 One can here deduce the date of the narrative—something otherwise somewhat
difficult to do—as June 1, 1795, one year after the so-called “Glorious First of June” or
Third Battle of Ushant: the first and largest naval battle between France and England, in
1794. Moreover, the text’s climax coincides with Camperdown, a battle that signalled the
end of any real possibility of French aid to Irish rebels. The narrator in Glenarvon recalls
the projected itinerary of the French-controlled Dutch fleet: “the armament which had
160 While it is difficult to say precisely which text Lamb is attributing to Glenarvon, it is one likely
originally written by Tone since he acted as the first and most eloquent propagandist for the Irish
Nationalist movement at this time. His Argument pamphlet, “printed [...] by the United Irish Society,” had
“6,000 sales by early 1792,” numbers that “put it in the best-seller league” and necessitated a second run o f
“a further 10,000” (Elliott 129). If this work made Tone famous across Ireland, it may, however, be more
likely that Lady Augusta refers in this particular instance to his next major document, published in the fall
o f 1791: “Declaration and Resolutions o f the Society o f United Irishmen o f Belfast.” While brief, Tone’s
text is a forceful and effective plea for an acknowledgement o f the right to Irish self-government. Through
allusions to Thomas Paine’s Rights o f Man— Tone met Paine in 1797 (Elliott 325)— and Rousseau’s Social
Contract, Tone identifies and denounces the injustice o f foreign political occupation and calls for (at this
point, non-violent) revolution. Tone was also behind the 1796 “invasion manifesto” (Elliott 311), entitled
“Address to the People o f Ireland.” The document was to be issued to the Irish public “immediately upon
[the French military] landing disavowing all idea o f conquest, offering security and protection to religious
property and inviting the people to form a national convention which in turn would establish a government”
(Elliott 292). At any rate, it seems clear that what Lady Augusta calls “the address to the United Irishmen”
would likely allude to Tone’s work generally and perhaps to “Declaration and Resolutions” specifically.
161 There are several additional references to the United Irishmen, including Glenarvon’s gift to Calantha o f
a ring with an “emerald [and] a harp engraved upon it— the armorial bearing o f Ireland: ‘let us be firm and
united,’ was written under. ‘I mean it merely politically,’ he said smiling” (159).
162 In the Dickson and Douglass edition, the editors note that Lamb confiises the dates from one edition to
the next, occasionally giving the event the date o f the 4th o f June rather than the 1st. However, Dickson and
Douglass make an odd choice, giving the date in the text they produce as the 4thwhen the battle in question
happened, in fact, on the 1st o f June. Aside from the comedic effect this has on a date that is that is called
“memorable” (139), it also suggests something about the way Lamb is both specific and yet casual about
her text’s relationship to recorded history.
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been fitted out on the part of the Batavian Republic, sailed at a later period of the same
year, under the command of Admiral De Winter, with the intention of joining the French
fleet at Brest, and proceeding from thence to Ireland, where the discontents and
disaffection were daily increasing, and all seemed ripe for immediate insurrection” (313).
According to received history, by this time the offensive was far too little and too late to
be effective:
It was the recognition of Holland’s poor showing in the war which had
forced a reluctant De Winter out of the Texel on 7 October [1797]. The
sailing was senseless. [...]. The fleet had sailed, it seemed, for no purpose
other than to prove Dutch mettle in direct combat with the English. On 11
October it duly met Duncan’s greatly superior force and was severely
defeated within sight of the Dutch coast at the battle of Camperdown. The
Dutch fleet was decimated. Only 13 ships returned of the 27 which had
sailed; 9 of the original ships of the line were lost or captured, among
them the Vrijheid, taken with the green flag [Wolf] Tone was to have
hoisted in Ireland. (Elliott 361-362)
In what looks like a final, ideological showdown, Lamb appropriates official history and
pits Glenarvon (now fighting/or the English) and Buchanan against the hopes of Irish
emancipation: “Lord Glenarvon was at St Alvin Priory, when he was summoned to take
the command of his frigate, and join Sir George Buchanan and Admiral Duncan at the
Texel” (313).
The impression generated by splicing the political and historical investments of
Glenarvon together is, however, quite misleading. For the text routinely distances itself
from official history, asserting, for instance, that “the preparations made this year by
France, in conjunction with the allies, and the great events which took place in
consequence of her enterprises”—in other words, the novel’s historical climax—“belong
solely to the province of the historian” (313). It is as if the novel seeks to withhold itself
from the very history it so decidedly places itself within. More specifically, the text
maintains more than one ‘history,’ running at least two distinct yet parallel plot lines:
Glenarvon’s duplicity—his existence as Viviani—involves a separate set of motives and
interests that centre on Lady Margaret and develop in terms of romantic blackmail. The
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split persona allows the plot to entertain two different paths of commitment that
ultimately relativize one another, each offering a kind of exit for or exodus from—to
borrow Bloch’s term—the other. Indeed, just as Althusser will talk of the “relative
autonomy o f the superstructures and their specific effectivity” {For Marx 111), so Lamb’s
history hovers between different levels of relations. For, as much as Glenarvon concerns
political betrayal and invests itself in the extant history of the Irish Rebellion, it is equally
invested in a fictional, semi-counterhistorical romance—“semi” counterhistorical since it
is complexly related to Lamb’s personal history and her affair with Byron. Indeed, the
duplicity at the level of the text’s plot renders in formal and narrative terms the
prophetess Elinor’s final, dramatic repudiation of predictability. In a particularly
powerful scene toward the end of the novel, Elinor rejects the determinism and fate she
has been cursed to inherit. After singing some lines from “The Exile of Erin,” a popular
Irish ballad, Elinor prepares her exit from history in a moment not merely of self-blinding
but of total self-destruction, repudiating the ‘clarity’ her family name, St Clare, entails:
As she sung the last strain of the song, which the sons of freedom had
learned, she tore the green mantle from her breast, and throwing it around
the head of her steed, so that he could not perceive any external object, she
pressed the spur into his sides, and galloped in haste toward the edge of
the cliff, from which she beheld, like a sheet of fire reddening the heavens,
the blazing turrets of Belfont. She heard the crash: she gazed in triumph,
as millions of sparks lighted the blue vault of the heavens; and volumes of
smoke, curling from the ruins, half concealed the ravages of the insatiate
flame. Then she drew her horn from her side, and sounding it loud and
shrill from Heremon cliff, heard it answered from mountain to mountain,
by all her armed confederates. The waves of the foaming billows now
reflected a blood-red light from the scorching flames........
Three hundred and sixty feet was the cliff perpendicular from the vast
fathomless ocean. “Glenarvon, hurrah! Peace to the broken hearts! Nay,
start not, Clarence: to horse, to horse! Thus charge: it is for life and
honor.” The affrighted steed saw not the fearful chasm into which, goaded
on by his rider, he involuntarily plunged. But de Ruthven heard the
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piercing shriek he gave, as he sunk headlong into the rushing waters,
which in a moment overwhelming both horse and rider, concealed them
from the view of man. (344)
Just as the immeasurable ocean absorbs and overwhelms the precise measurement of the
cliffs height, so does the green mantle and covering wave envelop and dissolve the
precise vision of Elinor St Clare, returning contingency and opacity to the future. Elinor’s
final charge is thus a charge against her own foresight. Her suicide is far from solipsistic
and is rather an act of renunciation that would annihilate the ‘privilege’ of prediction in
the name of an Exodus not from Ireland per se but from the sad fate of the Rebellion
according to the historical record.

Elinor would open the future by blinding

Clarence’s—that is, again, clarity’s—view of the cliff and her own view of the inevitable.
Desperately, Elinor seeks to reintroduce hope, something not-yet-conscious, into the
historical trajectory that would-—for her, eventually, and for readers of the novel,
already—form history as we know it, namely, the Rebellion’s failure. In other words,
reintroducing hope here takes the negative form of removing the hopelessness disclosed
by her Cassandrian vision of the ‘future’ of Irish history.
In fact, Glenarvon seems constantly in a state of Rebellion against Glenarvon’s
insistence on history’s inevitability: “Calantha, the time for safety is past: it is too late
now. I have linked my soul to yours; I love you in defiance of myself; I know it to be
guilt, and to be death; but it must be. We follow but the dark destiny that involves us: we
cannot escape from fate” (213). As noted above, another way that the text registers its
protest to this kind of coercion is in its willingness to translate details from Lamb’s
relationship with Byron into the plot of the novel through a particularly audacious pun on
the “double hair” incident. Given the apparent inheritability of prophecy, the concept of
inheritance is, in Glenarvon, coloured by notions of repetition, fate, and inevitability.
Hence, it is significant that Lamb not only runs parallel plots within Glenarvon but also
opens the text to two different layers of historical context: public and private. Byron’s
private double hair joke seems to fracture the closed, restricted economy of inheritance in163

163 As noted briefly above, critics point out that the name “Calantha” alludes to the protagonist in John
Ford’s 1633 The Broken Heart. Here, Elinor’s “peace to the broken hearts” seems once again to gesture in
this direction by echoing the title itself. In fact, if stoicism is one important theme in Ford’s text, Elinor—
more than Calantha— may reflect that theme in her self-sacrifice.
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Glenarvon by offering itself as a potential origin for Lamb’s concern with inheritance.
The pun on “hair” not only opens the possibility of displacing the determinism of the
inherited curse in the novel but, further, opens the text up to very different casual
networks in terms of its own relationship, as a cultural production, to social, political, and
personal context. Like Elinor, who aims to reintroduce the opacity of Romantic prophecy
into a history that has become tyrannically determined and determining, the pun on “hair”
counteracts the notion of historical predictability contained in the novel’s treatment of
inheritance and counteracts the notion that historical context can be reduced to one single,
determining cause. The pun, in other words, is Lamb’s take on the double voice of
prophecy: a voice that announces and renounces, threatens and declaims, and is always
already a repetition of the immediacy of the Absolute, undermining at the root claims to
historical univocity.
The introduction of Lamb’s personal history thus interrupts the narrative of
official Irish history in Glenarvon. This intervention is elaborated into a larger pattern of
images and concepts that serve to counterpoint and relativize the narrative of failed
Rebellion to which the novel is, as noted above, ambivalently joined. Given the context
of the Byron-Lamb affair, it is not surprising that Lamb should, for instance, make
idolatry a recurring motif in Glenarvon, for it captures something both of Byron’s
unprecedented popularity and the vanity of the audience that affords him attention. The
text, however, suggests a more complex set of issues surrounding this concept, such that
slighting Byron becomes a relatively small part of a larger concern with cultural and
historical representation. Put differently, the motif of idolatry serves as a commentary on
the relationship between history and aesthetics when that relationship is thrown into crisis
insofar as Lamb introduces a second set of historical circumstances ‘behind’ her aesthetic
production. The text’s historical overdetermination—its multiple ‘grounding’ causes—
thus diminishes its determination by one history or another exclusively, resulting in a
production that can only reflect ‘history’ (in scare-quotes since it has lost, in its very
materiality, any claim to univocity) in a complex and conflicted way. For this idolatry
must be understood not to be a failure in representation; rather, in the absence of a stable
meta-history, representation is necessarily ‘idolatrous’ as long as it maintains its nostalgia
for an economy of representation that has become untenable.
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Lamb intensifies this ambivalence between history and representation throughout
Glenarvon by thematizing idolatry. Before his ‘murder,’ Albert, the Duke’s heir, is
repeatedly praised as an “idol” (19), as the “constant object of still encreasing idolatry”
(9); Lord Avondale, Calantha’s long-suffering husband, the narrator relates, “could only
idolize” (50) his new wife—an equivocal compliment at the best of times but especially
so in the second edition of Glenarvon, as Lamb abruptly makes the Delevals Catholics;
and Count Gondimar, addressing Viviani (Glenarvon), remarks, “life is just opening upon
you; Calantha is your idol” (84). This somewhat ameliorative sense of the term finds its
counterpoint, however, in Avondale’s later, more cynical exchange with Calantha:
“Whilst [men] believe [women] angels, we kneel to you, we are your slaves;—[but after
marriage,] we awake and find you women, and expect obedience:—and is it not what you
were made for?’—‘Henry, [replied Calantha] we are made your idols too—too long, to
hear this sad reverse’” (95). This picture of domesticity as a failed form of Keatsian
imagination, of Adam’s domestic dream-—“he awoke and found it truth” (36)—suggests
a more dysfunctional form of representation, where the idol proves false and
disappointingly mundane. Yet, this does not prevent nearly everyone in the text from
idolizing Glenarvon: “all others, like herself [thought Calantha], were enamoured of the
same idol [i.e., Glenarvon]” (158). Even Glenarvon himself, taking advantage of his
double identity to reflect on Viviani, his alter-ego, announces and seems cynically to
enjoy his idolism:
“Who is this Viviani?” he [i.e., the Duke of Altemonte] said, in a tone of
voice loud and terrible. “An idol,” replied Glenarvon, “whom the
multitude have set up for themselves, and worshipped, forsaking their true
faith, to follow after a false light—a man who is in love with crime and
baseness—one, of whom it has been said, that he hath an imagination of
fire playing around a heart of ice—one whom the never-dying worm feeds
on by night and day—a hypocrite,” continued Glenarvon, with a smile of
bitterness, “who wears a mask to his friends, and defeats his enemies by
his unexpected sincerity.” (323)
Like Byronic mobility, this final line effectively deconstructs the expected distinction
between sincerity and deception, gesturing toward the redefinition of idolatry: for idolatry
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can connote falsity only relatively within the world of composite and shifting identities
that Lamb’s pun opens, with its gesture away from biological determinism and toward a
social milieu where identity is particularly malleable—where one (clipping of) hair/heir
can be replaced by another.
Traditionally, the idol is distinguished from the icon. While the icon opens a
conduit between the human and the Divine, the idol, in contrast, diverts or
misappropriates that relation. As Jean-Luc Marion, puts it, “what the idol works to
reabsorb is, precisely, the distance and the withdrawal of the divine. [...]. Subsidizing the
absence of the divine, the idol makes the divine available, secures it, [but] in the end
distorts it” (7). If Lamb, however, introduces the concept of idolatry, she rejects this
metaphysics. For Marion’s distinction posits a transcendent essence whose inaccessibility
perpetually indebts finite humanity and relegates all representation to misrepresentation.
In contrast, Lamb seems to anticipate Jean-Luc Nancy’s analysis of idolatry:
What is condemned [with charges of idolatry], therefore, is not that which
is an “image o f’ but rather that which asserts its presence only through
itself, a pure presence in a certain sense, a massive presence that amounts
to its being-there: the idol does not move, does not see, does not speak,
“yea, one shall cry unto him, yet can he not answer”—and the idolater,
facing the idol, also does not see and does not understand. Quite the
opposite of the idol, the “real god” is, in short, only word (addressed to his
people), vision (of the heart of man), and movement (in order to
accompany his people).
Thus the idol is not condemned as imitation or copy, but rather in terms
of its full and heavy presence, a presence of or within an immanence
where nothing opens (eye, ear, or mouth) and from which nothing departs
or withdraws (thought or word at the back of a throat or in the depths of a
gaze). (Ground 30-31)
Nancy describes a kind of idol where it is not a discrepancy between appearance and
essence that generates the sense impropriety. Rather, the idol induces anxiety precisely
because, in this formulation, it denies the retreat of some kind of hyper-essence—God,
Reality, or the thing-in-itself. Lamb adopts the terms of idolatry but only, it seems,
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dramatically to explode the metaphysics implied by the attendant concept of
representation. In affirming a certain kind of idolism, Lamb aims to reconfigure the logic
of presentation and representation in historical terms as a conflict not between more or
less accurate representations (with the whole range of problems surrounding
dissimulation) but as a field of competing presentations as mere simulations.
Lamb’s concept of idolatry thus hints at the more Althusserian notion of historical
representation, one where events emerge from an “absent cause” (Jameson 35)—that is,
the cause exists but is not available except in its effects. As noted above, Althusser’s
concept of structural causation—an attempt to avoid providential schemes of
historiography from Hegel to Marx—re-conceives cause as the synchrony of productive
relations within an historical moment. Cause, then, is understood as the synchronic form
of this system.164 Lamb thinks of history in this manner, abandoning totalizing narratives
by casting her idols in a Nietzschean twilight. Indeed, just as Althusser will critique the
classic Marxist notion of economic determination “in the last instance”165 in favor of a
model of “semi-autonomous levels, each possessing its own structural and internal
necessity and constituting a kind of metonymy,” so does Lamb reject the notion that
historical cause can be attributed to a single level of the “detotalized totality” of the social
and political world (Lentricchia 122). From this perspective, the “double hair” incident
with Byron is not necessarily the efficient cause of Lamb’s plot. Rather, more
troublingly, it opens the possibility of a much wider and perhaps immeasurable nexus of
influences, of a material context that does not stabilize the relationship between history
and romance but rather reveals materiality itself to be heterogeneous or, as in Shelley’s
Hellas, in a process of active (re)formation—of revolution. As in Shelley’s play, Lamb’s
text does not merely thematize revolution but adopts a revolutionary form or style of
composition and actively performs rather than merely describes Rebellion.
This theme of idolatry in Glenarvon gestures toward the role of the “relic” in the
formal construction o f Glenarvon: for the pun on “hair” recalls a very odd circulation of
actual hair between Byron and Lamb and, moreover, suggests that a history of this kind
of fetish object might have its own genre. The word “relic,” as the Oxford English
164 “For Althusser a structure functions synchronically as the ‘system o f social relationships as a whole,’ in
Jameson’s words” (Lentricchia 122).
165 For Althusser’s critique, see For Marx, pages 111-114.
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Dictionary notes, conies from the Latin for “remains” and often refers, very literally, to
the corpse of the deceased. This is particularly relevant to Glenarvon: for it is not only
that Lamb includes Byron’s ‘hand’ in her text when she splices his correspondence with
her into the novel. She also includes the hotly contested trinkets they exchanged.
Calantha, for instance, sports a “chain and locket, which contained [Glenarvon’s] dark
hair” (187),166 as if to complete fictionally the exchange botched in reality. Similarly,
when Glenarvon presents Calantha a ring—“remember the ring; this, too, is a marriage
bond between us” (256)—Lamb presents fictionally an exchange of rings that occurred
actually but that Byron attempted to deny. Indeed, if Lamb, early in 1813, successfully
forged Byron’s signature to gain his miniature from John Murray, the form of Glenarvon
takes this ventriloquism further, as the eponymous villain is really a ‘miniature Byron’—
though one, Byron complains, he “did not sit long enough” for {Letters 330).
Hence, Glenarvon is not only concerned, thematically, with idolatry but is
constructed, formally, as a reliquary of historical fragments, a kind of museum for what
Clara Tuite describes as “the material remains and canonical relics of one of the most
celebrated but also banal love stories of literary Romanticism” (60). The scandal of the
text is thus not merely the breach in social decorum that grants the public access to
Byron’s private correspondence. Rather, the indiscretion centers on granting public
access to Byron’s corpse. For Lamb, in every sense, mortifies Byron, then places his
remains on display, reveling in the darker side of what Samantha Matthews describes as a
“culture of material and immaterial commemoration” fueled by “a heightened awareness
of the significant relationship between the materiality of death and the materiality of
books” (11). With this strategy, Lamb proves prescient: by aligning Byron’s celebrity
with the mortuary, she anticipates the public’s morbid fascination, following Byron’s
death, with his body-—as if popularity amounts to a living death, or as if death and
celebrity are basically continuous states of being.
Relics form the tissue of Lamb’s private history and help stitch together
Glenarvon's plot. These relics constitute the failed materialization of idols, abortive
attempts at incarnation that, ultimately, can only make a spectacle of their failure to

166 Lamb emphasizes this element by repeating it later in the text: “As he [Glenarvon] spoke, he placed
around her [Calantha’s] neck a chain o f gold, with a locket o f diamonds, containing his hair” (256).
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stabilize representation. Hence, while Lamb, in one sense, writes a roman a clef, in
another sense she most decidedly does not. For the roman a clef genre is essentially
allegorical, the hypotext or the key determining the surface text such that the story
remains a partial, derivative expression of a transcendent code. That is, the roman a clef
represents a form of narrative akin to predictive and restrictive prophecy. However, the
duplicity of historical material in Glenarvon—drawing as it does on public and private
history in an irreducibly ambivalent way—displaces this logic, linking history, like the
mobile Byronic subject, into a wider complex of relations that levels-out historical
material into an array of relics. In other words, St Clare’s prophetic self-annihilation
dramatizes the negation of historical determination just as the text performs a similar
displacement of historical determination at the level of its historical and narrative
materiality. Put differently, what Althusser calls an “absent cause”—the impossibility of
isolating or identifying cause except retroactively and, therefore, as something of a
fiction—could just as easily refer to an excess of cause, an abundance of hypotexts or
multiple keys, where it becomes impossible to reduce history’s figures to effects of a
single, overriding determination.
And indeed this is the case with Glenarvon. As Paul Douglass notes, characters in
Lamb’s text are not simply representatives of real individuals but composite
formations.

For instance, Glenarvon is Viviani, and he is also Byron. But he is not only

Byron: as leader of the United Irishmen, Glenarvon is, as noted above, Wolf Tone, the
co-called “prophet of Irish independence” (Elliott 1). Moreover, Glenarvon’s turn against
the rebels upon recovering his ancient titles re-casts him as the Prince Regent who, upon
inheriting the crown, turns against the Whig society he earlier patronized. In other words,
if Lamb formally and thematically invests her text in history, she also re-imagines the
relationship between narrative and history. She does so by re-conceiving history’s
materiality: on one hand, the determinism of the official history of the Irish Rebellion is
met with a prophetic negativity that aims to cancel its own predictive power; on the other
hand, Lamb’s personal history—which as a whole suspends the novel’s commitment to
the history of Rebellion—abdicates any claim to transcendent authority by treating its167
167 “Some readers o f Glenarvon could be dispassionate in assigning ‘originals’ to its characters. Robert
Wilmot was an acquaintance o f Lady Byron’s, and he wrote to her with his own key to the novel, most o f
whose characters he perceptively described as ‘compounds’ rather than ‘portraits’” (Douglass xxxv).
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own materials as fragmentary relics of identities that are not themselves simply the
daughters of memory.

III. “If we can fit but one link to another”: Binding Prophecy in Shelley’s Valpersa

Early in Mary Shelley’s historical romance, Valperga: Or, The Life and
Adventures o f Castruccio, Prince o f Lucca, Castruccio Castracani dei Antelminelli, at just
fourteen years of age, journeys from Ancona—his family’s refuge following exile from
Lucca at the hands of the Guelphs—to Florence, lured by an advertisement for a dramatic
rendering of Dante’s Inferno.

Beginning a cautionary motif that will traverse the novel

and code imagination as excessive, dangerous, and prone to self-destruction—indeed,
will align such imagination with prophecy—this performance not only “fired the
imagination of Castruccio” (65) but gained its intense effect through its extemalization of
the collective interior: “the infernal drama was acted to the life; and the terrible effect of
such a scene was enhanced, by the circumstance of its being no more than an actual
representation of what then existed in the imagination of the spectators, endued with the
vivid colours of a faith inconceivable in these lethargic days” (66). In what Castruccio
cannot help but feel as a kind of Divine punishment, the scene suddenly transforms from
an imaginary into a real Hell: a substitution that will be repeated later in the text when
Beatrice, the prophetess of Ferrara, led by her vivid, recurring dream of a deluge, falls
into the hands and the subterranean prison of the sadistic Tripalda in a literal rendering of
the depths of her own unconscious.168169 For, while Castruccio looks on helplessly, “the

168 “It had been proclaimed in the streets o f the city, by a herald sent by the inhabitants o f the quarter o f San
Frediano, that all who wished to have news from the other world, should repair on the first o f May to the
bridge o f Carraia or to the quay o f the Amo. And he added, that he believed that preparations were made to
exhibit Hell, such as it had been described in a poem now writing by Dante Alighieri, a part o f which had
been read, and had given rise to this undertaking.” (65)
169 In her meeting with Mandragola, Beatrice reveals important details o f her prophetic dream o f abduction
that she neglected or was unable to recall in her description o f this same dream— one she dreams “always
on the eve o f some great misfortune” (358)—to Euthanasia. These additional details suggest a
psychological katabasis, placing her not only in the company o f Virgil and Dante but also o f Freud.
Beyond the image o f the deserted castle islanded in a flooded plain that, earlier, terminated her memory o f
the dream, she here recalls a scene o f shadowy doubling that is really self-reflection, suggesting that the
dungeon she will literally inhabit in some way represents the caverns o f her psyche:
There was a vast, black house standing in the midst o f the water; a concourse o f dark shapes
hovered about me; and suddenly I was transported into a boat which was to convey me to that
mansion. Strange! another boat like to mine moved beside us; its prow was carved in the same
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bridge of Carraia, on which a countless multitude stood, one above the other, looking on
the river, fell” (66). Fleeing the “fearful screams” (66) of the victims and onlookers,
Castruccio, in what seems like penance for surrendering to his imagination, enters a local
church to compose himself and to thank God that he had “escaped from Hell!” (67).
In other words, Castruccio fares much better than his fellow Ghibelline, Farinata
degli Uberti, whom Dante torments in Canto Ten of Inferno. The history of Farinata—
one that looms large in the political and military conflicts Castruccio enters so
ambitiously—is particularly germane since it is through Dante’s treatment of him that
Valperga marries prophecy with relentless persecution. As Allen Mandelbaum notes,
Farinata was the name used for Manente, son of Jacopo degli Uberti, a
famous leader of the Ghibellines of Florence. At the meeting of the
victorious Ghibellines at Empoli after the battle of Montaperti in
September 1260, he vehemently opposed the proposal to destroy Florence.
He returned to Florence after Montaperti and died in 1264, one year before
Dante’s birth. In 1283, [two years after the birth of Castruccio, according

manner; its rowers, the same in number, the same in habiliment, struck the water with their oars at
the same time with ours; a woman sate near the stem, aghast and wild as I;— but their boat cut the
waves without a sound, their oars splashed not the waters as they struck them, and, thought the
boats were alike black, yet not like mine did this other cast a black shadow on the water. We
landed together; I could not walk for fear; I was carried into a large room, and left alone; 1 leaned
against the hangings, and there advanced to meet me another form. It was myself; I knew it; it
stood before me, melancholy and silent; the very air about it was still. I can tell no more;— a few
minutes ago I remembered none o f this; a few moments, and 1 distinctly remembered the words it
spoke; they have now faded. Yes; there is something mysterious in my nature, which I cannot
fathom. (379-80)
Like the “dark chariot” (2.4.143) o f the Spirit o f the Hours in Percy Shelley’s Prometheus Unbound, the
second boat is something like Beatrice’s “shadow o f [...] destiny” (2.4.146), one that will indeed “wrap in
lasting night heaven’s kingless throne” (2.4.148) though in Beatrice’s case this means not psychological
revolution but rather confirms the psychic intrusion and ascendancy o f an Evil principle. In terms o f its
connection with Percy Shelley’s work, however, the notion o f encountering one’s dream in a real scene and
falling unconscious seems to come from the final passage o f Speculations on Metaphysics where Percy
describes a different scene but the very same psychological situation, going so far as to break his text off
mid-sentence: “here I was obliged to leave off, overcome by thrilling horror” (7.67), he notes. In her note to
this passage, Mary Shelley remarks, “I remember well his [i.e., Percy] coming to me from writing it, pale
and agitated, to seek refuge in conversation from the fearful emotions it excited. His nervous temperament
was wound up by the delicacy o f his health to an intense degree o f sensibility, and while his active mind
pondered for ever upon, and drew conclusions from his sensations, his reveries increased their vivacity, till
they mingled with, and made one with thought, and both became absorbing and tumultuous, even to
physical pain” (7.67). Mary thus seems to model Beatrice at least in part on Percy, which will have
interesting implications given Beatrice’s invective against imagination later in the novel.
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to Tegrimi170] Farinata and his wife were posthumously excommunicated
by the Franciscan inquisitor; their bones were exhumed and dispersed, and
the earthly goods of their heirs confiscated. (360)
Farinata’s heresy—echoing the Paterin heresy adopted by Beatrice later in Valperga—
consists in a rejection of Christian metaphysics, for Dante locates him with “Epicurus and
all his followers,/ Who hold the soul dies with the body” (10.13-14). What is most
important in the context of Valperga, however, is not so much the behaviour of Farinata,
although he prefigures and markedly contrasts Castruccio’s own—for Castruccio will
demolish the castle of Valperga, Florence’s proxy in the plain of Lucca. Rather, it is the
specific nature of his torment. Since “the punishments in the Inferno follow the law of
contrapasso—that is, the punishment is commensurate with the fault” (Mandelbaum
350), there is a darkly comic irony that Farinata should be transformed into a Cassandrian
prophet.
After some confusing, initial exchanges with Farinata’s shade, Dante asks, “pray
untie for me this knot [...]/ Which has entangled and confused my judgement” (10.95-6)
and remarks:
From what I hear, it seems
You see beforehand that which time will bring,
But cannot know what happens in the present. (10.97-99)
To which Farinata responds,
We see, like those with faulty vision,
Things at a distance [...]. That much,
For us, the mighty Ruler’s light still shines.
When they draw near or happen now,
Our minds are useless. Without the words of others
We can know nothing of your human state.
Thus it follows that all our knowledge
Will perish at the very moment
The portals of the future close. (10.100-8)

170 See Rajan’s chronology in Valperga (47). Mary Shelley makes Castruccio younger than he might
actually have been, imagining his birth to be in 1289.
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If Epicurus’ atomism171172promotes living for the present moment since it denies the
immortality of the soul, it is fitting, according to Dante’s form of poetic retribution, that a
particularly disabling version of prophecy should become Farinata’s peculiar form of
bondage: his view of the present is obscured and, in its place, only the long, selfalienating view of the future remains. As with Camioli and Elinor St Clare in Glenarvon,
prophecy is here coded not as an enviable privilege but as a form of punishment, one that
actually inhibits the subject despite its sense of expanded consciousness. In Valperga
prophecy, as prediction and predetermination, will follow this Danteian formulation
rigorously: foresight comes at the expense of freedom and historical agency in the
present. That is, prophecy is presented as a form of limitation, something captured neatly
in Euthanasia’s resident prophet, Bindo, whose name suggests all forms of binding and
bondage.

The power to see the universal scheme in advance solicits a kind of Divine

supervision that would aim to keep imagination within the limits of the actual and
forestall counterfactual and utopian thought that might reveal that the actual is only
provisional. As a reflection of its setting, the text seems to defend Dante’s world-view.
For such a view would be quite comfortable with the notion of Divine providence. In
many respects Shelley’s setting, if Dante’s vision can serve as a window on the period as
a whole, is pre-historical: this concept of history is thoroughly bound up with patterns
based on Divine justice, thus containing and disciplining historical unfolding through a
metaphysics of transcendent, eternal laws. There would be something natural or

171 The Atomists, like Leucippus, Democritus, Epicurus, and later Lucretius, following the lead o f
Empedocles, offer a pluralist solution to the problem o f change and becoming, suggesting that while the
root elements o f existence are eternal their relation is finite and that these elements can combine and
recombine in order to produce change. The Atomists thus attempt to overcome the Parmenidian aporia by
offering a theory o f change and movement that avoids the absurd consequences o f not only ex nihilo
creation but also o f being’s supposed annihilation in every moment o f change. In this metaphysics, the soul
is no more or less stable than any other thing, although some Atomists would suggest that it is composed o f
the most subtle or smoothest atoms.
172 “He [i.e., Bindo] has by heart, ready to quote on any suitable occasion, every prophecy that has been
made since the time o f Adam, and knows all the vulgar expositions o f the sacred texts. Then he is an adept
in the knowledge o f sacred trees, fountains, and stones, the flight o f birds, lucky and unlucky days; he has
an extensive acquaintance with witches, astrologers, sorcerers and tempestarir, he knows every peculiar
ceremony for remarkable days, how to celebrate the calends o f January, those o f August, and the Vindemie
Nolane-, none o f our cattle are blessed by St. Anthony until he has bound on their crowns; the ceremonies
attendant on the Nativity, Easter, and the other feasts, all are conducted under his guidance. He interprets
all the dreams o f the castle, and foretells the point o f time when to begin any enterprise [cf. Beatrice]: he
has a wonderful assortment o f holly legends and strange relics; such as a lock o f Adam’s hair, a little
sawdust from Noah’s saw pit [...]” (171).
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commonsensical in Castruccio and Dante’s historical moment about the notion of
predestination. Punishing any Pro-metheian effort—any forward dreaming or
revolutionary impulse—to intervene in this logic or discourse thus amounts to the
expression of an ideological pressure to defend the sense of a transcendental plan in
human life, nature, and thinking: to defend the continuity of a world “folded in upon
itself’ (Foucault 17) against the more troubling forms of negativity, like unconsciousness
and temporality, coincident with of the rise of dialectical historical thought.
The language of futurity in Valperga is, for instance, frequently couched in the
language of fate or destiny, suggesting that while the future is unknown it is nevertheless
basically continuous with the present and past. Hence, the youthful Castruccio “dreamed
of futurity”; and yet, “the uncertainty of his destiny only gave more scope to his
imagination, as he figured the glorious part which he flattered himself he was about to act
on the great theatre” (83). While Castruccio does not know his future, it is nevertheless
framed as his “destiny.” Indeed, the theatre metaphor suggests that his part or role
precedes him and that he will perform his life according to some sort of script. This
language thus quickly circumscribes the claims to his imagination’s expansion. It is clear
that his imagination’s range remains limited to the predictable patterns and subject
positions Castruccio’s historical moment affords to one of his particular class, gender,
and political constitution. Later, even Castruccio’s ostensible scepticism concerning
superstition belies his investment in a very conservative concept of history, one that
claims the impossibility of prediction only because it is so sure that history is mere
repetition—that is, completely predictable in its broader and deeper structure: “T am little
acquainted with the history of antient [si'c] times,’ said Castruccio gaily; ‘but, since the
world began, I can easily imagine that states have risen and fallen; we are blind with
regard to futurity, and methinks it is foolish to build for a longer term than a man’s life’”
(114-115). Castruccio’s Viconian sense of fatality here—the inevitable fall and rise, rise
and fall, of power—countermands even as it seems to endorse the sort of contingency
(the swerve or clinameri) the Atomists and perhaps Farinata degli Uberti posited; in other
words, if Castruccio seems in this comment to become an Epicurean advocate for the
finitude of the soul and of modulating behaviour according the short-term scale of the
individual’s life, he nevertheless thinks that very contingency into a circle of inevitability,
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or mitigates the process of organic development (opened by a recognition of contingency)
by determining that process at a higher level in terms of a predictable narrative. In an
historical version of Atomistic pluralism, Castruccio suggests that while the particular
content of historical events remains unknowable and therefore contingent, the larger
relations of history follows an, at root, Aristotelian concept of “revolution”—that is,
revolution in the sense of a circuit that returns to its original place, thus forestalling
historical narratives of development in a Manichean antinomy. This is something akin to
the popular Medieval sense of history as a perpetual struggle between reason and
irrationality and to the aforementioned De casibus tradition where Fortune functions as a
kind of karma police that equalizes good and bad luck.
In fact, since Shelley ensures that “there is never any doubt about Castruccio’s
development, which is already written in history” (Rajan 34), his vocal repudiation of
prediction cannot help but become ironic, gesturing toward a more ambiguous
relationship between history and romance. Upon hearing that the Florentines keep “a
number of lions, as signs and symbols of their strength” since they believe that “God and
St. John have plainly manifested on many occasions” through these animals, Castruccio
is all derision: “So these wise republicans, whom you, dear Euthanasia, so much vaunt,
believe these childish omens. I would wager my best charger, that their records are full of
the influence of stars, and the appearance of comets!” (193). Euthanasia, in reply,
tempers Castruccio’s scepticism—in fact, hints at his subtle hypocrisy—pointing out the
universal impulse to bind cause to effect:
We love to find a cause for every event, believing that, if we can but fit
one link to another, we are on the high road for discovering the last secrets
of nature. You smile at the celebration of the birth of these lion’s whelps,
yet I own that it pleases me; how innocent, yet how active, the imagination
of that people be, who can find a cause for universal joy in such an event!
It is this same imagination more usefully and capaciously employed, that
makes them decree the building of the most extensive and beautiful
building of modem times. The men who have conceived the idea, and
contributed their money towards the erection of the Duomo, will never see
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its completion; but their posterity will, and, if they be not degenerate, will
glory in the noble spirit of their ancestors. (194)
Euthanasia’s example of architecture’s capacity to project into the future—literally, to
structure social space for future generations—not only recalls Farinata’s efforts to save
Florence from destruction but points toward the logic of apocalypse. The imagination’s
relationship to the future is curtailed through an emphasis on spatalization and mapping
that imply a completion of vision; prophecy is very literally spatalized and detemporalized here as the future is concretely formed in terms of a precisely determined
plan or model.173
What becomes particularly strange in Valperga is, then, neither that prophecy
should be aligned with prediction nor that predictions should prove accurate or true, nor
that the future should be entailed to the past in various ways. Rather, it is far more
surprising how often accurate prediction is cast as failed prediction, or how often the text
attempts to diminish prophecy’s authority through the ostensible exposure of deception or
trickery. For, while scepticism toward prophetic claims of foreknowledge may feel
natural to the modem or nineteenth-century reader, it grinds against the sense of order
and universality appropriate to a Medieval setting. Shelley, in other words, seems to
contaminate the thirteenth-century world with a more Romantic sense of temporality,
precisely to the extent that she exposes prediction as a combination of fancy and
manipulation. It is, in other words, in the ostensible pronouncement of prediction and

173 For Steven Goldsmith, apocalypse tends to substitute history, in all its plasticity and contingency, for
spatial, monumental schemas that look very much like blueprints. Hence, commenting on the title o f his
book, Goldsmith explains that ‘“ Unbuilding Jerusalem’ is meant to indicate some types o f resistance to
formal apocalypse within romantic literature” (23). In other words, Goldsmith illustrates— through works
like Joseph Mede’s 1643 The Key o f Revelation—that there is more than a metaphorical association
between apocalypse and determporalization by looking at the tendency in seventeenth- and eighteenthcentury apocalyptic texts to express themselves diagrammatically and visually.
As an aside, this might offer a theoretical angle for a reconsideration o f the visual aspect o f
Blake’s work. For Blake would seem to participate ambivalently in this kind o f visual apocalypse. While
some o f his images— such as “The Last Judgment” or his engravings inspired by the Book o f Ezekiel and
the Apocalypse— do seem sublimely totalized, other images— such as those that accompany Urizen— seem
to dissolve totality. In fact, in many cases, there is a rather inexplicable relationship between text and
image, such as in the leading plates o f Europe Moreover, Blake’s page, as a blend o f visual art and text,
tends to displace the symmetry and systematic layout o f typical apocalyptic visual models. In fact, in many
cases text and image interpenetrate such that it becomes impossible strictly to identify the visual with the
spatial and the narrative with temporality, as Goldsmith attempts to do. At any rate, it may still be useful to
consider how the visual and the apocalyptic relate in earlier apocalyptic writing in order to consider the
ways Blake participates and reformulates that tradition.
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imagination’s closure—in the ostensible obliteration of the future’s indefiniteness—that a
different, more Romantic and opaque sense of the future as indeterminacy opens.
Perhaps the most dramatic example of the text’s contradiction of the determinism
of its prevailing discourse is its ambivalent treatment of prediction in the Judgement of
God episode in Ferrara. For the text’s ambiguity allows one, in fact, to read Beatrice’s
successful negotiation of the test as indeed a proof of Divine intervention, even as her
guardian, the Bishop of Ferrara, confesses to Castruccio to rigging the Inquisition’s test.
As the Bishop narrates to Castruccio,
Beatrice herself is wrapt up in the belief of her own exalted nature, and
really thinks herself the Ancilla Dei, the chosen vessel into which God has
poured a portion of his spirit: she preaches, she prophesies, she sings
extempore hymns, and entirely fulfilling the part of Donna Estatica, she
passes many hours of each day in solitary meditation, or rather in dreams,
to which her active imagination gives a reality and life which confirm her
in her mistakes. (212)
Her behaviour leads to her sudden incarceration at the hands of Dominican inquisitors
whereupon she proposes a test, a Judgement of God, to prove her status as a chosen
prophet. Unbeknownst to Beatrice, the Bishop, however, arranges to fix this test—she
must navigate, blindfolded, a maze of white-hot ploughshares—by appealing to the
Abbot whose men are charged with staging the event. The Abbot agrees and when
Beatrice does indeed manage to emerge unscathed, forcing the inquisitors to retreat, the
Bishop suffers from a guilty conscience given the perpetuation of what, in his mind, is a
total fraud. And yet, the strangeness of the scene emerges only upon closer scrutiny. For
what one first notices is that it seems impossible, despite the Bishop’s claims—and
despite the modem reader’s own willingness quickly to accept his demystification of the
scene—to determine how exactly this test was faked. There is no narrative explanation of
how precisely the brothers of the church are able to ensure Beatrice’s safety or success,
especially since she is not aware of any mundane interventions and does not herself
knowingly participate in any hoax. Indeed, when the Bishop undertakes the scheme, he is
entreated by the Abbot “not to ask an explanation”: the Abbot assures the Bishop “that he
and his monks [have] the charge of the preparation for the Judgement and that [...] she
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[i.e., Beatrice] should receive no injury” (216). Later on, after her escape from Tripalda
and rescue by Euthanasia from the inquisitors of Lucca, Beatrice’s own narrative of
events does little to elucidate the matter. She recalls addressing the Bishop: “tell me then,
by your hopes of heaven, [...] whether fraud was used in the Judgement o f God that I
underwent, or how I escaped the fearful burning of the hot shares” (353). When he delays
his explanation, she insists that he “tell [her] truly how it happened” (353). “That I
cannot, my child” replies the Bishop, “for I was myself kept in the dark” (353). Oddly,
this crucial episode of putative enlightenment seems, under closer examination, to
become more and more mysterious and inexplicable.
What this prompts, then, is the recognition of competing truth claims, and a
consideration of the function of the Bishop’s denial of Beatrice’s prophetic powers. After
all, the evidence available to the reader suggests that Beatrice is inspired. Moreover, in
terms of the text’s historical context and genre as historical romance, it would in some
respects be more fitting for Beatrice to emerge truly vindicated. For this would fit the
Dantean sense of the universe as a just and rational order thus subject—at least
potentially, given its metaphysical structure—to prediction by special insight. It seems,
rather, that the Bishop’s ironically incredible attempt to discredit Beatrice serves as a
kind of emergency amputation, that it represents an attempt to preserve a larger sense of
universal harmony by totally eliminating a portion of that whole that, while ostensibly an
agent of harmonization, is in fact a sign of imminent and immanent disharmony. The
Bishop’s scepticism surrounding prophetic prediction aims, counter-intuitively, to
reinforce the larger law of Providence. He rejects Beatrice as the point through which
Providence becomes revealed in history only because he is in fact invested in saving
history from a sense of contingency that such an acknowledgement would, necessarily
and symptomatically, imply. For the determinacy of this revelation in the individuality of
Beatrice could be deemed a threat to the distance the transcendent plan must maintain in
order to remain, precisely, transcendent.
By resisting and seeking to eliminate prophecy, the Bishop seeks to reinforce
God’s exclusive control over the interconnectedness of existence and to suppress any
sense that this control is in doubt. For the arrival of the prophet, as a supplement to
continuity, betrays the anxiety she is supposed to repress. Prophets, as representatives of
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the discourse of history more broadly, seem to emerge precisely as a response to an
unacknowledged but growing sense of discord and senselessness, such that the
emergence of supplementary forms of organization cannot help but also intensify the
anxiety they are solicited to ameliorate. Hence, the denial of Beatrice’s predictive power
aims not to introduce a more radical, Romantic, detotalizing form of prophecy or
contingency; the aim, rather, is to remove the supplement of prophecy altogether in order
to forestall the implicit allusion to discontinuity. Or, in Freudian terms, this is the gesture
of denegation: translating the German Verneinung, “denegation” means, according to
Mark Taylor, “an affirmation that is a negation and a negation that is an affirmation” (in
Foshay 7). Denegation is not merely a denial but also a kind of affirmation of the
denial—a negation that aims to intensify its negation but threatens to turn itself into a
new positivity. It is in this latter sense that the term connects to the rhetorical meaning of
apophasis, “a kind of an Irony, whereby we deny that we say or doe that which we
especially say or doe” (OED 1). Denegation indicates an ambivalent negation that ends
up exposing its own repressive action in the effort to intensify that repression. Indeed, in
the case of Valperga, by making a spectacle of masking the symptom—of eliding that
which is already a displacement, a second-order attempt to absorb the figure intended to
absorb anxiety—Shelley allows a more troubling sense of temporality as contingency to
enter the text or, in the language of Galeazzo, allows “the plague of liberty” (198) to
infect this closed world. Like St. Clare in Glenarvon, Beatrice’s apocalyptic vision has
the counter-effect of returning the text to history as potentiality. Like The Last Man, the
negation of total predictability seems to open up history through a double negation or
negative dialectic.
Beatrice’s escape from Tripalda represents prophecy’s escape from total
repression through ostensible demystification. That is, her escape represents the text’s
resistance to the sheer expulsion of the supplement of prophecy and the total denial of
discontinuity—representative of immanent possibility—that always attends prophecy.
This escape is not, however, the only factor that places the continuity or at least
reciprocity of Medieval life under threat in Valperga. The text reveals a deep if oblique
resistance to the predictability of the future in its attitude toward economics, specifically,
usurious loans. The visceral disgust elicited, at several points in the text, by usury stands
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behind the drama surrounding prophecy and prediction. That is, debt—accompanied by a
usurious interest rate—represents a very concrete form of temporal and historical
determinism. Such debts not only make a claim on the future (prophecy) but excessive
interest rates (profit) prescribe even more precisely the shape of that future, as if meting
out the possible into calculable units. Loans indebt the future of the debtor and radically
circumscribe his or her relationship to self-determination. In this sense, Pepi can be read
as a prophet whose effort to supplement and extend predictability and historical
continuity is even more problematic than Beatrice’s. In fact, Pepi fancies himself a kind
of Mephistopheles and considers his paper contracts to be powerfully Faustian. Rather
than merely extorting money, he insists that his insolvent debtors forfeit their very
existence: “they are all mine,” says Pepi, “body and soul; aye, with these bonds, the devil
himself might buy them” (242). That is, Pepi frames his debts in consistently
metaphysical terms that more closely align him with the concepts of fate and
determinism. Just as prophetic predictions bear on human will, Pepi claims that his
deceitful and unscrupulous dealings “blinded them [i.e., borrowers] till [he had] drawn
their very souls from their bodies” (242).
Upon abandoning Beatrice in Ferrara, Castruccio visits Pepi in Cremona. Pepi
claims he can ensure the success of a Ghibelline invasion, if led by Castruccio, and
requests, in exchange for his help, to be made lord of the city following a successful
revolt. Such ambition, in the abstract at least, is not unlike Castruccio’s own. However,
Castruccio is disgusted when Pepi reveals that his metaphorical “keys of this town” are in
fact, in Castruccio’s words, “usurious bonds” (239, 241). As the phrase makes clear, such
debts imprison, bind, or enchain debtors, recalling both “Bindo”—whose name joins
bondage with prophecy—and also Dante’s Farinata who is literally and figuratively
bound by prophecy itself. Indeed, Pepi conceals these bonds deep under his castle, in a
“long gallery, windowless and damp, which by its closed air indicated that it was below
the surface of the ground” and that Castruccio will describe as an “infernal den” (241,
243)—that is, in a Dantesque prison similar to Tripalda’s wherein Beatrice suffers for
three years. Yet like Tripalda’s prison, where he attempts but fails to confine the
supplement of prophecy, this effort fails. For Castruccio insists that a people increasingly
intent on self-determination will not tolerate such contracts:
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Thou, lord of Cremona! A usurer, a bloodsucker!—Why all the moisture
squeezed from thy miserable carcass would not buy one drop of the noble
heart’s tide of your debtors—And these parchments! Thinkest thou men
are formed of straw to be bound with paper chains? Have they not arms?
have they not swords? Tremble, foolish wretch! Be what thou art,—a
sycophant.—No, thou art not human; but in these filthy vaults thou hast
swollen, as a vile toad or rank mushroom; and then, because thou canst
poison men, thou wouldst lord it over them! Now, thou base-minded
fellow, be advised to cast off these presumptuous thoughts, or with my
armed heel I will crush thee in the dust! (242)
Castruccio’s prediction proves accurate. For while Castruccio himself merely threatens
Pepi, the subsequent struggle between Guelphs and Ghibellines in Cremona leads not
only to Pepi’s death but the utter destruction of his legacy:
Pepi fell in that tumult: whether by a chance-blow, or by the resolved
dagger of one of his debtors, cannot be ascertained. But his dead body was
discovered among the slain; and so great was the enmity of his townsmen
against him, that, although Cane and his troops had already entered the
city, the whole population rushed in furry towards his palace, and in a few
hours the massy walls, the high tower, and all the boasted possessions of
Pepi were, as himself, a loathsome and useless ruin. (246)
Ultimately, Pepi’s bonds—his claims on the future—prove too frail and suffer their own
ironic and reflexive entombment: “the hidden and unknown vaults where undisturbed;
and the paper wealth of the usurer lay buried there, to rot in peace among the mildews
and damps of those miserable dungeons” (246).
Since Pepi’s contracts represent a form of predictive prophecy—another
supplement to the prevailing discourse of determination and providence—his thorough
vilification and utter destruction is comparable to the fate suffered by Beatrice. Yet, if
this is another attempt to elide the symptom of historical supplementation in the effort to
maintain the transcendence of Providence or to reserve determination for Divine forces
only, this conservative gesture is so desperate that it cannot but suggest the weakening of
Natural Law. That is, the general and violent rejection of Pepi’s attempt to bind the future
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cannot be completely accounted for in terms of policing or regulating determination;
rather, it suggests a deeper and more troubling scepticism about historical and temporal
continuity as such—or, at the very least, a sense that such determinism is at odds with a
growing sense of individuality and personal sovereignty. In other words, the attempt to
regulate and preserve history’s regularity by punishing the attempts to appropriate
transcendent offices invites a more troubling shape of historical consciousness to emerge.
For the very appearance of the attempt to predict the future—even if in Beatrice’s case
demystified and Pepi’s case vilified—suggests that continuity is in jeopardy and needs to
be reinforced. Hence, the text’s rejection of prophecy—Mandragola’s callous and
pointless manipulation of Bindo and Beatrice is another instance of this in Valperga—
suggests, through the excessive energy with which it promotes demystification, that its
ostensible historical continuity is premised on wilful avoidance of the more troubling
implications of prophetic supplementation: namely, that the future may not be continuous
with the past, that revolution may be more Romantic than Aristotelian, that historical
negativity is not merely the privation of a rational scheme but that there may be a kind of
alterity that fundamentally questions the metaphysical assumptions of Classical thought
and their elaboration through the mechanics of the Enlightenment.
For a brief moment, Euthanasia gives voice to this changing sense of order—that
is, she gives voice to the corrosive negativity of time. In a somewhat theatrical soliloquy,
Euthanasia reflects on the uneven quality of temporal existence, where the uniformity of
past, present, and future seems to be suspended by something ineffable in the lived
instant:
The earth is a wide sea [...] and we its passing bubbles; it is a changeful
heaven, and we its smallest and swiftest driven vapours; all changes, all
passes—nothing is stable, nothing for one moment the same. But, if it be
so, oh my God! if in Eternity all the years that man has numbered on this
green earth be but a point, and we but the minutest speck in the great
whole, why is the present moment every thing to us? Why do our minds,
grasping all, feel as if eternity and immeasurable space were kemelled up
in one instantaneous sensation? We look back to times past, and we mass
them together, and say in such a year such and such events took place,
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such wars occupied that year, and during the next there was peace. Yet
each year was then divided into weeks, days, minutes, and slow-moving
seconds, during which there were human minds to note and distinguish
them, as now. We think of a small motion of the dial as of an eternity; yet
ages have past, and they are but hours; the present moment will soon be
only a memory, an unseen atom in the night of by-gone time. A hundred
years hence, and young and old we shall all be gathered to the dust, and I
shall no longer feel the coil that is at work in my heart, or any longer
struggle within the inextricable bonds of fate. I know this; but yet this
moment, this point of time, during which the sun makes but one round
amidst the many millions it has made, and the many millions it will make,
this moment is all to me. (305)
Here, just before the siege of Valperga, Euthanasia has a sublime vision of history that
apprehends time’s totality even as it senses the incommensurability of this totalization
with the singularity of the lived moment. Like Blake’s moment of prophetic self
annihilation in Milton, the finite minute here somehow contains the eternal, although not
in a reductive manner. In fact, Euthanasia’s vision of time’s stratification recalls Blake’s
detailed description of how the “Sons of Los build Moments & Minutes & Hours/ And
Days & Months & Years & Ages & Periods; wondrous buildings” (28.45-6) only, finally,
to translate that expanding structure into “a pulsation of the artery” (28.49): a ‘unit’ that
is, paradoxically, equal both to the ostensibly briefest unit, the moment, and an infinitely
grand time. Since “Every Time less than a pulsation of the artery/ Is equal in its period &
value to Six Thousand Years” (28.64-5), it is impossible to say what a time equal to the
pulsation might be, suggesting that the pulsation might transcend all finite temporal
terms.
Put differently, the all-consuming intensity of the eternal might emerge from
within the finite world but it does not leave this world unchanged. Rather, it gestures
toward time’s potential to effect what Bloch described as a transcendence without
transcendence. Even if history must ultimately fall into a scheme of temporal units or
submit to the repetition implied by Euthanasia’s reflection on the earth’s continuous solar
revolution, the power of the lived moment reveals those units and the history they form to
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be incapable of reflecting the complexity of a consciousness embedded in time. In this
brief moment where history is felt to be radically incommensurate with its own terms,
Euthanasia is more ecstatic than Beatrice or any of the supposed prophets in Valperga.
When her sensitivity to time intensifies, she effectively dissolves the bonds of history,
collapses the prison-like structure of temporal continuity: when the moment seems to
become eternal, the future and past have been severed from determination, have become
temporalized and opaque to the understanding.
In other words, the text does in terms of its treatment of temporality what it does
at the level of narrative, for as Raj an notes Valperga “unseals itself from the fatality of a
single story by including within the grand narrative of Castruccio the other histories of
Magfreda, Euthanasia and Beatrice” (16). In this respect it is also similar to Glenarvon
and to Shelley’s later novel, The Last Man, as all three texts not only adopt the themes
and figures of prophecy to insert counter-factual narratives into official accounts of
history but also layer private over public history. All three texts loosen the cause-effect
relationship within history by illustrating not only how the historical moment could be
differently determined through counterfactual supplementations but how that moment
itself is also always overdetermined in reality. History’s continuities become unstable in
the face of excessive and conflicting determinations. This is the case in Lamb, as she
fractures and multiplies historical causes for her aesthetic productions. And it is also the
case in Valperga insofar as excessive forms of prediction betray the instability they are
intended to correct. Objects produced by or in this historical moment, then, cannot be
‘returned’ to history—cannot bypass hermeneutic labour—precisely because history itself
is a field of competing determinations and therefore cannot serve as the stabilizing
authority of natural history.

IV. “Some vain imagination or deceitful hope”: The Last Man’s History of the Future

As noted above, for Bloch, Greek prophecy as exemplified by Cassandra
constitutes a “passive type of augury” (Atheism 103), a form of prediction that—unlike
Hebrew prophecy—enslaves the past and present to a knowable but unavoidable future.
Shelley frames The Last Man in terms of precisely this kind of prophecy. Constructing
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the bulk of the text as the redaction of a nineteenth-century editor who, as the text’s
fictional “Introduction” explains, discovers and translates prophetic leaves found in a
hidden chamber of the cave of the Sybil of Cumae,174 Shelley presents an apocalyptic
prophecy of the history of the future as told by Lionel Vemey, the sole survivor of a
global plague that leaves him, at the end of the twenty-first century, the last man on
earth.175 There remains, however, a gap between Shelley’s framing prophecy and the
treatment of prophecy within the text, represented in the figure of Evadne. Despite the
brevity of her appearance, Evadne is key to understanding how Shelley negotiates the
fraught relationship between sexual and historical agency and for uncovering a reading of
The Last Man that does not fall victim to what only appears to be a completely
depressing, closed, and apocalyptic picture of history. It is important, for instance, to see
her as a prophetess similar to Beatrice: not only does she suffer a similar fate but her
curse on Raymond inaugurates the text’s “natural revolution” (Kant Conflict 161) or total
decline, echoing Beatrice’s pessimism. At the same time, she is, like Elinor St Clare, in a
complex domestic position. As a young man, Adrian falls in love with Evadne. She,
however, rejects Adrian, for it is “Raymond, the deliverer of Greece, the graceful soldier,
who bore in his mien a tinge of all that, peculiar to her native clime” that “Evadne
cherished most dear” (31). Yet, in this case too love remains unreciprocated. Evadne thus
stands in the middle of a series of unrequited loves and unsatisfied desires, effectively
repeating Adrian’s psychological experience though in a manner that does not and cannot
generate any intimacy between her and Adrian. Given this instability—Evadne’s
precarious position between Adrian and Raymond—there is a certain irony that she
should be rediscovered in the text as the mysterious prize-winning architect.
Upon ascending to the office of Lord Protector, Raymond “projected the erection
of a national gallery for statues and pictures” (76). An emblem not only of British history
and culture, “the edifice was to be the great ornament of his Protectorship” (76). After
reviewing hundreds of unsatisfactory proposals, “at length a drawing came [...]. The
design was new and elegant, but faulty; so faulty, that although drawn with the hand and

174 Cumae is approximately 20 kilometers west o f Naples and represents the oldest Greek settlement in
Italy, dating to the eighth century B.C.E.
1/5 Four people survive the plague: Lionel, Adrian, Clara, and Evelyn. However, Evelyn dies from typhus
fever and Clara and Adrian die in a shipwreck from which only Lionel escapes.
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eye of taste, it was evidently the work of one who was not an architect” (77). For some
reason Raymond is fascinated with this design and his inquiries into its provenance lead
him eventually to “the dwellings of want” (78) and the wasting form of Evadne Zaimi.
Moved by her series of misfortunes, Raymond begins secretly visiting Evadne—a
decision that, like St Leon’s decision, in Godwin’s eponymous text, to keep secrets from
his wife, Marguerite, leads eventually to domestic catastrophe. But when Raymond
eventually rejects Evadne in an effort to return to his original political and domestic
responsibilities, it becomes impossible to do so. That is, recalling Blake’s Milton,
Raymond finds it impossible to secure his ‘state’ in political, emotional, and even
physiological terms. This is because Evadne, like Dido in Virgil’s Aeneid, curses the
would-be politician and contaminates the state’s claim—announced by political
philosophers from Plato to Hegel to Adrian—to serve as the material expression of
rationality itself. For instance, in the Philosophy o f Right Hegel asserts that “the state is
the divine will, in the sense that it is mind present on earth, unfolding itself to be the
actual shape and organisation of a world” (§ 270). Evadne’s curse on Raymond, however,
illustrates how something deeply unreasonable remains hidden within this eminently
reasonable process. A kind of workless, non-dialectical negativity thus returns like the
state’s repressed or unconscious and is forcefully expressed in Evadne’s curse: “many
living deaths have I borne for thee, O Raymond, and now I expire, thy victim!—By my
death I purchase thee—lo! the instruments of war, fire, the plague are my servitors. I
dared, I conquered them all, till now! I have sold myself to death, with the sole condition
that thou shouldst follow me—Fire, and war, and plague, unite for thy destruction—O my
Raymond, there is no safety for thee!” (131).
In fact, with this passage and the subsequent catastrophe, Shelley’s text, as
opposed to Lamb’s, seems to pronounce the most startling curse on the Byronic type. For
it is clear that Raymond is a Byron figure and that Shelley, too, writes a roman a clef that
gestures toward even as it displaces actual history. In fact, Shelley seems to invoke this
Byronic “idol” (28) in close proximity to Caroline Lamb. In the midst of his domestic
strife with Perdita, Raymond writes a letter that in tone, length, and sentiment echoes
Byron’s letter to Lamb announcing the end of the affair—the letter included by Lamb in
Glenarvon, there attributed to the eponymous villain. Raymond, playing the victim of
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outrageous insult, writes in reply to Perdita’s most pointed inquiry into his feelings a
terse letter full of passive-aggressive manoeuvres:
Notwithstanding your bitter letter [...] for bitter I must call it, you are the
chief person in my estimation, and it is your happiness that I would
principally consult. Do that which seems best to you: and if you can
receive gratification from one mode of life in preference to another, do not
let me be any obstacle. I foresee that the plan which you mark out in your
letter will not endure long; but you are mistress of yourself, and it is my
sincere wish to contribute as far as you will permit me to your happiness.
(103)
Like Byron/Glenarvon’s letter where he condescends to “remember with gratitude the
many instances” in which he had “received [Lamb/Calantha’s] predilections,” asks to
“continue [her] friend, if [she] will permit [him] to style [himself],” and ends with a
patronising offer of “advice,”176 so Raymond aims to deflect guilt and maintain control
over the domestic sphere by assuming a false contrition that has the effect of belittling
and deflating the intense, even overwhelming emotions Perdita expresses. Shelley’s
Raymond is every bit Lamb’s hypocritical Glenarvon. But, while Lamb leaves Glenarvon
privately haunted by his past crimes, Shelley insists more pointedly on how the damage
wrought by this personality infects social institutions. Hence, Evadne’s curse on
Raymond for ostensibly private wrongs expands to the public and even global level.
Whereas the consequences of Glenarvon’s betrayal of St Clare and Calantha are
quarantined in Ireland by the killing of both women in the course of the aborted
revolution, Shelley recognizes a universal problem. For Raymond’s treatment of Evadne

176 It is difficult to know which source here is primary and therefore which source to cite for Byron’s letter.
For as Leslie Marchand notes in his edition o f Byron's Letters and Journals, he includes the putative letter
from Byron to Lamb (in the second volume, page 242) even as the only source for this letter is Lamb’s
‘repetition’ o f it in Glenarvon. In his note, Marchand writes, “the only copy o f this letter is that published
in Caroline Lamb’s novel. It sounds Byronic, and Byron did not deny its authenticity when he read the
book; he must have recognized it as in substance what he had written. It is ascribed to the hero, Glenarvon,
who is obviously intended to represent Byron” (2.242 n l). Marchand’s strange description o f Glenarvon as
a “hero” notwithstanding, his comments gesture toward a larger problem o f originality and authenticity
surrounding the material object, recalling the argument, above, that for Lamb the idol comes to reflect a
form o f representation that is intensely anti-mimetic and closer to pure simulation. At any rate, ‘Byron’s’
letter can be found in Marchand’s collection, as noted above, or in chapter nine o f the third volume o f
Lamb’s novel, page 271 o f the first volume o f Douglass’ new three-volume edition o f Lamb’s complete
works.
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repeats the repudiation of femininity and female desire that forms the very basis—
figuratively and literally, in this case—of the political state.
A closer look at the history of the Sybil who frames the narrative may help expose
how a betrayal of intimacy and even sexual violence is not merely peripheral to more
ostensibly fundamental matters of state. With this in mind, it becomes clear why Shelley,
with the plague, evokes a Kantian “natural revolution” (Conflict 161)—that is, a disorder
so fundamental that it threatens not only all rational projects but even the project of
reason itself, the promise of the eventual unity of ‘faculties.’177 For the history of the state
models the ‘state of history,’ as it were—each is a form of institutional hierarchy that
repeats sexualized violence and marginalization not in spite of but through instrumental
rationality. Such a state, for Shelley, cannot be redeemed but must, rather, be entirely
purged. In an effort to reconsider the place of the female in history, Shelley thus trades
utopia for a kind of total catharsis: her reader is able to experience the end—as both
completion and elimination—of a particular form of history and ideology by living
through it fictionally. This is why the frame of the narrative in The Last Man is so
important: in stark contrast to Cassandra’s curse, Beatrice’s fate, or St Clare’s vision—
that is, in contrast to the form of prophecy that dominates history inside each narrative—
the reader is, in fact, offered a more Hebraic perspective. For while the story of total
human annihilation remains only a possible future for the reader and the fictional editor
as well. Like Jonah’s prophecy, The Last Man might be terrifying enough to effect
changes that cancel what it also promises.
Indeed, the frame narrative makes explicit that, while it offers another perspective
on history, it is not a meta-perspective or meta-history. While the ‘redactor’ organizes
objects that bear the traces of the future’s history, she cannot claim perfect mastery of
either the objects or the future history they depict. That is, as described in the fictional
“Author’s Introduction,” after discovering the “Sibylline leaves” the Author and her
companion “made a hasty selection of such leaves, whose writing one at least of us could
understand; and then, laden with our treasure, we bade adieu to the dim hypaethric
177 Kant’s assurance that the human race is progressing remains haunted by a parenthetical gesture toward
this kind o f absolute rupture in nature. For Kant can assert that “all the peoples on earth [...] will gradually
come to participate in progress [...] provided at least that there does not, by some chance, occur a second
epoch o f natural revolution which will push aside the human race to clear the stage for other creatures”
( 161).
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cavern” (3). Thus, the subsequent prophecy of Evadne’s prophesy emerges only through
the diligent intervention of the ‘editor’ who notes she has “been obliged to add links, and
model the work into a consistent form” (3-4). But if this order imposes a kind of
distortion, it is still fundamentally necessary since, ironically, the pages are
“unintelligible in their pristine condition” (4). Put in terms that anticipate the critique of
politics and history discussed below, the frame of the narrative makes clear that there
cannot be a state of non-distortion. The elements that form the subsequent prophecy are
always already fragmented.
So, not only does this history of the future emerge through the gathering of textual
fragments and the active invention of the ‘editor,’ but also it appears that there can be no
simple appeal to the historical objects themselves. For even when these objects are
materially at hand, they seem to disclose historical meaning only in dialogue with the
fictional editor and translator’s consciousness. Hence, the narrative frame abdicates any
claim to superior authority even as it displaces the inevitability of the ‘history’ depicted
in the text proper by rendering that history as, at root, romance. The frame, rather than
containing the text, functions more like one amongst a train of spectral messengers—
recalling Percy Shelley’s Hellas and The Triumph o f Life. For prophecy here, as with
Percy’s text, cannot totalize time. Rather, a prophecy of the twenty-first century emerges
only to be suspended in the dizzying reciprocity between the ancient pages and the
nineteenth-century editor, suggesting less a stable historical itinerary than a form of
temporal vertigo. Indeed, as Anne Melor notes, since The Last Man “is not history but a
self-conscious fiction” the ‘history’ of the future is not as determinate as it might appear.
Hence, for Mellor the text “is about the possibilities of human history, not about the past
as such. As such, I would like to suggest, it opens up the possibility for a new kind of
history, the not-yet-written story of a new kind of society” (n. pag.). This new kind of
history would emerge only on the further side of Shelley’s negative dialectic, one that
aims to cancel the kind of total vision and implicit violence performed by universalizing
forms of history.
One can better appreciate Shelley’s suspicion of progressive, rationalist, or
essentially Hegelian history—one where, as noted above, the state as the materialization
of rationality forms the actual shape of history’s end—by looking more closely at the
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history of the Sibyl. Classical scholars believe that the figure of Cassandra shades into the
figure of the Sibyl,178 suggesting that we might more precisely identify The Last Marts
framework in terms of Cassandra’s peculiar fate. In Sibyls and Sibylline Prophecy in
Classical Antiquity, H. W. Parke reiterates the clear associations between Cassandra and
the Sibyls of antiquity. Moreover, he offers a useful summary of the mythical origin of
both figures in relation to Apollo and notes the important role sexual difference plays in
the development of Cassandrian prophecy.
The theme of the gift of prophecy combined with the curse of failure to
convince the hearers may well have been invented for this context [i.e.,
Aeschylus’ Agamemnon] in the Epic cycle, but it would be equally useful
if attached to Sibylla, who similarly foretold disasters which were never
averted. [...]. [Beyond this common curse,] [t]he legend of Apollo, the
frustrated lover, is joined [in the case of the Sibyl] with the second motif
which we have mentioned—the mistaken prayer for long life, not
immortal youth. It appears first in a late narrative in Ovid, who tells in his
own vividly sophisticated manner what must have been a long-established
legend. The Cumaean Sibyl explains to Aeneas that she is not a goddess,
though she has been offered immortality if only she would yield her
virginity to Apollo. The god, wooing her, promised her the fulfilment of
her wish, and she grasped a handful of sand and asked for as many years
as it contained grains. This was granted, but she had forgotten to ask for
178 In “Vergil and the Sibyl o f Cumae,” J.H. Waszink argues that Cassandra might be identified with the
Sibyl o f Troy and perhaps again with the Sibyl o f Cumae:
It is well-known that in later times Cassandra the prophetess and the Sibyl o f Troy were
considered to be so strongly related to each other that the former is frequently called a Sibyl (for
evidence, cf. Bouche-Leclercq, op. cit., 148/153. 1755. 1754) it is even probable that the
characteristics o f one the two figures derive from the other (according to Bouchd-Leclercq, op.
cit., 148/153, and Picard, Claws et Ephese, 419.421, the figure o f the Sibyl is secondary; the
contrary opinion is held by Buchholz, art. Sibylle, Roscher 4, 797). Now in vss. 1464/1465
Lycophron calls Cassandra Klapov MipcMcov (i.e., Bayf), // MdayxpaipasxomCNr/aonq
Ovyaxpoq (schol. ad loc:. Melayypaipag de rj Zifiv/la, izapa to pekaivew xr/v tppaom you xovq
Xpr)opoi)<;. Nijacb Se, pr)xr)p hpvUrjq), in other words, he compares her to the Sibyl. It seems
indeed plausible that Lycophron knew both the identification o f Cassandra with the Sibyl o f Troy
and the tradition adopted by Dionysius o f Halicarnassus and others (cf. p. 48 and note 26) which
declared this Sibyl to have prophesied the fata Aeneae.
Finally, it should be remarked that in this context a prophecy by the Cumaean Sibyl would be
plainly superfluous, as Cassandra is already prophesying everything that was to be prophesied, the
“Italian part” o f the fata Aeneae included. (52)
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eternal youth. Although she would have obtained that also, if she had
yielded herself to him, she refused, and therefore was fated to grow older
and older until she had reached the number of the grains of sand. When
she was speaking to Aeneas, she had lived seven hundred years and had
still three hundred remaining. By then she would have shrunk to the tiniest
scale until there was nothing left but her voice. (57)
This back-story complicates The Last Marts frame by combining the Cassandrian
curse—the impossibility of using prophetic insight to intervene in history—as a particular
mode of historiography (one Bloch identifies as especially disabling and even ahistorical), with an act of betrayal that spoils a sexual contract between the male deity and
the mundane woman. In an almost Dantean move, reneging on her promise of sexual
favours means that Cassandra is permitted to ‘conceive’ history intellectually but denied
the power to bring that conception to term, as it were: Apollo’s curse aborts the
productivity of the imagination and suspends the materiality of the female body by
submitting all historical insight to rigorous limitations that ensure the gestating idea never
enters the world of historical actuality. In other words, the form of female prophecy that
frames The Last Man as a story of inevitable annihilation bears the traces of a specifically
sexual conflict. For even the unnaturally long life the Sibyl enjoys transforms her only
into a living testament to infertility—a figure so utterly deprived of a fruitful engagement
with the world that her continued existence seems like a mockery of life. If the Sibyl lives
for one thousand years, it is in a state of pure superfluity—like Mandragola in Valperga
whom the old men remember from their childhood as already frighteningly old.179
As in Glenarvon and Valperga, it is therefore impossible to separate the treatment
of prophecy and history from the treatment of sex and gender in The Last Man, both
within the main narrative and in the framing apparatus. That is, the sense of the
inevitability in Shelley’s prophecy of relentless depopulation merely generalizes Apollo’s
curse and forces official (male) history to adapt its narrative to the cruel ‘abortive’ terms

179 “On a stone near the cabin door sat the witch; she was very old; none knew how old: men, verging on
decrepitude, remembered their childish fears o f her; and they all agreed that formerly she appeared more
aged and decrepit than now. She was bent nearly double; there was no flesh on her bones; and the brown
wrinkled skin hung loosely about her cheeks and arms. She was short, thin and small; her hair was perfectly
white, and her red eyes, the only part about her that appeared to have life, glared within their sunken
sockets; her voice was cracked and shrill” (323).
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already imposed on female historians, represented by Cassandra, the Sibyl, Evadne, and
Dido: all women who must ultimately be left behind in order for the state and history to
‘progress.’ Shelley thus interrogates schemes of universal history that tend to reduce
temporality and alterity to known factors, or to take historical contradictions to be simple
rather than overdetermined. Such schemes elide or ignore the fruitful non-actuality of the
principle of hope through their excessive and obsessive determination in a manner that
has direct political implications for socially marginalized figures such as women insofar
as women would be afforded a place in history only through an act of de-differentiation
or de-sexualization—in lieu of outright sexual submission. For it is no accident that it is
the sexually impotent Adrian’s “perfect system of government” (68) that stands as the
apex of political thought and is put into practice only in the Last Days. That is, Shelley
seems not to oppose female sexual marginalization with a libertine utopia; rather, she
takes this marginalization to its extreme, suggesting ironically that the perfect, rational
state—the kind of beautiful coherence embodied by nature throughout the narrative—can
be achieved only once the lingering irrational factor standing in the way of this perfection
is removed: that is, not just women but all humans. Evadne’s curse, then, brings death
because it suspends symbolic exchange. That is, it draws attention to and disseminates
violence—the deeply non-reciprocal relationship between Apollo and the Sibyl—that
serves as the ground for the political order. Interrupting the symbolic has the effect then
of revealing the foundational violence o f symbolic exchange or of revealing how this
deferral of violence encodes and perpetuates another kind of violence at the same time.
That is, the deferral of death by symbolic exchange is not as much of a deferral as it
seems at first to be. Shelley, then, refuses to let the fundamental repudiation of women be
symbolized or converted into a mere figure. For, it is the symbolization of this very
violence that creates the condition for universal history—that is, it allows history to take
a rational shape only because it quarantines femininity as the site of a foundational and
irrational violence.
What is unexpected, then, is that when Shelley exposes how the state’s claims to
reason and perfection rely on a repudiation of the feminine, this perfect state begins to
look more and more like a vision that Cassandra might have. In other words, The Last
Man complicates the trajectories of repudiation typically operative in patriarchal society.
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The same woman who is the rejected sexual object (Evadne)—or who claims sexual
freedom (the Sibyl of the narrative frame)—and suffers a subsequent exile, seems in an
uncanny way to embody and emblematise the kind of complete restrictedness and
determinism that the perfectly dispassionate state would actually hope to achieve for
itself. This would be an ‘impregnable’ state in every sense of the word, one immune to
revolution and therefore unable to ‘conceive’ a new concept of the future. Indeed, as in
the extremely ‘gentlemanly’ form of political transition depicted early on in The Last
Man suggests, such resistance to discord approaches fascistic efficiency and insularity.
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Woman is abject in this situation: she is both the figure for the perfectly managed and
manipulated state even as the political institution seeks to quarantine her sexual desire,
systematically excluding her from participation in the state she serves to model. That is,
The Last Man carries out at the level of its narrative the kind of punishment for predictive
accuracy restricted in Valperga to Beatrice and in Glenarvon to St Clare. Beatrice’s
imprisonment and rejection in Valperga is an attempt to excise the supplement of
prophecy for fear that that supplement may reveal a discontinuity in existing power
structures. The generalization of this kind of fate to all of mankind and actual history in
The Last Man reveals the unreasonableness of reason itself through what looks like the
perfection of history and politics, insofar as the pursuit of this perfection—perhaps
unconsciously—follows a model of institutional and systemic violence. Shelley pursues
her critique, then, not by curtailing universal determination but, rather, by outrageously
inflating and insisting upon historical totalization. In doing so, she reveals, ultimately,
how disciplinary, restrictive, and even penal a perfectly rational historiography is, even if
we take this in non-apocalyptic terms. That is, she suggests that Absolute Knowledge,
embodied in the rational state, cannot help but perpetuate violence. This is not an
apocalyptic destructiveness—in fact, that seems to be the problem. For Absolute
Knowledge does not really mean the end of thinking or of history but rather the180
180 This would mean to read Shelley’s description o f the ‘perfection’ o f the English constitution as a
somewhat ironic comment: “every thing in the English constitution had been regulated for the better
preservation o f peace. On the last day, two candidates only were allowed to remain; and to obviate, if
possible, the last struggle between these, a bribe was offered to him who should voluntarily resign his
pretensions; a place o f great emolument and honor was given him, and his success facilitated at a future
election” (73). Indeed, Raymond is not so much elected Lord Protector as appointed by a kind o f default
when “the member who had nominated Ryland, rose and informed us that this candidate had resigned his
pretensions” (73).
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permanent installation of a particular system wherein history and the state’s smooth
functioning feeds on systemic inequality.
As Greg Kucich argues in a study sensitive to the relationship between gender and
history, Shelley “would situate the historicism of The Last Man within a broad, creatively
varied effort by many of the [Romantic] period’s women writers to reformulate the basic
narrative and epistemological patterns of mainstream history,” where this mainstream
history amounts to “a gendered structure of knowledge that excluded women and other
marginalized groups from ‘historical and political life’” by restricting significance to a
limited number of male-dominated realms of cultural action (n. pag.). Gary Kelly notes,
moreover, how changes in the sense of history as such in Romanticism seemed to offer
marginalized individuals, like women, an unprecedented opportunity to gain a foothold in
the burgeoning discourses of historiography, which is nothing short than a foothold in a
new formulation of metaphysics:
The French Revolution and the Revolution debate in Britain
recontextualized the meaning of history and the use of historiography. The
male polemicists of the Revolution debate recurred repeatedly to history
for analogies to the French Revolution and as a guide or a warning to
Britain. Yet the widely acknowledged unprecedented nature o f the French
Revolution challenged the meanings hitherto derivedfrom history and
indicated the limits o f historiography as a guide to the present and
immediate future, or as “philosophy teaching by examples.”
In the Revolutionary aftermath various movements subsumed reformist
impulses of the late eighteenth century and the Revolutionary decade, in
forms less threatening to order and continuity. This sublation
reconstructed models of subjectivity, domesticity, gender, locale, and
nation from the proleptically Revolutionary culture of Sensibility and
addressed post-Revolutionary anxiety about the groundedness, integrity,
and reproducibility of discursive orders of all kinds, and personal identity,
sociality, and the “nation” as a spatio-temporary condition and continuity.
Resolving these issues produced the elements of the cultural revolution
that founded the modem liberal state, (n. pag, my emphasis)
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While Kelly places emphasis on post-revolutionary reformulations of rational
containment, one might read The Last Man's narrative of ruin in terms not of a positive
but of a negative dialectic, as an attempt to exacerbate and protract the otherwise brief
moment of revolutionary discontinuity. The plague resists post-revolutionary attempts to
re-contain—discursively and institutionally to quarantine—the political from the sexual,
reason from affect, or the world of male-dominated politics and the world of domestic
affections. For such re-containment would simply perpetuate the closure of Absolute
Knowledge rather than recognize how that closure is itself problematic.
When Mary Shelley aligns history as such with a prophecy of humanity’s
termination, she interrogates universal history through an aggressive irony rather than by
simply replacing universal history with local, domestic, or private history. The minor
histories that emerge throughout The Last Man do not, then, necessarily represent
history’s conversion from the general to the local or from the public to the private.
Rather, these stories repeatedly draw attention to gender and female desire in an effort
more clearly to illustrate how even in an ostensibly rational and enlightened state, it
remains acceptable for women to suffer the emotional and sexual terms and conditions
imposed by men. That is, within the larger framework of unmitigated disaster, Lionel
feels compelled to recall, in almost Wordsworthian fashion, a series of vignettes or
comparatively ‘small’ histories of particular characters. Three in particular stand out.
There is, first, the history of the unfortunate Juliet, daughter of the Duke of L---- , who is
enabled, thanks to the plague, to pursue a relationship with her lover

1 O1

only to fall

victim, ultimately, to the machinations of the “impostor-prophet” (281). There is, second,
the story of Lucy: a young woman separated from her preferred lover and forced into
marriage with a brutal man who attempts to alienate her from her family. The plague
liberates her, too, to a degree and she enters the troop of English emigrants along with her
aged mother. Third, there is the “simple history” (307) of the Swiss organist. Like the
other young women mentioned, the plague removes class barriers and allows her, “the
fair daughter of a poor musician” (307), temporarily to unite with a young nobleman.18

181 “She had lost her indulgent parents, her brothers and sisters, companions o f her youth; in one fell swoop
they had been carried o ff from her. Yet she had again dared to call herself happy; united to her admirer, to
him who possessed and filled her whole heart, she yielded to the lethean powers o f life, and knew and felt
only his life and presence” (282).
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While Shelley’s decision to rewrite Cassandra’s condition as the human condition
itself means that Juliet, Lucy, and the Swiss organist do not escape the plague, their brief
sexual liberations help to expose the violence inherent in the state that would claim to end
history with the instantiation of Absolute Knowledge. Indeed, this state is not only
violent but even somewhat absurd, from an existential perspective—something illustrated
in Shelley’s figure of enlightened, scientific rationality: the astronomer, Merrival. For
like a combination of Lamb’s Camioli and Dante’s Farinata, Merrival seems to be cursed
with a prophetic vision of history of such a grand scale that it deprives him of historical
agency and awareness of the present.182 At the same moment that the English finally
admit their susceptibility to the plague, Merrival points out, as if to offer some sense of
consolation, that “in an hundred thousand years [...] [t]he pole of the earth will coincide
with the pole of the elliptic[,] [...] an universal spring will be produced, and earth
become a paradise” (159). This is not merely cold comfort but borders on the obscene.
“The seven league strides with which Merrival paced a coming eternity” (210) detaches
him from the prevailing, dire condition of humanity: “He was far too long sighted in his
view of humanity,” remarks Lionel, “to heed the casualties of the day, and lived in the
midst of contagion unconscious of its existence” (209). Shelley, in other words, seems to
parody such rational, universal history.
The Last Man is not, as Steven Goldsmith argues, merely a return to history aimed
to counteract Percy Shelley’s natural supematuralism—his apocalypse of interior,
subjective transcendence. Rather, the novel illustrates how a certain concept of history
emerging in the Romantic period—one that sees its own perfection as the state of
reason—models itself, in terms of its effort at total mastery, after the same violence it
commits against ‘irrationality’ in its constitutive repudiation of femininity. Shelley’s
strategy is to allow the identification and prohibit the repudiation, essentially turning
totalizing and patriarchal history against itself, just as St Clare turns against her own
predictive powers in an effort to reintroduce possibility on the hither side of this suicidal
gesture. The Last Man does not offer a clear counter-narrative—does not aim to re-

182 As Robert Hollander notes, concerning the nature o f Farinata’s curse, “the present and near future are
not known by the sinners, only the time to come. Most [critics] believe that what he says applies to all the
damned” (183). In a sense, then, Shelley’s The Last Man represents a new version o f Dante’s Inferno as it
descends, like Aeneas in Dante’s model text, into a narrative o f the damned through the cave o f the Sybil.
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determine history according to its own ideology—but rather gestures toward a new,
temporalized understanding of the future through the infinite, absolute negation of a
cultural present (i.e., the early nineteenth century imagined, in its perfection, at the end of
the twenty first century) that has, through the expansion of scientific rationality,
attempted to claim absolute, demystified authority for itself. In other words, Shelley
protracts the moment of dialectical negation, not completing history in its incompletion—
she is not that cynical—so much as ‘incompleting’ completion or inverting totalization in
a manner that decouples history from rational narration, since such narratives must
ultimately be disabling.
If The Last Man does not offer any explicitly compensatory, comforting, or
completely positive narratives, this is because the greater danger seems to be that what
starts as a history of the repressed might turn, itself, into another repressive history. That
is, Shelley’s decision to avoid representing some kind of redemptive counter-history of
the future is designed to move through or beyond rational perfection in order to open the
way to a new concept o f the future itself. Rather than just another future thought within
the closure of what remains epistemically violent, The Last Man seems to envision what
Benjamin called a “real state of emergency” {Illuminations 257), a state of re-stating that,
as in Blake’s Milton, is ‘founded’ in self-annihilation. Thus the pandemic within the
future’s history functions as something like Bloch’s atheism in Christianity, as the force
of Exodus: just as an immanent atheism loosens the regressive and repressive bonds in all
re-ligion and opens the possibility for a concrete hope centred on worldly life without
merely replacing Christianity with a new doctrine, The Last Man is an heretical essay on
the concept of history that breaches or ex-poses history’s self-containment by taking
history to its extreme point of rationalization. In so doing, the text cannot offer a model
for re-containment. In fact, culture seems—with a relentlessness nearly equal to the
spread of pestilence—to spawn new universalisms that would enslave humanity under the
guise of rescue. In other words history, as rational narrative, reconceived by or at the
margins merely falls into the Jovian patterns of power it ostensibly transcends. This
seems clear in Shelley’s treatment of the impostor prophet. For this megalomaniac
illustrates what Kant called fanaticism: he serves to illustrate the danger of prematurely
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abandoning the negativity of the plague, the danger of installing new positivities—states
or historical narratives—before reason itself has been totally purged.
In the political and theological power-vacuum the plague creates, one man, a
“self-erected prophet,” founds his own sect and “enter[s] upon various schemes, by which
to acquire adherents and power” (273, 274). While this ‘prophet’ succeeds in deceiving
many, what is more important is that he never deceives himself, is never confused about
the selfishness of his motives. For his goal is to appropriate history, to stake a claim to
the future and indebt humanity—like Pepi in Valperga—if not to him personally, then to
the particular version of a patriarchal control he perpetuates. As Lionel writes,
If we had considered the preacher as sincere in a belief of his own
denunciations, or only moderately actuated by kind feeling in the exercise
of his assumed powers, we should have immediately addressed ourselves
to him, and endeavoured with our best arguments to soften and humanize
his views. But he was instigated by ambition, he desired to rule over these
last stragglers from the fold of death; his projects went so far, as to cause
him to calculate that, if, from these crushed remains, a few survived, so
that a new race should spring up, he, by holding tight the reins of belief,
might be remembered by the post-pestilential race as a patriarch, a
prophet, nay a deity, such as of old among the post-diluvians were Jupiter
the conqueror, Serapis the lawgiver, and Vishnou the preserver. These
ideas made him inflexible in his rule, and violent in his hate of any who
presumed to share with him his usurped empire. (281, my emphasis)
Not only does this episode suggest that history cannot be separated from the self-interest
of historical actors but it also subtly indicts prevailing beliefs in the benevolence of
transcendent justifications for the established, patriarchal concentrations of worldly
power and authority. History seems ever ready to adopt some form of what Blake, noted
above, called “Priesthood”: a form of social power that disguises the human will-topower with spurious appeals to transcendent agents. Hence, Shelley’s text steadily
undercuts all attempts to (re)appropriate history by one interest or another, even if that
means withholding any more positive (re)formulation of the history of the repressed. For
Shelley remains wary of the repressive implications inherent even in an effort of intended

281

liberation: to narrativize the marginal may not so much enable the marginal as submit
marginality to the strictures and repudiations of rational history, effectively regulating
that disadvantaged element all the more thoroughly through the very matrix of advocacy.
Ultimately, the imagination is the force behind attempts positively to
(re)formulate historical schemes—schemes that, as The Last Mari’s narrative framing
makes clear, are always forms of social and, specifically, sexual control. This positivity
works against the negativity of the plague. And yet, as suggested thus far, the plague’s
negativity represents the most powerful form of possibility and political revolution. The
plague functions by deconstructing the reason behind universal history and the Hegelian
state as the completion of that history. Utopian or positive visions of the political seem,
by contrast, always to fall into ideological traps that simply remain within the disabling
concept of history and the political whence Shelley would like to depart. The imagination
seems doomed circularly to perpetuate the limits within its own condition of possibility,
to imagine new scenarios only within the closure of Absolute Knowledge. Hence, in
contrast to its typical Romantic valorization, Shelley characterizes the imagination as, at
best, a deceptive irritation and, at worst, evil itself. As Morton Paley notes, “the nature of
imagination in The Last Man is teasing. It presents itself as a saviour only to be revealed
as a creator of phantasms” (113). For instance, Lionel’s “attempt to find salvation
through the imagination is ultimately no more successful” than his attempts to escape into
the theatre earlier in the text (Paley 113). In fact, Paley notes that most of the characters
in Shelley’s text “find imagination a torment” (113). Yet, a glance back to Valperga
would suggest that what Paley calls “the failure of imagination” (114) in The Last Man is
not in fact a failure at all. Rather, The Last Man reads Beatrice’s diatribe against the
imagination as a critique of ideology, redistributing her diatribe across the entire surface
of the narrative in the form of the plague: a thoroughly de-idealizing force. The Last Man
seems to turn Beatrice’s theory of the imagination as described in Valperga into a
narrative of defacement that defaces history itself.
In Valperga, the attack on imagination comes, appropriately enough, from the
character that “had inherited from her mother the most ardent imagination that ever
animated a human soul” (230). That is, in the course of her invective against Euthanasia’s
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belief in a benevolent God, Beatrice comes finally to the imagination, at the top of her
pantheon of existing evils:
And the imagination, that masterpiece of malice; that spreads honey on the
cup that you may drink poison; that strews roses over thorns, thorns sharp
and big as spears; that semblance of beauty which beckons you to the
desart [sic]; that apple of gold with the heart of ashes; that foul image,
with the veil of excellence; that mist of the maremma, glowing with
roseate hues beneath the sun, that creates it, and beautifies it, to destroy
you; that diadem of nettles; that spear, broken in the heart! He, the damned
and triumphant one, sat meditating many thousand years for the
conclusion, the consummation, the final crown, the seal of all misery,
which he might set on man’s brain and heart to doom him to endless
torment; and he created the Imagination. And then we are told the fault is
ours; good and evil are sown in our hearts, and ours is the tillage, ours the
harvest. (343)
This is a powerful condemnation coming from someone who has suffered actual torture.
The imagination does not merely fail here but works actively in the service of a
hypocritical and malevolent power. The imagination, in its perhaps laudable attempts to
diminish suffering or assert some sense of just Providence in otherwise thoroughly
depressing circumstances, is here cast as evil’s propagandist, a faculty that essentially
naturalizes and justifies the most foul aspects of reality. Imagination forms the attractive
covering that not only allows figures like Tripalda to elude detection and punishment but,
more broadly, promotes the erroneous belief in a perfectly coherent, rational universe.
From this perspective any dissent, any incoherence must be a privation or an accident
rather than a legitimate counterpoint. In fact, it is just such a belief that can call reason’s
own violence necessity. Indeed, like the interlocutors in the Book of Job—Bloch’s
centrepiece in his reading of the Bible’s immanent atheism—who insist on Job’s guilt on
grounds that he would not otherwise be subject to such brutality, so the imagination
becomes the apologist for unjustifiable violence. Indeed, this is why hope, Exodus, and
possibility must inhere in the present not as substantial or objective positivites. The
negativity of Shelley’s plague works to explode imagination’s apologetic rationale.
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Shelley’s aim is to purge history of its confident narrative coherence by revealing that
reason’s systematic exclusion of irrationality—the state’s foundational gesture in The
Last Man—or the imagination’s systematic obfuscation of violent repudiation relies on
the denial of inherent violence.
The Last Marts prophetic annihilation of history—its narrative against the
enlightenment narrative of historical progress—represents a vast expansion and
formalization of Beatrice’s concept of the imagination. In a sense, the text’s prophecy is
an assent to imagination’s tyranny, taking imagination to the point where it encounters
the unimaginable or the very conditions that would eliminate the possibility of
imaginative amelioration—that is, amelioration through imagination. As such, it is
necessary to adjust Paley’s distinction between imagination and prophecy. Paley argues
that, “countering the insufficient artistic imagination in Mary Shelley’s novel [i.e., The
Last Man] is the power of prophecy. Here as elsewhere the author’s theme is in direct
contrast to the politics and poetics of her late husband. There are no unacknowledged
legislators here, enlarging the sense of human community through their poems. Instead,
prophecy is seen as entirely divorced from human ends—impersonal, inexplicable” (115).
Paley assumes that imagination’s positivity is something Shelley seeks to recover through
the supplement of prophecy. It seems, however, that the prophecy itself figures the
limitation of the imagination. That is, the prophecy of total depopulation takes
imagination’s ameliorating and narrating power to the point that it cancels itself out. The
aim is thus not to use prophecy in order to restore imagination bur rather to journey to the
end of the imagination, to the end of a kind of ideology. Despite its affiliation with ideas
like freedom and liberation, the imagination in fact maintains the veil of ideology that
obscures the foundational sexual violence of even the most utopian state when that state
is conceived as the apex of Hegelian, dialectical history.
In an effort to gesture toward a more open kind of future—to gesture toward a
new, as yet unknown paradigm for historical thought—Shelley forces the imagination to
consider the unimaginable. Hence, while on the surface the narrative of The Last Man
appears to foreclose the future the effect of the text, thanks to the distance offered by the
framing narrative, is quite the opposite, opening toward a concept of the future, of
history, and of humanity that is ‘post-apocalyptic.’ As suggested earlier, in the context of
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Kierkegaard’s irony, prophecy is not just predictive but always also a form of negation
that suspends the same narrative it supplements. Under this ironic aspect, prophecy
revokes actuality and dissolves the status quo in light of something unprecedented. Such
prophecy, taken as an absolute preface to the future or as the power of beginning, does
not establish the future’s content. Thanks to the overlapping prophetesses—Evadne
within the narrative proper and the Sybil who constitutes the frame—Shelley’s text
speaks in the ambivalent, double, or syncopated voice of the Romantic prophet. For a
closer look at this prophetic overdetermination reveals, within the putatively smooth
progress of official history, a foundational instability, a contradictory and systemic
repudiation of irrationality in the form of femininity. Hence, what might appear to be a
depressing narrative that simply predicts an inevitable human catastrophe must be
understood, at the same time, as an effort to expose through parody the eventual goal of
progressive, dialectical forms of history that lead to the ‘enlightened,’ rational state.
Shelley’s prophetic mode deconstructs this dialectic of enlightenment.

285

W o r k s C it e d

Aeschylus. The Persians. Trans. Edith Hall. Warminster: Aris & Phillips, 1996.
—. Prometheus Bound. Trans. James Scully and C.J. Herington. London: Oxford, 1975.
Agamben, Giorgio. Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. Trans. Daniel HellerRoazen. California: Stanford UP, 1998.
Althusser, Louis. Essays in Self Criticism. Trans. Grahame Lock. London: Humanities
Press, 1976.
—. For Marx. Trans. Ben Brewster. London: New Left, 1977.
Althusser, Louis and Etienne Balibar. Reading Capital. Trans. Ben Brewster. London:
New Left, 1977.
Aristotle. The Basic Works o f Aristotle. Ed. Richard McKeon. New York: Modem
Library, 2001.
Augustine, St., Bishop of Hippo. Confessions. Trans. Maria Bouldings. New York:
Vintage, 1998.
Aylesworth, Gary. “Lyotard, Gadamer, and the Relation Between Ethics and Aesthetics.”
Lyotard: Politics, Philosophy, and the Sublime. Ed. Hugh Silverman. New York:
Routledge, 2002. 84-99.
Baker, Jennifer J. “Natural Science and Romanticisms.” ESQ: A Journal o f the American
Renaissance 53.4 (2007): 387-412.
Bakhtin, Mikhail. “Forms of Time and of the Chronotope in the Novel.” The Dialogic
Imagination: Four Essays. Trans. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist. Austin:
Texas UP, 1981.
Balfour, Ian. “The Future of Citation: Blake, Wordsworth, and the Rhetoric of Romantic
Prophecy.” Writing the Future. Ed. David Wood. London: Routledge, 1990. 115
28.
—. The Rhetoric o f Romantic Prophecy. Stanford: Stanford UP, 2002.
Barfoot, C.C. “‘Milton Silent Came Down my Path’: The Epiphany of Blake’s Left
Foot.” Moments o f Moment: Aspects o f the Literary Epiphany. Ed. Wim Tiggers.
Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1999. 61-84.
Bataille, Georges. Inner Experience. Trans. Leslie Anne Boldt. Albany: SUNY, 1988.

286

Benjamin, Walter. The Arcades Project. Trans. Howard Eiland and Kevin McLaughlin.
Cambridge: Belknap, 1999.
—. Illuminations: Essays and Reflections. Ed. Hannah Arendt. Trans. Harry Zohn New
York: Shocken, 1968.
—. “On the Concept of Criticism in German Romanticism.” Walter Benjamin: Selected
Writings Vol 1 1913-1926. Eds. Marcus Bullock and Michael W Jennings. Trans.
David Lachterman, Howard Eiland, and Ian Balfour. Cambridge: Belknap, 2004.
—. On the Origin o f German Tragic Drama. Trans. John Osborne. New York: Verso,
1998.
—. Reflections: Essays, Aphorisms, Autobiographical Writings. Ed. Peter Demetz. Trans.
Edmund Jephcott. New York: Shocken, 1986.
Bible: Authorized King James Version with Apocrypha. New York: Oxford UP, 1997.
Blake, William. The Poetry and Prose o f William Blake. Ed. David Erdman.New York:
Doubleday, 1970.
Blanchot, Maurice. The Book to Come. Trans. Charlotte Mandell. Stanford: Stanford UP,
2003
—. The Infinite Conversation. Trans. Susan Hanson. Minneapolis: Minnesota UP, 1993.
—. The Step Not Beyond. Trans. Lycette Neilson. Albany: SUNY, 1992.
—. The Work o f Fire. Trans. Charlotte Mandell. Stanford: Stanford UP, 1995.
—. The Writing o f the Disaster. Trans Ann Smock. Lincoln: Nebraska UP, 1995.
Bloch, Ernst. Atheism in Christianity: Religion o f the Exodus and the Kingdom. Trans.
J.T. Swann. New York: Herder and Herder, 1972.
—. The Principle o f Hope. Vol 1. Trans. Neville Plaice, Stephen Plaice, and Paul Knight.
Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986.
Bloom, Harold. Geoffrey Hartman and Harold Bloom: Two Interviews. Laura Quinney.
Romantic Circles Praxis Series, http://www.rc.umd.edu/praxis/bloom hartman/
bloom/ bloom.html. Accessed 22/06/2010.
Bracher, Mark. Being fo rm ’d ’: Thinking Through Blake’s Milton. Barrytown: Station
Hill, 1985.
Burgess, Andrew J. “The Upbuilding in the Irony of Kierkegaard’s The Concept o f
Irony." The Concept o f Irony: International Kierkegaard Comentary. Ed. Robert

287

L Perkins. Macon: Mercer UP, 2001.
Byron, George Gordon. Byron's Letters and Journals. 9 vols. Ed. Leslie A. Marchand.
London: J. Murray, 1973-79.
—. The Complete Poetical Works. 7. vols. Ed. Jerome McGann. Oxford: Clarendon,
1980-93.
Caruth, Cathy. Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, Narrative, and History. Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins UP, 1994.
Cass, Jeffery. “Irish Girls Gone Wild: Glenarvon, Regency Hypocrisy, and Spartan
Virtue.” The CEA Critic 68.1-2 (Fall 2005-Winter 2006).
Chandler, James. England in 1819: The Politics o f Literary Culture and the Case o f
Romantic Historicism. Chicago: Chicago UP, 1998.
Chase, Cynthia. Decomposing Figures: Rhetorical Readings in the Romantic Tradition.
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1986.
Chew, Samuel C. Byron in England: His Fame and After-Fame. London: Longmans,
1924.
Clubbe, John. “Glenarvon Revised—and Revisited.” Wordsworth Circle 10 (1979): 205
17.
Coleridge, Samuel Taylor. Biographia Literaria. Ed. George Watson. London:
Everyman, 1991.
Collings, David. Monstrous Society: Reciprocity, Discipline, and the Political Uncanny,
c. 1780-1848. Lewisburg: Bucknell UP, 2009.
—. Wordsworthian Errancies: The Poetics o f Cultural Dismemberment. Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins UP, 1994.
Dante. Inferno. Trans Robert and Jean Hollander. New York: Doubleday, 2000.
Danto, Arthur. Narration and Knowledge. New York: Columbia UP, 1985.
Davies, Hugh Sykes. “Wordsworth and the Empirical Philosophers.” The English Mind:
Studies in the English Moralists Presented to Basil Willey. Ed. Hugh Sykes
Davies and George Watson. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1964. 153-74.
Deen, Leonard. Conversing in Paradise: Poetic Genius and Identity-as-Community in
Blake’s Los. Columbia: Missouri UP, 1983.
De Man, Paul. Allegories o f Reading: Figural Language in Rousseau, Nietzsche, Rilke,

288

and Proust. New Haven: Yale UP, 1979.
—. Blindness and Insight: Essays in the Rhetoric o f Contemporary Criticism. New York:
Oxford UP, 1971.
—. The Resistance to Theory. Minneapolis: Minnesota UP, 1997.
—. The Rhetoric o f Romanticism. New York: Columbia UP, 1984.
—. “Wordsworth and Holdemin.” Romanticism and Contemporary Criticism: The Gauss
Seminar and Other Papers. Eds. E.S. Burt, Kevin Newmark, and Andrzej
Warminski. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1993.
De Quincey, Thomas. On Wordsworth’s ‘There was a boy. ’ Romanticism: An
Anthology. 2nd ed. Ed. Duncan Wu. Oxford: Blackwell, 1998.
Derrida, Jacques. Given Time. I, Counterfeit Money. Trans. Peggy Kamuf. Chicago:
Chicago UP, 1992.
Dickson, Leigh. “Authority and Legitimacy: The Cultural Context of Lady Caroline
Lamb’s Novels.” Women’s Writings. 13.3 (October 2006): 369-91.
Eichner, Hans. “The Rise of Modem Science and the Genesis of Romanticism.” PMLA
97 (1982): 8-30.
Elliott, Marianne. Wolfe Tone: Prophet o f Irish Independence. New Haven: Yale UP,
1989.
Fenves, Peter. A Peculiar Fate: Metaphysics and World-History in Kant. Ithaca: Cornell
UP, 1991.
Ferris, David. Silent Urns: Romanticism, Hellenism, Modernity. Stanford: Stanford UP,
2000.
Foshay, Toby. “Introduction: Denegation and Resentment.” Derrida and Negative
Theology. Eds. Harold Coward and Toby Foshay. Albany: SUNY, 1992. 1-24.
Foucault, Michel. The Order o f Things: An Archaeology o f the Human Sciences. New
York: Vintage, 1973.
Fox, Susan. Poetic Form in Blake’s Milton. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1976.
Franks, James. Memoirs o f pretended prophets, Who have appeared in different ages o f
the World, and especially in modern Times; Pointing Out, from Authentic
Sources, their Blunders, and the Pernicious Consequences o f their Pretensions:
With An Examination o f some o f the most Remarkable and best attested Modern

289

Predictions, Shewing that no inference can be Deduced From them in Favor o f
the Recent Existence o f a Prophetic Spirit. By a Clergyman. London: J. Johnson,
1795.
Freud, Sigmund. Beyond the Pleasure Principle. The Standard Edition o f the Complete
Psychological Works o f Sigmund Freud. Vol. XVIII. (1920-1922). Ed/Trans.
James Strachey. London: Hogarth, 1955.
Gasche, Rodolphe. The Wild Card o f Reading: On Paul de Man. Cambridge: Harvard
UP, 1998.
Gay, Peter. The Enlightenment: The Science o f Freedom. New York: WW Norton, 1996.
Gibbon, Edward. The History o f the Decline and Fall o f the Roman Empire. 10 Vols.
London: W. Allason, 1823.
Godwin, William. “Of History and Romance.” Things as They Are; Or, The Adventures
o f Caleb Williams. Eds. Gary Handwerk and A. A. Markley. Peterborough:
Broadview, 2000.
Godzich, Wald. “Introduction.” Resistance to Theory. Minneapolis: Minnesota UP, 1997.
Goldsmith, Steven. Unbuilding Jerusalem: Apocalypse and Romantic Representation.
Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1993.
Guthrie, W.K.C. Greek Philosophers from Thales To Aristotle. London: Methuen, 1967.
Guyer, Paul. “Introduction.” Kant’s Critique o f the Power o f Judgement: Critical Essays.
Ed. Paul Guyer. Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003.
Hall, Ronald L. “The Irony of Irony.” The Concept o f Irony: International Kierkegaard
Commentary. Ed. Robert L. Perkins. Macon: Mercer UP, 2001.
Hartman, Geoffrey. Criticism in the Wilderness: The Study o f Literature Today. New
Haven: Yale UP, 1980.
—. “Looking Back on Paul de Man.” Reading de Man Reading. Eds. Lindsay Waters and
Wald Godzich. Minneapolis: Minnesota UP, 1989.
—. The Unremarkable Wordsworth. Minnesota: Minnesota UP, 1987.
—. Wordsworth’s Poetry: 1787-1814. New Haven: Yale UP, 1964.
Hegel, G.W.F. Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art. 2 vols. Trans. T.M. Knox. Oxford:
Clarendon, 1975.
—. Hegel’s Philosophy o f Right. Trans. T.M. Knox. Oxford: Clarendon, 1942.

290

—. Hegel’s Science o f Logic. Trans. A.V. Miller. New Jersey: Humanities Press
International, 1989.
—. The Phenomenology o f Spirit. Trans. A.V. Miller. Oxford: Clarendon, 1977.
Heidegger, Martin. Being and Time. Trans. Joan Stambaugh. Albany: SUNY, 1996.
Herder, J.G. The Spirit o f Hebrew Poetry. Trans. James Marsh. Burlington: Edward
Smith, 1833.
Hertz, Neil. “Lurid Figures.” Reading de Man Reading. Eds. Lindsay Waters and Wald
Godzich. Minneapolis: Minnesota UP, 1989. 82-104.
Hildebrand, Fredrick. uEpipyschidion,s Cosmic Collision: A Controlling Metaphor.” The
Keats-Shelley Journal. 37 (1988): 75-90.
Hill, Leslie. Blanchot: Extreme Contemporary. New York: Routledge, 1997.
Hogle, Jerrold E. Shelley’s Process: Radical Transference and the Development o f His
Major Works. New York: Oxford UP, 1988.
Jameson, Fredric. The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act.
Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1981.
Josipovici, Gabriel. The Book o f God: A Response to the Bible. New Haven: Yale UP,
1988.
Kant, Immanuel. The Conflict o f the Faculties. Trans. Mary J. Gregor. New York: Abaris,
1979.
—. Critique o f the Power o f Judgement. Trans. Paul Guyer and Eric Mathews. New
York: Cambridge UP, 2000.
—. To Perpetual Peace and Other Essays. Trans. Ted Humphery. Indianapolis: Hackett,
1983.
Keach, William. Shelley’s Style. New York: Methuen, 1984.
Keats, John. Selected Letters. Ed. John Mee. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2002.
Kelly, Gary. “The Last Man and Masculine History: Between the Revolutionary
Aftermath and the Founding of the Modem Liberal State.” Virtually Dead? Mary
Shelley’s The Last Man. Romantic Circles (1997) http://www.rc.umd.edu/villa/
vc97/k ellv.html. Accessed 22/06/2010. n. pag.
Kierkegaard, Soren. The Concept o f Irony. Trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong.
Princeton: Princeton UP, 1989.

291

—. Philosophical Fragments. Trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong. Princeton:
Princeton UP, 1985.
—. Prefaces; Writing Sampler. Trans. Todd Nichol. Princeton: Princeton UP,1997.
Kipperman, Mark. “History and Ideality: The Politics of Shelley’s Hellas.” Studies in
Romanticism. 30 (1991): 147-68
Kneale, J. Douglass. Monumental Writing: Aspects o f Rhetoric in Wordsworth’s Poetry.
Lincoln: Nebraska UP, 1988.
Kojève, Alexander. Introduction to the Reading o f Hegel. Ed. Allan Bloom. Trans. James
H. Nichols, Jr. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1969.
Kompridis, Nikolas. “The Idea of a New Beginning: A Romantic Source of Normativity
and Freedom.” Philosophical Romanticism. Ed. Nikolas Kompridis. New York:
Routledge, 2006. 32-59.
Koselleck, Reinhart. Futures Past: On the Semantics o f Historical Time. Trans. Keith
Tribe. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1985.
Kucich, Greg. “The Last Man and the New History.” Virtually Dead? Mary Shelley’s The
Last Man. Romantic Circles ( 1997) http://www.rc.umd.edu/villa/vc97/kucich
.html. Accessed 22/06/2010. n. pag.
Lamb, Caroline. Glenarvon. The Works o f Lady Caroline Lamb. Vol 1. Eds. Leigh W.
Dickson and Paul Douglass. London: Pickering & Chatto, 2009.
Lentricchia, Frank. Criticism and Social Change. Chicago: Chicago UP, 1983.
Liu, Alan. Wordsworth, The Sense o f History. Stanford: Stanford UP, 1989.
Locke, John. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Ed. Peter H. Nidditch.
Oxford: Clarendon, 1975
Lyotard, Jean-Francois. The Différend: Phrases in Dispute. Trans. Georges Van Den
Abbeele. Minneapolis: Minnesota UP, 1988.
—. Enthusiasm: The Kantian Critique o f History. Trans. Georgess van den Abbeele.
Stanford: Stanford UP, 2009.
—. “The Sign of History.” Post-Structuralism and the Question o f History. Eds. Derek
Abridge, Geoff Bennington, and Robert Young. Cambridge: Cambridge UP,
1987. 162-82.
MacLean, Gerald M. Time’s Witness: Historical Representation in English Poetry, 1603-

292

1660. Madison: WisconsonUP, 1990.
Mandelbaum, Allen. “Notes.” The Divine Comedy o f Dante Alighieri: Inferno. New
York: Bantam, 2004.
Marion, Jean-Luc. The Idol and Distance: Five Studies. Trans. Thomas A Carlson. New
York: Fordham UP, 2001.
Matthews, Samantha. Poetical Remains: Poets ’ Graves, Bodies, and Books in the
Nineteenth Century. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2004.
Mellor, Anne. “Response to ‘The Last Man and the New History.’” Virtually Dead?
MaryShelley’s The Last Man. Romantic Circles (1997) http://www.rc.umd.edu
/villa/ vc97/mellor.html. Accessed 22/06/2010. n. pag.
McDayter, Ghislaine. “Hysterically Speaking: Lady Caroline Lamb’s Glenarvon.”
RomanticGenerations: Essays in Honor o f Robert F. Gleckner. Eds. Ghislaine
McDayter; Guinn Batten; and Barry Milligan. Lewisburg: Bucknell UP, 2001.
155-77.
McGann, Jerome. “The Secrets of an Elder Day: Shelley after Hellas?' The Keats-Shelley
Journal. 15 (1966): 25-41
Mee, Jon. Romanticism, Enthusiasm, and Regulation: Poetics and the Policing o f Culture
in the Romantic Period. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2003.
Meinecke, Friedrich. Historism: The Rise o f a New Historical Outlook. Trans. J.E.
Anderson. London: Routledge, 1972.
Milton, John. Complete Poetry and Major Prose. Ed Merritt Y. Hughes. Indianapolis:
Hackett, 1957
—. The John Milton Reading Room, http://www.dartmouth.edu/~milton/reading room/.
Accessed 21/6/10.
Mole, Tom. Byron’s Romantic Celebrity: Industrial Culture and the Hermeneutic o f
Intimacy. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.
Morrison, J.S. “The Germanic World.” Oracles and Divination. Eds. Michael Loewe and
Carmen Blacker. New York: Random House, 1981.
Nancy, Jean-Luc. The Ground o f the Image. Trans. Jeff Fort. New York: Fordham UP,
2005.
Nancy, Jean-Luc and Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe. The Literary Absolute: The Theory o f

293

Literature in German Romanticism. Trans. Philip Barnard and Cheryl Lester.
Albany: SUNY, 1988.
Nietzsche, Friedrich. The Use and Abuse o f History. Trans. Adrian Collins. 2nd ed.
Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1957.
Nichol, Todd. “Introduction.” Prefaces; Writing Sampler. Trans. ToddNichol. Princeton:
Princeton UP, 1997.
O’Sullivan, Barbara Jane. “Beatrice in Valperga: A New Cassandra.” The Other Mary
Shelley: Beyond Frankenstein. Eds. Audrey A. Fisch, Anne K. Mellor, and Esther
H. Schor. New York: Oxford UP, 1993. 140-58.
Paley, Morton. “Apocalypse Without Millennium.” The Other Mary Shelley: Beyond
Frankenstein. Eds. Audrey A. Fisch, Anne K. Mellor, and Esther H. Schor. New
York: Oxford UP, 1993. 107-23.
Parke, H.W. Sibyls and Sibylline Prophecy in Classical Antiquity. London: Routledge,
1988.
Patocka, Jan. Heretical Essays in the Philosophy o f History. Ed. James Dodd. Trans
Erazim Kohak. Chicago: Open Court, 1996.
Pfau, Thomas. Wordsworth’s Profession: Form, Class, and the Logic o f Early Romantic
Cultural Production. Stanford: Stanford UP, 1997.
Plotz, John. Portable Property: Victorian Culture on the Move. Princeton: Princeton UP,
2008.
Popper, Karl. The Poverty o f Historicism. 2nd ed. New York: Basic Books, 1960.
Rajan, Tilottama. “(Dis)Figuring the System: Vision, History, and Trauma in Blake’s
Lambeth Books.” Huntington Library Quarterly. 58.3-4 (1996): 383-411.
—. “Introduction.” Valperga, or, The life and adventures o f Castruccio, Prince o f Lucca.
Peterborough: Broadview, 1998.
—. “Spirit’s Psychoanalysis: Natural History, the History of Nature, and Romantic
Historiography.” ERR 14.2 (2003): 187-96.
—. The Supplement o f Reading: Figures o f Understanding in Romantic Theory and
Practice. Ithaca: Cornell, 1990.
Robertson, William. The history o f the reign o f Charles the Fifth, Emperor o f Germany. :
and o f all the kingdoms and states in Europe, during his age. : To which is

294

prefixed, a view o f the progress o f society in Europe, from the subversion o f the
Roman Empire, to the beginning o f the sixteenth century. : Confirmed by
historical proofs and illustrations. : In three volumes. Philadelphia: Robert Bell,
1770-71.
Roston, Murray. Prophet and Poet: The Bible and the Growth o f Romanticism. Evanston:
Northwestern UP, 1965.
Scanlon, Larry. Narrative, Authority, and Power: The Medieval Exemplum and the
Chaucerian Tradition. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1994.
Shakespeare, William. The Arden Shakespeare Complete Works. Ed Richard Proudfoot et
al. London: Thomas Neilson and Sons, 1998.
Shelley, Mary. The Last Man. Ed. Hugh J. Luke, Jr. Lincoln: Nebraska UP, 1965.
—. Valperga: Or, The Life and Adventures o f Castruccio, Prince o f Lucca. Ed. Tilottama
Rajan. Peterborough: Broadview, 1998.
Shelley, P.B. The Complete Works o f Percy Bysshe Shelley. 10 vols. Eds. Rodger Ingpen
and Walter E Peck. London: Ernest Benn, 1926-30.
—. Shelley’s Poetry and Prose. Eds. Donald H. Reiman and Neil Fraistat. New York:
Norton, 2002.
—. The Wandering Jew; Or, The Victim o f the Eternal Avenger. The Complete Poetry
o f Percy Bysshe Shelley. 2 vols. Eds. Donald H. Reiman and Neil Fraistat.
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 2000.
Snow, Dale. Schelling and the End o f Idealism. Albany: SUNY, 1996.
Taylor, Peter Alan. “Providence and the Moment in Blake’s Milton.” Blake Studies 4.1
(1971): 43-60.
Thulstrup, Niels. Kierkegaard’s Relation to Hegel. Trans. George L. Stengren. New
Jersey: Princeton UP, 1980.
Tribe, Keith. “Introduction.” Futures Past: On the Semantics o f Historical Time
Cambridge: MIT Press, 1985.
Ulmer, William. “Hellas and the Historical Uncanny.” ELH 58.3 (1991): 611-32.
—. “The Politics of Metaphor in Shelley’s EpipsychidionC Journal o f English and
German Philology 78 (1988): 535-57.
Underwood, Ted. “Historical Difference as Immortality in the Mid-Nineteenth-Century

295

Novel.” MLQ 63.4 (2002): 441-69.
—. “Romantic Historicism and the Afterlife.” PMLA 117.2 (2002): 237-51.
—. “Stories of Parallel Lives and the Status Anxieties of Contemporary Historicism.”
Representations 85 (2004): 1-20.
van den Abbeele, Georgess. “Introduction.” Enthusiasm: The Kantian Critique o f
History. Stanford: Stanford UP, 2009.
Vardy, Allan. Romantic Ethics. PhD Dissertation. University of Washington, 1997.
Veyne, Paul. Writing History: Essays on Epistemology. Middletown: Wesleyan UP,
1984.
Wang, Orran. Fantastic Modernity. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1996.
Waszink, J.H. “Vergil and the Sibyl of Cumae.” Mnemosyne, Fourth Series, 1.1 (1948):
43-58
Weiskel, Thomas. The Romantic Sublime: Studies in the Structure and Psychology o f
Transcendence. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1976.
White, Hayden. Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe.
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1973.
Wirth, Jason. “Introduction.” ./Iges o f the World (1815). Albany: SUNY, 2000.
Woodman, Ross. The Apocalyptic Vision in the Poetry o f Shelley. Toronto: Toronto UP,
1964.
Wordsworth, William. Essays upon Epitaphs. The Prose Works o f William
Wordsworth. 3 vols. Ed. Alexander B. Grosart. New York: AMS Press, 1967.
—. “Home at Grasmere.” Ed. Beth Darlington. Cornell UP, 1977.
—. “Mutability.” Sonnet Series and Itinerary Poems, 1820-1845. Ed. Geoffrey Jackson.
Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2004. 197.
—. The Prelude. Eds. Jonathan Wordsworth, M.H. Abrams, and Stephen Gill. New York:
Norton, 1975.
Zizek, Slavoj. The Puppet and the Dwarf: The Perverse Core o f Christianity. Cambridge:
MIT Press, 2003.
—. The Sublime Object o f Ideology. New York: Verso, 1989.

